W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 1 of 23

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021

(In the matter of an application under Article 226 & 227 of the

Constitution of India)

In W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025

Swosti Premium Ltd., Jaydev Vihar,

Bhubaneswar, represented through

its General Manager and another

…

Petitioner

-versus-

State of Odisha, represented through

its Chief Secretary and others

…

Opposite Parties

Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-

For Petitioner : Mr.G.Mukherji, Sr.Advocate

Mr.A.Behera, Advocate

For Opposite Parties : T.K.Dash, AGA

In W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021

Hotel and Restaurant Association of

Odisha, Bhubaneswar, represented

through its Executive Secretary and

another

…

Petitioner

-versus-

State of Odisha, represented through

its Chief Secretary and others

…

Opposite Parties

Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-

For Petitioner : Mr.G.Mukherji, Sr.Advocate

Mr.A.Behera, Advocate

For Opposite Parties : T.K.Dash, AGA

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 2 of 23

CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY

JUDGMENT

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of Hearing : 24

th

March, 2026

Date of Judgment : 21

st

May, 2026

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B.P. Routray, J.

1. Both the writ petitions, one filed by Swosti Premium Ltd., and

other by Hotel and Restaurant Association of Odisha, are directed

with common prayer to quash the order of Chief Secretary, Odisha

dated 26

th

October 2021 along with different clauses of the Odisha

Tourism Policy, 2016 read with operational guidelines issued thereof

on 5

th

June 2017 and as such are involving common issues for

decision. In addition to this, Swosti Premium Ltd. has further prayed

to quash the order of the Director of Tourism rejecting his prayer to

grant such incentives. The common issues involved in both the writ

petitions are to the effect that, whether the migrated industrial units

could be included to receive such benefits/incentives under the Odisha

Tourism Policy, 2016 and the operational guidelines issued thereof.

The crux of the issue is relating to insertion of a migration clause in

the Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 based on certain clauses mentioned

in the Odisha Industrial Policy Resolution, 2015.

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 3 of 23

2. The Industrial Policy Resolution, 2015 (IPR 2015) was issued

by the Government of Odisha covering different industrial sectors

including concern of present Petitioners, i.e. Tourism and Hospitality

Sector. The objective of IPR 2015 was to promote industrial

development for setting up a business climate conducive to accelerate

investment in industries and infrastructure projects and its prime

objectives include, specifically, promotion of sectors in priority

category such as Information Technology (IT) / Information

Technology Enabled Services (ITES) / Electronic System Designing

and Manufacturing (ESDM), Biotechnology, Agro, Marine and Food

Processing, Tourism, Textiles and Apparel and automotive industries

which offer strong images to employment generation and exports.

3. The main purpose was to maximize employment generation and

enhance employability through industry oriented skill development

and to encourage establishment of environment friendly and less

polluting industries. For ready reference, the objectives of IPR 2015

as mentioned at Clause-2 of said resolution are reproduced below:

“2.3 To specifically promote sectors in the priority category

such as Information Technology (IT)/Information Technology

Enabled Services (ITES)/Electronic System Designing and

Manufacturing (ESDM), Biotechnology, Agro, Marine and Food

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 4 of 23

Processing, Tourism, Textiles and Apparel and automotive

industries, which offer strong images to employment generation

and exports.”

4. It is required to be mentioned here that priority sectors as per

the definition and interpretation clause given in IPR 2015, means

industrial units which fall within such categories that include tourism

and hospitality. It is further defined in IPR 2015, the new industrial

units, expansion of existing industrial units and migrated industrial

units. Such definition contained at Clause 15 of the IPR 2015 reads as

under:

“8. “Expansion/Modernization/Diversification” of an

existing industrial unit means additional investment of at least

50% of the un-depreciated book value of plant and machinery

of the said unit made in acquisition of additional plant and

machinery and technology for such E/W/D duly appraised and

approved by DIC/RIC/SISI/NSIC/NCDC/OCAC/ST PI/

IPICOL/ Public Financial Institutions. In case of “Expansion”

the additional investment as above must result in at least 50%

addition in production capacity. In case of “Diversification”

the additional investment as above must result in production of

at least one additional product.

xx.. xx.. xx..

