Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5370-5371 OF 2017

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.27311-27312 OF 2016)

INDUS MOBILE DISTRIBUTION

PRIVATE LIMITED … APPELLANT

VERSUS

DATAWIND INNOVATIONS

PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

R.F. NARIMAN, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.The present appeals raise an interesting question as to

whether, when the seat of arbitration is Mumbai, an exclusive

jurisdiction clause stating that the courts at Mumbai alone would

have jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising under the

agreement would oust all other courts including the High Court of

Delhi, whose judgment is appealed against.

3.The brief facts necessary to appreciate the controversy are

that Respondent No.1 is engaged in the manufacture, marketing

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Page 2 and distribution of Mobile Phones, Tablets and their accessories.

Respondent No.1 has its registered office at Amritsar, Punjab.

Respondent No.1 was supplying goods to the appellant at Chennai

from New Delhi. The appellant approached Respondent No.1 and

expressed an earnest desire to do business with Respondent No.1

as its Retail Chain Partner. This being the case, an agreement

dated 25.10.2014 was entered into between the parties. Clauses

18 and 19 are relevant for our purpose, and are set out

hereinbelow:

“Dispute Resolution Mechanism:

Arbitration: In case of any dispute or differences

arising between parties out of or in relation to the

construction, meaning, scope, operation or effect of

this Agreement or breach of this Agreement, parties

shall make efforts in good faith to amicably resolve

such dispute.

If such dispute or difference cannot be amicably

resolved by the parties (Dispute) within thirty days

of its occurrence, or such longer time as mutually

agreed, either party may refer the dispute to the

designated senior officers of the parties.

If the Dispute cannot be amicably resolved by such

officers within thirty (30) days from the date of

referral, or within such longer time as mutually

agreed, such Dispute shall be finally settled by

arbitration conducted under the provisions of the

Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 by reference to a

sole Arbitrator which shall be mutually agreed by the

parties. Such arbitration shall be conducted at

Mumbai, in English language.

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Page 3 The arbitration award shall be final and the

judgment thereupon may be entered in any court

having jurisdiction over the parties hereto or

application may be made to such court for a judicial

acceptance of the award and an order of

enforcement, as the case may be. The Arbitrator

shall have the power to order specific performance

of the Agreement. Each Party shall bear its own

costs of the Arbitration.

It is hereby ‘agreed between the Parties that they

will continue to perform their respective obligations

under this Agreement during the pendency of the

Dispute.

19.All disputes & differences of any kind

whatever arising out of or in connection with this

Agreement shall be subject to the exclusive

jurisdiction of courts of Mumbai only.”

4.Disputes arose between the parties and a notice dated

25.9.2015 was sent by Respondent No.1 to the appellant. The

notice stated that the appellant had been in default of outstanding

dues of Rs.5 crores with interest thereon and was called upon to

pay the outstanding dues within 7 days. Clause 18 of the

Agreement was invoked by Respondent No.1, and one Justice

H.R. Malhotra was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator between the

parties. By a reply dated 15.10.2015, the appellant objected to the

appointment of Justice Malhotra and asked Respondent No.1 to

withdraw its notice. By a further reply dated 16.10.2015, the

averments made in the notice were denied in toto.

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Page 4 5.Two petitions were then filed by Respondent No.1 – the first

dated September 2015, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 asking for various interim reliefs in the

matter. By an order dated 22.9.2015, the Delhi High Court issued

notice in the interim application and restrained the appellant from

transferring, alienating or creating any third party interests in

respect of the property bearing No.281, TK Road, Alwarpet,

Chennai-600018 till the next date of hearing. By an application

dated 28.10.2015, Respondent No.1 filed a Section 11 petition to

appoint an Arbitrator.

6.Both applications were disposed of by the impugned

judgment. First and foremost, it was held by the impugned

judgment that as no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai,

only the courts of three territories could have jurisdiction in the

matter, namely, Delhi and Chennai (from and to where goods were

supplied), and Amritsar (which is the registered office of the

appellant company). The court therefore held that the exclusive

jurisdiction clause would not apply on facts, as the courts in

Mumbai would have no jurisdiction at all. It, therefore, determined

that Delhi being the first Court that was approached would have

jurisdiction in the matter and proceeded to confirm interim order

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Page 5 dated 22.9.2015 and also proceeded to dispose of the Section 11

petition by appointing Justice S.N. Variava, retired Supreme Court

Judge, as the sole Arbitrator in the proceedings. The judgment

recorded that the conduct of the arbitration would be in Mumbai.

