2026 INSC 391 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5942 OF 2023

HIMAKSHI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAHUL VERMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5943 OF 2023

RAHUL VERMA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

HIMACHAL PRADESH BOARD OF

SCHOOL EDUCATION & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.

1. The present appeals relate to recruitment to the post of

Computer Hardware Engineer by respondent no. 2 – Himachal

Pradesh Board of School Education (hereinafter “the Board”). The

controversy centres around the prescribed qualifications for

appointment to the said post, particularly the requirement of prior

REPORTABLE

2

work experience and the preference, if any, to a higher

qualification, such as a Master’s degree.

2. These appeals emanate from the common impugned

judgement dated 23.04.2021 (hereinafter “ Impugned

Judgement”) passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh at Shimla (hereinafter “High Court”), whereby

the judgement of the Single Judge of the High Court was set aside.

The Division Bench held that neither the appellant Himakshi

(hereinafter “selected candidate”) nor the respondent no. 1 –

Rahul (hereinafter “unsuccessful candidate”) satisfied the

essential qualifications at the time of recruitment and

appointment.

3. At its core, the question involved is whether a candidate who

did not possess the required work experience at the time of

recruitment could still be selected and appointed, either on the

basis of having a preferred higher qualification or by exercising

supposed relaxation of the eligibility conditions.

4. Civil Appeal No. 5942 of 2023 has been preferred by the

selected candidate Himakshi, assailing the impugned judgement

to the extent it sets aside her appointment, challenge to which was

rejected by the Single Judge of the High Court. Civil Appeal No.

3

5943 of 2023 has been preferred by the unsuccessful candidate,

Rahul, challenging the same judgement insofar as it rejects his

prayer for appointment and consequential relief, despite

invalidating the selection process to the post in question. Since

there is a commonality of facts and legal issues, both appeals are

being dealt with by this common judgement. For the sake of

convenience, the parties are being referred to as per their status in

Civil Appeal No. 5942 of 2023.

Factual Matrix

5. The Board initiated a recruitment process vide Advertisement

No. 3001-3010 dated 21.07.2016 inviting applications for various

categories of posts on contract basis, including one unreserved

post of Computer Hardware Engineer on contract basis. The

qualification for selection was prescribed as follows: –

“Essential Qualification

(1) Should have passed 10+2 examination or its equivalent

from a recognised Board/University.

(2) B.E/B.Tech in Electronic telecommunication/I.T. from a

recognised University with at least 5 years’ experience in

computer manufacturing/ maintenance from a company of

repute.

(3) Preference will be given to candidate with M.Tech in

Electronic Degree.

Desirable Qualification

4

(4) Knowledge of customs, manner and dialects of Himachal

Pradesh and suitability for appointment in the peculiar

conditions prevailing in the Pradesh.”

6. Pursuant to the advertisement, various candidates, including

the parties herein, applied for the said post. The written test was

conducted on 28.08.2016, followed by a personal interview on

03.10.2016. Insofar as the qualifications of the candidates are

concerned, it is not in dispute that all three candidates – appellant

Himakshi, respondent no. 1 Rahul and respondent no. 3 Gaurav –

possessed a B.Tech degree from a recognised University in the

relevant field. Himakshi also held an M.Tech degree; however, at

the time of participating in the recruitment process, she had work

experience of only about one year. Gaurav possessed a Diploma in

Computer Engineering and had accumulated a combined work

experience of approximately two and a half years across different

organizations. Rahul possessed a Post Graduate Diploma in

Computer Applications and had work experience of approximately

six years across multiple organizations.

7. As per the result, respondent no. 1 – Rahul, having Roll No.

40032, obtained 118 marks in the written test and 25 marks in

the personal interview; being a total of 143 marks. Respondent no.

3 – Gaurav, having Roll No. 40013, obtained 123 marks in the

written test and 28 marks in the personal interview; being a total

5

of 151 marks. The appellant Himakshi, having Roll No. 40016,

scored 124 marks in the written test and 28 marks in the personal

interview; obtaining a total of 152 marks; thus being the highest-

scoring candidate. For better clarity, the position of each candidate

is referred in the table below: –

Candidate Qualifications and Work

Experience

Written

Test

Personal

Interview

Total

Marks

Himakshi

[Roll No.

40016]

B.Tech in Electronics &

Communication Engineering

with

M.Tech in Electronics &

Communication Engineering

and

approx. 1 years’ work

experience

124 28 152

Rahul

[Roll No.

40032]

B.Tech in Electronics &

Communication Engineering

with

Post Graduate Diploma in

Computer Application

and

approx. 6 years’ work

experience

118 25 143

Gaurav

[Roll No.

40013]

B.Tech in Computer Science

Engineering

with

Diploma in Computer

Engineering

and

approx. 2.5 years’ work

experience

123 28 151

6

8. After completion of the selection process, vide notification

dated 03.10.2016, the appellant Himakshi was declared as

selected candidate for the post of Computer Hardware Engineer.

