1

2026:CGHC:541

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA No. 161 of 2018

1 - Haseena Begum W/o Shri Abhul Razzak Aged About 56 Years R/o Bhoi

Para, Near Panch Path Chowk, Brahmanpara Ward, Raipur, Tehsil And District

Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

2 - Abdul Razzak (Died Through Lrs)- As Per Honble Court Order Dated 25-04-

2025.

2.1 - Abbas Ahmed S/o Late Abdul Razzak Aged About 44 Years R/o 298

Brahmanpara Panchpath Chowk, Brahmanpara Raipur, 492001.

2.2 - Abrar Ahmed S/o Late Abdul Razzak Aged About 41 Years R/o 298

Brahmanpara Panchpath Chowk, Brahmanpara Raipur, 492001.

2.3 - Roobina Khatun W/o Shamsher Khan Aged About 38 Years Ward No. 12,

Pandatarai, Kawardha Chhattisgarh.

2.4 - Safiya Khan W/o Mohammad Amir Khan Aged About 34 Years R/o H. No.

481 Ward No. 60 Pension Para Katul Board, Vtc Saf Lines Bhilai, Durg C.G.

2.5 - Rajiya Khatun C/o Ayazuddin Qureshi Aged About 38 Years R/o 2254 Ward

No. 44 Panchpath Chowk, Bramhanpara, Raipur, C.G.

.... Appellants/Defendants No.1 & 2

versus

1 - Ramavatar Agrawal S/o Late Shri Somchand Agrawal Aged About 63 Years

R/o Ashwini Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Plaintiff),

District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ...Plaintiff

2 - Smt. Pamatmi Bai W/o Late Somchand Agrawal Aged About 73 Years R/o

-2-

Ashwini Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur,

Chhattisgarh

3 - Rajaram Agrawal S/o Late Somchand Agrawal Aged About 58 Years R/o

Ashwini Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur,

Chhattisgarh

4 - Hemraj Agrawal S/o Late Shri Somchand Agrawal Aged About 48 Years R/o

Ashwini Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur,

Chhattisgarh

5 - Smt. Radha Bai W/o Shri Nandkishor Agrawal Aged About 53 Years R/o Near

Government School, Raipura, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur,

Chhattisgarh

6 - Smt. Uma Bai W/o Shri Naresh Prasad Sarawgi Aged About 49 Years R/o

Tatibandh, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

7 - Smt. Rama Bai W/o Shri Anil Agrawal Aged About 38 Years R/o Ashwini

Nagar, Mahadev Ghat Road, Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Defendant No. 3 To 8),

District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents

For Appellants/Defendants No.1 & 2 : Mrs.Fouzia Mirza,

Senior Advocate along with Ms.

Rashika Soni, Advocate

For Respondent No.1/Plaintiff: Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Senior Advocate

along with Ms. Preeti Yadav,

Advocate

For other respondents : None appears though served

Date of Hearing : 26.11.2025

Date of Judgment : 06.01.2026

Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey

CAV JUDGMENT

3

1.Heard.

2.Initially, this appeal was preferred by defendants No.1 & 2, but during

the pendency of this first appeal, defendant No.2, namely, Abdul

Razzak, died, and his name was deleted, and his legal

representatives were brought on record.

3.The defendants have filed this appeal under Section 96 of the CPC,

challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sixth

Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Suit No.53A/2013, whereby

the suit filed by the plaintiff for partition, possession, and mesne

profit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 29.11.2017. The

plaintiff/respondent No.1 is the son of the late Somchand Agrawal.

