IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

WPA 27330 of 2026

Hitachi Payment Services Pvt. Ltd.

Vs

Union of India & Ors.

With

WPA 27944 of 2026

Indusind Bank Limited

Vs

Union of India & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Majumder, Sr. advocate

in WPA 27330 of 2026 Mr. Jagannath Chatterjee.

For the Respondent No.3/ : Mr. Ranjay De, Sr. Advocate,

Bank in WPA 27330 of 2026 Ms. Anna Malhotra,

and Petitioner in WPA Mr. Basabjit Banerjee,

27944 of 2026 Mr. Aditya Abel Bose,

Mr. Rishav Maity,

Mr. D. Mukherjee.

For the Respondent No.4 : Mr. Dwaipayan Sengupta,

in WPA 27330 of 2026 Mr. Samrat Dey Paul.

For the Respondent No.4 : Mr. Soumya Majumder, Sr. Adv.

in WPA 27944 of 2026 Mr. Jagannath Chatterjee.

For the Respondent No.5 : Ms. Anna Malhotra.

in WPA 27330 of 2026

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For the Respondent No.5 : Mr. Kamalesh Jha,

in WPA 27944 of 2026 Md. Raihan Islam,

Mr. Sourasis Roy.

For the Respondent No.6 : Mr. Kamlesh Jha.

in WPA 27330 of 2026 Md. Raihan Islam,

Mr. Sourasis Roy.

For the Union of India : Mr. Kalyan Kr. Chakraborty,

in WPA 27330 of 2026 Mr. Rajesh Kr. Upadhay.

For the Union of India : Ms. Rashmi Bothra,

in WPA 27944 of 2026 Ms. Garima Raijada.

Judgment reserved on : 25.09.2026/30.09.2026

Judgment delivered on : 05.10.2026

Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

1. The present writ application is taken up for disposal by a common

order along with WPA 27944 of 2026, the issue being similar.

2. The writ applications have been preferred being aggrieved by the

conciliation proceedings, particularly the orders dated 29

th

June, 2026

and 1

st

September, 2026 passed by the Conciliation Officer under the

Industrial Relation Code, 2020 & Assistant Labour Commissioner (C),

Kolkata.

3. The petitioner’s prayer herein is for quashing of the said proceedings

and an interim order restraining the respondents from giving any

further effect to the decisions taken in the said meetings.

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4. The petitioner company was previously known as Prizm Payment

Services Private Limited. The name of the company got changed to

Hitachi Payment Services Private Limited with effect from 10th April,

2015. It is primarily a service provider for various clients including

Banks, one of which is the Respondent Indus ind Bank Limited, for

whom the petitioner, at all m aterial times had rendered, ATM

operations, caretaking, housekeeping and allied services. The first

agreement between your petitioner and your respondent Bank was

executed on 1st June, 2009, and the last one on 26th November, 2025.

The validity of the last agreement is still continuing.

5. The respondent nos. 4 and 5 are sub -contractors in relation to the

respondent Bank, who had been engaged with the consent of Indusind

Bank Limited for the purpose of executing the contract on behalf of the

petitioner. The petitioner had entered into separate contracts with the

respondent nos. 4 and 5.

6. There is no supervision, administration and control over the men of the

respondent nos. 4 and 5, by the petitioner company, with regard to

their nature and manner of work. The extent of supervision, exercised

by the petitioner is with regard to the general standard of execution of

the contract for the purpose of honouring the terms and conditions of

the contract.

7. The pre-dominance of online transactions through mobile phones, is

steadily declining the requirement of ATM sites of the Banks.

Resultantly, the maintenance and upkeeping of the ATM sites of the

Respondent Bank in the State of West Bengal has also lessened. The

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petitioner manages 77 number of ATMs for the respondent B ank in

West Bengal. However, by an email of 21

st

May, 2026, the petitioner

was instructed by the respondent Bank to remove caretakers from

the East Zone. The same was necessitated by reason of inevitable

closure of 43 ATM sites of Indusind Bank Limited. Consequent

upon such instruction and decision of the Bank, the petitioner had

instructed the sub-contractors i.e. the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to

remove the adequate number of work personnel deployed by th em at

the 43 ATM sites of Indusind Bank Limited. The respondent nos. 4 and

5 had accordingly issued retrenchment notices to their workmen by

terminating their services with effect from 30

th

June, 2026, by giving

30 days' notice period.