7.Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant has assailed the

judgment of the Delhi High Court, stating that even if it were to be

conceded that no part of the cause of action arose at Mumbai, yet

the seat of the arbitration being at Mumbai, courts in Mumbai

would have exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings over the same.

According to him, therefore, the impugned judgment was

erroneous and needs to be set aside.

8.In opposition to these arguments, learned counsel for

Respondent No.1 sought to support the judgment by stating that

no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai. This being the

case, even if the seat were at Mumbai, it makes no difference as

one of the tests prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to

give a court jurisdiction must at least be fulfilled. None of these

tests being fulfilled on the facts of the present case, the impugned

judgment is correct and requires no interference.

9.The relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996 are set out hereinbelow:

5

Page 6 “2. Definitions. - (1) In this Part, unless the context

otherwise requires, -

(e) “Court” means the principal Civil Court of original

jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court

in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction,

having, jurisdiction to decide the questions forming

the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had

been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not

include any civil court of a grade inferior to such

principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

(2) This Part shall apply where the place of

arbitration is in India.

20. Place of arbitration. – (1) The parties are free

to agree on the place of arbitration.

(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section

(1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by

the arbitral tribunal having regard to the

circumstances of the case, including the

convenience of the parties.

(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section

(2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise

agreed by the parties, meet at any place it

considers appropriate for consultation among its

members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the

parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or

other property.

31. Form and contents of arbitral award. –

(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the

place of arbitration as determined in accordance

with section 20 and the award shall be deemed to

have been made at that place.”

10.The concept of juridical seat has been evolved by the courts

in England and has now been firmly embedded in our

jurisprudence. Thus, the Constitution Bench in Bharat Aluminium

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Page 7 Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC

552, has adverted to “seat” in some detail. Paragraph 96 is

instructive and states as under:-

“Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as

under:

“2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the

context otherwise requires—

(a)-(d)***

(e) ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of

Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the

High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil

jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the

questions forming the subject-matter of the

arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter

of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a

grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any

Court of Small Causes;”

We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of

the arbitration” cannot be confused with

“subject-matter of the suit ”. The term

“subject-matter” in Section 2(1)(e) is confined to

Part I. It has a reference and connection with the

process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to

identify the courts having supervisory control over

the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a

court which would essentially be a court of the seat

of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the

provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed

keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which

give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the

narrow construction as projected by the learned

counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render

Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has

intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the

court which would have jurisdiction where the cause

of action is located and the courts where the

arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on

many occasions the agreement may provide for a

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Page 8 seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral

to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the

arbitration takes place would be required to exercise

supervisory control over the arbitral process. For

example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where

neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having

been chosen as a neutral place as between a party

from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the

tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order

under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the

appeal against such an interim order under Section

37 must lie to the courts of Delhi being the courts

having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration

proceedings and the tribunal. This would be

irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be

performed under the contract were to be performed

either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration

is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances,

both the courts would have jurisdiction i.e. the court

within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the

suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction

of which the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is

located.” [para 96]

11.Paragraphs 98 to 100 have laid down the law as to “seat”

thus:

“We now come to Section 20, which is as under:

“20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are

free to agree on the place of arbitration.

(2) Failing any agreement referred to in

sub-section (1), the place of arbitration shall be

determined by the Arbitral Tribunal having regard to

the circumstances of the case, including the

convenience of the parties.

(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or

sub-section (2), the Arbitral Tribunal may, unless

otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place

it considers appropriate for consultation among its

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Page 9 members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the

parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or

other property.”

A plain reading of Section 20 leaves no room for

doubt that where the place of arbitration is in India,

the parties are free to agree to any “place” or “seat”

within India, be it Delhi, Mumbai, etc. In the absence

of the parties' agreement thereto, Section 20(2)

authorises the tribunal to determine the place/seat

of such arbitration. Section 20(3) enables the

tribunal to meet at any place for conducting

hearings at a place of convenience in matters such

as consultations among its members for hearing

witnesses, experts or the parties.

The fixation of the most convenient “venue” is taken

care of by Section 20(3). Section 20, has to be read

in the context of Section 2(2), which places a

threshold limitation on the applicability of Part I,

where the place of arbitration is in India. Therefore,

Section 20 would also not support the submission of

the extra-territorial applicability of Part I, as

canvassed by the learned counsel for the

appellants, so far as purely domestic arbitration is

concerned.