Respondent no. 3 – Gaurav, having the second-highest marks, was

placed in the wait list (hereinafter “waitlisted candidate”) for the

post. It is not in dispute that at the time of selection, Himakshi

had been serving as a VT (Vocational Trainer) Telecom in

Government Senior Secondary School, Kapahi, Sundernagar since

August 2015. She obtained No Objection Certificate from her

earlier employer to join service as a Computer Hardware Engineer

with the Board.

9. This selection and appointment of the appellant was

challenged by the unsuccessful candidate Rahul by way of Original

Application No. 1561 of 2017 before the erstwhile Himachal

Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal at Shimla (hereinafter

“Tribunal”). In the said application, he prayed for setting aside of

the appellant’s selection as well as putting respondent no. 3 in the

wait-list, along with direction for his own appointment on the post

in question, and for grant of all consequential benefits since he

possessed the prescribed essential qualifications.

7

10. During pendency of the proceedings, the Tribunal came to be

abolished and the matter was transferred to the High Court, where

it was renumbered as CWPOA No. 136 of 2019. The learned Single

Judge vide judgement dated 24.08.2020, allowed the writ petition

ex-parte qua appellant Himakshi and set-aside her selection and

appointment. It was held that in absence of the essential

qualification of 5 years’ experience, no preference could have been

extended to her only on account of possessing an M.Tech degree.

It was further directed that the Board shall offer appointment to

Rahul, having regard to his claim of possessing the requisite

experience as on the relevant date. Pertinently, this order was

passed without any representation on behalf of the appellant, and

as such, she preferred Review Petition No. 33 of 2020 before the

High Court. The Single Judge allowed the said review petition,

thereby recalling the previous order dated 24.08.2020 and

restored the writ petition to its original number.

11. In her reply before the High Court, the appellant claimed that

she was more meritorious in the selection process and that the

Board had the power to relax the criteria if a candidate was found

to be otherwise well-qualified. It was further contended that none

of the candidates who were called for interview fulfilled the

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requisite experience. It was also not clear whether the experience

of the unsuccessful candidate Rahul was in a ‘company of repute’

dealing with ‘manufacturing/maintenance of computers’, as

stipulated in the advertisement.

12. It may be noted that during pendency of the writ petition

before the High Court, the selected candidate Himakshi continued

to render her services on the post in question and was ultimately

regularised on 07.11.2019 in terms of the regularisation policy

framed by the State of Himachal Pradesh.

13. Upon rehearing the matter, learned Single Judge of the High

Court, by order dated 23.09.2020, dismissed the writ petition filed

by respondent no. 1 Rahul, and upheld the selection and

appointment of the appellant Himakshi. The Court took note of the

applicable service rules for the post, being the Recruitment and

Promotion Rules for the Post of Computer Hardware Engineer in

the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education, Dharamshala

(hereinafter “R&P Rules”), particularly Rule 18 which conferred a

discretion to relax the conditions relating to eligibility, including

the requirement of age and work experience, in appropriate cases.

In this context, it was considered that the appellant Himakshi

possessed a higher qualification in the form of M.Tech degree,

9

which could be taken into account for evaluating her suitability for

the post. Her selection, having been conducted by a duly

competent Selection Committee (hereinafter “Committee”) and in

absence of any mala fides or procedural irregularity in the

selection process, the outcome of the process was not required to

be interfered with. In such backdrop, learned Single Judge was of

the view that mere absence of the prescribed length of experience

would, by itself, not vitiate the selection, particularly when the

selected candidate secured the highest marks, possessed a higher

academic qualification and the R&P Rules provided the power of

relaxation.

14. Aggrieved by the said decision, the unsuccessful candidate

Rahul preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 49 of 2020 before the

High Court. The Division Bench, by way of the impugned

judgement, set aside the selection and appointment of Himakshi

on the ground that the essential qualification relating to work

experience had not been satisfied on the relevant date and there

was no material on record to show that her selection was by

exercising the power of relaxation and using the discretion

available under the R&P Rules. However, at the same time, no

direction was issued for appointment in favour of the unsuccessful

10

candidate Rahul, or any other candidate, on the consideration that

none of them fulfilled the requirement of the requisite experience

as prescribed in the R&P Rules read with the advertisement. It is

in this backdrop, the present appeals came to be preferred. This

Court, vide order dated 06.05.2021, granted a stay on the

operation of the impugned judgement of the High Court. The said

interim relief was further extended by order dated 06.05.2021. As

a consequence of such relief, the appellant has been continuing to

work on the post.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the parties

15. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, appearing on

behalf of the selected candidate submitted that the challenge to

her selection is misconceived inasmuch as the respondent Rahul

does not stand in the zone of consideration for appointment. It was

urged that the merit position of the candidates would show that

even if the appellant were to be excluded, Rahul would not

automatically be entitled to appointment. It was further contended

that the R&P Rules, confer a power of relaxation upon the

competent authority, when a candidate is otherwise found

suitable. In this context, reliance was placed on Rule 18 to submit

that the requirement of experience is flexible and could be relaxed

11

in an appropriate case. It was further his case that the appellant,

having secured the highest marks in the selection process, was

found meritorious by the Board. Based on the overall evaluation

process, including the written test and the personal interview, the

appellant was rightly selected on account of securing the highest

marks. The power of relaxation, being discretionary, was not

necessary to be recorded giving detailed reasons for the selection

of a particular candidate. Once the recommendation of the

Committee had been accepted by the Board and appointment was

also directed, the same ought not to be interfered with.

