Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 31 OF 2013

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9190 of 2011)

Hema .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State, thr. Inspector of Police,

Madras .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1)Leave granted.

2)This appeal is directed against the final judgment and

common order dated 29.04.2011 passed by the Madurai

Bench of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.

37 of 2004 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal

filed by the appellant herein (A-5 therein) while confirming

the judgment dated 28.07.2004, passed by the Court of

Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai.

1

Page 2 3) Brief facts:

a)According to the prosecution, during the year 1992, the

appellant herein (A-5), along with other accused persons

(A-1 to A-4 therein) had entered into a criminal conspiracy to

cheat the Regional Passport Office, Trichy in order to obtain

passports on the basis of creating ante-dated passport

applications with duplicate file numbers, so as to make them

appear as old cases, accompanied by forged enclosures such

as police verification certificates etc. In pursuance of the

said conspiracy, A-2 being the Lower Division Clerk in the

Regional Passport Office, Trichy fraudulently received and

processed 42 forged passport applications filed by one

Goodluck Travels, Trichy run by A-3 with the assistance of A-

4 and A-5 (the appellant herein) and made false

endorsement of reference numbers, fee certifications etc.

and A-1, being the Superintendent of the Regional Passport

Office, Trichy, by abusing his official position, granted orders

for the issue of passports in respect of the said 42

applications.

2

Page 3 b)In pursuance of the same, on 09.02.1993, the District

Crime Branch at Ramanathapuram, Tamil Nadu received a

letter from Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), DCRB

Ramanad, containing a complaint given by the Passport

Officer, Trichy. On the basis of the same, a case was

registered by the District Crime Branch, Ramanad as

Criminal Case No. 1 of 1993 under Sections 419, 420, 465

and 467 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).

c)When the Inspector of Police, DCB, took up the

investigation, the CBI intervened and filed a First Information

Report being RC-21(A)/93 on 11.05.1973 under Section 120-

B read with Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (in short ‘the PC Act’). After

investigation, the case was committed to the Special Court

for CBI Cases, Madurai and numbered as CC No. 38 of 1996.

On 01.08.1996, the Special Court, framed charges under

Section 120-B of IPC against A-1 to A-5 and under Sections

420, 465 and 471 of IPC against the appellant herein (A-5)

and specific charges under Section 13(1)(d) read with

3

Page 4 Section 13(2) of the PC Act against A-1 and under Sections

420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC and under Section 13(1)(d)

read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act against A-2 and under

Sections 420, 465 and 471 of IPC against A-3.

d)By order dated 28.07.2004, the Principal Special Judge

convicted and sentenced A-1 to A-3 and A-5. In the present

appeal, we are concerned only with A-5 who was convicted

and sentenced to undergo RI for 2 years along with a fine of

Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for

each of the offences under Sections 120-B, 420 read with

Sections 511, 465 and 471 of IPC. (Total fine of Rs. 15,000/-).

e)Aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence,

the appellant herein filed Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 2004

before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. By

impugned order dated 29.04.2011, the High Court dismissed

the same along with other set of appeals filed in respect of

other accused and confirmed their conviction and sentence

awarded by the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the judgment

of the High Court, A-5 alone has preferred this appeal by way

of special leave before this Court.

4

Page 5 4)Heard Mr. S. Prabhakaran, learned counsel for the

appellant and Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor

General for the respondent-CBI.

Contentions:

5)Mr. S. Prabhakaran, learned counsel for the appellant,

after taking us through the entire materials including the

order of the trial Court and the High Court submitted that the

initial proceedings by the State Crime Branch and the

subsequent proceedings by the CBI cannot be permitted,

hence, the entire investigation is to be thrown out. In other

words, according to him, parallel proceedings by the State

Crime Branch and the CBI are not permissible. In addition to

the same, he submitted that the original seals and rubber

stamps have not been seized from the police officials and

those were not produced by the I.O. to prove that the seals

and stamps were forged. He further submitted that the

prosecution has failed to exhibit the FSL report with regard to

the impression of seals of M.Os 1 to 3 alleged to have been

recovered by the prosecution at the instance of A-3 despite

the same were being sent by Shri Madavanan (PW-30),

5

Page 6 Inspector of Police. According to him, the specimen

signatures of Shri Natarajan (PW-16), DSP, and R. Muniyandi

(PW-29), Sub-Inspector of Police, have not been sent to the

hand writing expert for his opinion. Further, the seal and

specimen signature of attesting officer, viz., Dr. Muthu (PW-

18) were not collected by the CBI to prove that the seal and

specimen signature were forged. There is no document or

indication found in Exh.P-3 to P-43 to show that they were

sent by M/s Goodluck Travels to the Passport Office at Trichy.