15) “New Industrial Unit” means an industrial unit where

fixed capital investment has commenced on or after the

effective date and which goes in to production within three

years for MSMEs and five years for Large units from the date

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 5 of 23

of starting of first fixed capital investment. New investment

after the effective date on existing land towards building and

plant and machinery and which goes in to production within

three and five years for MSME and Large units respectively

from the date of starting of first fixed capital investment will

be considered as a new industrial unit.

16. “Migrated Industrial Unit” means an industrial unit which

has commenced fixed capital investment but not gone into

production before the effective date and will have the option to

be treated as New Industrial Unit under this IPR provided that

it goes into production within three years for MSMEs and five

years for Large Industries from the effective date and it will

surrender and or refund the incentives availed, if any under

earlier IPRs, Provided also that such option shall be exercised

in the prescribed form provided in the Operational Guidelines

and submitted within 180 days from the “Effective Date”.

Once the option is exercised, it shall be final and irrevocable.”

5. The Miscellaneous Clause in IPR 2015 is also required to be

noted here and the same is reproduced below:

“14. MISCELLANEOUS

a) The policy lays down the base fiscal and non-fiscal

incentives available to any industry set up across the State.

b) Government of Odisha has notified a separate policy-

Orissa MSME Development Policy 2009- which provides

fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to MSME units.

c) Various sector specific policies have been and will be

notified by Government of Odisha from time to time. In

such cases, while the allocation of land will be governed

by this IPR, the industrial unit can choose to avail a

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 6 of 23

particular incentive under either this policy or the sectoral

policy.

d) Any Act or policy of Government of Odisha along with its

rules and procedures thereunder dealing with promotion of

investments in the State that is conflicting with this policy,

its rules and procedures shall be suitably amended to the

extent required to bring conformity with this policy within

one year of notification of this policy.

e) The incentives on taxes such as VAT, Entry Tax, Central

Sales Tax (CST) and Entertainment Tax will be applicable

till the notification of GST by Governed of India, Post

notification of GST, Industries Department will suitably

modify this policy.

f) The State Government may at any time amend any

provision of this policy

g) A special package of incentives over the above what has

been enumerated in this Policy document may be

considered for new industrial projects in certain sectors or

certain locations on a case to case basis by a high level

committee to be constituted under the Chairmanship of

Chief Secretary taking into account the benefits to the

State. The Cabinet would consider such proposals duly

recommended by the high level committee.

h) All the industrial units are expected to adhere to the

provisions of the Apprentice Policy 1973 as a measure of

their contribution to skill development.

i) Doubts relating to interpretation of any term and/or dispute

relating to the operation of any provision under this IPR

shall be referred to the Industries Department for

clarification/resolution. The decision of Government in

this regard shall be final and binding on all concerned.”

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 7 of 23

6. Subsequently, the State Government of Odisha announced

Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 at Annexure-15. The objective of such

policy is to promote sustainable and green tourism along with

preservation, enrichment and promotion of unique cultural heritage of

Odisha and its natural environment with a view to achieve inclusive

development for addressing developmental functions in Private Public

Partnership (PPP) mode and for creation of employment opportunities

bringing socio-economic benefits to the community. The details of

such objectives are narrated below:-

4. The Objectives:

a. To promote Sustainable and Green Tourism with a view to

create employment opportunities and to bring about socio-

economic benefits to the community.

b. To preserve, enrich and promote Odisha‟s unique cultural

heritage, natural resources and environment with a view to

achieve inclusive development; addressing the regulatory and

tourism promotion/ development functions in Private Public

Partnership (PPP) mode at all levels in an effective and well

coordinated manner.

c. To promote Odisha as one step destination to experience its

great history, culture, society and natural beauty so as to boost

foreign and domestic tourist arrival in the State.

d. To promote circuit tourism in association with the States of

the Eastern Zone of the country to facilitate easy arrival and

movement of the tourist.

