2025 INSC 701

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

IN RE: CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI STOREYED BUILDINGS

IN FOREST LAND MAHARASHTRA

I.A.NO. 2079 OF 2007

[Application for Impleadment and Directions]

WITH

I.A. NOS.2301-2302 OF 2008

[Applications for Impleadment and Directions

in I.A. No. 2079 OF 2007]

WITH

I.A. NOS.3044-3045 OF 2011

[Application for Impleadment and Directions

in I.A. No. 2079 OF 2007]

WITH

I.A. NO.254946 OF 2023

[Application for Directions in I.A. Nos. 2301-2302 of

2008 in I.A. No. 2079 OF 2007]

WITH

I.A. NO.39711 OF 2024

[Application for permission to file Additional Documents

in I.A. No.254946 of 2023]

IN

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 202 OF 1995

IN RE: T.N. GODAVARMAN

THIRUMALPAD ….PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….RESPONDENTS

WITH

2

WRIT PETITION (C) NO.301 OF 2008

WITH

I.A. No. 9108 OF 2024 in WRIT PETITION (C) NO.301 OF

2008

I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 3

II. FACTUAL POSITION ............................................................. 3

a. Background .......................................................................... 3

b. Actions of the State Government ......................................... 6

c. Acquisition and Construction by RRCHS .............................. 9

d. Proceedings before this Court............................................. 10

III. SUBMISSIONS .................................................................... 15

IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ............................................ 19

V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ............................................... 20

a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land.................. 20

b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was justified in

recommending the allotment of subject land in favour of the

‘Chavan Family’ and as to whether the State Government was

justified in accepting the said recommendation. ...................... 25

c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable

to the facts of the present case. ............................................... 38

d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona fide

purchaser of the subject land. .................................................. 42

e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to allotment of

alternate piece of land in view of the order passed by this Court in

In Re: “Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land

Maharashtra”. .......................................................................... 52

f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be applicable

in the facts and circumstances of the present case. .................. 57

VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 85

3

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, CJI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present matter is a classic example as to how the

nexus between the Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Builders

can result in the conversion of precious Forest Land for

commercial purposes under the garb of resettlement of people

belonging to the backward class from who se ancestors,

agricultural land was acquired for public purpose.

II. FACTUAL POSITION

2. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details, giving

rise to present proceedings are as under:

a. Background

2.1 An area admeasuring 32 Acres 35 Gunthas at Survey No.

20 of Village Kondhwa Budruk in Pune District was notified as

a Reserved Forest under the provisions of Section 34 of the

Indian Forest Act, 1878 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1878

Act”) vide Notification dated 1

st March 1879.

4

2.2 A portion of the land admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Gunthas

was de-reserved by the State Government vide Notification

dated 5

th January 1934.

2.3 It is pertinent to note that no further orders for de-

reservation were passed post 1934. As a result of which the

remaining area of 29 Acres and 15 Gunthas, which was

numbered as Survey No.20-A and subsequently renumbered

as Survey No.21 of Village Kondhwa Budruk remained to be a

Forest Land (hereinafter referred to as “the subject land”).

2.4 During the 1960s, a different parcel of land in Survey

No.37 of Kondhwa Budruk belonging to one ‘Chavan Family’

was acquired by the State Government for the purposes of

construction of “Dr. Bandorwala Leprosy Hospital”.

2.5 It appears from the record that no compensation was

paid to the ‘Chavan Family’. As such, a request was made by

them for allotment of the subject land as an alternative for

their resettlement.

2.6 It further appears from the record that in response to the

request made by the ‘Chavan Family’, the Tehsildar, Haveli

vide his communication dated 13

th May 1968, released the

subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ for cultivation for a period

5

of one year. The subject land was allotted on “Eksali” (yearly)

basis for the year 1968-69.

2.7 The said allotment was accepted by the ‘Chavan Family’.

The members of the ‘Chavan Family’ had also given an

undertaking to the Mamlatdar, Taluka-Haveli, District Pune.

The relevant part of the said undertaking reads thus:

“I accept and agree that the said assessment is

allotted to me under the provision of Bombay Land

Revenue Code 1879 and rules thereunder and shall

be subjected to following terms and conditions.

1. That, no part of the said land shall be leased

out, mortgaged, sold, excavated or no lien shall be

created by me (the term includes self, heirs,

executers, assignees, administrators) without prior

written approval of the Collector.

2. That, I will handover the possession of the land

to any person nominated by the Collector without

any hassle on or before 15/12/1967.

3. That, I will not use the said assessment for any

purpose other than cultivation.

4. That, I do not have any right of the trees

standing on the land and I will behave as per the

rules annexed herewith.”

2.8 It is pertinent to note that a perusal of the record would

reveal that the said Eksali (yearly) lease was never renewed

thereafter.

2.9 It further appears from the record that on 22

nd March

1969, the State Government took a decision that the Forest

6

Land given on lease for cultivation on Eksali basis should be

permanently released for cultivation to the Eksali leaseholders

after de-reservation.

2.10 It appears that in pursuance of this resolution, the

‘Chavan Family’ made an application for permanent release of

the subject land in the year 1988.

2.11 It is relevant to note that in the meanwhile, the Forest

(Conservation) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as, “the 1980

FC Act”) came into force with effect from 25

th October 1980.

Under the provisions of Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act, no Forest

Land could be de-reserved or used for any non-forest purposes

without the permission of the Central Government.

b. Actions of the State Government

2.12 A perusal of the record would reveal that there was a lot

of inter-departmental correspondence between the different

authorities. It appears that the District Collector vide his letter

dated 19

th June 1991 found that the members of the ‘Chavan

Family’ were cultivating only 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas and,

therefore, recommended that the said area which was under

actual cultivation be allotted to them in view of the

Government Resolution dated 22

nd March 1969. He further

7

recommended that the possession of the remaining land be

handed over to the Forest Department.

2.13 However, surprisingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide

his recommendation to the State Government dated 30

th

November 1994, though, specifically recorded that as per the

Collector’s report, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were in

cultivation only in 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, recommended

allotment of the entire subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’. It

is further surprising to note that the Divisional Commissioner

also observed that there is no necessity to obtain the prior

approval of the Central Government for allotment of the said

land. It is also surprising to note that the Divisional

Commissioner also noted that the subject land was a Reserved

Forest.

2.14 It appears that thereafter the file was pending before the

State Government. At that stage, the then Minister for

Revenue opined that the said land was granted by the

Government for Agricultural purpose and that the applicants

(the ‘Chavan Family’) were using the said land continuously

for such purpose and, therefore, the provisions of the 1980 FC

Act were not applicable in the said case. He therefore sought

8

legal advice on the point from the Law and Judiciary

Department of the Government of Maharashtra. This could be

gathered from the reply given by the Deputy Secretary to the

Government, Revenue and Forest Department dated 8

th April

2008 to the Central Empowered Committee (“CEC” for short)

in response to certain queries.

2.15 It would further appear that thereafter on 27

th July 1998,

the Deputy Secretary to Government, Law and Judiciary

Department, gave his opinion that there is no necessity for

obtaining prior sanction of the Government of India if the

Forest Land is already broken up and acquired before coming

into force of the 1980 FC Act. Accordingly, the Minister for

Revenue, the Government of Maharashtra sanctioned the

allotment of the subject land and an order came to be issued

by the Government of Maharashtra vide Memorandum dated

4

th August 1998 to that effect.

2.16 In pursuance to the order passed by the State

Government, the Collector issued an order of allotment of land

on 28

th August 1998. The said allotment, however, was

subject to certain conditions. It will be relevant to refer to

9

Condition Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the said allotment order dated

28

th August 1998, which read thus:

“2) The allottee shall not be entitled to mortgage,

donate, sell, partition or exchange in any other

manner without the prior permission of the

District Collector, Pune. Similarly, shall not sell

or transfer the said land or any part thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

4) The allotee shall not lease the aforesaid land

granted to him to any other person.

5) It is necessary for the allottee to bring the said

land under cultivation within a period of two

years from the date of this order.

xxx xxx xxx

7) The said land shall be used for agricultural

purposes. Except agriculture, it shall not be

used for any other purpose.”

c. Acquisition and Construction by RRCHS

2.17 It would further appear from the record that immediately

after the land was allotted, the Divisional Commissioner vide

order dated 30

th October 1999 granted permission to the

‘Chavan Family’ to sell the land in question to one Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promotor of Richie Rich

Cooperative Housing Society Limited (“RRCHS” for short) for

residential purposes.

10

2.18 However, a perusal of the material on record would reveal

that much prior to the said permission or even much prior to

the actual allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’,

the transactions were entered into by the members of the

‘Chavan Family’ with Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief

Promoter, RRCHS. We will be referring to those documents

when we discuss the rival submissions.

2.19 The District Collector, Pune thereafter vide order dated

8

th July 2005 granted permission for use of the subject land

for Non-Agricultural purposes i.e. for construction of the

residential buildings.

2.20 On 27

th February 2006, the Pune Municipal Corporation

issued a Commencement Certificate and sanctioned the

Building Plan.

2.21 Thereafter, on 3

rd July 2007, the Ministry of Environment

and Forest (MoEF) granted environmental clearance for

construction of “Raheja Richmond Park”, a Residential,

Shopping and IT Complex.

d. Proceedings before this Court

2.22 After noticing the aforesaid aspects, one Nagrik Chetna

Manch filed I.A. No. 2079-2080 of 2007 in Writ Petition (Civil)

11

No. 202 of 1995 before this Court challenging the allotment of

Reserved Forest Land to private persons and its use for

construction of multi-storeyed buildings in violation of the

1980 FC Act.

2.23 In the said proceedings, this Court vide order dated 23

rd

November 2007, directed the CEC to enquire into the matter

and submit its report.

2.24 In pursuance to the orders passed by this Court, the CEC

started conducting enquiries into the matter and held various

meetings. When the CEC started conducting enquiries,

various queries were made to the State Government. The

Revenue and Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra

issued a notice dated 2

nd July 2008 to the RRCHS and one of

the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ thereby informing them

about the Government’s decision to review the Government

Order dated 4

th August 1998 vide which the land was allotted

to the ‘Chavan Family’.

2.25 It would further appear that the Forest Department

issued a notice to the RRCHS dated 4

th July 2008, notifying

the RRCHS that the possession of the subject land was

required to be taken back. Aggrieved thereby, the RRCHS filed

12

I.A. No.2301-2302 of 2008 in I.A. No.2079 of 2007 praying for

impleadment as well as challenging the aforementioned

notices dated 2

nd July 2008 and 4

th July 2008.

2.26 The said RRCHS also filed a writ petition being Writ

Petition (Civil) No.301 of 2008, praying for the following reliefs:

“(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other

appropriate writ order or direction under Article

32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the

notice dated 2.7.2008 bearing no. Land -

3408/1025/PKP 935/Part 2/J-5, issued by the

State Government; and/or

(b) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other

appropriate writ order or direction under Article

32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the

notice dated 4.7.2008 bearing no. 57 of 2008-

09, issued by the Forest Department,

Government of Maharashtra; and/or

(c) Pass such other of further orders as this

Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the

facts and circumstances of the case.”