Finally, he submitted that inasmuch as the certificates issued

by the Village Administrative Officers that the applicants

were not the residents of the place mentioned in the

application form, their reports have no legal sanctity in the

absence of certification by the Tahsildar.

6)Mr. Rawal, learned ASG appearing for the CBI, met all

the contentions. He submitted that the claim that parallel

proceedings by the District Crime Branch (DCB) and the CBI,

though not urged before the trial Court, High Court and even

in the grounds of appeal, however, there is no legal basis for

such claim. Even otherwise, according to him, if there is any

6

Page 7 defect in the investigation, the accused cannot be acquitted

on this ground. By taking us through the evidence relied on

by the prosecution, findings by the trial Court and the High

Court, learned ASG submitted that in view of concurrent

decision of two courts, in the absence of any perversity,

interference by this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article

136 is not warranted.

Discussion:

7)With regard to the main objection as to parallel

proceedings as claimed by Mr. Prabhakaran, learned counsel

for the appellant, as stated earlier, this objection was not

raised either before the trial Court or before the High Court

and even in the grounds of appeal before this Court,

however, considering the fact that we are dealing with a

matter pertaining to criminal prosecution, we heard the

counsel on this aspect. He pointed out that the first FIR

dated 09.02.1993 was registered at the instance of the

complaint by Shri V.A. Britto, Passport Officer, Trichy. The

said FIR has been marked as Exh.P-214. He also pointed out

that the second FIR, at the instance of the Special Police

7

Page 8 Establishment, Madras Branch, was lodged on 11.05.1993

against three persons, namely, (1) P. Durai, Superintendent,

Passport Office, Trichy (2) P.M. Rajendran, LDC, Passport

Office, Trichy and (3) M/s Goodluck Travels, Thiruvadanai,

Ramanad District, Tamil Nadu. By taking us through the said

reports, particularly, the second FIR, the counsel for the

appellant has pointed out that the said report proceeds on

the basis of credible information from a reliable source. The

same was entertained and registered as R.C.No. 21(A)/93 by

S. Arulnadu, Inspector of Police, SPE:CBI:ACB:Madras. By

pointing out these details, it is contended by the counsel for

the appellant that the course adopted by the prosecution in

examining certain persons by the DCB, namely, the State

Police and the remaining persons by the CBI is not

permissible.

8)It is settled law that not only fair trial, but fair

investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed

under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, investigation must be fair, transparent and

judicious and it is the immediate requirement of rule of law.

8

Page 9 As observed by this Court in Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat

and Others, 2010 (12) SCC 254, the Investigating Officer

cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in a tainted

and biased manner. It was further observed that where non-

interference of the Court would ultimately result in failure of

justice, the Court must interfere. Though reliance was

placed on the above decision by the appellant, it is not in

dispute that in that case, the High Court has concluded by

giving detailed reasons that the investigation has been

totally one-sided based on malafide. Further, in that case,

the charge-sheets filed by the Investigating Agency in both

the cases were against the same set of accused. This was

not the situation in the case on hand. Though the State

Crime Branch initiated investigation, subsequently, the same

was taken over by the CBI considering the volume and

importance of the offence.

9)In this regard, Mr. Rawal, learned ASG by drawing our

attention to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Special Police

Establishment Act, 1946 submitted that the course adopted

by the CBI is, undoubtedly, within the ambit of the said Act

9

Page 10 and legally sustainable. Section 5 of the said Act speaks

about extension of powers and jurisdiction of special

establishment to other areas. Section 5 of the Act is relevant

for our purpose which reads as under:-

“5. Extension of powers and jurisdiction of special

police establishment to other areas .—(1) The Central

Government may by order extend to any area (including

Railway areas), in a State, not being a Union Territory the

powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special

Police Establishment for the investigation of any offences

or classes of offences specified in a notification under

Section 3.