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 8 of 23

e. To upgrade skill and professionalism and promote

employment opportunities in tourism sector.

f. To promote digital tourism.

g. To promote responsible tourism and develop tourism

products in an environment friendly manner.

h. To promote barrier free tourism.

i. To promote (1) Beach Tourism, (2) Eco Tourism, (3)

Buddhist Tourism, (4) Heritage Tourism, (5) Religious

Tourism, (6) Knowledge Tourism, (7) Medical Tourism, (8)

Travel Tourism, (9) Caravan Tourism, (10) Wellness Tourism,

(11) Cruise Tourism, (12) Sand Art Tourism, (13) Adventure

Tourism, in a mission mode.

7. Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 applies to a new tourism unit,

which means a tourism unit set up and commences commercial

operation during the partition period of the policy. It also includes an

existing tourism unit undergoing expansion more than 50% of its

existing capabilities after the effective date. In this regard Clause-6.3,

6.4 and 6.6 of the Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 enumerate as above.

8. The grievance of the Petitioners is that absence of inclusion of

migration clause in the Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 leads to violation

the purported representation of the State Government under Clause

14(c) and 14(d) of IPR 2015, and thereby attracts the doctrine of

legitimate expectation in favour of the Petitioners to get such

incentives/benefits as extended to the new „Industrial Units‟ and

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 9 of 23

expansion of „Existing Industrial Units‟ under said policy. According

to the description narrated by the Petitioners, IPR 2015 is to be

considered as the mother policy and Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016

being a sector specific policy cannot be in conflicting terms with IPR

2015 and must be in conformity with the same. Such inaction on the

part of the State Government to exclude migrated „Industrial Units‟

from the applicability of Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 is in violation

of the object and prescription of IPR 2015.

9. It is true and admitted on the part of the Petitioner in W.P.(C)

No.21670 of 2025, i.e. Swosti Premium Ltd., does not come within

the description and definition of „New Industrial Unit‟ and expansion

of existing „Industrial Unit‟ as per Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016. Thus

its‟ general grievance along with HRAO (the other petitioner) is for

inclusion of the migrated „Industrial Units‟ in the Odisha Tourism

Policy, 2016 and the operational guidelines prescribed thereof on 5

th

June 2017.

10. As per Clause-14(c) of IPR, 2015 various sectors specific

policies have been and will be notified by the Government of Odisha

from time to time and the „Industrial Unit‟ may chose to avail a

particular incentive either under IPR 2015 or under such sectoral

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 10 of 23

policy. Further, as per Clause-14(d), any act or policy of Government

of Odisha along with its rules and procedures there-under dealing with

promotion of investments in the State that is conflicting with IPR

2015, its rules and procedures shall be suitably amended to the extent

required to bring conformity with IPR 2015. These are two clauses of

IPR 2015 taken to the advantage of the Petitioners to submit that

exclusion of clause „Migrated Industrial Unit‟ is in conflict with IPR

2015 and violation of the principles thereof.

