http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5

PETITIONER:

HOUSING BOARD HARYANA

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

HOUSING BOARD COLONY WELFAREASSOCIATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/09/1995

BENCH:

FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

BENCH:

FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:

1996 AIR 92 1995 SCC (5) 672

JT 1995 (6) 293 1995 SCALE (5)89

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

Faizan Uddin, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The appellant Housing Board is a statutory body

constituted for the purposes of providing cheap and

economical housing facilities. The land for construction of

tenements is provided by Haryana Urban Development Authority

(hereinafter HUDA) which is also a statutory body. The land

is acquired by the appellant-Board from HUDA under

stipulation with regard to enhancement in the price of the

land consequent upon judicial pronouncement. The appellant-

Board invited applications for allotment of houses/flats

from the economically weaker section, belonging to LIG/MIG

category. The appellant -Board issued allotment letters to

various appellant specifically mentioning in clause (9) of

the allotment letters that as a result of the land award or

arbitration proceedings, etc. if there is an increase in the

cost, the Board may enhance the price of the dwelling

houses/flats allotted to them. This condition was reiterated

in Clause 2 (W) of the Hire Purchase Tenancy Agreement (Form

A) entered into under Section 11 (4) of the Housing Board,

Haryana (Allotment, Management & Sale of Tenements )

Regulations. 1972. It was also provided that there shall be

no enhancement in the price after a period of 7 years from

the date of allotment. According to the appellant - Board,

this Clause 2(W) of Form 'A' of the Regulations was,

however, amended by a notification dated 26.5.1985 whereby a

proviso was inserted to the effect that the restriction of 7

years shall not be applicable when the escalation in the

price is due to judicial pronouncement or award of an

arbitrator.

4. Consequent upon the judicial pronouncements enhancing the

compensation granted to the land owners, HUDA also raised an

additional demand on 5.3.1992 on the appellant-Board

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5

demanding a sum amounting to Rs. 27,96,011.80

(approximately) for the land given to the appellant-Board.

In pursuance of this demand by HUDA, the appellant-Board in

turn, issued additional demand letters to its various

allottees of the houses/flats towards the enhanced price of

the land as per terms of the agreement and the regulations.

In order to avoid payment of interest on the demand by HUDA

the appellant-Board paid the entire amount to HUDA in May,

1992 including the interest that had accrued till the date

of said payment.

5. Three complaints were made before the District Consumer

Forum, Kurukshetra by the respondents herein in the three

appeals against aforementioned additional demand raised by

the appellant-Board by contending that in view of Clauses 2

(W) of the agreement the additional demand was barred by

time having been made after more than 7 years of the

allotment of houses/flats. The appellant-Board defended the

said complaints by disputing the jurisdiction of the

Consumer Forum to entertain such a complaints besides other

grounds of attack. The appellant-Board took the stand that

there was no 'service' rendered within the meaning of clause

'O' of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Consumer

Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter the Act) nor there was nay

'deficiency' in the service within the meaning of clause (g)

of Section 2 (1) of the Act. According to the appellant the

dispute, if any, related to an alleged breach of the terms

of contract for which the remedy lies in the Civil Court and

not in the Consumer Forum.

6. The District Forum by its order dated 22.10.1992

rejected the objections and defence set up by the appellant-

Board, allowed all the three complaints and quashed the

additional demand made by the appellant-Board. The

appellant-Board filed three separate appeals on 30.11.1992

before the State Commission against the aforementioned order

dated 22.10.1992 quashing the additional demands. The State

Commission took the view that all the three appeals as were

filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation under

Section 15 of the Act and as no sufficient cause for

condonation was pleaded, dismissed all the three appeals as

barred by time. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned order

of the State Commissions passed in First Appeals Nos. 389,

390, and 391 of 1992, the appellant-Board preferred Revision

Petitions before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter 'National Commission')

being Revision Petition Nos. 66 to 68/1993. The National

Commission maintained the order of State Commission and

dismissed all the three revisions by a common order dated

7.1.1993 impugned in these appeals.

7. Learne counsel for the appellant-Board submitted that

the President of the District Forum had pronounced the order

dated 22.10.1992 in open Court and after such pronouncement

of the order he proceeded on leave. Since the President had

not signed the said order before proceeding on leave, the

same was not made available to the appellant. The said order

was however, attested and certified on 30.10.1992 a copy

whereof was furnished to the appellant only on 3.11.1992.

Since 29.11.1992 was a Sunday the appeals before the State

Commission were filed on 30.11.1992. According to the

learned counsel for the appellant the appeals were filed

within one month from 30.10.1992, the date on which the

attested and certified copy of the order was supplied to the

appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant venemently

urged that according to sub-rule (10) of Rule 4 of the

Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 it was obligatory on

the part of the District Forum to furnish signed and dated

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5

copy of the order free of charge to the appellant and that

such a copy was furnsihed to the appellant on 30.10.1992

and, therefore, the appeals filed before the State

Commission on 30.11.1992, would be within the prescribed

limitation under Section 15 of the Act and there was no

question or making any application for condonations of delay

in filing the appeals. He further submitted that the

appellant-Board could not have filed the appeals against the

order of the District Forum on the basis of mere

pronouncement thereof in the open Court unless the contents

of the order were made available to the appellant for the

purposes of preparing the appeal and challenging the same in

the higher Forum. Learned counsel for the appellant,

therefore, urged that the State Commission as well as the

National Commission both committed a serious error in

dismissing the appeals and the revisions on the ground that

the same were barred by time and no sufficient cause for

condonation of delay was pleaded.