(2) When by an order under sub-section (1) the powers

and jurisdiction of members of the said police

establishment are extended to any such area, a member

thereof may, subject of any orders which the Central

Government may make in this behalf, discharge the

functions of a police officer in that area and shall, while so

discharging such functions, be deemed to be a member of

a police force of that area and be vested with the powers,

functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of

a police officer belonging to that police station.

(3) where any such order under sub-section (1) is made in

relation to any area, then, without prejudice to the

provisions of sub-section (2) any member of the Delhi

Special Police Establishment of or above the rank of Sub-

Inspector may subject to any orders which the Central

Government may make in this behalf, exercise the powers

of the officer in charge of a police station in that area and

when so exercising such powers, shall be deemed to be an

officer in charge of a police station discharging the

functions of such an officer within the limits of his station.”

Sub-section (3) which was inserted with effect from

18.12.1964 by Act 40 of 1964 makes it clear that on the

orders of the Central Government, any member of the Delhi

10

Page 11 Special Police Establishment is permitted to exercise the

powers of the officer in charge of a police station in that area

and while exercising such powers, he shall be deemed to be

an officer in charge of a police station concerned discharging

the functions of such officer within the limits of his station. In

the light of the mandates as provided in sub-section (3), we

are of the view that learned ASG is right in contending that

there is no infirmity or flaw in continuing the investigation by

the officers of the CBI in spite of the fact that the State Crime

Branch registered a complaint and proceeded with the

investigation to a certain extent.

10)It is also settled law that for certain defects in

investigation, the accused cannot be acquitted. This aspect

has been considered in various decisions. In C. Muniappan

and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu , 2010 (9) SCC 567,

the following discussion and conclusion are relevant which

are as follows:-

“55. There may be highly defective investigation in a

case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is

any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any

benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this

issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by

itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given

11

Page 12 to such designed or negligent investigations or to the

omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith

and confidence of the people in the criminal justice

administration would be eroded. Where there has been

negligence on the part of the investigating agency or

omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation,

there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to

examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses,

carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable

or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether

such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth.

Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for

judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the

trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the

probity of investigation.

11)In Dayal Singh and Others vs. State of Uttaranchal,

2012 (8) SCC 263, while reiterating the principles rendered in

C. Muniappan (supra), this Court held thus:

“18. … Merely because PW 3 and PW 6 have failed to

perform their duties in accordance with the requirements

of law, and there has been some defect in the

investigation, it will not be to the benefit of the accused

persons to the extent that they would be entitled to an

order of acquittal on this ground. …”

12)In Gajoo vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2012 (9) SCC 532,

while reiterating the same principle again, this Court held

that defective investigation, unless affects the very root of

the prosecution case and is prejudicial to the accused should

not be an aspect of material consideration by the Court.

Since, the Court has adverted to all the earlier decisions with

12

Page 13 regard to defective investigation and outcome of the same, it

is useful to refer the dictum laid down in those cases:

20. In regard to defective investigation, this Court in

Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal while dealing with the

cases of omissions and commissions by the investigating

officer, and duty of the court in such cases, held as under:

(SCC pp. 280-83, paras 27-36)

“27. Now, we may advert to the duty of the court in

such cases. In Sathi Prasad v. State of U.P this Court

stated that it is well settled that if the police records

become suspect and investigation perfunctory, it

becomes the duty of the court to see if the evidence

given in court should be relied upon and such lapses

ignored. Noticing the possibility of investigation

being designedly defective, this Court in Dhanaj

Singh v. State of Punjab, held: (SCC p. 657, para

5)

‘5. In the case of a defective investigation the court

has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence.

But it would not be right in acquitting an accused

person solely on account of the defect; to do so

would tantamount to playing into the hands of the

investigating officer if the investigation is designedly

defective.’