2.27 After an elaborate enquiry, the CEC submitted its report

dated 27

th November 2008 and recommended thus:

i) the allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserve Forest land

in Survey No.21 (old Survey No.20A) Kondhwa

Bk in District Pune for agriculture purposes

and subsequent permission given for its sale in

favour of M/s Richie Rich Co-operative Housing

Society Ltd. and construction of buildings

should be cancelled.

ii) the area should be restored back as forest;

13

iii) the senior functionaries and officers of the

Government of Maharashtra responsible for the

allotment/use of the said Reserve Forest land in

violation of the provision of the FC Act and this

Hon’ble Court’s order dated 12.12.1996 should

be prosecuted for criminal breach of trust and

other provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It is

imperative that amongst others the then

Revenue Minister, Maharashtra, who approved

the land allotment along with the then

Divisional Commissioner, Pune who granted the

permission for the sale of the land in favour of

private person for the construction of buildings,

Mr. Ashok Khadse, the then Deputy

Conservator of Forests, Pune who has issued

“No Objection Certificate” not only in this case

but in many other cases facilitating illegal use

of the forest land for private gains and Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Developer, who

entered into various Development Agreements

for purchase and use of the Reserve Forest for

construction of buildings are prosecuted.

iv) Mr. Khadse who is presently under suspension

should not be reinstated without obtaining

permission of this Hon’ble Court;

v) the Chairman, Central Empowered Committee

may be authorized to constitute a multi

disciplinary “Special Investigation Team” to

examine the details of all the Reserve Forest

under the administrative control of the Revenue

Department in Pune and which have b een

allotted/allowed to be used in the past without

obtaining approval under the FC Act. All such

allotment/uses should be treated as null and

void and the Government of Maharashtra

should be directed to cancel all such orders.

State functionaries/officers who are found to be

responsible for allotment/use of the forest land

in all such cases, should be prosecuted for

criminal breach of trust; and

14

vi) the Chief Secretary, Government of

Maharashtra should be directed to ensure

immediate compliance of this Hon’ble Court’s

order dated 22.9.2006 in IA No.1483 regarding

transfer of forest land in charge of the Revenue

Department to the Forest Department. Till the

entire exercise is completed, he should be

directed to file fortnightly Action Taken Report

before the Hon’ble Court as well as the CEC.”

2.28 Subsequent reports have been filed by the CEC on 1

st

November 2010 and 14

th August 2013.

2.29 I.A. Nos. 3044-45 of 2011 are filed by one Greenfield

Cooperative Housing Society (“GCHS” for short) praying for

impleadment in the matter and for quashing of the order dated

29

th September 2008 by which the Divisional Commissioner,

Pune had cancelled the permission to sell by virtue of which

the GCHS had purchased the land from the original

leaseholder.

2.30 I.A. No.254946 of 2023 for directions has been filed by

RRCHS contending that the Gazette Notification dated 9

th

March 1944 did not show the subject land as the Forest Land

and, therefore, prayed for disposal of the present proceedings

in view of the said Gazette Notification.

15

2.31 I.A. No.39711 of 2024 has been filed by the State to place

on record the original Gazette Notification dated 9

th March

1944. It was contended by the State that the Gazette

Notification dated 9

th March 1944 placed by RRCHS was a

fabricated document.

2.32 This Court, therefore, vide order dated 9

th May 2024,

directed enquiry to be conducted by the Additional Director

General of State CID, Pune. The Additional Director General

of State CID, Pune conducted an enquiry and submitted his

report on 16

th August 2024 pointing out therein that the

Gazette Notification dated 9

th March 1944 placed by the

RRCHS was a forged one and not genuine one.

2.33 That is how the present proceedings have reached this

stage.

III. SUBMISSIONS

3. We have heard Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior

Counsel (Amicus Curiae) ably assisted by Mr. M.V. Mukunda,

Ms. Kanti, Ms. Raji Gururaj and Mr. Shreenivas Patil, learned

counsel. We have also heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi,

learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the RRCHS and

Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

16

behalf of the GCHS and Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the State.

4. Shri K. Parameshwar submitted that the allotment of the

Forest Land to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in flagrant breach of

the orders of this Court and the provisions of the 1980 FC Act.

He submits that though the record would clearly reveal that

the subject land was recorded as a Forest Land, the land was

allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ in flagrant violation of the law.

He submits that the record would reveal that the ‘Chavan

Family’ was only a front, while, in fact, the allotment was made

by the State Government in favour of a Builder. He submits

that the record would reveal that much prior to 1998 when the

land was actually allotted in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’, the

‘Chavan Family’ had already entered into a deal with Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of RRCHS.

5. The learned Amicus submits that in the present case it

would clearly reveal that the then Revenue Minister and the

then Divisional Commissioner of Pune had acted in total

breach of the doctrine of public trust and misused their power

to aid the illegal activities of the Builder. The learned Amicus

further submits that, considering for a moment that the

17

allotment of the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’

was legal, it is clear that the subsequent allocation thereof in

favour of RRCHS was totally in contravention of the conditions

on which the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. He

further submits that the record would reveal that the subject

land was in fact used for the purposes of plantation.

6. The learned Amicus, therefore, would submit that this

Court should accept the report of the CEC and set aside the

allotment in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’.

7. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel

submitted that the subject land was not used as a Forest Land

for a long period. It is submitted that the land in question was

allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ in lieu of compensation for

acquisition of their land. It is submitted that the subject land

lost its character as a Forest Land on account of non-use of it

for a long time for the said purpose. It is therefore submitted

that in view of the doctrine of desuetude, the subject land no

longer remained a Forest Land and, therefore, the allotment of

the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was totally

valid in law. In this respect, he relied on the judgment of this

18

Court in the case of Municipal Corporation for City of Pune

and another v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. and others

1

8. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the

RRCHS is the bona fide purchaser of the subject land from the

‘Chavan Family’. It is submitted that the records viz., the

revenue records as well as the Final Regional Plan of Pune

Region would show that the land in question was shown in a

Public/Semi Public Zone which could be used for residential

purposes. It is submitted that the Final Regional Plan of Pune

Region was published in accordance with the provisions of the

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, which is

a complete code in itself. It is submitted that since the subject

land was not shown in a green zone, the RRCHS was the bona

fide purchaser and, therefore, it cannot be penalized for

purchasing the said land.

9. An alternative submission made by the learned Senior

Counsel is that, as held by this Court in In Re: “Construction

of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land

Maharashtra

2”, the RRCHS should be allotted an alternate

1

(1995) 3 SCC 434 : 1995 INSC 181

2

I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 etc. dated 9

th

September 2024

19

piece of land inasmuch as the land allotted to the ‘Chavan

Family’ was in lieu of their land acquired by the Government.

10. Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Amicus, in rejoinder,

submitted that the doctrine of desuetude would not be

applicable to the facts of the present case. He relied on the

following judgments of this Court in this regard:

(i) State of Maharashtra v. Nara yan Shamrao

Puranik and Others

3;

(ii) Cantonment Board, MHOW and Another v. M.P.

State Road Transport Corpn.

4; and

(iii) Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited v. Union of

India and Others

5

IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

11. In the background of these submissions, the following

points arise for consideration:

a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land;

b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was

justified in recommending the allotment of subject

land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ and as to

3

(1982) 3 SCC 519 : 1982 INSC 78

4

(1997) 9 SCC 450 : 1997 INSC 401

5

(2012) 11 SCC 1 : 2012 INSC 305

20

whether the State Government was justified in

accepting the said recommendation;

c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be

applicable to the facts of the present case;

d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be bona

fide purchaser of the subject land;

e. As to whether the RRCH S would be entitled to

allotment of alternate piece of land in view of the

order passed by this Court in In Re: “Construction

of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land

Maharashtra”

6;

f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be

applicable in the facts and circumstances of the

present case.

V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land.

12. A perusal of the Gazette Notification dated 1

st March

1879 would reveal that it declares the lands described in the

Schedule annexed thereto to be Reserved Forest in the Poona

6

I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 in WP(C) No.202 of 1995 etc. dated 9

th

September

2024

21

Collectorate. The said Notification has been issued in exercise

of the powers conferred by Section 34 of the 1878 Act. A

perusal of the Schedule thereto would reveal that the land in

Village Kondhwa Budruk having survey No. 20, admeasuring

an area of 32 Acres and 35 Gunthas (13.27 ha) has been

included in the said Schedule. Subsequently, by way of

Notification issued on 5

th January 1934, it was declared that

out of the said area in Survey No.20, an area admeasuring 3

Acres and 20 Gunthas would cease to be a Reserved Forest.

As such, after deforestation of 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, the

balance area of 29 Acres and 15 Gunthas (11.89 ha) continued

to be notified as a Reserved Forest. The said area of 29 Acres

and 15 Gunthas was numbered as Survey No.20-A, which was

subsequently renumbered as Survey No.21 Kondhwa Budruk.

13. A perusal of the records of the Forest Department would

reveal that the said area continued to be shown as notified

‘Reserved Forest’.

14. However, in the records maintained by the Revenue

Department, the said area of Survey No.21 Kondhwa Budruk

has been recorded as “Government Grazing Ground”.

22

15. It will be relevant to note that in order to clear this

anomaly, the officers of the Forest Department have addressed

number of letters to the Collector, Pune for rectification of the

revenue records, which are as under:

(i) Letter dated 18.3.1991 from Deputy

Conservator of Forests, Pune to District

Collector, Pune.

(ii) Letter dated 5.1.1994 from the Deputy

Conservator of Forests to the Tahsildar, Haveli.

(iii) Letter dated 9.7.1998 from the Range Forest

Office to the Tahsildar, Haveli

(iv) Letter dated 29.7.1998 from the Deputy

Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune

(v) Letter dated 10.9.1998 from the Range Forest

Officer to the Tahsildar, Haveli

(vi) Letter dated September, 1998 from the Deputy

Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune.

(vii) Letter dated 11.9.1998 from the Deputy

Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune.

(viii) Letter dated 17.12.1998 from the Deputy

Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune

16. Not only this, but the perusal of the communication

dated 26

th August 1994, addressed by the District Collector,

Pune to the Executive Engineer (Estd.), Maharashtra State

Electricity Board (“MSEB” for short) would reveal that it is

reserved as a “Forest Land”. It is to be noted that the MSEB

had sought allotment of this land for construction of High-

23

Tension Sub-Station. While refusing the said request, the

Collector, Pune informed the MSEB vide letter dated 26

th

August 1994 as under:

“In reference to your above letter please note that the

land referred by you is reserved as “Forest Land” as

per the Indian Forest Rules, 1897 vide circular No.

24F dt. 1

st March, 1879 and amended in 1890.

Hence same cannot be allotted to you. The

application is therefore filed.”

17. It is further relevant to note that the Collector, Pune while

forwarding the request of the ‘Chavan Family’ to the State

Government vide communication dated 19

th June 1991,

referred to the said land as “Government Forest Land”.

However, noting that the ‘Chavan Family’ was in cultivation of

the land admeasuring 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, he

recommended allotment of the said land to the ‘Chavan

Family’. He also recommended that the possession of the

remaining land be handed over to the Forest Department. In

the said letter, the Collector noted thus:

“S.No.20 is reserved for afforestation. As per the

Govt. notification No. AS/36/13//14032 dt

5.01.1934 (Pg 175) the rights for cultivation of the

area admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Gunthas out of

S.No.20A have been allotted to Shri Chauhan family

for which the Forest Dept has given their consent.

The Forest Department has requested for the

possession of the remaining land i.e. 29 Acres 15

Gunthas since reserved for Forest only.”

24

18. It could thus be seen that the though the Collector

recorded that Survey No. 20 was reserved for afforestation, he

recommended the allotment of the land admeasuring 3 Acres

20 Gunthas to ‘Chavan Family’. While doing so, he recorded

“No Objection” of the Forest Department. We will be referring

to the said aspect subsequently inasmuch as the said “No

Objection given by one of the Forest Officers , was

subsequently cancelled by the Forest Authorities.

19. Surprisingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide his

communication dated 30

th November 1994, addressed to the

Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department, noticing the stand

taken by the Collector, Pune, recommended the entire land be

allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. It is further to be noted that

in the said communication, the Divisional Commissioner also

specifically recorded that the ‘Chavan Family’ was in illegal

possession of the land after 1969.

20. After the 1980 FC Act came into effect, no Forest Land

could have been de-reserved without the permission of the

Central Government. It is to be noted that though the reliance

is placed by the RRCHS on the Gazette Notification dated 9

th

March 1944 to contend that the said subject land was de -

25

reserved, on an enquiry conducted by the Additional

Superintendent of Police State CID under the orders of this

Court, the said Gazette Notification is found to be fabricated.

21. It would thus be amply clear from the record that the said

land was notified as early as in 1879 as Reserved Forest and

which reservation continues to be so till date.

b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was

justified in recommending the allotment of subject

land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ and as to

whether the State Government was justified in

accepting the said recommendation .

22. Having held that the subject land is a reserved Forest

Land, the next question that would be required to be

considered is as to whether the said land could have been

allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’.

23. It will be relevant to refer to Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act

(as it originally exists, without amendment), which reads thus:

“2. Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or

use of forest land for non -forest purpose.—

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law

for the time being in force in a State, no State

Government or other authority shall make, except

with the prior approval of the Central Government,

any order directing—

(i) that any reserved forest (within the

meaning of the expression “reserved

forest” in any law for the time being in

26

force in that State) or any portion thereof,

shall cease to be reserved;

(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof

may be used for any non-forest purpose;

(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof

may be assigned by way of lease or

otherwise to any private person or to any

authority, corporation, agency or any

other organization not owned, managed or

controlled by Government.

(iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof

may be cleared of trees which have grown

naturally in that land or portion, for the

purpose of using it for reafforestation].

Explanation.—For the purposes of this

section “non-forest purpose” means the

breaking up or clearing of any forest land

or portion thereof for—

(a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices,

rubber, palms, oil -bearing plants,

horticulture crops or medicinal plants;

(b) any purpose other than reafforestation,

but does not include any work relating to

or ancillary to conservation, development

and management of forests and wildlife,

namely, the establishment of check-posts,

fire lines, wireless communications and

Construction of fencing, bridges and

culverts, dams, waterholes, trench marks,

boundary marks, pipelines or other like

purposes.”

24. It would thus be clear that after the 1980 FC Act was

brought into effect, no State Government or any other

authority, unless there is prior approval by the Central

27

Government, could have directed any Reserved Forest or any

portion thereof to cease to be under the status of “reserved” or

any forest land or any portion thereof to be used for any non-

forest purposes. Nor could it have assigned any forest land or

any portion thereof, by way of lease or otherwise to any private

person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other

organization.

25. Reliance is placed by the RRCHS on the judgment of this

Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi and

Others

7. The legal opinion given by the Deputy Secretary, Law

and Judiciary Department, Government of Maharashtra also

relies on the said judgment.

26. No doubt that in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra),

this Court held that if an area had already been dug up and

mining operations were carried on prior to coming into force of

the 1980 FC Act, the State Government, for continuing the

said lease for the purposes of mining, shall not need prior

approval of the Central Government. It has been held that

though it would be necessary to seek prior approval of the

Central Government for starting mining operations on a virgin

7

(1985) 3 SCC 643 : 1985 INSC 126

28

area, it would not be necessary to seek such approval for the

purposes of carrying out mining operations in a forest area

which is broken up or cleared before the commencement of the

1980 FC Act.

27. We find that even on facts, the said judgment would not

be applicable. There is no order permitting the subject land to

be used for non-forest purposes by any of the competent

authorities. A reliance is sought to be placed on the letter

issued by the Tehsildar, Taluka Haveli dated 13

th May 1968,

thereby informing the ‘Chavan Family’ about its decision to

lease the subject land on “Eksali” basis for the year 1968-69.

However, it is to be noted that the said lease was only for a

period of one year. It is further to be noted that while

accepting the said yearly lease, the ‘Chavan Family’ has given

an undertaking that they will hand over the vacant and

peaceful possession on 15.12.1967 (sic) i.e. prior to 1980.

28. In any case, nothing is placed on record to show that the

land was permitted to be used by the State for any non-forest

purposes prior to 1980. In any event, since the lease deed was

valid only for one year, after the 1980 FC Act came into effect,

in view of the restrictions imposed in clause (iii) of Section 2 of

29

the 1980 FC Act, the forest land could not have been assigned

either by way of lease or any other mode to any private person

unless there was prior approval of the Central Government.

29. In the case of Ambica Quarry Works v. State of

Gujarat and Others

8, this Court while distinguishing the

judgment in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) observed

thus:

“15. The rules dealt with a situation prior to the

coming into operation of 1980 Act. The “1980 Act”

was an Act in recognition of the awareness that

deforestation and ecological imbalances as a

result of deforestation have become social

menaces and further deforestation and

ecological imbalances should be prevented . That

was the primary purpose writ large in the Act of

1980. Therefore the concept that power coupled

with the duty enjoined upon the respondents to

renew the lease stands eroded by the mandate of

the legislation as manifest in 1980 Act in the

facts and circumstances of these cases. The

primary duty was to the community and that

duty took precedence, in our opinion, in these

cases. The obligation to the society must

predominate over the obligation to the

individuals.

*** *** ***

18. The aforesaid observations have been set out in

detail in order to understand the true ratio of the said

decision in the background of the facts of that case.

It is true that this Court held that if the permission

had been granted before the coming into operation of

the 1980 Act and the forest land has been broken up

8

(1987) 1 SCC 213 : 1986 INSC 267

30

or cleared, clause (ii) of Section 2 of 1980 Act would

not apply in such a case. But that decision was

rendered in the background of the facts of that case.

The ratio of any decision must be understood in the

background of the facts of that case. It has been said

long time ago that a case is only an authority for what

it actually decides, and not what logically follows

from it. (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem)

[(1901) AC 495] . But in view of the mandate of Article

141 that the ratio of the decision of this Court is a

law of the land, Shri Gobind Das submitted that the

ratio of a decision must be found out from finding out

if the converse was not correct. But this Court,

however, was cautious in expressing the reasons

for the said decision in State of Bihar v. Banshi

Ram Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643]. This Court observed

in that decision that the result of taking the contrary

view would be (SCC p. 648, para 10) that while the

digging for purposes of winning mica can go on, the

lessee would be deprived of collecting felspar or

quartz which he may come across while he is

carrying on mining operations for winning mica. That

would lead to an unreasonable result which would

not in any way subserve the object of the Act. There

was an existing lease where mining operation

was being carried on and what was due by

incorporation of a new term was that while

mining operations were being carried on some

other minerals were available, he was giving

right to collect those. The new lease only

permitted utilisation or collection of the said

other minerals.

19. In the instant appeals the situation is entirely

different. The appellants are asking for a renewal of

the quarry leases. It will lead to further deforestation

or at least it will not help reclaiming back the areas

where deforestations have taken place. In that view

of the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the

case, in our opinion, the ratio of the said decision

cannot be made applicable to support the appellants'

demands in these cases because the facts are entirely

different here. The primary purpose of the Act

31

which must subserve the interpretation in order

to implement the Act is to prevent further

deforestation. The Central Government has not

granted approval. If the State Government is of

the opinion that it is not a case where the State

Government should seek approval of the Central

Government, the State Government cannot

apparently seek such approval in a matter in

respect of which, in our opinion, it has come to

the conclusion that no renewal should be

granted.”

[Emphasis supplied]

30. It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal

terms held that the obligation to society must predominate

over the obligation to the individuals. This Court held that in

the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra), there was an existing

lease where mining operations were being carried on and what

was due by incorporation of a new term was that while mining

operations were being carried on some other minerals were

available, he was given right to collect those. This Court

observed that, however, in Ambica Quarry Works (supra), the

situation is entirely different. The appellants therein were

asking for a renewal of the quarry leases. It would lead to

further deforestation or at least it will not help reclaiming back

the areas where deforestations have taken place. The Court,

therefore, observed thus:

32

“20. In that view of the matter and the scheme of the

Act, in our opinion, the respondents were right and

the appellants were wrong. All interpretations

must subserve and help implementation of the

intention of the Act. This interpretation, in our

opinion, will subserve the predominant purpose of

the Act.”

[Emphasis supplied]

31. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms held

that taking into consideration the Scheme of the Act, all

interpretations which subserve and help implementation of

the intention of the Act i.e. the protection of the forests must

be accepted.

32. It would further be apposite to note that this Court in the

present proceedings had an occasion to consider the

judgments in the cases of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) and

Ambica Quarry Works (supra). In the order dated 12

th

December 1996, this Court observed thus:

“4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted

with a view to check further deforestation which

ultimately results in ecological imbalance; and

therefore, the provisions made therein for the

conservation of forests and for matters connected

therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the

nature of ownership or classification thereof. The

word “forest” must be understood according to its

dictionary meaning. This description covers all

statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as

reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of

Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term

“forest land”, occurring in Section 2, will not only

33

include “forest” as understood in the dictionary

sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the

Government record irrespective of the ownership.

This is how it has to be understood for the purpose

of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted in the

Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of

forests and the matters connected therewith must

apply clearly to all forests so understood irrespective

of the ownership or classification thereof. This aspect

has been made abundantly clear in the decisions of

this Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of

Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] , Rural Litigation and

Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1)

SCC 504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996

(Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie

Dehradun Development Authority [ WP (C) No 749 of

1995 decided on 29-11-1996] ). The earlier decision

of this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram

Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643] has, therefore, to be

understood in the light of these subsequent

decisions. We consider it necessary to reiterate this

settled position emerging from the decisions of this

Court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of

any State Government or authority. This has become

necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf

of the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage,

relating to permissions granted for mining in such

area which is clearly contrary to the decisions of this

Court. It is reasonable to assume that any State

Government which has failed to appreciate the

correct position in law so far, will forthwith correct its

stance and take the necessary remedial measures

without any further delay.

5. We further direct as under:

I. General

1. In view of the meaning of the word

“forest” in the Act, it is obvious that

prior approval of the Central

Government is required for any non -

forest activity within the area of any

“forest”. In accordance with Section 2

34

of the Act, all on-going activity within

any forest in any State throughout the

country, without the prior approval of

the Central Government, must cease

forthwith. It is, therefore, clear that the

running of saw mills of any kind including

veneer or plywood mills, and mining of any

mineral are non-forest purposes and are,

therefore, not permissible without prior

approval of the Central Government.

Accordingly, any such activity is prima

facie violation of the provisions of the

Forest Conservation Act, 1980 . Every

State Government must promptly ensure

total cessation of all such activities

forthwith.”

[Emphasis supplied]

33. A perusal of the aforesaid observation of this Court in the

present proceedings would reveal that this Court after

considering the judgment in Banshi Ram Modi (supra) has in

unequivocal terms held that in accordance with Section 2 of

the Act, all on-going activity within any forest in any State

throughout the country, without the prior approval of the

Central Government, must be ceased immediately. It can thus

clearly be seen that this Court has in unequivocal terms

overruled what was held in Banshi Ram Modi (supra).

