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2026:CGHC:17637

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Order Reserved on : 20.03.2026

Order Delivered on : 17.04.2026

WPC No. 840 of 2020

Indrapal Bhaskar, aged about 52 years, S/o Shri Johan Ram Bhaskar,

Occupation Service Assistant Teacher (LB) Primary School Jhikatola,

District Balod (Chhattisgarh), R/o Village and Post Badgaon, Tehsil

Daundilohara, District Balod (Chhattisgarh)

--- Petitioner

Versus

1. State of Chhattisgarh through the Secretary, Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes Development Department, Naya Raipur, Mantralaya,

District Raipur (CG)

2. State of Chhattisgarh through the Secretary, School Education

Department, Naya Raipur, Mantralaya, District Raipur (CG)

3. High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee through its Member

Secretary-cum-Director, Tribal and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes Development, Office at Block-4D, Ground Floor, Naya Raipur,

Atal Nagar, District Raipur (CG)

4. Collector, Balod, District Balod (Chhattisgarh)

--- Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. R. K. Bhagat, Advocate

For State/Respondents :Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government

Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

CAV Order

1.Heard Mr. R.K. Bhagat, learned counsel for the petitioner as well

as Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate

appearing for the State/respondents.

2.The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 25.01.2020 passed

by the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee, whereby the

caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner has been

cancelled, and the concerned authorities have been directed to

take appropriate action in accordance with the provisions

contained under Section 9(3) of the Chhattisgarh Scheduled

Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes

(Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act, 2013 (for short, ‘Act

of 2013’) as well as Rules 23(3), 23(5) and 24(1) of the

Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other

Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification)

Rules, 2013 (for short, ‘Rules of 2013’). The petitioner has sought

for following relief(s) :-

“10.1 That the petitioner most humbly and

respectfully prays to this Hon'ble Court to issue

appropriate writ/order/direction for quashment

of impugned order dated 25.1.2020 contained

in ANNEXURE-P/1.

10.2 That the petitioner most humbly and

respectfully prays to this Hon'ble Court to issue

appropriate writ/order/direction to hold that the

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caste certificate issued to the petitioner

contained in ANNEXURE-P/2 as valid.

10.3 Any other relief whatsoever, this Hon'ble

Court may deem fit and proper may also be

granted to the petitioner.”

3.Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell are that the petitioner was

issued a valid caste certificate by the competent authority

certifying him to be a member of the Scheduled Caste community

“Mahar”. The said caste “Mahar” stands notified as a Scheduled

Caste under Clause (1) of Article 341 of the Constitution of India in

the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and continues to retain the

same status in the State of Chhattisgarh after its bifurcation. The

petitioner, being duly qualified educationally, was appointed as

Assistant Teacher (LB) on 29.06.2007, after due consideration of

his eligibility and the benefit of reservation applicable to Scheduled

Caste candidates. Since then, he has been discharging his duties

and is presently posted as Assistant Teacher (LB) at Primary

School, Jhikatola, District Balod (Chhattisgarh). In the year 2013,

a vague and omnibus complaint was made against the petitioner

along with 17 other persons alleging that they had secured

appointment on the basis of forged caste certificates. Acting upon

such complaint, a preliminary enquiry is stated to have been

conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Balod and the

District Level Scrutiny Committee, and thereafter, the matter was

referred on 06.02.2013 to the High Power Certification Scrutiny

Committee.

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4.Upon receipt of the reference, the High Power Certification

Scrutiny Committee initiated an enquiry and sought reports from

the Vigilance Cell as well as the Investigation Assistant. The

Vigilance Cell, after examining documentary evidence, recorded

certain findings. It noted that in the Missal Bandobast of the year

1930–31 pertaining to the petitioner’s grandfather, namely

Sadaram, and his brother Ajab Singh, their caste was recorded as

“Mahara”. It was further observed that the petitioner’s father,

Johan Ram, at the time of his admission in Primary School in the

year 1947, had mentioned his caste as “Baya”. At the same time,

the caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner records his

caste as “Mahar”, which is also reflected in the petitioner’s school

records.

5.Statements of local villagers were also recorded, who affirmed that

the petitioner’s family has been recognized in society as belonging

to the “Mahara/Mahar” community.

6.Despite such material, the Vigilance Cell arrived at a highly

erroneous and untenable conclusion by suggesting a new caste

category termed “Baya Mahara”, which finds no mention in any of

the documents examined and is not a recognized caste.

Simultaneously, the Investigation Assistant conducted a detailed

enquiry into the petitioner’s social status, including aspects such

as ancestral profession, mother tongue, family customs, deities,

and social acceptance.