Somchand Agrawal died on 03.11.1984. A Civil Suit No.151-A/1965

was filed by Somchand Agrawal for specific performance of contract

with respect to the suit house Nos. 13/631 & 13/632 situated at

Village Bramhanpara, Raipur. The said suit was decreed by the

learned Second Civil Judge Class II, Raipur, vide judgment and

decree dated 14.12.1967. Chhedi @ Salarbux was defendant No.1,

who had entered into a sale agreement with the late Somchand

Agrawal. The sale deed was executed on 11.03.1991 by the learned

Trial Court according to provisions of Order 21 Rule 34 of CPC in

favour of Ramavatar Agrawal, S/o Late Somchand Agrawal, who is

respondent No.1 herein. As per the records, the execution

application was moved on 29.07.1988 pursuant to the judgment and

decree passed by the learned Trial Court in favor of the late

-4-

Somchand Agrawal, whereby he was held the owner of 33/40 share

of the suit property. During the pendency of the execution

proceedings, one Budhobai raised an objection on 16.02.1996 in

execution proceedings to the effect that the suit property is joint

family property and possession cannot be handed over to the plaintiff

in the absence of partition of the property. Thereafter, Abdul Razzak

and Haseena Begum raised an objection before the learned

Executing Court, and their objection was rejected vide order dated

27.07.2010. Against the said order, WP(227) No.6006/2010 was filed

by Abdul Razzak and another, whereby a direction was issued to the

learned Executing Court to conclude the execution proceedings in

accordance with law so far as the delivery of possession is

concerned. Against the order dated 28.02.2011, Review Petition

No.107 of 2011 was filed by the plaintiff Ram Awatar Agrawal which

was dismissed vide order dated 03.02.2012 reserving liberty in his

favour to institute a suit for partition of the property. Thereafter, Ram

Awtar Agrawal/plaintiff filed a suit for partition, possession, and

mesne profit on 21.06.2013.

4.Defendants No.1 & 2 filed their written statement and denied the

plaint averments. They pleaded that the suit property was purchased

by Abdul Razzak from one Khwaza Hussain through a registered

sale deed dated 07.09.1957 for a sale consideration of Rs.700/-. It

was also pleaded that defendant No.2, Abdul Razzak, was not

impleaded as a party in earlier proceedings.

5

5.Learned Trial Court framed issues, the parties led evidence and

thereafter the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated

29.11.2017.

6.Mrs. Mirza, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, would

submit that the suit filed by late Somchand Agrawal for specific

performance of the contract pertaining to the suit house was decreed

vide judgment and decree dated 14.12.1967, wherein the original

plaintiff was held entitled to get 33/40th share of title and interest in

the suit house. Mrs. Mirza would further submit that a sale deed was

executed in favour of the original plaintiff by the learned Trial Court

on 07.12.1968, and this fact has not been disclosed by the plaintiff in

the plaint. She would also submit that the appellants have placed on

record the certified copy of the order passed by the learned Civil

Judge Class II, Raipur, dated 07.12.1968, along with an application

under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. She would contend that in the