34. It is thus amply clear that for permitting any non-forest

activity within the area of any “forest”, it was necessary to have

prior approval of the Central Government. It has

35

unequivocally been directed that all on-going activity within

any forest in any State throughout the country, without the

prior approval of the Central Government, must cease

forthwith. This Court specifically directed that running of saw

mills of any kind including veneer or plywood mills, and

mining of any mineral are non-forest purposes and they are

not permissible without prior approval of the Central

Government.

35. It is further to be noted that this court in the case of

Nature Lovers Movement v. State of Kerala

9 has observed

thus:

“52. In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the

following terms:

(1) ……………………………………………….. .

(2) After the enforcement of the 1980

Act, neither the State Government nor

any other authority can make an order

or issue direction for dereservation of

reserved forest or any portion thereof

or permit use of any forest land or any

portion thereof for any non -forest

purpose or assign any forest land or

any portion thereof by way of lease or

otherwise to any private person or to

any authority, corporation, agency or

organisation not owned, managed or

controlled by the Government except

after obtaining prior approval of the

9

(2009) 5 SCC 373 : 2009 INSC 371

36

Central Government.

(3) Conclusion D recorded by the High

Court in para 103 of the impugned

judgment is legally unsustainable and is

set aside.

(4) As and when the State Government

decides to assign 10,000 ha of forest land

to unauthorised occupants/encroachers,

it shall do so only after obtaining prior

approval of the Central Government and

the latter shall take appropriate decision

keeping in view the object of the 1980 Act

and the guidelines framed for

regularisation of encroachments on forest

land.”

[Emphasis supplied]

36. The legal position, therefore, has been clarified by this

Court in the case of Nature Lovers Movement (supra) after

considering the earlier judgments reiterating the position that

neither the State Government nor any other authority can

make an order or issue a direction for de-reservation of

reserved forest or any portion thereof or permit use of any

forest land or any portion thereof for any non-forest purpose.

Neither is it permissible to assign any forest land or any

portion thereof by way of lease or otherwise to any private

person or to any authority, corporation, agency or organization

not owned, managed or controlled by the Government except

after obtaining prior approval of the Central Government.

37

37. It is further to be noted that in the present case, the

opinion given by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Law

and Judiciary Department was on 27

th July 1998. The order

approving allotment of land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’

was issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 4

th August

1998 and the order of allotment by the Collector was passed

on 28

th August 1998. It is thus clear that all these events have

taken place well after the directions were issued by this Court

on 12

th December 1996 in the present proceedings.

38. It is thus clear that the Deputy Secretary to the

Government of Maharashtra had totally erred in relying on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Banshi Ram Modi

(supra) by ignoring the observations made by this Court in the

case of Ambica Quarry Works (supra) and specific directions

issued by this Court in the present proceedings. For that very

said reason, the decision of the State Government of allotting

the land and implementing the same by the Collector is not at

all sustainable in law. In that view of the matter, we have no

hesitation in holding that the allotment of the land in favour

of the ‘Chavan Family’ vide orders dated 4

th August 1998 and

28

th August 1998 is not sustainable in law.

38

c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be

applicable to the facts of the present case.

39. An argument is sought to be raised on behalf of the

RRCHS that the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable to

the facts of the present case. Let us test the correctness of the

said argument.

40. Reliance in this respect is sought to be placed on behalf

of the RRCHS on the judgment of this Court in the case of

Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra). In the said case, the liability

of the respondents therein to pay octroi to the Municipal

Corporation was under consideration. It was sought to be

argued that since the 1918 Notifications had not been

implemented, they stood repealed ‘quasily’ by the time new

Octroi Rules came to be framed in 1963 and, in fact, they were

applied to realize octroi from the respondents. In this

background, this Court observed thus:

“34. Though in India the doctrine of desuetude does

not appear to have been used so far to hold that any

statute has stood repealed because of this process,

we find no objection in principle to apply this doctrine

to our statutes as well. This is for the reason that a

citizen should know whether, despite a statute

having been in disuse for long duration and instead

a contrary practice being in use, he is still required

to act as per the “dead letter”. We would think it

would advance the cause of justice to accept the

application of doctrine of desuetude in our country

39

also. Our soil is ready to accept this principle; indeed,

there is need for its implantation, because persons

residing in free India, who have assured

fundamental rights including what has been stated

in Article 21, must be protected from their being, say,

prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which

has become “dead letter”. A new path is, therefore,

required to be laid and trodden.

35. In written submissions filed on behalf of

respondents, it has been stated that the theory of

desuetude can have no application to the facts of the

present case, since the challenge by the respondents

is to the levy and calculation under the 1963

Schedule, and not to the rates enforced since 1918.

This submission has been characterised as “most

important”. As to this we would observe that if

Notification of 1818 were to prevail despite 1918

Notifications, the fact that some changes were made

in the Schedule in 1963 has no legal bearing on the

question under examination. The theory of

desuetude has been pressed into service by the

appellant only to take care of relevant 1918

Notifications. If those notifications can be said to

stand eclipsed, the fact that changes were made in

the rates etc. in 1963 cannot stand in the way of

application of the theory of desuetude.”

41. It could thus be seen that the Court observed that the

doctrine of desuetude would apply to our statutes as well for

the reason that a citizen should know whether, despite a

statute having been in disuse for long duration and instead a

contrary practice being in use, he is still required to act as per

the “dead letter”. It has been observed that it would advance

the cause of justice to accept the application of doctrine of

40

desuetude in our country as well. The Court observed that in

view of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the

Constitution of India, a citizen must be protected from being

prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which has

become “dead letter”.

42. However, it is clear from the aforesaid observations that

for applicability of the doctrine of desuetude, the statute must

not only be required to be in disuse for long duration but

instead a contrary practice must also be prevalent.

43. We fail to understand as to how the said doctrine of

desuetude would be applicable in the facts of the present case.

44. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the RRCHS that

though the subject land was shown as Reserved Forest Land,

as far back as in 1879, it was not used as a Forest Land for a

long period and therefore it ceased to be Reserved Forest Land.

We fail to appreciate such a submission. The subject land has

continuously been recorded as ‘Reserved Forest’ in the Forest

Records. Not only that, as we have already reproduced

hereinabove, the Forest Authorities through a number of

communications had requested the Revenue Authorities to

correct the revenue entries and transfer the land to the Forest

41

Department. In any case, this Court in the case of Monnet

Ispat and Energy Limited (supra) has correctly laid down the

legal position as under:

“201. From the above, the essentials of the doctrine

of desuetude may be summarised as follows:

(i) The doctrine of desuetude denotes a

principle of quasi-repeal but this doctrine

is ordinarily seen with disfavour.

(ii) Although the doctrine of desuetude has

been made applicable in India on few

occasions but for its applicability, two

factors, namely, (i) that the statute or

legislation has not been in operation

for a very considerable period, and (ii)

the contrary practice has been

followed over a period of time must be

clearly satisfied. Both ingredients are

essential and want of any one of them

would not attract the doctrine of

desuetude. In other words, a mere neglect

of a statute or legislation over a period of

time is not sufficient but it must be firmly

established that not only the statute or

legislation was completely neglected but

also the practice contrary to such statute

or legislation has been followed for a

considerably long period.”

[Emphasis supplied]

45. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the

doctrine of desuetude is ordinarily seen with disfavour. It has

also been held that although this doctrine has been made

applicable in India on a few occasions, however, for its

applicability, two factors are necessary, namely, (i) that the

42

statute or legislation has not been in operation for a very

considerable period, and (ii) the contrary practice has been

followed over a period of time. It has been held that, not one

but, both the conditions must be available to attract the

applicability of the said doctrine of desuetude.

46. In the present case, the legislative history would clearly

show that, right from 1878, when the 1878 Act was enacted,

under Section 34 of the said Act, the law with regard to

protection and conservation of forest has been consistently

evolving more and more in favour of protection of forests.

47. We do not find any substance in the argument that the

Notification dated 1

st March 1879 issued under Section 34 of

the 1878 Act has been put to disuse for a long time. In any

case, nothing has been brought on record to show that a

practice contrary to the provisions of the said Act was being

applied. In that view of the matter, such an argument has to

be heard only to be rejected.

d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona

fide purchaser of the subject land.

48. It is sought to be urged on behalf of the RRCHS that they

are the bona fide purchaser of the subject land in question. It

43

is submitted on behalf of the RRCHS that the land in question

was reflected as revenue land. It is submitted that the Final

Regional Plan of Pune Region, which has statutory force, had

shown the subject land as municipal land. It is further

submitted that even prior to that in the Pune Regional Plan

implemented on 17

th May 1976, the land in question was

included in the agricultural zone. As such, by no stretch of

imagination, the RRCHS could have known that the subject

land was Forest Land and not Revenue Land. It is further

stated that even the revenue record pertaining to the subject

land had shown the possession of the ‘Chavan Family’ over the

said land. It is, therefore, submitted that the RRCHS, which

is a bona fide purchaser of the land in question, could not be

faulted with and penalized for no fault of theirs.

49. As already stated herein above, the subject land was

allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ by the Tehsildar, Haveli on 13

th

May 1968 on Eksali (yearly) lease for the year 1968-69. Not

only that, the ‘Chavan Family’ had given an undertaking to the

Mamlatdar, Haveli to surrender the said land prior to

completion of one year. The ‘Chavan Family’ had further given

an undertaking that the said land would not be put to any

44

other use except for the agricultural purposes. It is further

pertinent to note that after the grant of lease for one year, there

has been no renewal of the said lease, although the names of

the ‘Chavan Family’ do appear in the 7/12 extracts of revenue

records.

50. This Court in the case of Suraj Bhan and others v.

Financial Commissioner and Others

10 has held as follows:

“9. ….. It is well settled that an entry in revenue

records does not confer title on a person whose name

appears in record-of-rights. It is settled law that

entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have

only “fiscal purpose” i.e. payment of land revenue,

and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such

entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it

can only be decided by a competent civil court

(vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh [(1993) 4 SCC 403 :

AIR 1994 SC 1653] ). As already noted earlier, civil

proceedings in regard to genuineness of will are

pending with the High Court of Delhi. In the

circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the

order passed by the High Court in the writ petition.”

51. Recently, this Court in the case of P. Kishor Kumar v.

Vittal K. Patkar

11 has also observed thus:

“13. …. mutation in revenue records neither creates

nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any

presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the

person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the

land revenue in question.”

10

(2007) 6 SCC 186 : 2007 INSC 424

11

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1483

45

52. It is well-settled law that the entries in the revenue record

do not confer a title to the property.

53. It would further appear from the record that after the

lease was not renewed in 1969, for a period of about 20 years,

the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ kept silent. It appears

that only in the year 1988, they started moving the authorities

for allotment of land in lieu of compensation. However, much

prior to the actual allotment of land in their favour, they had

already entered into transactions with the Builders. A perusal

of the record would reveal that one Mr. Rajesh Shah had filed

a civil suit, being Civil Suit No. 1023 of 1998 for permanent

injunction against Mr. Raghunath Shripati Chavan and

others. In the said suit, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief

Promoter of the RRCHS, was also made a party respondent.

The other members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were also made

respondents. In the said suit, Mr. Rajesh Shah had claimed

that he had purchased 75% share of the subject land from

some of the co-owners of the said land. The said co-owners

had executed the Development Agreement dated 16

th February

1995 and had granted development rights as well as executed

46

Power of Attorney to the plaintiff along with one Mr. Yogesh

Kariya. In the said proceedings, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande,

Chief Promoter of the RRCHS had filed an affidavit dated 28

th

August 1998, wherein it was stated that the owners/holders

of the said land had executed the Development Agreement

dated 25

th July 1992 and thereafter the Supplementary

Agreement dated 23

rd June 1995 in his favour and that the

possession of the said property to the extent of their share had

been delivered to him. He had also placed on record the copies

of the General Power of Attorney dated 22

nd June 1995 and

12

th February 1996 executed by one Mr. Kesu Hari Chavan

and others in his favour.