11. Said submission as advanced on behalf of the Petitioners is not

found quite convincing. It is for the reason that, exclusion of

„Migrated Industrial Unit‟ from the purview of Odisha Tourism

Policy, 2016 may not be construed as conflicting to the principles or

terms of policy in IPR 2015 though it may be opined to some extent

that it is not conformity with the adopted terms of IPR 2015. IPR 2015

includes three categories of „Industrial Units‟ Viz. New Industrial

Unit, Migrated Industrial Unit and expansion/modernization/

diversification of an existing „Industrial Unit‟. The word „conflicting‟

as used in Clause-14(d) of IPR 2015 has a restricted application which

denotes that the rules and procedures under a sector specific policy

dealing with promotion and investment should not run contrary to the

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 11 of 23

principles regarding rules and procedures for promotion of

investments in the State. Non-inclusion or exclusion of particular

category of „Industrial Unit‟ in the sectoral policy from those included

in IPR 2015 thus cannot be said as conflicting with the rules and

procedures of IPR 2015. For example, had it been a case of expansion

of the „Industrial Unit‟ less than 50% as specified in IPR 2015 as a

condition of eligibility, it would have been an effect of conflict with

IPR 2015. In the given case at hand, it is a matter of exclusion of a

particular category of industrial unit from the Odisha Tourism Policy,

2016 which was drafted as per the advice of the Tourism Advisory

Committee. It is pertinent to mention here that, objective of both the

policies does not run in conflict with each other nor any such rule or

procedure of Odisha Tourism Policy 2016 would be said as repugnant

to the objective of IPR 2015.

12. The second contention of the Petitioners to treat IPR 2015 as

the mother policy of Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 has no legislative

sanctity. Both IPR 2015 and Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 are the

resolutions formulated by the Government of Odisha having the

approval of Cabinet. Both the policies are the Cabinet approved

resolutions and therefore nothing is there not to distinguish them to be

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 12 of 23

treated differently, according to the arguments advanced on behalf of

the Petitioners.

13. So far as the expectation of the Petitioners to get such

incentives/ benefits under Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 is concerned,

the same is not supported by any such express promise or practice

under the existing policy for any relevant time. It is admitted that

Odisha Tourism Policy, 2013 does not contain any such provision or

clause to incentivize „Migrated Industrial Units‟ during validity of

said policy. This aspect is never disputed and the Petitioner does not

claim about existence of any such policy term in Odisha Tourism

Policy, 2013 to favour „Migrated Industrial Units‟. As a settled

principle the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies where there is

an express promise given by a public authority, or because of the

existence of a regular practice which a claimant can reasonably expect

to continue, and such expectation must be within the limits of

reasonableness. Any situation of change in policy or where the

position is altered in public interest the question of legitimate

expectation does not survive. In State of Bihar and Ors. Vs.

Suprabhat Steel Limited and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 31, the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court has observed that, “ .. .. the industrial incentive policy

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 13 of 23

is issued by the State Government after such policy is approved by the

Cabinet itself. The issuance of the notification under Section 7 of the

Bihar Finance Act is by the State Government in the Finance

Department which notification is issued to carry out the objectives

and the policy decisions taken in the Industrial Policy itself. In this

view of the matter, any notification issued by the Government order in

exercise of power under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act, if is found

to be repugnant to the Industrial Policy declared in a Government

Resolution, then the said notification must be held to be bad to that

extent”.

14. In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed

Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71, Hon‟ble Apex Court have held at

paragraph 8 as follows:-

“8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a

citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct

enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight

to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the

requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation

forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary

concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation

is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair

decision making process. Whether the expectation of the

claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a

question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises,

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 14 of 23

it is to be determined not according to the claimant's

perception but in larger public interest wherein other more

important considerations may outweigh what would

otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the

claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority

reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-

arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of

legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and

operates in our legal system in this manner and to this

extent.”

15. In Tej Prakash Pathak & others vs- Rajasthan High Court &

Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1, it has been explained as follows:-

26. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not

impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay down

a policy or withdraw it. The public authority has the discretion

to exercise the full range of choices available within its

executive power. The public authority often has to take into

consideration diverse factors, concerns, and interests before

arriving at a particular policy decision. The courts are generally

cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of public

authorities which denies legitimate expectation provided such a

decision is taken in the larger public interest. Thus, public

interest serves as a limitation on the application of the doctrine

of legitimate expectation.

27. Courts have to determine whether the public interest is

compelling and sufficient to outweigh the legitimate expectation

of the claimant. While performing a balancing exercise, courts

have to often grapple with the issues of burden and standard of

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 15 of 23

proof required to dislodge the claim of legitimate expectation.