16. Per contra, Mr. M.C. Dhingra, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the respondent Rahul submitted that the very

foundation of the appellant’s selection was flawed as she did not

possess the relevant essential qualification at the time of selection.

The requirement of five years’ work experience was a mandatory

condition, and in absence of the same, any preference on account

of having a Masters’ degree could not have been exercised in favour

of the appellant. It was further submitted that even if the R&P

Rules contemplate the power of relaxation, no material was placed

to indicate that the same was mentioned in the advertisement

pursuant to which selection was made, or that the Board had

12

exercised the same in favour of the appellant; hence the appellant’s

selection couldn’t be sustained. It was further his case that once

the appellant had herself contended before the High Court that

none of the candidates fulfilled the required essential

qualifications, the selection was effectively done without strict

adherence to the eligibility conditions, which was impermissible in

law.

17. In response, Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel

appearing for the respondent Board submitted that the selection

process had been carried out through a duly constituted

Committee and that the appellant was selected on the basis of

securing the highest marks in the written test as well as the

personal interview. However, when queried as to whether the issue

of eligibility, particularly the requirement of work experience as

envisaged under the R&P Rules had been specifically examined or

if any relaxation was formally granted; after taking instructions, it

was fairly informed that there was no express decision to such

effect.

18. At this point in time, it was reiterated by Mr. P.S. Patwalia,

learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that even assuming

certain deficiencies in eligibility, no candidate, including the

13

unsuccessful and waitlisted candidates herein, could claim an

indefeasible right of appointment. Additionally, pursuant to her

selection and appointment, the appellant has been serving on the

post for a considerable period of time and was also regularised in

service in the year 2019. In view of her long continuance in service,

the Court may take into account considerations of equity and

decline to interfere with her appointment at this stage. In this

regard, reliance was placed on the judgement in If at all any

interference was warranted, on account of it being an admitted

position that no candidate had the required essential qualification,

the proper course would not be to grant appointment to any

particular candidate but to uphold the selection process or direct

a fresh exercise, as the case may be.

19. In the said factual backdrop, the following issues arise for our

consideration:– (i) Whether a candidate not possessing the

essential qualification of five years’ work experience as on the

relevant date could nonetheless be considered for selection on the

strength of having a higher academic qualification, on account of the

same being indicated as a preference under the R&P Rules; (ii)

Whether the power of relaxation could be exercised in favour of a

candidate not possessing the essential qualification as prescribed

14

in the R&P Rules, and if so, whether such relaxation was in fact

exercised in favour of the appellant in accordance with law; and (iii)

Whether the selection and appointment of the appellant can be

sustained in law, and if not, whether any direction for appointment

of any other candidate is warranted.

Appreciation of the issues in seriatim

20. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length

on the conspectus of this case and perused the material on record.

In that context, the issues are being appreciated in the succeeding

paragraphs.

Re: Issue (i) and (ii)

21. At the outset, it must be noted that the advertisement dated

21.07.2016 issued by the respondent Board clearly stipulates that

a candidate must possess, apart from the academic requirement

of passing the 10+2 examination from a recognised Board or its

equivalent and a B.E/B.Tech in Electronic telecommunication/I.T.

from a recognised University, inter alia, a minimum of five years’

work experience in a reputed organization engaged in computer

manufacturing or maintenance. This requirement was not

couched as being discretionary or flexible, but in fact, was

prescribed as part of the minimum eligibility criteria for

15

appointment. The said stipulation finds its source in Rule 7 of the

R&P Rules governing the post in question, which also prescribe

experience as a component of eligibility for direct recruitment. The

said Rule is relevant and reproduced below for ready reference: –

“7. Minimum educational and other qualification

required for direct recruit(s)

(a) Essential

(i) B.E./B/Tech. Degree in Electronics &

Telecommunication/IT from a recognised University with

at least 5 years experience in computer manufacturing /

maintenance company of repute.

(ii) Preference will be given to candidates with M.Tech. in

Electronic Degree.

(b) DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION

Knowledge of customs, manners and dialects of Himachal

Pradesh and suitability for appointment in the peculiar

conditions prevailing in the Pradesh.”

22. Clause 2 preceding the said Rule 7 provides the manner in

which relaxation may be exercised by the Recruitment Agency and

is reproduced below: –

“2. Age and experience in case of direct recruitment, relaxable

at the discretion of the Recruitment Agency as the case may

be, in case the candidate is otherwise well qualified.”