28. Dealing with the cases of omission and commission,

the Court in Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar enunciated the

principle, in conformity with the previous judgments, that

if the lapse or omission is committed by the investigating

agency, negligently or otherwise, the prosecution evidence

is required to be examined dehors such omissions to find

out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. The

contaminated conduct of officials should not stand in the

way of evaluating the evidence by the courts, otherwise

the designed mischief would be perpetuated and justice

would be denied to the complainant party.

13

Page 14 29. In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, the

Court noticed the importance of the role of witnesses in a

criminal trial. The importance and primacy of the quality of

trial process can be observed from the words of Bentham,

who states that witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice.

The court issued a caution that in such situations, there is

a greater responsibility of the court on the one hand and

on the other the courts must seriously deal with persons

who are involved in creating designed investigation. The

Court held that: (SCC p. 398, para 42)

‘42. Legislative measures to emphasise prohibition

against tampering with witness, victim or informant

have become the imminent and inevitable need of

the day. Conducts which illegitimately affect the

presentation of evidence in proceedings before the

courts have to be seriously and sternly dealt with.

There should not be any undue anxiety to only

protect the interest of the accused. That would be

unfair, as noted above, to the needs of the society.

On the contrary, efforts should be to ensure a fair

trial where the accused and the prosecution both

get a fair deal. Public interest in the proper

administration of justice must be given as much

importance, if not more, as the interest of the

individual accused. In this courts have a vital role to

play.’ (emphasis in original)

30. With the passage of time, the law also developed

and the dictum of the court emphasised that in a

criminal case, the fate of proceedings cannot always be

left entirely in the hands of the parties. Crime is a

public wrong, in breach and violation of public rights

and duties, which affects the community as a whole

and is harmful to the society in general.

31. Reiterating the above principle, this Court in NHRC

v. State of Gujarat held as under: (SCC pp. 777-78, para

6)

‘6. … “35. … The concept of fair trial entails familiar

triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim

and the society and it is the community that acts

through the State and prosecuting agencies. Interest

of society is not to be treated completely with

disdain and as persona non grata. The courts have

always been considered to have an overriding duty

to maintain public confidence in the administration

of justice—often referred to as the duty to vindicate

and uphold the ‘majesty of the law’. Due

administration of justice has always been viewed as

14

Page 15 a continuous process, not confined to determination

of the particular case, protecting its ability to

function as a court of law in the future as in the case

before it. If a criminal court is to be an effective

instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge

must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording

machine by becoming a participant in the trial

evincing intelligence, active interest and elicit all

relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct

conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer

justice with fairness and impartiality both to the

parties and to the community it serves. The courts

administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind

eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has

occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair

trial is still possible, except at the risk of

undermining the fair name and standing of the

Judges as impartial and independent adjudicators.”

(Zahira Habibullah case, SCC p. 395, para 35)’

32. In State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy this Court

occasioned to consider the similar question of defective

investigation as to whether any manipulation in the station

house diary by the investigating officer could be put

against the prosecution case. This Court, in para 19, held

as follows: (SCC p. 720)

‘19. But can the above finding (that the station house

diary is not genuine) have any inevitable bearing on the

other evidence in this case? If the other evidence, on

scrutiny, is found credible and acceptable, should the

court be influenced by the machinations demonstrated

by the investigating officer in conducting investigation

or in preparing the records so unscrupulously? It can be

a guiding principle that as investigation is not the

solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial, the

conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed to

depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is well-

nigh settled that even if the investigation is illegal or

even suspicious the rest of the evidence must be

scrutinised independently of the impact of it. Otherwise

the criminal trial will plummet to the level of the

investigating officers ruling the roost. The court must

have predominance and pre-eminence in criminal trials

over the action taken by the investigating officers. The

criminal justice should not be made a casualty for the

wrongs committed by the investigating officers in the

case. In other words, if the court is convinced that the

testimony of a witness to the occurrence is true the

court is free to act on it albeit the investigating officer’s

suspicious role in the case.’

15

Page 16 33. In Ram Bali v. State of U.P. the judgment in Karnel

Singh v. State of M.P. was reiterated and this Court had

observed that: (Ram Bali case

15

, SCC p. 604, para 12)

‘12. … In case of defective investigation the court has

to be circumspect [while] evaluating the evidence. But

it would not be right in acquitting an accused person

solely on account of the defect; to do so would

tantamount to playing into the hands of the

investigation officer if the investigation is designedly

defective.’