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7.Upon completion of the investigation, the Investigation Assistant

submitted a report clearly concluding that the petitioner shares the

same social status and characteristics as members of the “Mahar”

Scheduled Caste community. However, the High Power

Certification Scrutiny Committee, while passing the impugned

order dated 25.01.2020, failed to properly appreciate the material

on record. The Committee ignored the affirmative findings of the

Vigilance Cell and completely overlooked the report of the

Investigation Assistant, which substantiated the petitioner’s claim.

Without assigning cogent reasons and in disregard of the relevant

evidence, the Committee proceeded to cancel the petitioner’s

caste certificate and directed consequential action under Section

9(3) of the Act of 2013, read with Rules 23(3), 23(5) and 24(1) of

the Rules of 2013.

8.Being aggrieved by the said arbitrary and unsustainable action, the

petitioner has preferred the present petition.

9. Mr. R. K. Bhagat, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

the impugned action of the High Power Certification Scrutiny

Committee is ex facie illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the

constitutional scheme. By virtue of powers conferred under Clause

(1) of Article 341 of the Constitution of India, the caste “Mahar”

stands duly notified as a Scheduled Caste in the erstwhile State of

Madhya Pradesh and continues to retain the said status even after

the bifurcation of the State and formation of the State of

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Chhattisgarh. It is further submitted that at Serial No. 31 of the

Presidential Order applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh, the

castes “Mahar”, “Mehra” and “Mehar” are specifically recognized

as Scheduled Castes. Therefore, the very foundation of the

impugned order, whereby the caste status of the petitioner has

been doubted, is legally unsustainable. It is further contended that

the Scrutiny Committee has committed a grave error in completely

overlooking the settled principles governing verification of caste

status, particularly the requirement of conducting an affinity test. It

is well settled that determination of caste status cannot be based

solely on documentary evidence but must also take into account

anthropological and ethnological traits, customs, traditions, and

social acceptance of the individual. In the present case, the

Investigation Assistant of the Vigilance Cell had conducted a

detailed enquiry and categorically recorded a finding that the

petitioner shares identical social status, customs and traits with

other members of the “Mahar” community. However, the said

crucial report has been completely ignored by the Scrutiny

Committee without assigning any reason, thereby vitiating the

impugned order.

10.Learned counsel further submits that the Committee has failed to

appreciate that greater probative value is to be attached to pre-

Independence documents, as such documents are less likely to be

manipulated and carry higher evidentiary sanctity. In the present

case, the Missal Bandobast records of 1929–30 and 1930–31

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clearly reflect the caste of the petitioner’s ancestors as “Mahara”,

which is synonymous with “Mahar”. Despite this, the Committee

has discarded such vital evidence on flimsy grounds, while at the

same time relying upon inconclusive and inconsistent entries such

as “Baya”. It is further submitted that no proper opportunity was

afforded to the petitioner to explain alleged discrepancies, nor

were the concerned authorities, such as the Head Master,

examined to verify the correctness of the records. It is also

contended that the Vigilance Cell itself has not recorded any

finding that the documents produced by the petitioner are forged

or fabricated. Rather, the entire adverse inference is based on

speculative observations regarding alleged corrections in certain

entries. Shockingly, the Vigilance Cell has proceeded to invent a

non-existent caste category, namely “Baya Mahara”, which finds

no mention in any statutory notification or in any of the documents

on record. Such a conclusion is perverse and demonstrates

complete non-application of mind.

11.Learned counsel further submits that as per Rule 21 of the Rules

of 2013, where the Vigilance Cell report supports the claim of the

applicant, no further adverse action is warranted. In the present

case, the Investigation Assistant’s report clearly supports the

petitioner’s claim, and therefore, there was no occasion for the

Scrutiny Committee to take a contrary view. The deliberate

suppression of the favourable findings of the affinity test renders

the impugned order wholly arbitrary and unsustainable in law. It is

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also argued that the invocation of Section 9(3) of the Act of 2013

and Rules 23(3), 23(5) and 24(1) of the Rules of 2013 is wholly

misconceived, inasmuch as there is no finding that the petitioner

has obtained the caste certificate by fraud, misrepresentation or

any illegal means. In absence of any such finding, the drastic

consequences contemplated under the said provisions could not

have been triggered. The impugned action, therefore, amounts to

misuse of statutory powers.

12.Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner has been serving as an

Assistant Teacher since the year 2007 and has an unblemished

service record. If the impugned order is allowed to stand, the

petitioner would suffer grave and irreparable loss. It is further

pointed out that in respect of a close relative of the petitioner,

whose case is similarly situated, the caste certificate has already

been duly verified and upheld by the same Scrutiny Committee.