23. The use of the expression “minimum” in the R&P Rules

assumes significance. It indicates that the requirement of

experience is a threshold condition which must be fulfilled by all

16

candidates seeking consideration. Such a condition cannot be

diluted or substituted merely on the basis of comparative merit or

superior academic qualifications. A close perusal of the governing

service rules, i.e., the R&P Rules reveals that there is a clear

distinction in the essential and desirable qualifications. While a

higher educational qualification may confer an additional

advantage of preference in the matter of selection, it does not

supplant or override the primary requirement of essential

eligibility. To hold otherwise would amount to rewriting the terms

of the selection and altering the criteria after the process had

commenced.

24. The indication in Rule 7 of the R&P Rules that preference

shall be given to candidates possessing an ‘M.Tech in Electronics’

degree must be understood in its proper context. A preference

operates only within the zone of eligible and merit candidates; it

does not enlarge or modify the field of eligibility itself. In other

words, the stage of applying preference arises only after a

candidate is found to fulfil the essential qualifications prescribed

for the post. Where a candidate does not meet the threshold

requirement of eligibility, the question of extending preference,

being in merit, on account of higher qualification does not arise.

17

Preference may, at best, be exercised in a situation where two or

more candidates, otherwise eligible and similarly placed in terms

of merit, stand at par. In such event, the candidate possessing

M.Tech degree may be accorded preference. However, the same

cannot be extended to a candidate who is otherwise ineligible for

selection merely on account of possessing desirable qualification

prescribed for preference.

25. To accept the contention of the appellant that possession of

a higher degree can compensate for the absence of an essential

qualification would be to invert the scheme of the R&P Rules. It

would effectively permit the preferred qualification to override the

minimum essential qualification, thereby rendering the latter

nugatory. Such an interpretation would not only defeat the plain

language of the R&P Rules, but would also introduce uncertainty

and subjectivity into the selection process, which is impermissible

in matters of public employment.

26. The legal position regarding the impermissibility of

substituting prescribed qualifications with higher degrees, in the

absence of an express enabling provision, stands fortified in the

judgement of this Court in Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v.

18

Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors.

1

, where it was held that in

absence of a specific statutory rule or a provision in the

advertisement, the recruiting agency cannot broaden the eligibility

criteria by treating a higher qualification as a replacement for the

mandatory ‘essential' qualification’. The relevant portion of the

judgement is reproduced for ready reference: –

“26. …it would not be permissible to draw an inference that a

higher qualification necessarily presupposes the acquisition of

another, albeit lower, qualification. The prescription of

qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The

State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications

as a condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of

judicial review to expand upon the ambit of the prescribed

qualifications. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a

matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of

judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or

should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State,

as the recruiting authority, to determine.”

27. It is trite law that the terms of the recruitment rules and the

advertisement form the basis of the selection process and are

binding on both, the candidates as well as the recruiting agencies.

Any departure therefrom, unless expressly permitted and properly

exercised, would be arbitrary and violative of the principles of

selection.

1

(2019) 2 SCC 404.

19

28. The contention of the appellant that the R&P Rules confer a

power of relaxation also requires consideration. In this regard,

Rule 18 of the said rules states as thus: –

“18. Power to Relax

Where the Board is of the opinion that it is necessary or

expedient to do so, it may be order for reasons to be recorded in

writing relax any of the provisions of these rules with respect to

any class of category of persons of posts(s).”

29. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to examine the scope

and effect of the power of relaxation under the R&P Rules. Clause

2 preceding Rule 7 permits relaxation of two kinds when a

candidate is otherwise well qualified; one, in case of age, and

second, in case of experience. Rule 18, on the other hand, confers

a much broader power upon the Board to relax any of the

provisions of the R&P Rules, where it is of the opinion that is

necessary or expedient to do so, for reasons to be recorded in

writing.

30. The width of the power under Rule 18, however, cannot be

construed as dispensing with the requirement of a structured and

conscious exercise of such discretion. Even if it were to be assumed

that the said power extends to relaxing the essential qualification,

including the requirement of a minimum of five years’ experience;

the same can be effected only upon due consideration of the nature

20

of the requirement and the suitability of the candidate,

accompanied by reasons recorded in writing. The mere existence

of the power of relaxation does not obviate the manner of its

exercise.

31. This position is further borne out from the material placed on

record. This Court vide order dated 27.11.2025 called for records

of the Board to ascertain whether any relaxation was extended by

the recruiting agency. The said order is important, and as such,

the relevant portion is quoted below: –

“3) It is contended that under the Rules, age and experience in

case of direct recruits is relaxable at the discretion of the

Recruiting Agency/Board. It also gives power of relaxation if it is

necessary and expedient.

4) During arguments, Mr. P. S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel

representing petitioner-Himakshi submits that relaxation in

experience has been granted by the Recruiting Agency while Mr.