34. Where our criminal justice system provides safeguards

of fair trial and innocent till proven guilty to an accused,

there it also contemplates that a criminal trial is meant for

doing justice to all, the accused, the society and a fair

chance to prove to the prosecution. Then alone can law

and order be maintained. The courts do not merely

discharge the function to ensure that no innocent man is

punished, but also that a guilty man does not escape. Both

are public duties of the Judge. During the course of the

trial, the learned Presiding Judge is expected to work

objectively and in a correct perspective. Where the

prosecution attempts to misdirect the trial on the basis of

a perfunctory or designedly defective investigation, there

the court is to be deeply cautious and ensure that despite

such an attempt, the determinative process is not

subverted. For truly attaining this object of a ‘fair trial’, the

court should leave no stone unturned to do justice and

protect the interest of the society as well.

35. This brings us to an ancillary issue as to how the court

would appreciate the evidence in such cases. The

possibility of some variations in the exhibits, medical and

ocular evidence cannot be ruled out. But it is not that

every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the

balance of justice in favour of the accused. Of course,

where contradictions and variations are of a serious

nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of

the substantive case sought to be proved by the

prosecution, they may provide an advantage to the

accused. The courts, normally, look at expert evidence

with a greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true

that the courts are not absolutely guided by the report of

the experts, especially if such reports are perfunctory,

unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate attempt to

misdirect the prosecution. In Kamaljit Singh v. State of

16

Page 17 Punjab, the Court, while dealing with discrepancies

between ocular and medical evidence, held: (SCC p. 159,

para 8)

‘8. It is trite law that minor variations between medical

evidence and ocular evidence do not take away the

primacy of the latter. Unless medical evidence in its

term goes so far as to completely rule out all

possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the

manner stated by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of

the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out.’

36. Where the eyewitness account is found credible and

trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative

possibilities may not be accepted as conclusive.

‘34. … The expert witness is expected to put before the

court all materials inclusive of the data which induced

him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the court

on the technical aspect of the case by [examining] the

terms of science so that the court although, not an

expert may form its own judgment on those materials

after giving due regard to the expert’s opinion, because

once the expert’s opinion is accepted, it is not the

opinion of the medical officer but [that] of the court.’”

13)It is clear that merely because of some defect in the

investigation, lapse on the part of the I.O., it cannot be a

ground for acquittal. Further, even if there had been

negligence on the part of the investigating agency or

omissions etc., it is the obligation on the part of the Court to

scrutinize the prosecution evidence de hors such lapses to

find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and

whether such lapses affect the object of finding out the truth.

17

Page 18 In the light of the above principles, as noticed, we reject the

main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant,

however, as observed in the above decisions, let us examine

the material relied on by the prosecution and find out

whether a case has been made out against the appellant.

Discussion as to the merits of the prosecution case:

14)It is the claim of the appellant that the prosecution has

not proved that the travel agency was purported to have

been run by S. Rajendran (A-3) for the purpose of submitting

passport applications. According to the appellant, Exh.P-2 to

P-43 is incorrect. The said contention is liable to be rejected

since Palaniappan (PW-11), who is the owner of the building

bearing No.48/9, MCT Building, near Bus Stand, Karaikudi has

leased out the first floor of the said building to S. Rajendran

(A-3) for the purpose of running a travel agency in the name

and style of Goodluck Travels. Even in the cross-

examination, PW-11, the owner of the said building, admitted

that A-3 was a tenant under him. In addition to the same, it

is also clear from the evidence of one Dawood (PW-13) that

Rajendran (A-3) was running a travel agency at Karaikudi in

18

Page 19 the name and style of Goodluck Travels. It is also relevant to

point out that as per the evidence of Assistant Registrar,

Ramanad District (PW-9), Goodluck Travels was registered as

a firm in the Office of the District Registrar, Karaikudi. It is

clear from the above materials that A-3 was occupying the

said premises pertaining to PW-11 during the period from

1991-93 and he was running a travel agency in that place.