54. It will be relevant to reproduce Para 2 of the Affidavit

dated 28

th August 1998 filed by Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande,

Chief Promoter, RRCHS in Civil Suit No. 1023 of 1998, which

reads thus:

“2. It is submitted that the owners/holders of the

suit property Shri Abu G. Chavan, Sarubai S.

Chavan, Pandurang Bhau Chavan, Kesu Hari

Chavan, Dattatraya R. Chavan, Narayan Nana

Chavan, Rakhmabai Vithal Chavan and others have

executed Development agreeme nt 25/7/92 and

thereafter supplementary agreement dated 23/6/95

in favour of this applicant. The said owners have also

delivered the possession of the suit property to the

extent of their share to this applicant. As such this

47

applicant is in possession of the suit property to the

extent of the undivided share of the above owners. In

view of the said fact this applicant is necessary party

to the suit. It is submitted that if any order is passed

in the suit the same may seriously affect the right of

this applicant and the applicant may suffer

irreparable loss and hardship. The orders passed in

the suit may also lead to multiplicity of litigation as

such it is necessary that this third party may be

added as the Defendant to the suit. If this applicant

is added as the necessary party to the suit no

hardship or injustice will be caused either to the

plaintiff or the Defendant, on the contrary this

applicant may suffer irreparable loss and hardship,

hence in the interest of justice this applicant may

please be added as the necessary party to the suit.

The details of this applicant is as under:

SHRI ANIRUDDH P. DESHPANDE

AGE : 37 YEARS, OCC : BUSINESS

RESIDING AT : 66/2, APEKSHA,

OPPOSITE LAW COLLEGE,

PUNE 411 004.”

55. It is further to be noted that another suit being Civil Suit

No.1364 of 1998 was filed by one Mr. Raju Shivaji Bhonsale

and another challenging the allotment of the subject land to

the ‘Chavan Family’. In the said suit also, Mr. Aniruddha P.

Deshpande, Chief Promoter of the RRCHS was made a party

respondent. Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had also filed an

affidavit dated 14

th February 2005 in the said suit inter alia

stating therein that during 1995 Mr. Chavan and others had

granted the Development Rights in his favour.

48

56. It is further to be noted that the members of the ‘Chavan

Family’ had entered into Development Agreement with Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande on 18

th August 1998.

57. It is further to be noted that an order approving the

allotment of the land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was

passed by the Government vide order dated 4

th August 1998,

whereas the actual allotment of land by the Collector is by

order dated 28

th August 1998.

58. It is relevant to note that in the civil suit filed by Mr.

Rajesh Shah, a Compromise Pursis dated 29

th August 1998

was filed by the members of the ‘Chavan Family’, Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande and Mr. Rajesh Shah, which reads

thus:

“i) the members of the Chavan family (allottees of

the said land) and Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande

(Chief Promoter of the Richie Rich Co-operative

Housing Society) admit, agree and confirm that

(a) the Development Agreement dated

16.2.1995 pertaining to the said land has been

executed by the three members of the Chavan

family in favour of Mr. Rajesh Shah and Mr.

Yogesh Kariya, and (b) the possession of the

said property was delivered to Mr. Rajesh Shah

and Yogesh Shah to the extent of shares of

owners executing the agreement.

ii) the Agreement dated 25.7.1992 and the

Supplementary Agreement dated 23.6.1995

and Agreement dated 16.2.1995 executed by

49

the other owners in favour of Mr. Aniruddha P.

Deshpande is also valid and subsisting and that

the possession of the said property has been

given to him to the extent of shares of the

owners executing the said agreement.

iii) the said land is exclusively in the joint

possession of Mr. Rajesh Shah, Mr. Yogesh

Kariya, Raghunath Chavan and Aniruddha P.

Deshpande.

iv) an Agreement has been reached between Mr.

Rajesh Shah and Aniruddha P. Deshpande that

out of the said land Mr. Shah and Mr. Kariya

shall be entitled to an area of 8 acres and Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande shall be entitled to the

balance area. They shall be deemed to be in

possession of the respective area; and

v) Mr. Raghunath Chavan and other 19 members

of Chavan family have agreed to sell/grant

development rights for the respective area to

Mr. Rajesh Chavan and Mr. Yogesh Kariya and

Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande.”

59. On the very same date i.e., 29

th August 1998, after

recording the Compromise Pursis, the said civil suit being Civil

Suit No. 1023 of 1998 came to be disposed of.

60. We ask a question to ourselves as to whether the short

span within which the decision was taken by the Government

to allot the land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’, the actual

allotment of the land to the ‘Chavan Family’ by the Collector

and the disposal of the suit in terms of the compromise on the

very next day, is merely a coincidence.

50

61. It is further to be noted that the allotment order dated

28

th August 1998, specifically prohibited the ‘Chavan Family’

in view of conditions (2) and (4), reproduced hereinabove, from

mortgaging, donating, selling, partitioning or exchanging in

any other manner, or allotting the said land on lease to any

other person without the prior permission of the District

Collector. The allotment order further mandated the ‘Chavan

Family’ to bring the said land under cultivation within a period

of two years from the date of the allotment. It further

prohibited the said land from being used for any other purpose

than agricultural purpose.

62. In the light of these glaring facts, can it be said that the

RRCHS is a bona fide purchaser? The records amply speak

for themselves.

63. It is amply clear that though the Eksali (yearly) lease

expired in 1969, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were

silent for a period of almost 20 years. Things started moving

only in 1988. During the said period, much before the

allotment could be done, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’

had already started negotiating the deals with Mr. Aniruddha

P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of RRCHS and Mr. Rajesh

51

Shah. The files were moving at different levels from 1991 to

1998, culminating in the final allotment in the year 1998. In

the meantime, all the Development Rights in the land already

stood transferred either to Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the

Chief Promoter of the RRCHS or to Mr. Rajesh Shah. For the

said purpose, not only had some of the members of the

‘Chavan Family’ entered into a Development Agreement, but

they had also executed Power of Attorney in favour of said Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande surrendering their entire rights in

his favour.

64. In that view of the matter, we find no substance in the

argument that the RRCHS was a bona fide purchaser of the

subject land. The facts point out that the ‘Chavan Family’ was

only set up as a front for the benefit of the Developers. The

fact that the agricultural land of the ‘Chavan Family’ was

acquired, was being misused by the Developers as a pretext

for grabbing the valuable piece of Forest Land for the purposes

of commercial development. For doing so, even the status of

a person who belongs to backward class was being misused.

52

e. As to whether the RRCH S would be entitled to

allotment of alternate piece of land in view of the

order passed by this Court in In Re: “Construction of

Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land

Maharashtra”.

65. An alternate submission made on behalf of the RRCHS is

that since they are the bona fide purchaser of the subject land

from the members of the ‘Chavan Family’, they would be

entitled to allotment of an alternate piece of land as has been

done by this Court in I.A. No.2771 of 2009.

66. The facts in the present case and the facts in I.A. No.2771

of 2009 are totally different. In the said case (i.e. I.A. No.2771

of 2009), the State had illegally taken possession of the land

belonging to the predecessor-in-title of the applicants therein.

Not only that, but the said land was given to the Armament

Research Development Establishment Institute (“ARDEI” for

short), which was a unit of Defence Department of the Union

of India. There was no acquisition proceeding. The applicants

therein fought right from the Trial Court to this Court and

succeeded in getting a decree for possession of the land. When

they put the decree in execution, the ARDEI opposed the same

contending therein that an Armament Defence establishment

was constructed thereon.

53

67. Faced with this situation and realizing its mistake, the

State Government allotted another piece of land in lieu of the

land which was already given in possession of the ARDEI.

However, the record subsequently revealed that the land

which was allotted to the applicants therein was notified as a

Forest Land.

68. The Court noted the following special circumstances in

the said case:

(i) “That the applicants had succeeded upto this

Court and as such, they cannot be denied the

benefits of the decree passed in their favour;

(ii) That the action of the State Government in

encroaching upon the land of a citizen was itself

illegal;

(iii) The State Government ought to have taken due

precautions before allotting an alternate piece

of land to the applicants;

(iv) That the land which was notified as a Forest

Land could not have been allotted;

(v) That the State ought to have allotted a land,

which had a clear title and also had a

marketable value; and

(vi) That after the proceedings had reached finality

in favour of the petitioners/applicants, the

matter was lingering in the Court for almost 15

years.”

69. In the aforesaid factual scenario, this Court passed the

order dated 23

rd July 2024, which is as under:

54

“8. We, therefore, direct the State Government to

come with a clear stand:

i. As to whether another piece of

equivalent land will be offered to the

petitioner(s)/applicant(s); or

ii. As to whether adequate

compensation would be paid to the

petitioner(s)/applicant(s); or

iii. As to whether the State Government

proposes to move the Central Government

for denotification of the said land as forest

land.”

70. Thereafter, the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and

Forest Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai tendered an

undertaking before this Court, agreeing to allot an alternate

piece of land in favour of the applicants therein. Accepting the

said undertaking, this Court passed the order dated 9

th

September, 2024, which is as under:

“7. We accept the undertaking and take it on

record. However, in addition, we direct that the

Collector, Pune shall personally ensure that the

alternate land admeasuring 24 acres 38 guntas out

of Survey No.7 situated at Mouje Yewalewadi, Tq.

Haveli, District Pune would be measured and

demarcated and thereafter peaceful and vacant

possession of the said land would be handed over to

the applicants/petitioners.

8. It is needless to state that if any encroachments

are there on the said land, the same shall be removed

prior to the said land being handed over to the

applicants/petitioners.

55

9. Insofar as the modification to be issued under

Section 37 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town

Planning Act, 1966 for changing the land use in

question from Private/Semi-Private to Residential is

concerned, we direct that the said procedure shall be

completed within a period of three months from

today.

10. It is further directed that all the formalities for

conveying the title of the said land in favour of the

applicants/petitioners shall be completed within a

period of six weeks from today.”

71. That is not the case here. The RRCHS knowing very well

that the land was a Forest Land had entered into transactions

with the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ much prior to the

land even being allotted in their favour. The transactions

between the RRCHS and the members of the ‘Chavan Family’

were totally illegal and contrary to the conditions on which the

land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. As per the conditions

of allotment, the land or any part thereof could not have been

transferred by the ‘Chavan Family’ to anyone without the prior

permission of the District Collector. The land was required to

be brought under cultivation within a period of two years from

the date of the allotment and that the land or any part thereof

was not to be used for any other purpose than the agricultural

purpose.

56

72. As already discussed hereinabove, the RRCHS through

Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had already entered into

transactions with the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ much

before the land was allotted in their favour. The members of

the ‘Chavan Family’ had given the developmental rights as well

as executed Power of Attorney in favour of said Mr. Aniruddha

P. Deshpande even prior to the allotment of land in their

favour. As discussed hereinabove, immediately on the next

day on which the land was allotted in favour of the ‘Chavan

Family’, the suit with regard to the subject property was

compromised between Mr. Rajesh Shah , plaintiff and Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande. It is thus clear that the case of the

RRCHS, in no way, bears any resemblance to the case in

I.A.No. 2771 of 2009.