M. C. Dhingra, learned senior counsel representing petitioner-

Rahul Verma, submits that as per the result declared, it is not

clear that the relaxation in experience has been granted by

recruiting agency. It is also contended that as per the chart, his

client possesses the requisite experience. The said argument of

having requisite qualification and experience has been

controverted by Mr. P. S. Patwalia, inter alia, contending that

experience which is required in computer

manufacturing/maintenance company of repute. In absence of

such experience, the reference of experience as indicated in the

selection chart have no relevance.

5) Having considered the submissions as made, we deem it

appropriate to call for the records of selection from the Board. The

Board shall produce the relevant documents extending relaxation

if any by the recruiting agency or in exercise of the power if any

exercised by the Board along with the relevant record…”

21

32. In response thereto, the material placed on record by the

respondent Board does not disclose any specific instance or

decision evidencing the exercise of the power of relaxation in favour

of any candidate, much less the appellant herein. In the Proforma

for the Interviews to be held for the post, the relevant details of the

concerned candidates were mentioned as thus: –

“HIMACHAL PRADESH BOARD OF SCHOOL EDUCATION

DHARAMSHALA (KANGRA-176213)

PROFORMA FOR COMPUTER H/W ENGINEER INTERVIEW TO

BE HELD ON 03/10/2016

NAME Computer

Degree or

Diploma

Other

Qualification

Remarks, if

any

Gaurav

Upadhaya

B.Tech

2157

S.No. 000306

1. Diploma in

Computer

Engg.

Experience

1. 1 ½ years

2. 1 years

Himakshi B.Tech

10332

S.No. 0004246

M.Tech

MT-1229

S.No.

0001500502

Experience

1. 1 years

Rahul

Verma

B.Tech

40204039

S.No. 183421

PGDCA in

2015

Experience

1. 1.7 years

2. 5 months

3. 3.3 years

4. 1 years

33. A conjoint reading of the above material leaves no iota of

doubt that the requirement of experience was a substantive

qualification intended to ensure that the candidate possessed

adequate practical exposure in the relevant field. In such a

22

backdrop, the selection of the appellant, who admittedly possessed

only about one year of such experience, without any recorded

decision to relax the qualification, clearly indicates that the

essential eligibility criteria was neither adhered to nor consciously

dispensed with.

34. It is thus clear that no material has been placed on record to

indicate that any relaxation of experience was in fact exercised in

favour of the appellant, by way of recording in writing or otherwise.

The record of the Committee is silent to that effect, except to state

that the appellant secured the highest combined marks in the

written test and personal interview. However, there is nothing to

show that the recruitment agency applied its mind to the deficiency

in eligibility, particularly regarding the essential qualification, or

by recording any reason to relax the qualification of experience in

order to treat the appellant as eligible. The absence of any

deliberation or reasoning in this regard, when viewed in the light

of the above material, reinforces the position that the selection was

effected without due application of mind or after granting

relaxation.

23

35. In Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan

and Ors.

2

, this Court had the occasion to look into the power of

relaxation and the manner in which the same shall be exercised

by the recruiting agency, especially in case of public employment.

While the selections of persons in whose favour the relaxation was

exercised, albeit without recording any reasons, was sustained on

account of their period of service and lapse of time due to the

litigation, this Court laid down certain guidelines which may be

referred at this point: –

“11. … We, however, feel it necessary to emphasise and bring

to the notice of the University that the illegal practices in the

selection of candidates which have come to light and which

seem to be followed usually at its end must stop forthwith. It is

for this purpose that we lay down the following guidelines for

the future selection process:

A. The University must note that the qualifications it

advertises for the posts should not be at variance with

those prescribed by its Ordinance/Statutes.

B. The candidates selected must be qualified as on the last

date for making applications for the posts in question or

on the date to be specifically mentioned in the

advertisement/notification for the purpose. The

qualifications acquired by the candidates after the said

date should not be taken into consideration, as that

would be arbitrary and result in discrimination. It must

be remembered that when the advertisement/notification

represents that the candidates must have the

qualifications in question, with reference to the last date

for making the applications or with reference to the

specific date mentioned for the purpose, those who do not

have such qualifications do not apply for the posts even

2 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168.

24

though they are likely to acquire such qualifications and

do acquire them after the said date. In the circumstances,

many who would otherwise be entitled to be considered

and may even be better than those who apply, can have

a legitimate grievance since they are left out of

consideration.

C. When the University or its Selection Committee

relaxes the minimum required qualifications,

unless it is specifically stated in the

advertisement/notification both that the

qualifications will be relaxed and also the

conditions on which they will be relaxed, the

relaxation will be illegal.

D. The University/Selection Committee must mention

in its proceedings of selection the reasons for

making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the

candidates in whose favour relaxation is made.

E. The minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee

should be preserved for a sufficiently long time, and if the

selection process is challenged until the challenge is

finally disposed of. An adverse inference is liable to be

drawn if the minutes are destroyed or a plea is taken that

they are not available.”