The petitioner has placed on record the said verification along with

the family tree to establish parity. In such circumstances, the

impugned order is liable to be set aside.

13.In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner

placed reliance upon the order passed by Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court in WPC No.842 of 2020 (Santosh Kumar Bhaskar v.

State of Chhattisgarh and others) decided on 06.03.2024.

14.On the other hand, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned State counsel

opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

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petitioner and submits that the entire writ petition is misconceived

and devoid of merits, as the petitioner has failed to discharge the

burden of proving his caste status as belonging to the “Mahar”

Scheduled Caste. The primary contention of the petitioner, that

there exists no caste such as “Baya Mahara”, is factually incorrect.

Learned State counsel submits that “Baya Mahara” is a

recognized caste included in the Other Backward Classes (OBC)

category in the State of Chhattisgarh, as reflected at Serial No. 78

of the relevant State notification. Therefore, the petitioner cannot

deny the existence of such caste merely to discredit the findings of

the Vigilance Cell. It is further submitted that the entire

proceedings were initiated on the basis of a specific and

substantiated complaint dated 18.08.2012 made by a member of

the Scheduled Caste community, wherein it was categorically

alleged that the petitioner, who actually belongs to “Baya Mahara”

(OBC), had fraudulently obtained a caste certificate of “Mahar”

(Scheduled Caste) and availed benefits meant for SC candidates.

The said complaint named the petitioner along with 17 others.

Upon preliminary inquiry conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer

(Revenue), Dondi-Lohara, it was found that prima facie the

petitioner belongs to “Baya Mahara” community. Consequently, the

matter was referred to the competent Scrutiny Committees for

detailed verification.

15.Learned State counsel further submits that due procedure as

prescribed under the Act of 2013 and the Rules of 2013 has been

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strictly followed. The matter was examined at multiple levels,

including by the District Level Caste Scrutiny Committee and

thereafter by the High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee. The

petitioner was afforded adequate opportunities of hearing,

including issuance of show cause notices and personal hearings

on multiple dates. Therefore, the allegation of violation of

principles of natural justice is wholly baseless. It is contended that

the Vigilance Cell, constituted in accordance with Rule 22 of the

Rules of 2013 and headed by a Deputy Superintendent of Police,

conducted a thorough and detailed inquiry by examining revenue

records, school records, and statements of local villagers. The

Vigilance Cell, on appreciation of the entire evidence, categorically

concluded that the petitioner does not belong to “Mahar”

Scheduled Caste but belongs to “Baya Mahara” community, which

falls under the OBC category. The said report forms the backbone

of the proceedings and has rightly been relied upon by the High

Power Caste Scrutiny Committee.

16.Learned State counsel also submits that the reliance placed by the

petitioner on the report of the so-called “Investigation Assistant” is

misplaced and legally untenable. It is clarified that no such

statutory post exists under the Act or the Rules. At best, the report

relied upon by the petitioner is that of a Research Assistant, which

has no statutory backing and cannot override or dilute the findings

of the Vigilance Cell constituted under the statutory framework.

Therefore, the Scrutiny Committee has rightly given primacy to the

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Vigilance Cell report. It is further submitted that the documentary

evidence produced by the petitioner itself creates doubt regarding

his caste status. The school admission register of the petitioner’s

father clearly records the caste as “Baya”, and there are

inconsistencies in other records, including indications of

manipulation in entries reflecting “Mahar”. In contrast, revenue

records and other contemporaneous documents indicate the caste

of the petitioner’s ancestors as “Baya” or related variants. In such

circumstances, the Scrutiny Committee has rightly concluded that

the petitioner failed to establish his claim of belonging to

Scheduled Caste.

17.Lastly, learned State counsel submits that once the caste

certificate of the petitioner has been found to be invalid, the

consequential action under Section 9(3) of the Act of 2013 and

Rules 23(3), 23(5) and 24(1) of the Rules of 2013 has rightly been

invoked. Since the petitioner has secured appointment against a

post reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates without actually

belonging to such category, his appointment is void ab initio and

liable to be cancelled. It is thus prayed that the writ petition being

devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed.

18.I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well

as learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents at length

and have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. I have also

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carefully perused the pleadings, documents and material placed

on record, including the reports submitted by the Vigilance Cell,

the findings recorded by the High Power Certification Scrutiny

Committee, as well as the documents relied upon by the petitioner

in support of his claim.

19.Upon such consideration, this Court finds that the controversy

involved in the present case lies within a narrow compass, namely,

the correctness and legality of the impugned order dated

25.01.2020 passed by the High Power Certification Scrutiny

Committee, whereby the caste certificate of the petitioner has

been cancelled and consequential directions have been issued.