73. The RRCHS through Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had,

with open eyes, entered into illegal transactions with the

members of the ‘Chavan Family’. If a direction, as sought by

the applicant-RRCHS is issued, it will amount to granting a

premium to the RRCHS for the illegalities committed by them.

74. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the

said submission.

57

f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be

applicable in the facts and circumstances of the

present case.

75. That leaves us with the issue with regard to the doctrine

of public trust.

76. Recently, this Court in the case of In Re: T.N.

Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and others

12

had an occasion to consider the importance of doctrine of

public trust in the environmental matters. It will be apposite

to refer to the following observations of this Court:

“151. The importance of the ‘Public

Trust’ doctrine in environmental and ecological

matters has been explained by this Court in the case

of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath. This Court has

elaborately referred to various articles and the

judgments on the issue to come to a conclusion that

the ‘public trust’ doctrine is a part of the law of the

land in the following paragraphs:

“23. The notion that the public has a right

to expect certain lands and natural areas

to retain their natural characteristic is

finding its way into the law of the land. The

need to protect the environment and

ecology has been summed up by David B.

Hunter (University of Michigan) in an

article titled An ecological perspective on

property : A call for judicial protection of the

public's interest in environmentally critical

resources published in Harvard

Environmental Law Review, Vol. 12 1988,

p. 311 is in the following words:

12

(2025) 2 SCC 641 : 2024 INSC 178

58

“Another major ecological tenet is

that the world is finite. The earth can

support only so many people and

only so much human activity before

limits are reached. This lesson was

driven home by the oil crisis of the

1970s as well as by the pesticide

scare of the 1960s. The current

deterioration of the ozone layer is

another vivid example of the

complex, unpredictable and

potentially catastrophic effects posed

by our disregard of the

environmental limits to economic

growth. The absolute finiteness of the

environment, when coupled with

human dependency on the

environment, leads to the

unquestionable result that human

activities will at some point be

constrained.

‘Human activity finds in the natural

world its external limits. In short, the

environment imposes constraints on

our freedom; these constraints are

not the product of value choices but

of the scientific imperative of the

environment's limitations. Reliance

on improving technology can delay

temporarily, but not forever, the

inevitable constraints. There is a

limit to the capacity of the

environment to service … growth,

both in providing raw materials and

in assimilating by-product wastes

due to consumption. The largesse of

technology can only postpone or

disguise the inevitable.’

Professor Barbara Ward has written of this

ecological imperative in particularly vivid

language:

59

‘We can forget moral imperatives. But

today the morals of respect and care

and modesty come to us in a form we

cannot evade. We cannot cheat on

DNA. We cannot get round

photosynthesis. We cannot say I am

not going to give a damn about

phytoplankton. All th ese tiny

mechanisms provide the

preconditions of our planetary life. To

say we do not care is to say in the

most literal sense that “we choose

death”.’

There is a commonly-recognized link

between laws and social values, but

to ecologists a balance between laws

and values is not alone sufficient to

ensure a stable relationship between

humans and their environment.

Laws and values must also contend

with the constraints imposed by the

outside environment. Unfortunately,

current legal doctrine rarely

accounts for such constraints, and

thus environmental stability is

threatened.

Historically, we have changed the

environment to fit our conceptions of

property. We have fenced, plowed

and paved. The environment has

proven malleable and to a large

extent still is. But there is a limit to

this malleability, and certain types of

ecologically important resources —

for example, wetlands and riparian

forests — can no longer be destroyed

without enormous long-term effects

on environmental and therefore

social stability. To ecologists, the

need for preserving sensitive

resources does not reflect value

60

choices but rather is the necessary

result of objective observations of the

laws of nature.

In sum, ecologists view the

environmental sciences as providing

us with certain laws of nature. These

laws, just like our own laws, restrict

our freedom of conduct and choice.

Unlike our laws, the laws of nature

cannot be changed by legislative fiat;

they are imposed on us by the

natural world. An understanding of

the laws of nature must therefore

inform all of our social institutions.”

24. The ancient Roman Empire developed

a legal theory known as the “Doctrine of

the Public Trust”. It was founded on the

ideas that certain common properties

such as rivers, seashore, forests and the

air were held by Government in

trusteeship for the free and unimpeded

use of the general public. Our

contemporary concern about “the

environment” bear a very close conceptual

relationship to this legal doctrine. Under

the Roman law these resources were either

owned by no one (res nullious) or by every

one in common (res communious). Under

the English common law, however, the

Sovereign could own these resources but

the ownership was limited in nature, the

Crown could not grant these properties to

private owners if the effect was to interfere

with the public interests in navigation or

fishing. Resources that were suitable for

these uses were deemed to be held

in trust by the Crown for the benefit of

the public. Joseph L. Sax, Professor of

Law, University of Michigan — proponent

of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine — in

61

an erudite article “Public Trust Doctrine in

Natural Resource Law : Effective Judicial

Intervention”, Michigan Law Review, Vol.

68, Part 1 p. 473, has given the historical

background of

the Public Trust Doctrine as under:

“The source of

modern public trust law is found in a

concept that received much attention

in Roman and English law — the

nature of property rights in rivers,

the sea, and the seashore. That

history has been given considerable

attention in the legal literature, need

not be repeated in detail here. But

two points should be emphasized.

First, certain interests, such as

navigation and fishing, were sought

to be preserved for the benefit of

the public; accordingly, property

used for those purposes was

distinguished from

general public property which the

sovereign could routinely grant to

private owners. Second, while it was

understood that in certain common

properties — such as the seashore,

highways, and running water —

‘perpetual use was dedicated to

the public’, it has never been clear

whether the public had an

enforceable right to prevent

infringement of those interests.

Although the State apparently did

protect public uses, no evidence is

available that public rights could be

legally asserted against a recalcitrant

government.”

25.The Public Trust Doctrine primari

ly rests on the principle that certain

resources like air, sea, waters and the

62

forests have such a great importance to

the people as a whole that it would be

wholly unjustified to make them a subject

of private ownership. The said resources

being a gift of nature, they should be made

freely available to everyone irrespective of

the status in life. The doctrine enjoins

upon the Government to protect the

resources for the enjoyment of the

general public rather than to permit their

use for private ownership or commercial

purposes. According to Professor Sax

the Public Trust Doctrine imposes

the following restrictions on governmental

authority:

“Three types of restrictions on

governmental authority are often

thought to be imposed by

the public trust : first, the property

subject to the trust must not only be

used for a public purpose, but it

must be held available for use by the

general public; second, the property

may not be sold, even for a fair cash

equivalent; and third the property

must be maintained for particular

types of uses.”

26. The American law on the subject is

primarily based on the decision of the

United States Supreme Court in Illinois

Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State

of Illinois, [146 US 387 (1892) : 36 L.Ed.

1018]. In the year 1869 the Illinois

Legislature made a substantial grant of

submerged lands — a mile strip along the

shores of Lake Michigan extending one

mile out from the shoreline — to the

Illinois Central Railroad. In 1873, the

Legislature changed its mind and repealed

the 1869 grant. The State of Illinois sued

to quit title. The Court while accepting the

63

stand of the State of Illinois held that the

title of the State in the land in dispute was

a title different in character from that

which the State held in lands intended for

sale. It was different from the title which

the United States held in public lands

which were open to preemption and sale.

It was a title held in trust — for the people

of the State that they may enjoy the

navigation of the water, carry on

commerce over them and have liberty of

fishing therein free from obstruction or

interference of private parties. The

abdication of the general control of the

State over lands in dispute was not

consistent with the exercise of

the trust which required the Government

of the State to preserve such waters for the

use of the public. According to Professor

Sax the Court in Illinois Central [146 US

387 : 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892)] “articulated a

principle that has become the central

substantive thought

in public trust litigation. When a State

holds a resource which is available for the

free use of the general public, a court will

look with considerable skepticism upon

any governmental conduct which is

calculated either to relocate that resource

to more restricted uses or to

subject public uses to the self-interest of

private parties”.

27. In Gould v. Greylock Reservation

Commission, [350 Mass 410 (1966)] the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

took the first major step in developing

the doctrine applicable to changes in the

use of lands dedicated to

the public interest. In 1886 a group of

citizens interested in preserving Mount

Greylock as an unspoiled natural forest,

promoted the creation of an association for

64

the purpose of laying out a public park on

it. The State ultimately acquired about

9000 acres, and the legislature enacted a

statute creating the Greylock Reservation

Commission. In the year 1953, the

legislature enacted a statute creating an

Authority to construct and operate on

Mount Greylock an Aerial Tramway and

certain other facilities and it authorised

the Commission to lease to the Authority

any portion of the Mount Greylock

Reservation. Before the project

commenced, five citizens brought an

action against both the Greylock

Reservation Commission and the

Tramway Authority. The plaintiffs brought

the suit as beneficiaries of

the public trust. The Court held both the

lease and the management agreement

invalid on the ground that they were in

excess of the statutory grant of the

authority. The crucial passage in the

judgment of the Court is as under:

“The profit-sharing feature and some

aspects of the project itself strongly

suggest a commercial enterprise. In

addition to the absence of any clear

or express statutory authorization of

as broad a delegation of

responsibility by the Authority as is

given by the management agreement,

we find no express grant to the

Authority or power to permit use

of public lands and of the Authority's

borrowed funds for what seems, in

part at least, a commercial venture

for private profit.”

Professor Sax's comments on the above-

quoted paragraph from Gould decision are

as under:

“It hardly seems surprising, then,

65

that the court questioned why a State

should subordinate a public park,

serving a useful purpose as relatively

undeveloped land, to the demands of

private investors for building such a

commercial facility. The court, faced

with such a situation, could hardly

have been expected to have treated

the case as if it involved nothing but

formal legal issues concerning the

State's authority to change the use of

a certain tract of land…. Gould,

like Illinois Central, was concerned

with the most overt sort of imposition

on the public interest : commercial

interests had obtained advantages

which infringed directly

on public uses and promoted private

profits. But the Massachusetts court

has also confronted a more

pervasive, if more subtle, problem —

that concerning projects which

clearly have

some public justification. Such cases

arise when, for example, a highway

department seeks to take a piece of

parkland or to fill a wetland.”

28.In Sacco v. Development

of Public Works, [532 Mass 670], the

Massachusetts Court restrained the

Department of Public Works from filling a

great pond as part of its plan to relocate

part of State Highway. The Department

purported to act under the legislative

authority. The court found the statutory

power inadequate and held as under:

“the improvement of public lands

contemplated by this section does

not include the widening of a State

highway. It seems rather that the

improvement of public lands which

66

the legislature provided for … is to

preserve such lands so that they may

be enjoyed by the people for

recreational purposes.”

29. In Robbins v. Deptt. of Public Works,

[244 NE 2d 577], the Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts restrained

the Public Works Department from

acquiring Fowl Meadows, “wetlands of

considerable natural beauty … often used

for nature study and recreation” for

highway use.

30. Professor Sax in the article (Michigan

Law Review) refers to Priewev v. Wisconsin

State Land and Improvement Co., [93 Wis

534 (1896)], Crawford County Lever and

Drainage Distt. No. 1, [182 Wis 404], City

of Milwaukee v. State, [193 Wis

423], State v. Public Service Commission,

[275 Wis 112] and opines that “the

Supreme Court of Wisconsin has probably

made a more conscientious effort to rise

above rhetoric and to work out a

reasonable meaning for

the public trust doctrine than have the

courts of any other State”.