plaint, the original plaintiff sought relief for possession of the property

and failed to seek relief of partition. She would further contend that

no relief for partition was sought for by the original plaintiff; therefore,

the learned Trial Court erred in law while granting relief of partition,

which was not sought for. It is also contended that the suit filed by

the plaintiff for partition on 21.06.2013 was barred by limitation. It is

argued that any observation made by the High Court would not

extend the period of limitation. She would further argue that the

original plaintiff was aware of the fact that the suit house is the joint

-6-

family property and in the absence of partition of the said property,

possession could not have been handed over. She would also argue

that for the first time, an objection was raised by Budhobai on

16.02.1996. She would state that again an objection was raised by

Abdul Razzak and Haseena Begum, and it was rejected on

27.07.2010. She would further state that the suit was filed on

23.06.2010, but no steps were taken by the plaintiff to file a suit for

partition. She would also state that the plaintiff suppressed the

material facts while filing the suit with regard to the order passed by

the learned Trial Court dated 07.12.1968, and again approached the

learned Executing Court for execution of the decree in the year

1988, with a delay of 20 years. She would contend that when the

said sale deed was executed in favour of late Somchand Agrawal in

the year 1968, there was no occasion for the learned Executing

Court to pass a fresh order for execution of the sale deed on

11.03.1991. She would further contend that a notice was issued to

the plaintiff to approach the Sub-Registrar for registration of sale

deed on 26.02.1985, thus, the plaintiff was aware of the fact that the

sale deed is not registered one but no steps were taken in this

regard and in the absence of registration of the sale deed, the suit

for partition was not maintainable according to the provisions of

Section 54, Order 20 Rule 18 and Order 21 Rule 34(6) of CPC. She

would submit that the learned Trial Court held that the cause of

action arose in favour of the plaintiff on 03.02.2012, whereby the

7

review petition filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, and liberty was

granted to file a suit for partition. It is argued that even the Courts

cannot extend the period of limitation. In support, she placed reliance

on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

matters of Ram Preet Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School and

Intermediate Education and Others, 2003 (8) SCC 311, Pathapati

Subba Reddy (died) by Lrs. and others Vs. the Special Deputy

Collector (LA), SLP (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, F. Liansanga &

another Vs. Union of India and others, 2022 Livelaw (SC) 252,

and, the judgment passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in the

matter of Menharan Vs. Ghanaram and others, 2014 (4) CGLJ

117.

7.On the other hand, Mr. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate appearing

for the plaintiff, would oppose the submissions made by Mrs. Mirza.

He would submit that though the sale deed was executed in favour

of late Somchand Agrawal on 07.12.1968 but its registration was

refused by the Sub-Registrar vide noting dated 30.07.1970. He

would further submit that after the death of Somchand Agrawal, his

legal representatives applied for a succession certificate. He would

also submit that though a notice was issued by the Sub-Registrar to

the plaintiff to appear in its office but in the absence of a succession

certificate, it was not possible for the Sub Registrar to execute a

registered sale deed in his favour. He would contend that an

execution application was moved on 29.07.1988 before the learned

-8-

Executing Court, wherein an objection was raised by defendants

No.1 & 2 for the first time on 23.06.2010. He would further contend

that the objection raised by defendants No.1 & 2 was rejected by the

learned Trial Court, and against the said order, WP(227)

No.6006/2010 was filed, which was dismissed vide order dated

28.02.2011. He would also contend that the review petition was filed

by the plaintiff, and it was dismissed reserving liberty in his favour to

institute a suit for partition vide order dated 03.02.2012, and

immediately, thereafter, a suit was filed. He would argue that as

liberty was granted by the High Court to institute a suit, the cause of

action arose on 03.02.2012, and the suit filed by the plaintiff was

within limitation. Mr. Agrawal would further argue that the sale deed

executed in his favour was registered on 11.03.1991 and therefore,

the contention made by Mrs. Mirza with regard to the applicability of

Section 54, Order 20 Rule 18 and Order 21 Rule 34(6) of CPC would

not arise. Mr. Agrawal would also argue that in the plaint, the plaintiff

had sought the relief of partition. He would further state that the relief

of possession includes partition. Mr. Agrawal would submit that the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan

Nair (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Padmanabha Pillai (dead) by Lrs. and

others, 2004 (12) SCC 754, has held that the period of limitation

would start to run from the date when liberty was granted by the High

Court to file a suit.

8.I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

9

perused the record.

9.The question for determination would be:-

(I) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation?

(II) Whether the learned Trial Court was justified in decreeing the

suit?