The Court is, therefore, required to examine whether the said

order has been passed in accordance with law, upon proper

appreciation of evidence on record and in adherence to the settled

principles governing determination of social status.

20.From perusal of the impugned order dated 25.01.2020, it

transpires that the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee

has proceeded to examine the case of the petitioner in light of the

guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhuri

Patil vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development (AIR

1995 SC 94), as well as the provisions contained under the

Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other

Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status Certification) Act,

2013 and the Rules framed thereunder. The Committee has noted

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that it was duly reconstituted vide notification published in the

Chhattisgarh Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 21.02.2018, thereby

superseding the earlier constitution of the Committee. It further

transpires that the proceedings were initiated pursuant to a

complaint alleging that the petitioner and others had secured

public employment on the basis of false caste certificates. The

Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Dondi Lohara, District Balod

conducted a preliminary inquiry and, upon finding prima facie

substance in the allegations, referred the matter to the District

Level Scrutiny Committee, which in turn forwarded the case to the

High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee through the Assistant

Commissioner, Tribal Development, vide communication dated

06.02.2013 for detailed investigation.

21.The impugned order reflects that various documents relating to the

petitioner and his family members were taken into consideration

by the Committee. These included school records, revenue

records such as Kisanbandi Khatauni and mutation registers, as

well as genealogical records. Notably, certain documents,

including the school admission register of the petitioner’s father

(year 1947), recorded the caste as “Baya”, whereas the Misal

Settlement record of the year 1930–31 pertaining to the

petitioner’s grandfather recorded the caste as “Mahara”. Other

revenue records of subsequent years also reflected entries such

as “Baya” and “Baya Mahar”. It is further evident that, in

compliance with the prescribed procedure, the Committee referred

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the matter to the Vigilance Cell for detailed inquiry, which

submitted its report dated 22.07.2017 after examining

documentary evidence and recording statements of local villagers.

While the villagers reportedly identified the petitioner’s family as

belonging to “Mahar” community, the Vigilance Cell, upon overall

assessment of the records, concluded that the petitioner belongs

to “Baya Mahara” caste, which is not included in the list of

Scheduled Castes in the State of Chhattisgarh. The impugned

order also indicates that the Committee had issued show cause

notices to the petitioner and afforded him opportunities of hearing

on multiple dates, including 13.12.2019 and 17.01.2020. The

petitioner submitted his replies and relied upon certain documents,

including pre-independence records and other supporting material

to establish his caste as “Mahar”. However, the Committee found

that the petitioner failed to produce cogent documentary evidence

of sufficient probative value, particularly prior to the Presidential

Notification of 1950, to conclusively establish his claim. On the

basis of the Vigilance Cell report, documentary evidence on

record, and the material produced during the course of hearing,

the Committee arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner does

not belong to “Mahar” Scheduled Caste, but rather to “Baya

Mahara” community. Consequently, the caste certificate dated

24.10.2003 issued in favour of the petitioner was held to be invalid

and was cancelled in exercise of powers under Section 8(1) of the

Act of 2013 read with Rule 23(2) of the Rules of 2013. The

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Committee further directed initiation of consequential action under

Section 9(3) of the Act of 2013 and Rules 23(3), 23(5) and 24(1) of

the Rules of 2013.

22.From perusal of Annexure P/4 dated 22.07.2017, it is quite clear

that the Vigilance Cell, upon conducting a detailed and

comprehensive enquiry in accordance with the directions issued

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble High Court of

Chhattisgarh, has categorically recorded a finding that the caste of

the petitioner/holder is ‘Baya-Mahara’ and not ‘Mahar’ as claimed.

It has further been specifically observed that the said caste ‘Baya-

Mahara’ does not find mention in the list of Scheduled Castes

notified for the State of Chhattisgarh. Thus, the report

unequivocally concludes that the petitioner does not belong to the

‘Mahar’ Scheduled Caste category, thereby rendering the caste

certificate issued in his favour liable to be treated as invalid.

23.Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the

parties and after perusing the material available on record, it is

significant to note that the earliest available documentary

evidence, i.e., the Misal Bandobast records of the years 1929–30

and 1930–31, unequivocally reflect that the petitioner’s forefathers

were recorded as belonging to “Mahara” caste. The said entry,

being a pre-independence document, carries great evidentiary

value and credibility, inasmuch as such documents are presumed

to be free from manipulation and constitute the best evidence for

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determining social status. Importantly, there is no whisper in these

records about any caste described as “Baya Mahara”. The

introduction of such a nomenclature by the Vigilance Cell is,

therefore, wholly artificial, unsupported by any statutory

notification, and clearly dehors the material on record.