31. Professor Sax stated the scope of

the public trust doctrine in the following

words:

“If any of the analysis in this Article

makes sense, it is clear that the

judicial techniques developed

in public trust cases need not be

limited either to these few

conventional interests or to

questions of disposition

of public properties. Public trust pro

blems are found whenever

governmental regulation comes into

question, and they occur in a wide

range of situations in which

67

diffused public interests need

protection against tightly organized

groups with clear and immediate

goals. Thus, it seems that the

delicate mixture of procedural and

substantive protections which the

courts have applied in

conventional public trust cases

would be equally applicable and

equally appropriate in controversies

involving air pollution, the

dissemination of pesticides, the

location of rights of way for utilities,

and strip mining of wetland filling on

private lands in a State where

governmental permits are required.”

32. We may at this stage refer to the

judgment of the Supreme Court of

California in National Audubon

Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,

[33 Cal 3d 419]. The case is popularly

known as “the Mono Lake case”. Mono

Lake is the second largest lake in

California. The lake is saline. It contains

no fish but supports a large population of

brine shrimp which feed vast numbers of

nesting and migrating birds. Islands in the

lake protect a large breeding colony of

California gulls, and the lake itself serves

as a haven on the migration route for

thousands of birds. Towers and spires of

tura (sic) on the north and south shores

are matters of geological interest and a

tourist attraction. In 1940, the Division of

Water Resources granted the Department

of Water and Power of the City of Los

Angeles a permit to appropriate virtually

the entire flow of 4 of the 5 streams flowing

into the lake. As a result of these

diversions, the level of the lake dropped,

the surface area diminished, the gulls

68

were abandoning the lake and the scenic

beauty and the ecological values of Mono

Lake were imperilled. The plaintiffs

environmentalist — using

the public trust doctrine — filed a law suit

against Los Angeles Water Diversions. The

case eventually came to the California

Supreme Court, on a Federal Trial Judge's

request for clarification of the

State's public trust doctrine. The Court

explained the concept

of public trust doctrine in the following

words:

“‘By the law of nature these things

are common to mankind — the air,

running water, the sea and

consequently the shores of the sea.’

(Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1) From

this origin in Roman law, the English

common law evolved the concept of

the public trust, under which the

sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable

waterways and the lands lying

beneath them as trustee of

a public trust for the benefit of the

people.’”

The Court explained the purpose of

the public trust as under:

“The objective of

the public trust has evolved in

tandem with the

changing public perception of the

values and uses of waterways. As we

observed in Marks v. Whitney, [6 Cal

3d 251], ‘[p]ublic trust easements

(were) traditionally defined in terms

of navigation, commerce and

fisheries. They have been held to

include the right to fish, hunt, bathe,

swim, to use for boating and general

recreation purposes the navigable

69

waters of the State, and to use the

bottom of the navigable waters for

anchoring, standing, or other

purposes. We went on, however, to

hold that the traditional triad of uses

— navigation, commerce and fishing

— did not limit the public interest in

the trust res. In language of special

importance to the present setting, we

stated that ‘[t]he public uses to

which tidelands are subject are

sufficiently flexible to encompass

changing public needs. In

administering the trust the State is

not burdened with an ou tmoded

classification favouring one mode of

utilization over another. There is a

growing public recognition that one

of the important public uses of the

tidelands — a use encompassed

within the tidelands trust — is the

preservation of those lands in their

natural state, so that they may serve

as ecological units for scientific

study, as open space, and as

environments which provide food

and habitat for birds and marine life,

and which favourably affect the

scenery and climate of the area.’

Mono Lake is a navigable waterway.

It supports a small local industry

which harvests brine shrimp for sale

as fish food, which endeavour

probably qualifies the lake as a

‘fishery’ under the

traditional public trust cases. The

principal values plaintiffs seek to

protect, however, are recreational

and ecological — the scenic views of

the lake and its shore, the purity of

the air, and the use of the lake for

nesting and feeding by birds.

70

Under Marks v. Whitney, [6 Cal 3d

251], it is clear that protection of

these values is among the purposes

of the public trust.”

The Court summed up the powers of the

State as trustee in the following words:

“Thus, the public trust is more than

an affirmation of State power to

use public property

for public purposes. It is an

affirmation of the duty of the State to

protect the people's common heritage

of streams, lakes, marshlands and

tidelands, surrendering that right of

protection only in rare cases when

the abandonment of that right is

consistent with the purposes of

the trust….”

The Supreme Court of California, inter

alia, reached the following conclusion:

“The State has an affirmative duty to

take the public trust into account in

the planning and allocation of water

resources, and to

protect public trust uses whenever

feasible. Just as the history of this

State shows that appropriation may

be necessary for efficient use of water

despite unavoidable harm

to public trust values, it

demonstrates that an appropriative

water rights system administered

without consideration of

the public trust may cause

unnecessary and unjustified harm

to trust interests. (See Johnson, 14

U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233, 256-57/;

Robie, Some Reflections on

Environmental Considerations in

Water Rights Administration , 2

Ecology L.Q. 695, 710-711 (1972);

71

Comment, 33 Hastings L.J. 653,

654.) As a matter of practical

necessity, the State may have to

approve appropriations despite

foreseeable harm

to public trust uses.

In so doing, however, the State must

bear in mind its duty as trustee to

consider the effect of the taking on

the public trust (see United

Plainsmen v. N.D. State Water Cons.

Comm'n, [247 NW 2d 457 (ND 1976)]

at pp. 462-463, and to preserve, so

far as consistent with

the public interest, the uses

protected by the trust.”

The Court finally came to the conclusion

that the plaintiffs could rely on

the public trust doctrine in seeking

reconsideration of the allocation of the

waters of the Mono basin.

33. It is no doubt correct that

the public trust doctrine under the

English common law extended only to

certain traditional uses such as

navigation, commerce and fishing. But the

American Courts in recent cases have

expanded the concept of

the public trust doctrine. The

observations of the Supreme Court of

California in Mono Lake case, [33 Cal 3d

419] clearly show the judicial concern in

protecting all ecologically important lands,

for example fresh water, wetlands or

riparian forests. The observations of the

Court in Mono Lake case, [33 Cal 3d 419]

to the effect that the protection of

ecological values is among the purposes

of public trust, may give rise to an

argument that the ecology and the

environment protection is a relevant factor

72

to determine which lands, waters or airs

are protected by the public trust doctrine.

The Courts in United States are finally

beginning to adopt this reasoning and are

expanding the public trust to encompass

new types of lands and waters. In Phillips

Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, [108 S.Ct.

791 (1988)] the United States Supreme

Court upheld Mississippi's extension

of public trust doctrine to lands

underlying non-navigable tidal areas. The

majority judgment adopted ecological

concepts to determine which lands can be

considered tide lands. Phillips Petroleum

case, [108 S.Ct. 791 (1988)] assumes

importance because the Supreme Court

expanded the public trust doctrine to

identify the tide lands not on commercial

considerations but on ecological concepts.

We see no reason why

the public trust doctrine should not be

expanded to include all ecosystems

operating in our natural resources.

34. Our legal system-based on English

common law -includes

the public trust doctrine as part of its

jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of

all natural resources which are by nature

meant for public use and

enjoyment. Public at large is the

beneficiary of the seashore, running

waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile

lands. The State as a trustee is under a

legal duty to protect the natural resources.

These resources meant for public use

cannot be converted into private

ownership.

35. We are fully aware that the issues

presented in this case illustrate the classic

struggle between those members of

73

the public who would preserve our rivers,

forests, parks and open lands in their

pristine purity and those charged with

administrative responsibilities who, under

the pressures of the changing needs of an

increasingly complex society, find it

necessary to encroach to some extent

upon open lands heretofore considered

inviolate to change. The resolution of this

conflict in any given case is for the

legislature and not the courts. If there is a

law made by Parliament or the State

Legislatures the courts can serve as an

instrument of determining legislative

intent in the exercise of its powers of

judicial review under the Constitution.

But in the absence of any legislation, the

executive acting under

the doctrine of public trust cannot

abdicate the natural resou rces and

convert them into private ownership, or for

commercial use. The aesthetic use and the

pristine glory of the natural resources, the

environment and the ecosystems of our

country cannot be permitted to be eroded

for private, commercial or any other use

unless the courts find it necessary, in good

faith, for the public good and

in public interest to encroach upon the

said resources.”

152. This Court in unequivocal terms has held that

the executive acting under

the doctrine of public trust cannot abdicate the

natural resources and convert them into private

ownership, or for commercial use. The aesthetic use

and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the

environment and the ecosystems of our country

cannot be permitted to be eroded for private,

commercial or any other use unless the courts find it

necessary, in good faith, for the public good and

in public interest to encroach upon the said

resources.

74

153. The law with regard to the importance of the

‘public trust’ doctrine in ecological/environmental

matters has further been evolved and expanded by

this Court in subsequent judgments. In the case

of Association for Environment Protection v. State of

Kerala

11, this Court has referred to some of the

judgments which followed the law laid down in the

case of Kamal Nath (supra), which are as under:

“6. In M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey

Shyam Sahu, [(1999) 6 SCC 464], the

Court applied the public trust doctrine for

upholding the order of the Allahabad High

Court which had quashed the decision of

Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika permitting

appellant M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. to

construct an underground shoppin g

complex in Jhandewala Park, Aminabad

Market, Lucknow, and directed demolition

of the construction made on

the park land. The High Court had noted

that Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika had

entered into an agreemen t with the

appellant for construction of shopping

complex and given it full freedom to lease

out the shops and also to sign agreement

on its behalf and held that this was

impermissible. On appeal by the builders,

this Court held that the terms of

agreement were unreasonable, unfair and

atrocious. The Court then invoked

the public trust doctrine and held that

being a trustee of the park on behalf of

the public, the Nagar Mahapalika could

not have transferred the same to the

private builder and thereby deprived the

residents of the area of the quality of life to

which they were entitled under the

Constitution and municipal laws.

7. In Intellectuals Forum v. State of A.P.,

[(2006) 3 SCC 549], this Court again

invoked the public trust doctrine in a

75

matter involving the challenge to the

systematic destruction of percolation,

irrigation and drinking water tanks in

Tirupati Town, referred to some judicial

precedents including M.C. Mehta v. Kamal

Nath [M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1

SCC 388], M.I. Builders (P) Ltd., [(1999) 6

SCC 464], National Audubon

Society [National Audubon

Society v. Superior Court, 658 P 2d 709 :

33 Cal 3d 419 (1983)] and observed :

(Intellectuals Forum case, [(2006) 3 SCC

549], SCC p. 575, para 76)

“76. … This is an articulation of

the doctrine from the angle of the

affirmative duties of the State with

regard to public trust. Formulated

from a negatory angle,

the doctrine does not

exactly prohibit the alienation of the

property held as a public trust.

However, when the State holds a

resource that is freely available for

the use of the public, it provides for a

high degree of judicial scrutiny on

any action of the Government, no

matter how consistent with the

existing legislations, that attempts to

restrict such free use. To properly

scrutinise such actions of the

Government, the courts must make a

distinction between the

Government's general obligation to

act for the public benefit, and the

special, more demanding obligation

which it may have as a trustee of

certain public resources….”