36. In light of the above, absence of any decision exercising power

of relaxation in favour of the selected candidate, i.e., the appellant

herein assumes greater significance, especially in the context of a

public selection process, where transparency and adherence to

declared criteria are of paramount importance. If such relaxation

were to be granted, it ought to have been reflected in the record in

clear terms, indicating that the recruitment agency was conscious

of the lack of essential qualification of five years’ experience and

had, for valid reasons, chosen to relax the same.

25

37. The argument that the Committee is not required to record

reasons for its selection does not advance the case of the appellant.

While it may be correct that detailed reasons are not required for

awarding marks or selecting a candidate, the same principle

cannot be extended to the exercise of a statutory power of

relaxation. The latter involves a departure from the prescribed

eligibility conditions and, therefore, necessarily requires a

conscious, reasoned and demonstrable exercise of discretion. In

the absence of any material evidencing such exercise of, it cannot

be presumed that the requirement of minimum five years’

experience stood waived. Acceptance of such a contention would

effectively render the eligibility criteria nugatory and confer an

unguided discretion upon the recruiting agency, which is

impermissible in law.

38. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that

the requirement of “at least five years’ experience in computer

manufacturing/ maintenance company of repute”, being an

essential qualification, was required to be fulfilled as on the

relevant date. A candidate not fulfilling such requirement could

not have been treated as eligible merely on the basis of possessing

a higher degree or securing a higher rank in merit. The record

26

clearly indicates that the selected candidate, at the time of

submission of her application for the purpose of selection,

possessed work experience of only about one year, as is evident

from the application status and supporting documents furnished

by her during the selection process. In such circumstances, the

possession of ‘M.Tech degree in Electronics and Communication’,

which is a preferential qualification under the R&P Rules, could

not have been relied upon to either confer eligibility or to justify

any relaxation of the essential requirement. The mere possession

of such a higher academic degree does not, by itself, render a

candidate “otherwise eligible or well qualified” without meeting the

requirement of experience within the meaning of the R&P Rules,

particularly when the basic eligibility criteria itself remains

unfulfilled. Any such approach would amount to substituting the

minimum qualification with a preferential one, which is

impermissible. The selection of the appellant on such basis,

therefore, reflects a clear non-application of mind to the distinction

between essential and preferential qualifications and renders any

purported relaxation fundamentally flawed.

39. Further, although the R&P Rules do contemplate the power

of relaxation, such power is not capable of being presumed. It is

27

required to be exercised consciously by the recruiting agency, for

reasons to be recorded in writing such that it is in accordance with

the R&P Rules. In the case at hand, despite an order asking the

material granting relaxation in the eligibility criteria by applying

the mind by the recruiting agency, nothing has been brought on

record. In absence, guidance can be taken from the judgment of

Rekha Chaturvedi (Supra), whereby it is clear that the selection

committee were required to mention in its proceedings and to

assign reasons to grant relaxation, if any.

40. Issue nos. (i) and (ii) are answered in the above terms.

Re: Issue (iii)

41. Having answered issue nos. (i) and (ii) against the appellant,

the question that now arises is whether, notwithstanding the

absence of eligibility and lawful exercise of relaxation, the selection

and appointment of the appellant can be sustained in law.

42. The position as it exists today is that on appointment and on

dismissal of the writ petition of the unsuccessful candidate Rahul

by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the selected

candidate i.e., Himakshi has continued to serve on the post. When

her selection and appointment was set aside by the Division Bench

28

of the High Court in the impugned judgement, on being challenged,

stay was granted by this Court vide order dated 06.05.2021 which

is still in operation and the appellant has been in service. There is

no doubt that she was also regularised on the post in the year

2019.

43. In light of the same, it was strenuously urged on behalf of the

appellant that these factors, coupled with the absence of any

allegation of mala fides in appointment or any deficiency in

performance, ought to weigh with this Court in order to exercise

equity. In this regard, reference was made to the decision of a

three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup v. State of

Haryana and Ors.

3

, wherein the initial appointment was treated

to be deemed as regular, on account of the experience acquired

from the date of appointment to the post. The relevant portion of

the judgement reads as thus: –

“2. …The appellant was undoubtedly a graduate of a

recognised university in Economics and he also held diploma

in Social Welfare of a recognised university but admittedly he

did not have five years' experience in the field of Labour Laws

as Labour Inspector or Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops or

Wage Inspector. He was a Statistical Officer for about six

years and thereafter for a period of about ten months he held

the post of Chief Inspector of Shops. His experience of the

working of Labour Laws as Chief Inspector of Shops which is

a post higher than the Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops was,

3 (1979) 1 SCC 168.

29

therefore, limited only to a period of about ten months and he

did not satisfy the requirement of five years' experience. He

was, in the circumstances, ineligible to be appointed as

Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer under Rule 4, clause (1).