24.This Court further finds that the caste “Mahar” is a notified

Scheduled Caste under Article 341 of the Constitution of India and

continues to hold such status in the State of Chhattisgarh. Once

the petitioner has produced cogent documentary evidence

establishing linkage with “Mahara/Mahar” caste, the burden shifted

upon the respondents to dislodge the same by leading clear,

cogent and convincing evidence. However, the respondents have

failed to discharge such burden. It is also apparent that the

Scrutiny Committee has committed a patent error in selectively

relying upon stray and inconclusive entries such as “Baya”

recorded in certain school documents, while discarding the more

reliable and probative pre-independence records without assigning

any cogent reason. The approach of the Committee, in this regard,

is contrary to the settled principles of appreciation of evidence in

caste verification matters.

25.Further, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the statements

of independent villagers, recorded during the course of vigilance

enquiry, clearly support the petitioner’s claim that his family has

always been recognized in society as belonging to the “Mahar”

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community. The element of social acceptance, which forms a

crucial component of the affinity test, has thus been established in

favour of the petitioner. In addition, the report of the Investigation

Assistant (though sought to be discredited by the State)

categorically affirms that the petitioner shares the anthropological,

ethnological and customary traits of the “Mahar” Scheduled Caste

community. The complete non-consideration of such vital material

renders the decision-making process vitiated on account of non-

application of mind.

26.The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, including

Madhuri Patil vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal

Development (AIR 1995 SC 94), has laid down the procedure

and safeguards to be followed in caste verification proceedings,

emphasizing that such determinations must be based on a holistic

consideration of documentary evidence, affinity test and social

acceptance. Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated that

greater reliance must be placed upon pre-independence

documents and that minor discrepancies in subsequent records

cannot override consistent and credible ancestral evidence. It has

also been held that findings of Scrutiny Committees must be

based on cogent reasoning and cannot rest on conjectures or

invented classifications.

27.In Kavita Solunke v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2012) 8

SCC 430, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that

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invalidating a caste claim in absence of fraud would not

automatically justify punitive consequences, thereby underscoring

the requirement of a strict standard of proof, by observing as

follows :-

“14. A careful reading of the above would show

that both the High Court as also this Court were

conscious of the developments that had taken

place on the subject whether ‘Halba-Koshti’ are

‘Halbas' within the meaning of the Presidential

Order. The position emerging from the said

circulars, resolutions and orders issued by the

competent authority from time to time

notwithstanding, this Court on an abstract

principle of law held that an inquiry into the

question whether ‘Halba-Koshti’ were Halbas

within the meaning of the Presidential order

was not legally permissible.

15. The appellant before us relies upon the

above passage extracted above to argue that

her appointment had attained finality long

before the judgment of this Court was delivered

in Milind’s case and even when she was found

to be a ‘Koshti’ and not a ‘Halba’ by the

Verification Committee, she was entitled to

protection against ouster.

16. We find merit in that contention. If ‘Halba-

Koshti’ has been treated as ‘Halba’ even before

the appellant joined service as a Teacher and if

the only reason for her ouster is the law

declared by this Court in Milind’s case, there is

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no reason why the protection against ouster

given by this Court to appointees whose

applications had become final should not be

extended to the appellant also. The

Constitution Bench had in Milind’s case noticed

the background in which the confusion had

prevailed for many years and the fact that

appointments and admissions were made for a

long time treating ‘Koshti’ as a Scheduled Tribe

and directed that such admissions and

appointments wherever the same had attained

finality will not be affected by the decision taken

by this Court.

17. After the pronouncement of judgment in

Milind’s case, a batch of cases was directed to

be listed for hearing before a Division Bench of

this Court. The Division Bench eventually

decided those cases by an order dated 12th

December 2000 (State of Maharashtra v. Om

Raj (2007) 14 SCC 488) granting benefit of

protection against ouster to some of the

respondents on the authority of the view taken

by this Court in Milind’s case. One of these

cases, namely, Civil Appeal No.7375 of 2002

arising out of SLP No.6524 of 1988 related to

the appointment of a ‘Koshti’ as an Assistant

Engineer against a vacancy reserved for a

‘Halba/Scheduled Tribe candidate. This court

extended the benefit of protection against

ouster to the said candidate also by a short

order passed in the following words:

“4. Leave granted.

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5. The appellant having belonged to Koshti

caste claimed to be included in the

Scheduled Tribe of Halba and obtained an

appointment as Assistant Engineer. When his

appointment was sought to be terminated on

the basis that he did not belong to Scheduled

Tribe by the Government a writ petition was

filed before the High Court challenging that

order which was allowed. That order is

questioned in this appeal. The questions

arising in this case are covered by the

decision in State of aharashtra v. Milind1and

were got to be allowed, however, the benefits

derived till now shall be available to the

appellant to the effect that his appointment

as Assistant Engineer shall stand protected

but no further. The appeal is disposed of

accordingly.”