[Sivanandan C.T. case, (2024) 3 SCC 799, para 37]

16. In Madras City Wine Merchants’ Association and Anr. Vs.

State of T.N. and Anr., (1994) 5 SCC 509, the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court has observed as follows:-

19. Legitimate expectation is a weak and sober right as ordained

by a statute. When the Government decides to introduce fair

play by way of auction facilitating all eligible persons to contest

on equal terms, certainly one cannot contend that he is entitled

for a lease merely on the basis of a pending application. The

right being not legal, apart from being non-existent, it can

certainly not be enforceable. The principle of law on these

aspects, as settled decades ago in State of T.N. v. Hind Stone

[State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205] , is being

reiterated from time to time. (Monnet Ispat & Energy [Monnet

Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1] , SCC

pp. 106 & 110, paras 183 & 188)

Principles of legitimate expectation

183. As there are parallels between the doctrines of

promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation because

both these doctrines are founded on the concept of fairness

and arise out of natural justice, it is appropriate that the

principles of legitimate expectation are also noticed here

only to appreciate the case of the appellants founded on the

basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate

expectation.

188. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions of

this Court. Suffice it to observe that the following

principles in relation to the doctrine of legitimate

expectation are now well established:

188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded

in public interest as per executive policy or law, the court

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 16 of 23

would be reluctant to interfere with such decision by

invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The

legitimate expectation doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter

changes in administrative policy if it is in the public

interest to do so.

188.4. The legitimate expectation is different from

anticipation and an anticipation cannot amount to an

assertable expectation. Such expectation should be

justifiable, legitimate and protectable.

188.5. The protection of legitimate expectation does

not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an

overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other

words, personal benefit must give way to public interest

and the doctrine of legitimate expectation would not be

invoked which could block public interest for private

benefit.”

20.Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corpn. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh

[Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corpn. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh,

(2019) 9 SCC 710 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 821] : (SCC pp. 719-

20, paras 14-20)

“B. Legitimate expectation

14. The main argument on behalf of the respondents

was that the Government was bound by its promise and

could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible

legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming

from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002 which could

not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on

behalf of the respondents that they were not given an

opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was

taken away. To appreciate this contention of the

respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of

legitimate expectation.

15. The principle of legitimate expectation has been

recognised by this Court in Union of India v. Hindustan

Development Corpn.[Union of India v. Hindustan

Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499] If the promise

made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and

unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all

fairness should not act contrary to the promise.

16. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on

legitimate expectation inPunjab Communications Ltd. v.

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 17 of 23

Union of India [Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of

India, (1999) 4 SCC 727] . He referred (at SCC pp. 741-

42, para 27) to the judgment inCouncil of Civil Service

Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [Council of Civil

Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC

374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] in which Lord Diplock

had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the

decisions of the administrative authority must affect the

person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage

which : (Punjab Communications case [Punjab

Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727]

, SCC p. 742, para 27)

27. … (i) he had in the past been permitted by the

decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately

expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have

been communicated to him some rational grounds for

withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity

to comment; or

(ii) he has received assurance from the decision-

maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him

first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending

that they should not be withdrawn. ’(AC p. 408)

17. Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural

part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation

that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be

afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part

of the principle is that if a representation is made that a

benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the

person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be

continued and not be substantially varied, then the same

could be enforced.

18. It has been held by R.V. Raveendran, J. inRam

Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [Ram Pravesh Singh v.

State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1986]

that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a

right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an

expectant : (SCC p. 391, para 15)

‘15. … (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the

expectation is dashed; or

(b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In

appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction

requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or

established practice.’

Substantive Legitimate Expectation

19. An expectation entertained by a person may not be

found to be legitimate due to the existence of some

countervailing consideration of policy or law. [ H.W.R.