8. Before considering the merits of the submissions made

by the learned counsel for the appellant it would be

appropriate first to look into the relevant provisions

relating to the limitation. Section 15 of the Act makes a

provision for appeal and prescribes the limitation for the

same. It reads as under:

15. Appeal.-- Any person aggrieved by an

order made by the District Forum may

prefer an appeal against such order to

the State Commission within a period of

thirty days from the date of an order,

in such form and manner as may be

prescribed.

Provided further that the State

Commission may entertain an appeal after

the expiry of the said period of thirty

days if it is satisfied that there was

sufficient cause for not finding it

within that period.

9. Further the State Government made Rules under Sub-

Section (2) of Section 30 of the Act known as the Haryana

Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred as

Rules). Sub-rule (10) of Rules 4 and Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8

which are relevant for purposes of these appeals are

reproduced hereunder:

Rule 4 (10). -- "Orders of the District

Forum shall be signed and dated by the

members of the District Forum

constituting the Bench and shall be

communicated to the parties free of

charge."

Rule 8 (3). -- "Each memorandum shall be

accompanied by the certified copy of the

order of the District Forum appealed

against and such of the documents as may

be required to support grounds of

objection mentioned in the Memorandum."

10. Reading of the provisions of Section 15 reproduced

above goes to show that any person aggrieved by an order

made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal to the State

Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the

order. But under the proviso the State Commission is

enjoined with the discretion to entertain the appeal even

after the expiry of the period of 30 days if it is satisfied

that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal

within 30 days from the date of order. Section 15 does not

prescribe any other requirement for the purposes of filing a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5

proper and valid appeal to the State Commission. The other

requirements for a properly constituted appeal are

contained in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 which contemplates that

each Memorandum of Appeal shall be accompanied by a

certified copy of the order of the District forum appealed

against and such other documents as may be required to

support the grounds of objection mentioned in the Memorandum

of Appeal. Sub-rule (10) of Rule 4 further makes it

obligatory that the order of the District Forum shall not

only be signed and dated by the members of the District

Forum constituting the Bench but it enjoins a duty to

communicate the order so passed signed and dated by the

members of the District Forum, to the parties free of

charge.

11. From the scheme of the Act it becomes apparent that the

Consumer Protection Act 1986 has been enacted with the

object to provide for better protection of the interest of

the consumers, as a measure for economical and speedy remedy

for the settlement of their disputes and matters connected

therewith. It is with this object in view that Rule 4 (10)

has also been made. It provides for communication of the

order of the district Forum to the parties free of charge in

order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from

the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining

the certified copy. If the rule itself enjoins a duty for

communicating the order of the District Forum duly signed

and dated to the parties free of charge, there will hardly

be an occasion for the parties to make an application for

obtaining a certified copy thereof. Thus, Section 15 of the

Act cannot be read in isolation but it has to be read

alongwith Rules 4 (10) and 8 (3) of the Rules and a

combined reading of Section 15 and the Rules reproduced

above gives an impression that the purposes, object and

intention of these statutory provisions is to protect the

interest of the parties before the District Forum by making

it obligatory on the District Forum to provide a copy of the

order duly signed and dated by the members of the Bench and

the period of limitation prescribed with regard to the

filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from the

date of communication of the order in the manner laid down

in sub-rule (10) of the Rule 4.

12. In the facts and circumstances stated above. The date

of pronouncement of the order in the open Court by itself

cannot be the starting point of determining the period of

limitation under Section 15 of the Act. It has also to be

shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was

duly singed and dated by the members of the District Forum

constituting the Bench and the same was communicated to the

parties free of the charge. That being so, it has to be

appreciate that mere pronouncement of an order in the open

Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the Rules a

copy of the said order has also to be communicated to the

parties affected by the aid order so that the party

adversely affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable

opportunity of knowing that text, reasons and contents

thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the

appellant or higher forums. In the absence of such

communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely

affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of

the order so as to challenge the same and get it set aside

by the appellate authority or the higher Forums.

13. In the present case as aid before the State Commission

the appellant contended that the order was pronounced by the

District Forum in the open Court on 22.10.1992, it was not

signed and dated as the President had proceeded on leave

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5

soon thereafter and therefore, neither the reasons on which

the said order was based were known nor a copy thereof was

furnished to the appellant-Board so as to know the reasons

and contents of the order. It was also the case of the

appellant that on an enquiry by the counsel for the

appellant-Board he was informed by the Stenographer of the

President that the order would be dictatated and typed after

the return of the President and that the copy would be made

available to the parties only on 30.10.1992 under the

signature of the President and the copy was in fact made

available to the counsel for the appellant only on

3.11.1992. It may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh,

learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before the

National Commission had filed his own affidavit affirming

these facts which have not been controverted by the

respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in this Court

by Shri K.C. Chug, President, Housing Board Colony Welfare

Association, Kurukshetra on behalf of the respondents has

admitted that in the present case free copies were ready

with the office on 30.10.1992 which were collected by the

counsel for the answering respondent on 30.10.1992 whereas

the counsel for the petitioner got the same on 3.11.1992.

From these facts it is abundantly clear that the copies were

duly signed and dated by the members of the forum on

30.10.1992. That being so the period of limitation in view

of the above discussion will commence from the date on which

the copies of the order were ready and made available i.e.

30.10.1992. In the present case the appeals were filed

before the State Commission on 30.11.1992 and since

29.11.1992 was Sunday, the appeals were prima facie within

time. In these facts and circumstance there was no question

of making any application for condonation of delay in filing

the appeals as there was no delay at all.

14. For the reasons stated above the appeals succeed and

are hereby allowed. The impugned orders of the National

Commission and the State Commission are set aside. The

appeals are remitted back to the State Commission for

disposal on merits in accordance with law. No order as to

costs.