True, that in an international commercial arbitration,

having a seat in India, hearings may be

necessitated outside India. In such circumstances,

the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at

the venue fixed by the parties, but it would not have

the effect of changing the seat of arbitration which

would remain in India. The legal position in this

regard is summed up by Redfern and Hunter, The

Law and Practice of International Commercial

Arbitration (1986) at p. 69 in the following passage

under the heading “The Place of Arbitration”:

“The preceding discussion has been on the basis

that there is only one ‘place’ of arbitration. This will

be the place chosen by or on behalf of the parties;

and it will be designated in the arbitration

agreement or the terms of the reference or the

minutes of proceedings or in some other way as the

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Page 10 place or ‘seat’ of the arbitration. This does not

mean, however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold

all its meetings or hearings at the place of

arbitration. International commercial arbitration often

involves people of many different nationalities, from

many different countries. In these circumstances, it

is by no means unusual for an Arbitral Tribunal to

hold meetings—or even hearings—in a place other

than the designated place of arbitration, either for its

own convenience or for the convenience of the

parties or their witnesses…. It may be more

convenient for an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in one

country to conduct a hearing in another country—for

instance, for the purpose of taking evidence…. In

such circumstances, each move of the Arbitral

Tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat of

arbitration changes. The seat of the arbitration

remains the place initially agreed by or on behalf of

the parties.”

This, in our view, is the correct depiction of the

practical considerations and the distinction between

“seat” [Sections 20(1) and 20(2)] and “venue”

[Section 20(3)]. We may point out here that the

distinction between “seat” and “venue” would be

quite crucial in the event, the arbitration agreement

designates a foreign country as the “seat”/“place” of

the arbitration and also selects the Arbitration Act,

1996 as the curial law/law governing the arbitration

proceedings. It would be a matter of construction of

the individual agreement to decide whether:

(i) the designated foreign “seat” would be read as

in fact only providing for a “venue”/“place” where the

hearings would be held, in view of the choice of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 as being the curial law, OR

(ii) the specific designation of a foreign seat,

necessarily carrying with it the choice of that

country's arbitration/curial law, would prevail over

and subsume the conflicting selection choice by the

parties of the Arbitration Act, 1996.” [paras 98 – 100]

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Page 11 12.In an instructive passage, this Court stated that an

agreement as to the seat of an arbitration is analogous to an

exclusive jurisdiction clause as follows:

“Thus, it is clear that the regulation of conduct of

arbitration and challenge to an award would have to

be done by the courts of the country in which the

arbitration is being conducted. Such a court is then

the supervisory court possessed of the power to

annul the award. This is in keeping with the scheme

of the international instruments, such as the Geneva

Convention and the New York Convention as well

as the UNCITRAL Model Law. It also recognises the

territorial principle which gives effect to the

sovereign right of a country to regulate, through its

national courts, an adjudicatory duty being

performed in its own country. By way of a

comparative example, we may reiterate the

observations made by the Court of Appeal, England

in C v. D [2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282

(CA)] wherein it is observed that:

“It follows from this that a choice of seat for the

arbitration must be a choice of forum for remedies

seeking to attack the award.”

(emphasis supplied)

In the aforesaid case, the Court of Appeal had

approved the observations made in A v. B [(2007) 1

All ER (Comm) 591 : (2007) 1 Lloyd's Rep 237]

wherein it is observed that:

“… an agreement as to the seat of an arbitration

is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any

claim for a remedy … as to the validity of an

existing interim or final award is agreed to be made

only in the courts of the place designated as the

seat of arbitration.” (emphasis supplied)

[para 123]

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Page 12 13.The Constitution Bench’s statement of the law was further

expanded in Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon Gmbh, (2014) 5

SCC 1. After referring to various English authorities in great detail,

this Court held, following the Constitution Bench, as follows:

“It is accepted by most of the experts in the law

relating to international arbitration that in almost all

the national laws, arbitrations are anchored to

the seat/place/situs of arbitration. Redfern and

Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford

University Press, Oxford/New York 2009), in Para

3.54 concludes that “the seat of the arbitration is

thus intended to be its centre of gravity”.

In BALCO [Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser

Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC

552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , it is further noticed

that this does not mean that all proceedings of the

arbitration are to be held at the seat of arbitration.