8. The respondent Trade Union, as it appears from the proceedings of

conciliation, had approached the respondent Bank by issuing a strike

notice dated 29

th

May, 2026 raising various issues including

retrenchment compensation, minimum wages, gratuity and other

service conditions of the workers of the sub-contractors. The said letter

was forwarded under the cover of a conciliation notice dated 10

th

June,

2026 issued by the respondent no. 2, purporting to initiate conciliation

under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

9. The petitioner attended the conciliation. Conciliation meetings were

held on 16

th

June, 2026 and 29

th

June, 2026.

10. Further conciliation notice dated 9

th

July, 2026 was issued by the

respondent no. 2 to various officers of the respondent Bank to enforce

its presence at the conciliation.

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11. In course of the conciliation proceeding, the petitioner commented

through its representation dated 29

th

July, 2026.

12. Subsequent conciliation proceeding was held on 29

th

July, 2026.

13. Another trade union being respondent no.7 herein had also raised

dispute over the disengagement of the contractors at the ATM sites to

be closed.

14. By an order dated 1

st

September, 2026, the respondent no. 2 held the

alleged dismissal or discharge of the contractor to be bad in law and

the petitioner/ Respondent Bank/sub -contractors were advised to

release the dues of the workers at the earliest as they were deemed to

be in service.

15. The respondent no. 6 Trade Union has thereafter made a

representation inter alia to the petitioner for enforcement of the

direction of the conciliation officer which has been received by the

petitioner on 16

th

September, 2026.

16. Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioner states that

the role of the conciliation officer under the provisions of the

Industrial Relations Code, 2020 has been guided by the statutory

provisions and under no circumstance the conciliation officer can

assume jurisdiction beyond the said statutory mandate, which has

been done in the instant case.

17. The retrenchment notices were evidently issued to the workers of

the sub-contractors before commencement of any conciliation

proceeding and admittedly there was no industrial dispute pending

in conciliation on the date of issuance of the retrenchment notices;

6

which would allow the conciliation officer to invoke the jurisdiction

under Section 33 of the erstwhile In dustrial Disputes Act, 1947,

corresponding to Section 90 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020,

18. Mr. Majumder further argues that retrenchment does not come under

the mischief of Section 90 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020; and

therefore, invocation of jurisdiction by the Conciliation Officer is per se

ex-statutory and perverse.

19. The respondent no. 2 failed to appreciate that the factual matrix of the

case does not permit recourse to Section 90 of the Industrial Relations

Code, 2020 to a conciliation officer; and as such, by making a repeated

reference to judicial pronouncements and legal position, he has craftily

hidden the factual matrix of the present case so as to snatch at

jurisdiction.

20. The conciliation officer while exercising jurisdiction under the

provisions of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 does not have power

and authority to either direct maintenance of status quo or to

transform a case of retrenchment from service to a case of dismissal or

discharge.

21. The respondent trade unions had not made out any case whatsoever

through an appropriate application as regards violation of conditions

of service vis-à-vis discharge or dismissal, during the pendency of

conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020

and as such it is wholly incompetent and incorrect on the part of the

Conciliation Officer being the respondent no. 2 to pass the orders on

29th June, 2026 as well as on 1

st

September, 2026.

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22. The orders dated 29

th

June, 2026 and 1

st

September, 2026 passed by

the respondent no. 2 are wholly without jurisdiction and bad in law.

23. Hence, the writ application.

24. The petitioner has relied upon the judgment in L. Robert D’Souza Vs.

Executive Engineer, Southern Railway & Anr. reported in (1982) 1

SCC 645.

25. Mr. Majumder relies upon Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act

and the 4

th

Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act with the argument

that “retrenchment” is not covered in the 4

th

Schedule.

26. Mr. De, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.3 being the bank

has stated that the Respondent No. 4 being one of the contractors of

the petitioner served a letter of termination upon its employees.

27. During a conciliation proceeding, the union being Respondent No. 6

made an incorrect statement that more than 100 workmen were

"retrenched” by the Respondent Bank.

28. The conciliation officer during the conciliation proceeding passed an

order for maintenance of status quo by injuncting the employer of the

contract labour from changing their conditions of service.

29. The conciliation officer being the Respondent No. 2 by an order held

that in the instant matter, there is a violation of Section 33(2)(b) of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , though none of the employees

employed by Respondent No. 4 were dismissed as a resultant effect of a

disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, the petitioner, the Respondent

Bank as well as the contractor are to reinstate them in job though

8

as a business decision, the bank has discontinued the "caretaker

service" of ATM centers.