18. Reference may also be made to Punjab

National Bank v. Vilas (2008) 14 SCC 545. That

too was a case of appointment based on a

certificate which was later cancelled on the

ground that ‘Halba Koshti’ was not the same as

‘Halba’ Scheduled Tribe. The High Court had

set aside the termination of the service of the

affected candidates relying upon a Government

resolution dated 15th June 1995 as applicable

to Punjab National Bank. While upholding the

said order, H.K. Sema, J. held the candidate to

be protected against ouster on the basis of the

resolution. V.S. Sirpurkar, J., however, took a

slightly different view and held that the

appointment made by the Bank having become

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final the same was protected against ouster in

terms of the decision of the Constitution Bench

in Milind’s case (supra). The question whether

the Government resolution protected the

candidates against ouster from service was for

that reason left open by His Lordship. Reliance

in support of that view was placed upon the

decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 7375

of 2000 (wrongly mentioned in the report as

Civil appeal No. 3375 of 2000) mentioned

above. The Court observed:

“The situation is no different in case of the

present respondent. He also came to be

appointed and/or promoted way back in the

year 1989 on the basis of his caste certificate

which declared him to be Scheduled Tribe.

Ultimately, it was found that since a “Koshti”

does not get the status of a Scheduled Tribe,

the Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidated the

said certificate holding that the respondent

was a Koshti and not a Halba. I must hasten

to add that there is no finding in the order of

the Caste Scrutiny Committee that the

petitioner lacked in bona fides in getting the

certificate. I say this to overcome the

observations in para 21 in Sanjay K. Nimje

case. But it is not a case where the

respondent pleaded and proved bona fides.

Under such circumstances the High Court

was fully justified in relying on the

observations made in Milind case. The High

Court has not referred to the judgment and

order in Civil Appeal No. 3375 of 2000

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decided on 12-12-2000 to which a reference

has been made above. However, it is clear

that the High Court was right in holding that

the observations in Milind case apply to the

case of the present respondent and he

stands protected thereby”.

19. Our attention was drawn by counsel for the

respondents to the decision of this Court in

Addnl. General Manager/Human Resource

BHEL v. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde (2007) 5

SCC 336 in which the protection against ouster

granted by the decision in Milind’s case was not

extended to the respondent therein. A bare

reading of the said decision, however, shows

that there is a significant difference in the

factual matrix in which the said case arose for

consideration. In Burde’s case, the Scrutiny

Committee had found that the caste certificate

was false and, therefore, invalid. That was not

the position either in Milind’s case nor is that

the position in the case at hand. In Milind’s

case, the Scrutiny Committee had never

alleged any fraud or any fabrication or any

misrepresentation that could possibly disentitle

the candidate to get relief from the Court. In the

case at hand also there is no such accusation

against the appellant that the certificate was

false, fabricated or manipulated by

concealment or otherwise. Refusal of a benefit

flowing from the decision of this Court in

Milind’s case may, therefore, have been

justified in Burde’s case but may not be justified

in the case at hand where the appellant has not

23

been accused of any act or omission or

commission of the act like the one mentioned

above to disentitle her to the relief prayed for.

The reliance upon Burde’s case (supra),

therefore, if of no assistance to the respondent.

20. The decision of this Court in State of

Maharashtra v. Sanjay K. Nimje (2007) 14 SCC

481 relied upon by learned counsel for the

respondents was distinguished even by V.S.

Sirpurkar, J. in Vilas’s case. The distinction is

primarily in terms whether the candidate

seeking appointment or admission is found

guilty of a conduct that would disentitle him/her

from claiming any relief under the extraordinary

powers of the Court. This Court found that if a

person secures appointment or admission on

the basis of false certificate he cannot retain

the said benefit obtained by him/her. The

Courts will refuse to exercise their discretionary

jurisdiction depending upon the facts and

circumstances of each case.

21. The following passage from decision in the

Nimje’s case is apposite:

“In a situation of this nature, whether the

Court will refuse to exercise its discretionary

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India or not would depend

upon the facts and circumstances of each

case. This aspect of the matter has been

considered recently by this Court in Sandeep

Subhash Parate v. State of Maharashtra

(2006) 7 SCC 501.”

24

22. Applying the above to the case at hand we

do not see any reason to hold that the

appellant had fabricated or falsified the

particulars of being a Scheduled Tribe only with

a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the

matter of appointment as a Teacher. There is,

therefore, no reason why the benefit of

protection against ouster should not be

extended to her subject to the usual condition

that the appellant shall not be ousted from

service and shall be re-instated if already

ousted, but she would not be entitled to any

further benefit on the basis of the certificate

which she has obtained and which was 10

years after its issue cancelled by the Scrutiny

committee.”