(emphasis in original)

8. In Fomento Resorts and Hotels

Ltd. v. Minguel Martins, [(2009) 3 SCC

571 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 877], this Court

76

was called upon to consider whether the

appellant was entitled to block the passage

to the beach by erecting a fence in the garb

of protecting its property. After noticing

the judgments to which reference has been

made hereinabove, the Court held : (SCC

pp. 614-15 & 619, paras 53-55 & 65)

“53. The public trust doctrine enjoin

s upon the Government to protect the

resources for the enjoyment of the

general public rather than to permit

their use for private ownership or

commercial purposes.

This doctrine puts an implicit

embargo on the right of the State to

transfer public properties to private

party if such transfer

affects public interest, mandates

affirmative State action for effective

management of natural resources

and empowers the citizens to

question ineffective management

thereof.

54. The heart of

the public trust doctrine is that it

imposes limits and obligations upon

government agencies and their

administrators on behalf of all the

people and especially future

generations. For example, renewable

and non -renewable resources,

associated uses, ecological values or

objects in which the public has a

special interest (i.e. public lands,

waters, etc.) are held subject to the

duty of the State not to impair such

resources, uses or values, even if

private interests are involved. The

same obligations apply to managers

of forests, monuments, parks,

the public domain and

77

other public assets. Professor

Joseph L. Sax in his classic article,

‘The Public Trust Doctrine in

Natural Resources Law : Effective

Judicial Intervention’ (1970),

indicates that

the public trust doctrine, of all

concepts known to law, constitutes

the best practical and philosophical

premise and legal tool for

protecting public rights and for

protecting and managing resources,

ecological values or objects held

in trust.

55. The public trust doctrine is a

tool for exerting long -

established public rights over short-

term public rights and private gain.

Today every person exercising his or

her right to use the air, water, or land

and associated natural ecosystems

has the obligation to secure for the

rest of us the right to live or otherwise

use that same resource or property

for the long-term and enjoyment by

future generations. To say it another

way, a landowner or lessee and a

water right holder has an obligation

to use such resources in a manner as

not to impair or diminish the people's

rights and the people's long-term

interest in that property or resource,

including downslope lands, waters

and resources.

***

65. We reiterate that natural

resources including forests, water

bodies, rivers, seashores, etc. are

held by the State as a trustee on

behalf of the people and especially

the future generations. These

78

constitute common properties and

people are entitled to uninterrupted

use thereof. The State cannot

transfer public trust properties to a

private party, if such a transfer

interferes with the right of

the public and the court can invoke

the public trust doctrine and take

affirmative action for protecting the

right of people to have access to light,

air and water and also for protecting

rivers, sea, tanks, trees, forests and

associated natural ecosystems.”

154. The importance of the doctrine of ‘public trust’

has further been emphasized in the case of Tata

Housing Development Company Limited v. Aalok

Jagga (2020) 15 SCC 784 to which one of us

(B.R. Gavai, J.) was a party.”

77. In the present case, it appears that the then Minister for

Revenue and the then Divisional Commissioner had totally

given a go-bye to the doctrine of public trust. The facts

appearing on the record are glaring.

78. As already discussed hereinabove, as per the order of the

Tehsildar, Haveli, the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’

on Eksali (yearly) lease and as per the undertaking of the

‘Chavan Family’ the possession of the land was to be returned

on the expiry of the one year and there has been no further

renewal. It further appears that thereafter the members of the

‘Chavan Family’ were in deep slumber.

79

79. From the records, it appears that one Mr. R.S. Chauhan,

a retired Police Inspector, residing in Pune and others, for the

first time, started agitating their rights on 4

th August 1988.

They had addressed communications dated 4

th August 1988,

30

th August 1988 and 27

th December 1990 for allotment of

subject land on permanent basis for cultivation in lieu of their

land at Survey No. 37, acquired for Kondhwa Leprosy Hospital.

80. It appears that thereafter for the first time the Collector,

Pune on 19

th June 1991 recommended the permanent

allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ only

insofar as 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas are concerned. The

Collector, Pune specifically observed that the ‘Chavan Family’

had the cultivation rights from 1969 only on 3 Acres and 20

Gunthas, whereas the rest of the land was reserved for village

animal feeding. The Collector, Pune, therefore, recommended

allotment of only 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas to the ‘Chavan

Family’ and also recommended that possession of rest of the

land should be handed over to the Forest Department.

81. It is to be noted that the office of the Collector, Pune on

26

th August 1994, rejected the request of the Executive

Engineer, MSEB for establishment of High-Tension Sub-

80

Station on the ground that the land in question was reserved

as “Forest Land”.

82. The Divisional Commissioner in his letter dated 30

th

November 1994 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue and

Forest Department, Mantralaya noted that the Collector, Pune

had opined that the ‘Chavan Family’ was entitled only to 3

Acres and 20 Gunthas. He also recorded the objection of the

Forest Department to the effect that the Forest Department

had asked for possession of the subject land for the purposes

of afforestation.

83. In spite of noticing all of these facts, the Divisional

Commissioner recommended that the entire subject land of 11

Hectare 89 Are be granted to the ‘Chavan Family’. Thereafter

the matter remained pending at the level of the State

Government.

84. The then Minister for Revenue considered the proposal

and came to a conclusion that the provisions of the 1980 FC

Act were not applicable to the present case. However, he

decided to seek the opinion of the Law and Judiciary

Department of the Government of Maharashtra. The Deputy

Secretary to Government, Law and Judiciary Department on

81

27

th July 1998, relying on the judgment of this Court in the

case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) opined that the permission

of the Government of India is not necessary. While doing so,

he specifically ignored the specific judgment of this Court in

the case of Ambica Quarry Works (supra) and the direction

of this Court dated 12

th December 1996 in the present

proceedings.

85. Almost within a week thereafter, i.e. on 4

th August 1998,

the Government of Maharashtra issued an order allotting the

land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’. A corrigendum thereto,

vide order dated 13

th August 1998, specifically provided that

the allotment of land was specifically for “Agricultural

purpose”. The Collector, Pune thereafter within a short span,

i.e. on 28

th August 1998, allotted the subject land in favour of

the ‘Chavan Family’.

86. The alarming speed with which the events took place

from July to August 1998 speaks volumes.

87. As already discussed hereinabove, though the ‘Chavan

Family’ had already entered into transactions with Mr.

Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of the RRCHS,

they transferred the land in favour of RRCHS on 19

th

82

December 1998. This is again done in breach of the allotment

order of 28

th August 1998. The Divisional Commissioner

thereafter vide order dated 30

th October 1999, permitted the

sale of the subject land to the RRCHS on payment of 75% of

the price fixed by the Collector, Assistant Director, Town

Planning Department, Pune.

88. It is to be noted that though the powers for grant of

permission are with the Collector, it is the Divisional

Commissioner who exercised the said powers for reasons best

known to him. Thereafter the District Collector granted

permission for use of the subject land for Non-Agricultural

purposes on 8

th July 2005.

89. It is to be noted that all this has been done in the teeth

of various communications of the Forest Department since

1991 requesting the Revenue Department to transfer the land

to the Forest Department. It was also brought to the notice

of the Revenue Authorities by the Forest Department that a

plantation had already been carried out on the subject land in

the year 1995-96.

90. In the light of these glaring facts, we have no hesitation

in holding that the then Minister for Revenue, Government of

83

Maharashtra and the then Divisional Commissioner, Pune

have acted totally in breach of public trust to illegally cause

gain to private individuals at the cost of sacrificing precious

Forest Land.

91. In the conclusion, we have no hesitation to hold that the

allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in

blatant disregard to the provisions of the law inasmuch as it

was violative of Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act as well as the

directions issued by this Court from time to time. We also hold

that the allotment of the subject land was made, ignoring the

communications of the Forest Department which had insisted

that the said land could not be allotted inasmuch as, the same

was classified as a Forest Land. We also have no hesitation to

hold that the then Minister for Revenue and the then

Divisional Commissioner, Pune have given a total go-bye to the

doctrine of public trust inasmuch as, valuable forest land was

allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ de hors the provisions of the

law.

92. While hearing this matter, another glaring issue has

come to the notice of the Court. It has been noticed that a vast

stretch of the land which is notified as ‘Forest Land’ is still in

84

possession of the Revenue Department. Such a situation

creates many complexities as is evident in the present matter.

The Revenue Department, despite resistance from the Forest

Department, allotted the land to private

individuals/institutions for non-forestry purposes. This, in

turn, reduced the vital green cover. We, therefore, find that it

is necessary that a direction needs to be issued to all the State

Government and the Union Territories to hand over the

possession of the lands which are recorded as ‘Forest Land’

and which are in possession of the Revenue Department to the

Forest Department.

93. The report of the CEC would also reveal that there is

material to show that many of the Forest Lands have been

allotted to private individuals/institutions for non-forestry

purposes. Any such allotment after 12

th December 1996, i.e.,

the date on which the directions were given by this Court in

the present proceedings, would not be sustainable in law.

94. It would, therefore, be imperative that wherever it is

possible to take back the possession of such land, the

State/Union Territory should do so and hand over the

possession to the Forest Department for forestry purposes.

85

However, if on account of such lands already being converted

for non-forest activities, it is found that taking back the

possession of the land would not be in the larger public

interest, then the States/Union Territories should recover the

cost of the land from such individuals/institutions and use

the said amount for the purpose of afforestation, restoration

and conservation.

VI. CONCLUSION

95. We, therefore, dispose of the Interlocutory Applications

and the Writ Petition in the following terms:

(i) We hold that the allotment of 11.89 ha of

Reserve Forest land in Survey No.21 (old

Survey No.20A) Kondhwa Budruk in District

Pune for agriculture purposes on 28

th August

1998 and subsequent permission given for its

sale in favour of RRCHS on 30

th October 1999

was totally illegal;

(ii) We further hold that Environmental Clearance

granted by the MoEF on 3

rd July 2007 to

RRCHS is illegal and is accordingly quashed

and set aside;

86

(iii) Since the State of Maharashtra has recalled

the communication dated 4

th August 1998

approving the allotment of the subject land to

the ‘Chavan Family’, we uphold the same;

(iv) We direct that the possession of the subject

land, which is reserved as a Forest Land, but

is in possession of the Revenue Department,

should be handed over to the Forest

Department within a period of three months

from today;

(v) We further direct the Chief Secretaries of all

the States and the Administrators of all the

Union Territories to constitute Special

Investigation Teams for the purpose of

examining as to whether any of the reserved

Forest Land in the possession of the Revenue

Department has been allotted to any private

individuals/institutions for any purpose other

than the forestry purpose;

(vi) The State Governments and the Union

Territories are also directed to take steps to

87

take back the possession of the land from the

persons/institutions in possession of such

lands and handover the same to the Forest

Department. In case, it is found that taking

back the possession of the land would not be

in the larger public interest, the State

Governments/Union Territories should

recover the cost of the said land from the

persons/institutions to whom they were

allotted and use the said amount for the

purpose of development of forests; and

(vii) We further direct the Chief Secretaries of all

the States and the Administrators of all the

Union Territories to constitute Special Teams

to ensure that all such transfers take place

within a period of one year from today.

Needless to state that hereinafter such land

should be used only for the purpose of

afforestation.

88

96. Before we part with this judgment, we place on record

our deep appreciation for Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior

Counsel, ably assisted by Mr. M.V. Mukunda, Ms. Kanti, Ms.

Raji Gururaj and Mr. Shreenivas Patil, learned counsel, for

rendering valuable assistance to this Court as Amicus Curiae.

We also place on record our appreciation for the efforts put in

by Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Shri Shekhar Naphade and

Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the parties.

.................CJI

(B.R. GAVAI)

…………...................................J

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH )

…………................................J

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 15, 2025.