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 18 of 23

Wade & C.F. Forsyth : Administrative Law (Eleventh Edn.,

Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative policies

may change with changing circumstances, including

changes in the political complexion of Governments. The

liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent

in our constitutional form of Government. [Hughes v.

Deptt. of Health & Social Security, 1985 AC 776, 788 :

(1985) 2 WLR 866 (HL).]

20. The decision-makers ’freedom to change the policy

in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the

principle of substantive legitimate expectation. [Findlay,

In re, 1985 AC 318 : (1984) 3 WLR 1159 (HL).] So long

as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or in an

unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call

for interference by judicial review on the ground of a

legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of

individuals being defeated.”

17. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat &

Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 747, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has stated that

legitimate expectation is a weak and sober right as ordained by a

statute. There it has been held as follows:-

48. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.

[(1993) 3 SCC 499 : JT (1993) 3 SC 15, 50-51] this Court

observed thus: (SCC pp. 540-41, para 29)

“It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate

expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly,

gained sufficient importance. It is stated that ‘legitimate

expectation ’is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts

fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative

action and this creation takes its place beside such

principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness,

the fiduciary duty of local authorities and ‘in future,

perhaps, the principle of proportionality’. A passage in

Administrative Law, 6th Edn., by H.W.R. Wade page 424

reads thus:

These are revealing decisions. They show that the courts

now expect government departments to honour their

published statements or else to treat the citizen with the

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 19 of 23

fullest personal consideration. Unfairness in the form of

unreasonableness here comes close to unfairness in the

form of violation of natural justice, and the doctrine of

legitimate expectation can operate in both contexts. It is

obvious, furthermore, that this principle of substantive, as

opposed to procedural, fairness may undermine some of

the established rules about estoppel and misleading advice,

which tend to operate unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated

emphatically that unfairness in the purported exercise of a

power can amount to an abuse or excess of power, and this

seems likely to develop into an important general

doctrine.’

Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus:

“It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right

to be heard that ‘legitimate expectation ’was introduced

into the law. It made its first appearance in a case where

alien students of ‘scientology ’were refused extension of

their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home

Secretary, who had announced that no discretionary

benefits would be granted to this sect. The Court of Appeal

held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension

beyond the permitted time, and so no right to a hearing,

though revocation of their permits within that time would

have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official

statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate

expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. In a

different context where car-hire drivers had habitually

offended against airport bye-laws, with many convictions

and unpaid fines, it was held that they had no legitimate

expectation of being heard before being banned by the

airport authority.

There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate

expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair

hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit

which is being sought. But the result is the same in either

case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the

public authority from affording a hearing.

Again, at pages 56-57 it is observed thus: (SCC p. 547, para 33)

“A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a

body by representation or by past practice aroused

expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil.

The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial

review can be within those limits. But as discussed above a

person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate

expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a

foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim.

In considering the same several factors which give rise to

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 20 of 23

such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision

taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary,

unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a

question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the

courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case

whether there are such facts and circumstances giving rise

to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a

question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the court

is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made

out then the next question would be whether failure to give

an opportunity of hearing before the decision affecting

such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure

of justice and whether on that ground the decision should

be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is

again a matter which depends on several factors.”

Again at pages 57-58 it is observed thus: (SCC pp. 548-49, para

35)