28.Recently, in Yogesh Madhav Makalwad v. State of Maharashtra

and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1679, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held thus :-

“7. At the outset, it would be apposite to refer

to the judgment of this Court in the case of

Anand v. Committee for Scrutiny & Verification

of Tribe Claims. It would be relevant to refer

paragraph 22 of the said judgment which reads

thus:

“22. It is manifest from the aforeextracted

paragraph that the genuineness of a caste

claim has to be considered not only on a

thorough examination of the documents

submitted in support of the claim but also on

the affinity test, which would include the

25

anthropological and ethnological traits, etc., of

the applicant. However, it is neither feasible

nor desirable to lay down an absolute rule,

which could be applied mechanically to

examine a caste claim. Nevertheless, we feel

that the following broad parameters could be

kept in view while dealing with a caste claim:

(i) While dealing with documentary evidence,

greater reliance may be placed on pre-

Independence documents because they

furnish a higher degree of probative value to

the declaration of status of a caste, as

compared to post-Independence documents.

In case the applicant is the first generation

ever to attend school, the availability of any

documentary evidence becomes difficult, but

that ipso facto does not call for the rejection of

his claim. In fact, the mere fact that he is the

first generation ever to attend school, some

benefit of doubt in favour of the applicant may

be given. Needless to add that in the event of a

doubt on the credibility of a document, its

veracity has to be tested on the basis of oral

evidence, for which an opportunity has to be

afforded to the applicant;

(ii) While applying the affinity test, which

focuses on the ethnological connections with

the Scheduled Tribe, a cautious approach has

to be adopted. A few decades ago, when the

tribes were somewhat immune to the cultural

development happening around them, the

affinity test could serve as a determinative

26

factor. However, with the migrations,

modernisation and contact with other

communities, these communities tend to

develop and adopt new traits which may not

essentially match with the traditional

characteristics of the tribe. Hence, the affinity

test may not be regarded as a litmus test for

establishing the link of the applicant with a

Scheduled Tribe. Nevertheless, the claim by an

applicant that he is a part of a Scheduled Tribe

and is entitled to the benefit extended to that

tribe, cannot per se be disregarded on the

ground that his present traits do not match his

tribe's peculiar anthropological and

ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs,

mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method

of burial of dead bodies, etc. Thus, the affinity

test may be used to corroborate the

documentary evidence and should not be the

sole criteria to reject a claim.”

[emphasis supplied]

8. It can, thus, be seen that this Court held that

while dealing with documentary evidence,

greater reliance may be placed on pre-

Independence documents because they

furnish a higher degree of probative value to

the declaration of status of a caste, as

compared to post-Independence documents.

Insofar as the applicability of the affinity test is

concerned, the Court observed that a cautious

approach has to be adopted. It has been

observed that a few decades ago, when the

27

tribes were somewhat immune to the cultural

development happening around them, the

affinity test could serve as a determinative

factor. However, with the migrations,

modernisation and contact with other

communities, these communities tend to

develop and adopt new traits which may not

essentially match with the traditional

characteristics of the tribe. It is, therefore, held

that the affinity test may not be regarded as a

litmus test for establishing the link of the

applicant with a Scheduled Tribe. It has been

held that merely because the applicant does

not match the tribe's peculiar anthropological

and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs,

mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method

of burial of dead bodies etc., it cannot be solely

taken into consideration for rejecting the claim

of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe.

9. In the present case, the appellant has

placed on record the School Admission and

Leaving Extract in respect of his grandfather

namely, Jalba Malba Makalwad, recorded on

10

th

October, 1943 which indicates his caste

as Koli Mahadev. Though the report of the

handwriting expert is inconclusive as to

whether there is interpolation or not, we have

examined the said document with a magnifying

glass.

***

12. In view of the pre-Independence document

which certifies that the appellant's grandfather,

28

Jalba Malba Makalwad, to be belonging to Koli

Mahadev Tribe, we are of the considered

opinion that a greater probative value ought to

have been given to the said document.

However, on the basis of presumptions and

assumptions, the said document has been

disbelieved.

***

14. We may also gainfully refer to a recent

judgment of this Court rendered by the three

learned Judges in the case of Maharashtra

Adiwasi Thakur Jamat Swarakshan Samiti v.