…

The appellant could not, therefore, be legitimately appointed

to the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer unless,

amongst other things he possessed five years’ experience in

the working of Labour Laws as Labour Inspector, Deputy

Chief Inspector for Shops or Wage Inspector, which he

admittedly did not…

3. The question then arises as to what was the effect of

breach of clause (1) of Rule 4 of the Rules. Did it have the

effect of rendering the appointment wholly void so as to be

completely ineffective or merely irregular, so that it could be

regularised as and when the appellant acquired the

necessary qualifications to hold the post of Labour-cum-

Conciliation Officer. We are of the view that the

appointment of the appellant was irregular since he

did not possess one of the three requisite qualifications

but as soon as he acquired the necessary qualification

of five years' experience of the working of Labour Laws

in any one of the three capacities mentioned in clause

(1) of Rule 4 or in any higher capacity, his appointment

must be regarded as having been regularised …”

44. Reliance was further placed on the decision of this Court in

Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors.

4

where the selection, and subsequent appointment, of candidates

as Motor Vehicle Inspector in the State of Bihar was under

challenge on account of not possessing the experience in an

appropriate automobile institution registered under the Factories

Act, 1948 or not possessing a driving license. It was held that by

4 (2001) 3 SCC 328.

30

virtue of having served on the post for a long time, by extending

equitable consideration, the appointments made pursuant to a

selection were not liable to be disturbed. The relevant portion is

reproduced below for ready reference: –

“6. The selected candidates, who have been appointed, are

now in employment as Motor Vehicle Inspectors for over a

decade. Now that they have worked in such posts for a

long time, necessarily they would have acquired the

requisite experience. Lack of experience, if any, at the

time of recruitment is made good now. Therefore, the

new exercise ordered by the High Court will only lead

to anomalous results. Since we are disposing of these

matters on equitable consideration, the learned counsel for

the contesting respondents submitted that their cases for

appointment should also be considered. It is not clear

whether there is any vacancy for the post of Motor Vehicle

Inspectors. If that is so, unless any one or more of the

selected candidates are displaced, the cases of the

contesting respondents cannot be considered. We think that

such adjustment is not feasible for practical reasons. We

have extended equitable considerations to such

selected candidates who have worked in the post for a

long period, but the contesting respondents do not come in

that class. The effect of our conclusion is that

appointments made long back pursuant to a selection

need not be disturbed. Such a view can be derived from

several decisions of this Court including the decisions in Ram

Sarup v. State of Haryana; District Collector Chairman,

Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M.

Tripura Sundari Devi and H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief

Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore. Therefore, we

must let the matters lie where they are.”

45. It was further urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the

appellant that such equitable consideration was extended by this

Court in a catena of cases, being Bholanath Mukherjee and Ors.

v. Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Centenary College and

31

Ors.

5, Rajesh Kumar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.

6 and

Vikas Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and

Ors.

7

to contend that where a candidate has continued in service

for a considerable period, this Court may, in appropriate cases,

mould the relief on equitable considerations so as to avoid

unsettling appointments.

46. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decisions is that

this Court may, in appropriate cases, having regard to the long

period of service, in absence of any fault on the part of the

incumbent, and on equities that may have crystallised over time;

mould the relief so as to do complete justice. However, such

exercise of discretion is necessarily conditioned by the facts of each

case and cannot be invoked to dilute or override the essential

eligibility requirements forming the basis of the selection process.

47. At this point, we must emphasise that the grant of relief on

equitable considerations is not a matter of right. The exercise of

such jurisdiction is discretionary and is invoked only in

exceptional circumstances when the facts so warrant. Where the

basic eligibility criteria itself remains unfulfilled, no claim of equity

5 (2011) 5 SCC 464.

6 (2013) 4 SCC 690.

7 (2013) 14 SCC 494.

32

can arise in favour of one candidate, in particular, when some

other candidate allegedly possessing the qualification and also

claiming appointment to the said post succeeded in the writ

Appellate Court. To extend such consideration in the face of a clear

breach of essential qualifications would amount to placing equity

above the R&P Rules, which is impermissible. The decisions relied

upon by the appellant, wherein this Court extended equitable

consideration to protect appointments, were rendered in distinct

factual contexts. In those cases, the deficiency in qualification was

either marginal or was capable of being cured by the incumbents

upon their continuation in service, inasmuch as the experience or

requirement in question could be acquired in the course of

discharging duties on the post itself. It was in such circumstances

that this Court, having regard to long years of service, declined to

unsettle the appointments.