The arbitrators are at liberty to hold meetings at a

place which is of convenience to all concerned. This

may become necessary as arbitrators often come

from different countries. Therefore, it may be

convenient to hold all or some of the meetings of

the arbitration in a location other than where

the seat of arbitration is located. In BALCO, the

relevant passage from Redfern and Hunter has

been quoted which is as under: (SCC p. 598, para

75)

“75. … ‘The preceding discussion has been on

the basis that there is only one “place” of arbitration.

This will be the place chosen by or on behalf of the

parties; and it will be designated in the arbitration

agreement or the terms of reference or the minutes

of proceedings or in some other way as the place or

“seat” of the arbitration. This does not mean,

however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its

meetings or hearings at the place of arbitration.

International commercial arbitration often involves

people of many different nationalities, from many

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Page 13 different countries. In these circumstances, it is by

no means unusual for an Arbitral Tribunal to hold

meetings—or even hearings—in a place other than

the designated place of arbitration, either for its own

convenience or for the convenience of the parties or

their witnesses…. It may be more convenient for an

Arbitral Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a

hearing in another country — for instance, for the

purpose of taking evidence…. In such

circumstances each move of the Arbitral Tribunal

does not of itself mean that the seat of arbitration

changes. The seat of arbitration remains the place

initially agreed by or on behalf of the parties.’

(Naviera case [Naviera Amazonica Peruana

S.A. v. Compania Internacional De Seguros Del

Peru, (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)] , Lloyd's Rep

p. 121)” (emphasis in original)

These observations have also been noticed

in Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas

Corpn. [(1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep 48]” [para 134]

14.This Court reiterated that once the seat of arbitration has

been fixed, it would be in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction

clause as to the courts which exercise supervisory powers over the

arbitration. (See: paragraph 138).

15.In Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2014) 7

SCC, 603, this statement of the law was echoed in several

paragraphs. This judgment makes it clear that “juridical seat” is

nothing but the “legal place” of arbitration. It was held that since

the juridical seat or legal place of arbitration was London, English

courts alone would have jurisdiction over the arbitration thus

13

Page 14 excluding Part I of the Indian Act. (See: paragraphs 36, 41, 45 to

60 and 76.1 and 76.2). This judgment was relied upon and

followed by Harmony Innovation Shipping Limited v. Gupta

Coal India Limited and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 172 (See:

paragraphs 45 and 48). In Union of India v. Reliance Industries

Limited and Others, (2015) 10 SCC 213, this Court referred to all

the earlier judgments and held that in cases where the seat of

arbitration is London, by necessary implication Part I of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is excluded as the

supervisory jurisdiction of courts over the arbitration goes along

with “seat”.

16.In a recent judgment in Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura

Minechem Limited and Another, (2016) 11 SCC 508, all the

aforesaid authorities were referred to and followed. Paragraph 34

of the said judgment reads as follows:

“As a matter of fact the mere choosing of the

juridical seat of arbitration attracts the law

applicable to such location. In other words, it would

not be necessary to specify which law would apply

to the arbitration proceedings, since the law of the

particular country would apply ipso jure. The

following passage from Redfern and Hunter on

International Arbitration contains the following

explication of the issue:

“It is also sometimes said that parties have

selected the procedural law that will govern their

14

Page 15 arbitration, by providing for arbitration in a particular

country. This is too elliptical and, as an English

court itself held more recently in Breas of Doune

Wind Farm it does not always hold true. What the

parties have done is to choose a place of arbitration

in a particular country. That choice brings with it

submission to the laws of that country, including any

mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration. To

say that the parties have “chosen” that particular

law to govern the arbitration is rather like saying that

an English woman who takes her car to France has

“chosen” French traffic law, which will oblige her to

drive on the right-hand side of the road, to give

priority to vehicles approaching from the right, and

generally to obey traffic laws to which she may not

be accustomed. But it would be an odd use of

language to say this notional motorist had opted for

“French traffic law”. What she has done is to choose

to go to France. The applicability of French law then

follows automatically. It is not a matter of choice.

Parties may well choose a particular place of

arbitration precisely because its lex arbitri is one

which they find attractive. Nevertheless, once a

place of arbitration has been chosen, it brings with it

its own law. If that law contains provisions that are

mandatory so far as arbitration are concerned,

those provisions must be obeyed. It is not a matter

of choice any more than the notional motorist is free

to choose which local traffic laws to obey and which

to disregard.”[para 34]

17.It may be mentioned, in passing, that the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 has been amended in 2015 pursuant to a

detailed Law Commission Report. The Law Commission

specifically adverted to the difference between “seat” and “venue”

as follows:

15

Page 16 “40.The Supreme Court in BALCO decided that

Parts I and II of the Act are mutually exclusive of

each other. The intention of Parliament that the Act

is territorial in nature and sections 9 and 34 will

apply only when the seat of arbitration is in India.