State of Maharashtra4 which reiterated the

position that the affinity test cannot be

conclusive either way. It has been held that

when the affinity test is conducted by the

Vigilance Cell, the result of the test along with

all other material on record having probative

value will have to be taken into consideration

by the Scrutiny Committee for deciding the

caste validity claim. It has been reiterated that

the affinity test is not a litmus test to decide the

caste claim and is not an essential part in the

process of determination of correctness of a

caste or tribe claim in every case.

”

29.Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the

aforesaid judicial precedent, it is quite vivid that the impugned

action of the Scrutiny Committee cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

The petitioner has produced consistent and credible pre-

29

independence documentary evidence reflecting his lineage from

“Mahara/Mahar” caste, which, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, carries the highest probative value. The said evidence is

further corroborated by the statements of independent villagers as

well as the affinity test indicating social acceptance of the

petitioner as a member of the “Mahar” community. In contrast, the

conclusion drawn by the Scrutiny Committee is primarily founded

upon stray and inconclusive entries such as “Baya” and an

artificially coined expression “Baya Mahara”, which finds no

recognition either in statutory notifications or in the documentary

record. The approach adopted by the Committee, in discarding

reliable ancestral records and ignoring material evidence

favourable to the petitioner, is clearly contrary to the settled

principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and reflects

perversity and non-application of mind. Further, in absence of any

cogent finding of fraud or misrepresentation, the drastic action of

cancellation of caste certificate and initiation of penal

consequences is wholly arbitrary and disproportionate.

30.This Court is also persuaded by the fact that the petitioner has

been in continuous service since the year 2007 and has

discharged his duties as an Assistant Teacher for a considerable

length of time without any blemish or adverse remark. The long

and uninterrupted service rendered by the petitioner cannot be

lightly disregarded, particularly when his initial appointment was

made after due verification of his eligibility and caste status by the

30

competent authorities. The impugned action, if sustained, would

not only result in loss of employment but would also visit the

petitioner with serious civil and pecuniary consequences, thereby

affecting his livelihood and dignity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

has repeatedly held that where an employee has served for a long

duration, the consequences of cancellation of caste certificate

must be examined with greater caution, especially in absence of

any finding of fraud.

31.It is further to be noted that the doctrine of proportionality, which is

now well entrenched in administrative law, mandates that the

action taken by the authorities must be commensurate with the

gravity of the alleged misconduct. In the present case, there is no

finding that the petitioner has indulged in any deliberate

misrepresentation or fraud. The entire case rests upon doubtful

and inconsistent entries, which by themselves are insufficient to

dislodge the strong presumption arising from reliable ancestral

records. Therefore, the extreme consequence of cancellation of

caste certificate and initiation of penal action is clearly

disproportionate and arbitrary.

32.This Court also finds substance in the submission of the petitioner

that similarly situated persons within the same family have been

granted validation of their caste status by the competent Scrutiny

Committee. The principle of parity, which is a facet of Article 14 of

the Constitution of India, requires that similarly situated persons

31

be treated alike. In absence of any distinguishing feature, the

denial of similar treatment to the petitioner renders the impugned

action discriminatory and violative of the guarantee of equality

before law.

33.The impugned order further suffers from the vice of non-

application of mind, inasmuch as it fails to consider relevant

material on record while placing undue reliance on inconclusive

and extraneous factors. The selective appreciation of evidence,

coupled with complete disregard of vital documents and reports

supporting the petitioner, vitiates the decision-making process. It is

trite law that when a statutory authority exercises quasi-judicial

powers, it is incumbent upon it to record clear reasons

demonstrating application of mind to the material available on

record. The absence of such reasoning renders the order

unsustainable.

34.In view of the foregoing discussion and in the light of the settled

legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this

Court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned order dated

25.01.2020 suffers from manifest illegality, arbitrariness, perversity

and non-application of mind. The findings recorded by the Scrutiny

Committee are not borne out from the evidence on record and are

liable to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

35.Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed.

32

The impugned order dated 25.01.2020 (Annexure P/1) passed by

the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee is hereby

quashed and set aside. It is declared that the caste certificate

issued in favour of the petitioner (Annexure P/2) is valid and

subsisting in the eyes of law.

36.As a natural consequence, all further actions initiated or

contemplated pursuant to the impugned order, including those

under Section 9(3) of the Act of 2013 and the relevant Rules, shall

stand quashed. The respondents are directed not to take any

coercive steps against the petitioner on the basis of the impugned

proceedings.

37.The respondents are further directed to extend all consequential

service benefits to the petitioner, including continuity of service

and protection of his employment, within a reasonable period,

preferably within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of a

certified copy of this order.

38.There shall be no order as to costs.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Yogesh

The date when the

judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is

pronounced

The date when the judgment is

uploaded on the website

Operative Full

20.03.2026 17.04.2026 ------ 17.04.2026