48. In the present case, the defect is not merely procedural or

incidental, but goes to the root of eligibility itself. The selected

candidate, i.e., the appellant did not fulfil the essential

qualification of “at least five years’ work experience in computer

manufacturing/maintenance” as on the relevant date. Such

experience is of a specialised nature and external to the post in

33

question, which couldn’t have been acquired by a candidate after

serving as a Computer Hardware Engineer. At the same time, the

plea taken by the unsuccessful candidate has been accepted in the

Letters Patent Appeal, though consideration for his appointment

was not allowed. Thus, we can presume from the chart referred

above in paragraph 32 of this judgment, wherein the Committee

has not specified the nature of experience possessed by the

candidates even though it was deficient. Therefore, in such a

scenario, the qualification of five years’ experience which is within

the minimum qualification, must be understood in its true sense

to mean that the candidates ought to possess prior hands-on

exposure in the field of computer manufacturing/maintenance in

a company of repute. The experience in service on the said post

could not be substituted by the experience required at the

threshold.

49. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, it is further

observed that the recruiting agency or the Board had not exercised

their power under Clause 2 preceding Rule 7 or as per Rule 18 of

the R&P Rules by application of mind and assigning any reason in

writing. Therefore, the selection made, if any, in contravention to

the R&P Rules prevalent on the date, would cause inherent

34

illegality which cannot be dispensed with by way of equitable

consideration or by exercising discretion of the Court.

50. The next aspect which arises for consideration is whether, on

the selection of the appellant being held unsustainable, any

direction for selection/appointment of the unsuccessful candidate,

i.e., respondent no. 1 – Rahul or any other candidate is warranted.

51. It was contended on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel for

the unsuccessful candidate that he, having possessed the requisite

experience as on the relevant date, and the selection of the selected

candidate having been set aside, ought to be considered for

appointment to the post in question. This submission, however,

cannot be accepted in a mechanical manner. It is well settled that

mere participation in a selection process or even fulfilment of

eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to

appointment. The right, if any, is only to be considered in

accordance with the applicable rules and the outcome of a valid

selection process.

52. The material on record indicates that the selection process

itself was not conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed

eligibility criteria. As noticed hereinabove, candidates who did not

fulfil the essential qualification of experience were permitted to

35

participate, and there is nothing to show that the eligibility of

candidates was scrutinised with due rigour at the threshold. In

such circumstances, the recruitment process stands vitiated to

that extent, as also observed in the impugned judgement. A

perusal of the supporting documents submitted by the candidates

during the selection process, which are on record, indicates that

none of the parties herein appear to have possessed the requisite

experience in a “computer manufacturing/maintenance company

of repute” as specifically prescribed under the R&P Rules. The

selected candidate’s experience was in the capacity of a Vocational

Trainer (Telecom) in a Government school, whereas the

unsuccessful candidate had experience as a Senior Technical

Assistant, Project Associate and Additional Programme Officer in

various autonomous public institutions. The waitlisted candidate

was working as a System Administrator in a private company.

Such engagements, on the face of the record, do not satisfy the

specific nature of experience contemplated under the R&P Rules.

This further reinforces the observation that the essential eligibility

criteria was neither scrutinised nor adhered to at the stage of

selection, thereby vitiating the selection process.

36

53. Further, even on perusal of the facts and material on record,

it is not the case that respondent no. 1 – Rahul stood next in merit,

in a valid and properly conducted selection, upon exclusion of the

appellant Himakshi. The record does not support any such

automatic or consequential right of appointment. To direct

appointment in his favour would amount to substituting one

illegality with another without the benefit of a fair and rule-

compliant selection process.

54. In matters of public employment, the Court must be

circumspect in issuing positive directions for appointment unless

the entitlement is clear, unambiguous, and flows directly from the

applicable rules. Where the selection process itself is found to be

flawed, the appropriate course would ordinarily be to set aside the

selection rather than to direct appointment of a particular

candidate.

55. Before concluding, it may be noted that the controversy in

the present appeals has, at its core, arisen from the selection of a

candidate who did not fulfil the essential eligibility criteria as on

the relevant date, and the subsequent continuance of such

appointment over a period of time. The issues that have engaged

the attention of this Court, therefore, lie at the intersection of

37

adherence to the R&P Rules and the equities sought to be invoked

on account of subsequent developments. As discussed

hereinabove, the former must prevail.

56. In view of the above, the selection and appointment of the

appellant cannot be sustained in law. At the same time, no

direction for appointment of the unsuccessful candidate or any

other candidate is warranted, in the facts and circumstances of

the case.

57. Issue no. (iii) is answered accordingly.

58. Having regard to the above discussion, this Court finds no

infirmity in the impugned judgement of the Division Bench of the

High Court, and accordingly, the same is upheld. On considering

the nature of the defect in eligibility, the passage of time, and the

fact that the appellant has continued in service for a considerable

period, no useful purpose would be served in directing a fresh

process of selection at this stage with the same candidate.

However, the respondent no. 2 – Board is at liberty to issue a fresh

advertisement for selection to the post in question and do the

needful strictly in accordance with the R&P Rules. As such, for

the reasons recorded hereinabove, no direction for appointment in

38

favour of respondent no. 1 – Rahul or any other candidate can be

issued. Accordingly, these appeals stand dismissed.

59. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

.….………………………… J.

[J.K. MAHESHWARI]

..…………………………… J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

New Delhi;

April 20, 2026.