The seat is the “centre of gravity” of arbitration, and

even where two foreign parties arbitrate in India,

Part I would apply and, by 24 virtue of section 2(7),

the award would be a “domestic award”. The

Supreme Court recognized the “seat” of arbitration

to be the juridical seat; however, in line with

international practice, it was observed that the

arbitral hearings may take place at a location other

than the seat of arbitration. The distinction between

“seat” and “venue” was, therefore, recognized. In

such a scenario, only if the seat is determined to be

India, Part I would be applicable. If the seat was

foreign, Part I would be inapplicable. Even if Part I

was expressly included “it would only mean that the

parties have contractually imported from the

Arbitration Act, 1996, those provisions which are

concerned with the internal conduct of their

arbitration and which are not inconsistent with the

mandatory provisions of the [foreign] Procedural

Law/Curial Law.” The same cannot be used to

confer jurisdiction on an Indian Court. However, the

decision in BALCO was expressly given prospective

effect and applied to arbitration agreements

executed after the date of the judgment.

41.While the decision in BALCO is a step in the

right direction and would drastically reduce judicial

intervention in foreign arbitrations, the Commission

feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to

be problematic.

(i) Where the assets of a party are located in India,

and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate

its assets in the near future, the other party will lack

an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is

abroad. The latter party will have two possible

remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the

latter party can obtain an interim order from a

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Page 17 foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a

civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim

order. The interim order would not be enforceable

directly by filing an execution petition as it would not

qualify as a “judgment” or “decree” for the purposes

of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil

Procedure (which provide a mechanism for

enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event

that the former party does not adhere to the terms

of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate

proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and

enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under

sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a 25

practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the

interim relief obtained by it.

That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a

foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its

favour only to realize that the entity against which it

has to enforce the award has been stripped of its

assets and has been converted into a shell

company.

(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made

prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains

are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation

where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in

Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it

whenever they are faced with a case arising from an

arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO.

42.The above issues have been addressed by way

of proposed Amendments to sections 2(2), 2(2A),

20, 28 and 31.”

18.In amendments to be made to the Act, the Law Commission

recommended the following:

“ Amendment of Section 20

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Page 18 12.In section 20, delete the word “Place” and add

the words “Seat and Venue” before the words “of

arbitration”.

(i) In sub-section (1), after the words ”agree on the”

delete the word “place” and add words “seat and

venue”

(ii) In sub-section (3), after the words “meet at any”

delete the word “place” and add word “venue”.

[NOTE: The departure from the existing phrase

“place” of arbitration is proposed to make the

wording of the Act consistent with the international

usage of the concept of a “seat” of arbitration, to

denote the legal home of the arbitration. The

amendment further legislatively distinguishes

between the “[legal] seat” from a “[mere] venue” of

arbitration.]

Amendment of Section 31

17.In section 31

(i) In sub-section (4), after the words “its date and

the” delete the word “place” and add the word

“seat”.”

19.The amended Act, does not, however, contain the aforesaid

amendments, presumably because the BALCO judgment in no

uncertain terms has referred to “place” as “juridical seat” for the

purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act. It further made it clear that

Section 20(1) and 20 (2) where the word “place” is used, refers to

“juridical seat”, whereas in Section 20 (3), the word “place” is

equivalent to “venue”. This being the settled law, it was found

unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the Constitution Bench

18

Page 19 of the Supreme Court has already done by way of construction of

the Act.

20.A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the

moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive

jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that

the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it

clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts.

Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure

which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a

concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to

an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical

sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may

have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the

provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In

arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment

“seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest

Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating

arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the

parties.

21.It is well settled that where more than one court has

jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an

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Page 20 exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private

Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32.

This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von

Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment

Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225. Having regard to the above, it is

clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of

all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is

at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set

aside. The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will

continue for a period of four weeks from the date of

pronouncement of this judgment, so that the respondents may take

necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals

are disposed of accordingly.

…………………………………..J.

(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE )

…….…………………………… J.

(R.F. NARIMAN)

New Delhi;

April 19, 2017.

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