10.The admitted facts are that initially, the suit house was purchased

during the minority of Razzak Ahmed by his mother, Zubaida

Khatoon, from one Khwaja Hussain through a sale deed dated

07.09.1957. Thereafter, an agreement to sell the suit house was

entered into between Somchand Agarwal and Chedi Khan @ Salar

Bux on 08.12.1957. Chedi Khan @ Salar Bux failed to execute the

sale deed; therefore, a suit for specific performance of the contract

was filed by late Somchand Agrawal bearing Civil Suit

No.151-A/1965 on 20.06.1960. The judgment and decree were

passed in favour of Somchand Agarwal on 14.12.1967 by the

learned Second Civil Judge, Raipur. An application for execution

was moved by the original plaintiff, and a sale deed was executed

on 07.12.1968 by the Executing Court according to the provisions of

Order 21 Rule 34 of CPC. There was one more legal dispute

amongst the defendants, and Second Appeal No.95/1961 was filed

by Budhobai before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which was

allowed vide judgment and decree dated 30.09.1964, wherein she

was held entitled to get 7/40th share of the suit house. Despite the

execution of the sale deed, the suit property could not be handed

-10-

over to the plaintiff, as there was no partition. The sale deed

executed on 07.12.1968 was presented for registration before the

Sub-Registrar but the said authority refused to register it. Somchand

Agarwal (original plaintiff) died on 03.11.1984. Thereafter, an

application was made by the plaintiff for a succession certificate,

which was granted vide order dated 22.11.1989. The plaintiff

Ramavatar Agarwal filed an application for execution of the decree

in the year 1988, and the sale deed was executed by the learned

Executing Court in his favour on 11.03.1991. It was registered

according to the Registration Act in the office of the Sub-Registrar,

Raipur.

11.An application under Order 21 Rule 29 of CPC was filed by the

judgment debtors/appellants herein on 16.03.1994. An objection was

raised by Budhobai on 16.02.1996 to the effect that the property is

the joint property, and she has the right over 7/40th share of the suit

house. An objection was raised by the judgment debtors/appellants

herein on 12.05.2010 under Order 21 Rule 35(2) of the CPC, and it

was rejected by the learned Executing Court vide order dated

27.07.2010. The appellants herein filed WP227 No.6006/2010,

which was disposed of vide order dated 28.02.2011, and a direction

was issued to the learned Executing Court to conclude the execution

proceedings in accordance with the law so far as the delivery of

possession is concerned.

11

12.The plaintiff Ramavatar Agarwal filed a review application, and it was

dismissed vide order dated 03.02.2012 but at the same time, the

High Court granted liberty to the plaintiff to file a suit seeking

partition of the suit property.

13.The plaintiff filed a suit bearing registration No. 53A/2013 on

22.06.2013 and claimed 33/40th share in the suit property along with

possession and mesne profit. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit

vide judgment and decree dated 29.11.2017.

14.So far as the argument advanced by Mrs. Mirza with regard to

suppression of material facts is concerned, it is evident from the

record that the decree was passed in Civil Suit No.151A/1965 on

14.12.1967 and thereafter, a sale deed was executed according to

the provisions of Order 21 Rule 34 of CPC on 07.12.1968 but the

Sub-Registrar refused to register the sale deed. The plaintiff herein

obtained a succession certificate and thereafter approached the

learned Executing Court for execution of the decree, and in that

proceeding, again a sale deed was executed, and it was registered.

The appellants herein have placed on record the sale deed executed

by the learned Executing Court on 07.12.1968 but the registration

was refused by the Sub-Registrar and this fact is evident from back-

leaf of said document. Later on, the father of the plaintiff namely,

Somchand Agarwal died on 03.11.1984 and the plaintiff approached

the competent Civil Court to get a succession certificate. He filed the

execution case in the year 1988, and subsequently, the sale deed

-12-

was executed in his favour on 11.03.1991 and the plaintiff has

explained the subsequent events in the plaint. On the conspectus of

the above-discussed facts and circumstances, the application

moved by the appellants herein under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC is

allowed, and the document is taken on record, but the said

document would not help the appellants in any manner.

15.In the matter of Ram Preet Yadav (supra), it is held that once fraud

is proved, it will deprive the person of all advantages or benefits

obtained thereby, and a delay in the detection of or in taking action

will raise no equities. In the present case, the appellants herein

could not prove that the suppression of earlier execution of the sale

deed was deliberate or that it would extend any benefit in favour of

the plaintiff; therefore, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the instant matter would not apply.