“Legitimate expectations may come in various forms

and owe their existence to different kind of circumstances

and it is not possible to give an exhaustive list in the

context of vast and fast expansion of the governmental

activities. They shift and change so fast that the start of our

list would be obsolete before we reached the middle. By

and large they arise in cases of promotions which are in

normal course expected, though not guaranteed by way of

a statutory right, in cases of contracts, distribution of

largess by the Government and in somewhat similar

situations. For instance discretionary grant of licences,

permits or the like, carry with it a reasonable expectation,

though not a legal right to renewal or non-revocation, but

to summarily disappoint that expectation may be seen as

unfair without the expectant person being heard. But there

again the court has to see whether it was done as a policy

or in the public interest either by way of GO, rule or by

way of a legislation. If that be so, a decision denying a

legitimate expectation based on such grounds does not

qualify for interference unless in a given case, the decision

or action taken amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore

the limitation is extremely confined and if the according of

natural justice does not condition the exercise of the

power, the concept of legitimate expectation can have no

role to play and the court must not usurp the discretion of

the public authority which is empowered to take the

decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an

objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority

the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed

to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left

entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 21 of 23

any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly

and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground

of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on

legitimate expectation might be affected. For instance if an

authority who has full discretion to grant a licence prefers

an existing licence-holder to a new applicant, the decision

cannot be interfered with on the ground of legitimate

expectation entertained by the new applicant applying the

principles of natural justice. It can therefore be seen that

legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the

grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the

granting of relief is very much limited. It would thus

appear that there are stronger reasons as to why the

legitimate expectation should not be substantively

protected than the reasons as to why it should be protected.

In other words such a legal obligation exists whenever the

case supporting the same in terms of legal principles of

different sorts, is stronger than the case against it.

As observed in Attorney General for New South Wales

case [Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin,

(1990) 64 Aust LJR 327] :

"To strike down the exercise of administrative power

solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the

legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the

courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover,

the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a

legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating

the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise

accords with law.

If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to

denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory,

unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of

principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on

the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim

based on mere legitimate expectation without anything

more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these

principles.”

From the above it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise-

(a) if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or

(b) because of the existence of a regular practice which the

claimant can reasonably expect to continue;

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 22 of 23

(c) Such an expectation must be reasonable.

However, if there is a change in policy or in public interest the

position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate

expectation would arise.

18. The facts as narrated in the instant case not do not reveal any

such promise or existence of regular practice to give rise a legitimate

expectation on the part of the Petitioners to get the benefits/ incentives

in their favour. This was not availed or extended in the previous

tourism policy of the year 2013 nor is it in present policy. What is

stated in IPR 2015 to include tourism sector in Clause 2.3 is in a

general form and that apart, Petitioners case is not to be considered in

terms of IPR 2015 excluding the tourism policy, 2016. It is further

seen that the Petitioner had the choice to opt between IPR 2015 and

Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 as per the condition stipulated in both

the policies. Keeping in view the objective and applicability of Odisha

Tourism Policy, 2016, the expectation of the Petitioners to get such

benefits as „Migrated Industrial Units‟ under IPR 2015 cannot be

considered as legitimate on their part either by way of practice or

promise. The expectation of the Petitioners to pluck the benefits for

Migrated Industrial Units implanting the same within the purview of

Odisha Tourism Policy, 2016 would thus not considered as

reasonable.

W.P.(C) No.21670 of 2025 & W.P.(C) No.37811 of 2021 Page 23 of 23

19. In the given case at hand, the claim of both the Petitioners have

been rejected vide the direction of Director of Tourism and the Chief

Secretary to Government of Odisha respectively. The order of the

Chief Secretary dated 26

th

October 2021, commonly impugned in both

the writ petitions, is seen to be a reasoned one declining to extend the

benefits to Migrated Industrial Units as per the Odisha Tourism

Policy, 2016. On the anvil of discussions made above, the reasons

stated in the impugned order of the Chief Secretary do not found to be

unreasonable warranting interference of this Court to grant the relief

in favour of the Petitioners. Nonetheless, it is found from said

impugned order of the Chief Secretary that the Finance Department of

State Government has opined to insert perspective migration in the

policy and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that in the event, such

migration clause is included perspectively in the policy to include

“Migrated Industrial Units” to avail such incentives/ benefits, it is

open for the State Authority to do so for extending benefits to such

„Migrated Industrial Units‟.

20. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are disposed of.

( B.P. Routray)

Judge

C.R.Biswal, A.R.-cum-Sr.Seretary

S.Das