15)The claim of the appellant that there is no evidence to

show that Exh.P-2 to P-43 had been presented by the

Goodluck Travels is incorrect since Hema (A-5), who was

working as a clerk in the said travel agency of A-3 has

admitted in the statement under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure that at the relevant time she was working

with the Goodluck Travels and she used to submit the

passport applications in the passport office and receive the

passports from the office. The above statement makes it

clear that she was assisting S. Rajendran (A-3) in preparing

applications and filing them before the passport office and

dealing the affairs connected therewith. This fact is also

19

Page 20 evident from Exh. P-2, which is a folder marked on the side of

the prosecution and captioned as “Goodluck Travels”.

16)The other relevant aspect is the admissible portion of

the confessional statement of A-3 which is marked as Exh.P-

215 and which led to the recovery of forged/fabricated

rubber stamp seals, M.Os 1 to 3 seized at his behest under

Exh.P-216, the Mazahar, in the presence of Village

Administrative Officer (PW-15) and Village Menial also prove

the prosecution case and disprove the stand of the appellant.

17)The trial Court, on verification and perusal of Exh.P-2 to

P-43, passport applications, noted that the same were filed

by Goodluck Travels. It is pointed out that the applicant

concerned in Exh.P-2 (passport application) namely, Shri

Rasool, authorized M/s Goodluck Travels to deal with the

matter relating to his passport and to receive the same on

his behalf. The evidence of PW-12 and PW-13 also lends

credence to the above aspect. Further, we have already

noted that the appellant (A-5) has admitted in her

examination under Section 313 that she was working with

20

Page 21 Goodluck Travels and she used to submit the applications in

the passport office and receive the passports from the office.

18)Next, it is contended by the appellant that the police

verification forms, namely, Exh.128 to 136 and 161 to 202

were not proved to have been forged in the light of the fact

that the subsequent signatures of PWs 16 and 29 were not

sent to PW-28, the hand writing expert, for his opinion. The

said contention is liable to be rejected in view of the

categorical statement of Shri Selvin (PW-26), DSP, DCRB,

Ramanad who has stated that as soon as the personal

particulars, forms of passport applications were received

from the Passport Office for police verification, they were

entered in the register maintained for the purpose and each

application was given a number and all the applications were

sent to the respective Police Stations for report. He further

explained that after verification by the officials concerned,

the paper would again come to the office of DSP, DCRB for

forwarding the same to the concerned Passport Offices. He

asserted that 42 application forms, viz., Exh. P-2 to P-43 were

not received at the office of DSP, DCRB, Ramanad. He also

21

Page 22 highlighted that these forms were neither sent to the sub-

Inspector of Police Thiruvadanai for verification nor received

back from the S.I. Police and not dispatched to the Passport

Office, Trichy for recommendation for issue of passports. A

perusal of the evidence of Shri Natarajan (PW-16), DSP, R.

Muniyadi (PW-29), Sub-Inspector of Police clearly shows that

they did not sign the verification forms. PW-29 specifically

stated that during the relevant time, passport applications

(Exh.P-2 to 43) were not received by his office and he did not

sign the verification forms Exh.P-161 to P-202. It is clear

from their statements and assertions that the verification

forms of the said 42 applications have not been dealt with by

the concerned officials and the trial Judge was right in

concluding that they were forged. Mere non-production of

registers maintained in the office of DSP, DCRB, Ramanad

cannot be construed to be an infirmity in this case in the light

of the evidence of PWs 16, 26 and 29 who are relevant

officers concerned with those documents.

19)Regarding the contention that the specimen signatures

of Dr. Muthu (PW-18), Civil Surgeon, Government Hospital

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Page 23 and Shri Vairavan (PW-20), Executive Officer (Retired), Town

Panchayat, Thondi in Ramanad District, who are all

independent witnesses, were not forged, it is very much clear

from their evidence that their signatures were forged in the

applications. There is no reason to disbelieve their evidence

and the trial Judge has rightly accepted the same.

20)Regarding the evidence of Village Administrative

Officers and the certificates issued by them, it is relevant to

point out that those documents were properly marked

through Village Administrative Officers of the villages

concerned and also by the officers who made a field enquiry

for the same. We are satisfied that there is no legal infirmity

as claimed.