16.It was next argued that the plaintiff filed a suit for partition,

possession, and mesne profit, but in the relief clause, he failed to

claim partition; therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the

learned Trial Court is liable to be set aside.

17.A perusal of the plaint would show that the plaintiff filed a suit for

partition, possession, and mesne profit. The plaintiff pleaded that

pursuant to the decree dated 14.12.1967, the original plaintiff was

entitled to get 33/40th share of the property. In the relief clause, the

plaintiff has specifically sought possession of 33/40th share of the

13

property; thus, the plaintiff has sought relief for partition as well as

possession, and the contention made by Mrs. Mirza appears to be

misconceived.

18.It was next contended that the suit for partition was filed by the

plaintiff on 21.06.2013 and thus, it was barred by limitation. It is

further contended that any observation or liberty granted by the High

Court would not extend the period of limitation. Initially, the suit was

filed by the father of the plaintiff for specific performance of the

contract, and it was decreed on 14.12.1967. Ramavatar Agrawal

(plaintiff) moved an application for execution and in that proceeding,

the sale deed was executed in his favour according to the provisions

of Order 21 Rule 34 of CPC on 11.03.1991. The sale deed got

registered too. An objection was raised with regard to the

continuation of execution proceedings by Abdul Razzak and

Haseena Begum on the ground that the suit property is joint

property, and it was rejected on 27.07.2010. The said order was

challenged by the appellants herein by filing WP227 No.6006/2010,

and the High Court directed the Executing Court to continue with the

execution proceedings so far as it relates to the delivery of

possession. The plaintiff Ramavatar filed a review petition, which

was dismissed vide order dated 03.02.2012 but at the same time,

liberty was granted to file a suit for partition. Pursuant to the liberty

granted by the High Court, a suit for partition was filed on

22.06.2013. Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is the residuary

-14-

provision that sets a three-year limitation period to file a suit for

which no specific period is prescribed elsewhere in the Act. The

three-year period starts running from the moment the right to sue

accrues.

19.In the matter of F. Liansanga (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has held that the Court has no power to extend the period of

limitation on equitable grounds, even though the statutory provisions

may sometimes cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular

party.

20.In the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held that Section 3 of the Limitation Act states

that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after

the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even

though limitation has not been set up as a defence. Relevant paras

9,10, 12, 15 & 26 are reproduced herein below:-

“9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain

terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application

instituted, preferred or made after the period

prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed

even though limitation has not been set up as a

defence subject to the exceptions contained in

Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.

10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake

of convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow:

"3. Bar of limitation. (1) Subject to the provisions

contained in sections 4 (inclusive), every suit

instituted, appeal preferred, to 24 and application

made after the prescribed period shall be

dismissed, although limitation has not been set up

as a defence."

15

12. In view of the above provision, the appeal

which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation

is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word

'shall' in the aforesaid provision connotes that the

dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions.

Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be

given effect to even though no objection regarding

limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in

the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation

upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is

presented beyond limitation. This is the general

law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out

under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation

Act but we are concerned only with the exception

contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts

to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the

prescribed period provided the proposed appellant

gives 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal

within the period prescribed. In other words, the

courts are conferred with discretionary powers to

admit an appeal even after the expiry of the

prescribed period provided the proposed appellant

is able to establish 'sufficient cause' for not filing it

within time. The said power to condone the delay

or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of

time is discretionary in nature and may not be

exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based

upon host of other factors such as negligence,

failure to exercise due diligence etc.

15.It is in the light of the public policy upon which

law of limitation is based, the object behind the law

of limitation and the mandatory and the directory

nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation

Act that we have to examine and strike a balance

between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation

Act in the matters of condoning the delay.

26. On a harmonious consideration of the

provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid

down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that

there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the

right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been

exercised or availed of for a long time must come

to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of

time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be

-16-

construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be

construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has

to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though

liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or

cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind

but the same cannot be used to defeat the

substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3

of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to

condone the delay if sufficient cause had been

explained, but that exercise of power is

discretionary in nature and may not be exercised

even if sufficient cause is established for various

factors such as, where there is inordinate delay,

negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar

matter, it does not mean that others are also

entitled to the same benefit if the court is not

satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in

filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be

considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be

decided on the parameters laid down for

condoning the delay and condoning the delay for

the reason that the conditions have been imposed,

tantamounts to disregarding the statutory

provision.”

21.In the matter of Menharan (supra), the High Court of Chhattisgarh

held that in the absence of a specific Article governing the period of

limitation in filing the suit for partition, Article 113 of the Limitation Act

would be applicable, and the limitation would be three years when

the right to sue accrues to the party.

22.Mr. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, has placed reliance on the

judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of

Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair (supra), wherein it is held that

17

the period of limitation would start to run from the date when liberty

was granted by the High Court to file a suit. It reads thus:-

22. In our opinion, the suit filed in the present case

being a suit for partition primarily and predominantly

and the relief of redemption having been sought for

only pursuant to the direction made by the High

Court in its order of remand, the limitation for the suit

would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation

Act, 1908. For a suit for partition the starting point of

limitation is — when the right to sue accrues, that is,

when the plaintiff has notice of his entitlement to

partition being denied. In such a suit, the right of the

redeeming co-mortgagor would be to resist the claim

of non-redeeming co-mortgagor by pleading his right

of contribution and not to part with the property

unless the non-redeeming co-mortgagor had

discharged his duty to make contribution. This

equitable defence taken by the redeeming co-

mortgagor in the written statement would not convert

the suit into a suit for redemption filed by the non-

redeeming co-mortgagor.

23.Taking into consideration the fact that the objection raised by the

appellants herein was rejected by the learned Executing Court on

27.07.2010, and it was challenged by filing WP227 No.6006/2010,

which was dismissed vide order dated 28.02.2011. A review petition

was filed by the plaintiff Ramavatar Agrawal and it was dismissed

vide order dated 03.02.2012 but liberty was granted on 03.02.2012

and thus, from the date of rejection of the application moved by the

appellants herein dated 27.07.2010, the suit was filed within a period

of three years on 22.06.2013, thus, the suit was filed within the

period of three years from the date of objection. Further, liberty was

-18-

granted by the High Court to file a suit for partition.

24.Thus, in my opinion, the suit filed by the plaintiff for partition was

within the limitation. It was also argued that the sale deed was not

registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, whereas, in the absence

of registration of the sale deed, the suit for partition was not

maintainable according to the provisions of Section 54, Order 20

Rule 18, and Order 21 Rule 34(6) of CPC. During the course of

hearing, the learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the

State was directed to seek instruction with regard to the registration

of the sale deed and it was informed that the sale deed was

registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, thus, the contention made

by Mrs. Mirza with regard to the provisions of Section 54, and Order

21 Rule 34(6) of CPC appears to be misconceived.

25.The facts discussed above would reveal that the

defendants/appellants never challenged the judgment and decree

passed in Civil Suit No.151-A/1965 dated 14.12.1967, and it attained

finality. The learned Executing Court executed the sale deed in favor

of the plaintiff on 11.3.1991, and the said order was also not

challenged by the appellants herein. The liberty granted by the High

Court in Review Petition No.107 of 2011 was also not challenged by

the appellants. Therefore, the contentions made by Mrs. Fouzia

Mirza with regard to the delay in filing the suit cannot be accepted.

26.Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts, it is held that

19

the suit filed by the plaintiff was within limitation and the learned Trial

Court rightly decreed the suit.

27.Accordingly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s).

28.A decree be drawn accordingly.

Sd/-

(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)

Judge

Rekha