21)Insofar as the contention relating to recoveries of M.Os

1 to 3 – Seals of Superintendent of Police, Ramanad, as

rightly concluded by the trial Court, the evidence of the

concerned Village Administrative Officers, Deputy

Superintendent of Police, Civil Surgeon (PW-18), Government

Hospital, Executive Officer (Retired) of Town Panchayat (PW-

20) are sufficient to establish that the forged attested

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Page 24 documents were created and enclosed for the purpose of

getting passports in support of false addresses given in the

applications by the appellant. The above fact is also evident

from the evidence of Village Administrative Officer (PW-15),

Thiruvadanani, the confessional statement given by A-3

which was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in

his presence and M.Os 1 to 3 which were recovered under a

cover of mazahar (Exh. P-216) at the behest of A-3 and the

admissible portion of the evidence leading to recovery which

is marked as Exh. 215. The contradictions as pointed out by

the learned counsel for the appellant are only trivial in nature

as found by both the trial Court and the High Court,

accordingly, it cannot be construed to be a material one so

as to affect the version of the prosecution. We are satisfied

that there is no infirmity in the recovery and reject the

argument of the learned counsel for the appellant.

22)Coming to the next contention, namely, the failure of

the prosecution to exhibit the report of FSL, Chennai with

regard to the impression of seals M.Os 1 to 3 is fatal to the

prosecution, it is relevant to note that PWs 16, 26 and 29

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Page 25 DSPs and S.I. of Police have categorically denied the

genuineness of the above seals since the same were

recovered pursuant to the confessional statement of A-3 and

the absence of expert opinion by itself does not absolve the

liability of the appellant.

23)The contention that the evidence of Sundaram (PW-14),

who was examined for the purpose of proving the

handwriting of the appellant and whose competency to

identify the writing of the appellant itself is doubtful, as

rightly pointed out by the respondent that it was admitted by

A-5 (appellant herein), while questioning under Section 313

that she had been working in Sugir Tours and Travels run by

PW-14 during 1987-91 and, hence, the evidence of PW-14,

who identified the writings available in Exhs.P-2 to P-43 as

that of A-5 is admissible under Section 47 of the Indian

Evidence Act. We are satisfied that the same was rightly

acted upon by the trial Court and the High Court while

holding the charge against the accused-appellant as proved

to have committed in pursuance of the conspiracy.

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Page 26 24)Finally, the contention of the appellant that simply

because the applications were filled up by a person does not

automatically lead to the inference that a person is a party to

the conspiracy. In the case on hand, it is very well

established by the prosecution that the filled up passport

applications were submitted by A-5 (appellant herein) on

behalf of her employer A-3. Further, in majority of passport

applications (Exh. P-2 to P-43), bogus particulars were filled

by A-5 (appellant herein), at Trichy. The prosecution has also

established that A-5 has given false particulars regarding the

place of residence of applicants’ in the passport applications

in view of her admission in 313 statement that she was

working in Goodluck Travels and assisting Rajendran (A-3) in

preparing applications and filing them before the Passport

Office as well as handling the affairs connected therewith

which clearly prove that A-5 has filled up the said passport

applications (Exh.P-2 to P-43). We are also satisfied that the

prosecution has clearly established that false documents

were made for the purpose of cheating and those documents

were used as genuine for obtaining passports.

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Page 27 25)In the light of the overwhelming evidence placed by the

prosecution, analyzed by the trial Court and affirmed by the

High Court, interference by this Court with concurrent

findings of fact by the courts below is not warranted except

where there is some serious infirmity in the appreciation of

evidence and the findings are perverse. Further, this Court

will not ordinarily interfere with appreciation of evidence by

the High Court and re-appreciation is permissible only if an

error of law or procedure and conclusion arrived are

perverse.

26)Taking note of the fact that the appellant is having a

small child, while confirming the conviction we reduce the

sentence to six months from two years.

27) With the above modification i.e., reduction of sentence,

the appeal stands disposed of.

………….…………………………J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

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Page 28 ………….…………………………J.

(RANJAN GOGOI)

………….…………………………J.

(V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 7, 2013.

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