30. It is the further contention of the respondent no.3 that the conciliation

officer is not empowered to pass any direction, as passed in the present

case and relies upon the judgment in Hooghly Dock and Port

Engineers Ltd. Vs. Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Government of

India & Ors.

31. Mr. De for the respondent no. 3 further states that a contract labour

can never be converted into an employee of the principal employer ,

when there is no finding from the competent judicial f orum - the

agreement to be sham one and relies upon a judgment in Steel

Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in (2006) 12

SCC 233.

32. Mr. De further relies upon Section 2(zh) of the Industrial Relations

Code, 2020 wherein it appears that retrenchment does not include

imposition of any arrangement by way of disciplinary action.

33. The respondent no.3 also relies upon L. Robert D’Souza (Supra).

34. Mr. Jha learned counsel for the respondent no.6 herein being an

employee’s organization, a registered union on filing written notes

argues that the petitioner's contention that the retrenchment

"commenced" on 26.05.2026 is not, by itself, determinative of the

applicability of Section 90 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

Respondent No.6 does not dispute that 26.05.2026 may be treated as

the date on which the petitioner initiated the process leading to

retrenchment. The legal question is whether the mere issuance of

9

such notice, before commencement of conciliation, conclusively

takes the subsequent termination outside Section 90, when the

petitioner's own notice stipulated that the services wo uld

terminate only with effect from 30.06.2026.

35. The statutory scheme makes the distinction material. Section 70 of the

Industrial Relations Code requires, the statutory notice period to expire

before retrenchment, subject to wages in lieu thereof. Thus, notice of

retrenchment and actual cessation of employment are not

necessarily the same legal event. The Supreme Court in North

Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 879, clearly

distinguished proposal, notice and actual implementation, holding that

conditions of service are altered when the change is actually effected

and not merely when the proposal or notice is made.

The same principle has been reiterated in the judgment of Karnataka

High Court decided on 10.01.2014, Bangalore Electricity Supply Co.

Ltd. Vs- S. Jyothi, where the Court held that the date of actual

alteration, and not the earlier decision to effect it, is material for

Section 33.

36. The chronology in the present case is therefore decisive: 26.05.2026-notice; 29.05.2026-strike notice by Respondent No.6; 16.06.2026-first

conciliation meeting; 29.06.2026 status quo recorded; 30.06.2026 -effective date of termination. Section 60(1) of the Code treats the first

meeting of the Conciliation Officer as the commencement of

conciliation. The petitioner's own documents consequently establish

that conciliation was pending before the stipulated date of termination.

10

37. The respondent union further states that Section 90(1)(a) is concerned,

not merely with the decision to retrench but with alteration, to the

prejudice of the concerned workers, of conditions of service "in regard

to any matter connected with" the pending dispute. The enquiry must

therefore be directed to the actual alteration of the workers' service

position and its nexus with the pending dispute. The corresponding

jurisprudence under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act remains

instructive because of the substantial similarity of the statutory

protection. The judgment in Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v.

Shankarprasad, (1999) 6 SCC 275, treated a termination effected

during pending conciliation, where it was directly connected with the

matter in dispute, as attracting Section 33 protection.

38. The petitioner's reliance upon the alleged prior closure of the

commercial contract does not by itself conclude the issue. Closure of

the commercial arrangement and cessation of the workers'

employment are distinct events. Even if the petitioner establishes

that its contract with the subcontractor was closed before 16.06.2026,

it must still establish when the workers’ own employment actually

ceased. The petitioner’s own notice presently fixes that date as

30.06.2026. The alleged contract closure may explain the commercial

reason for initiating retrenchment, but does not automatically establish

the date of retrenchment of the workers or render the subsequent

termination unrelated to the pending industrial dispute.

39. Relying upon the judg ment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Bhavnagar Municipality Vs. Alibhai Karimbhai reported in (1977)

11

2 SCC 350, the respondent no.6 submits that the governing labour

jurisprudence requires consideration of the nexus between the

termination and the subject matter of the pending dispute.

40. It is further added that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhavnagar

Municipality (Supra) clarified that retrenchment does not in every

circumstance amount to alteration of service condition; however, where

the employment status of the concerned workmen itself formed part of

the dispute, terminating that employment during pendency directly

affected the subject matter of the dispute and attracted Section 33

protection.

41. It is the further case that in the present case the dispute placed before

the Conciliation Officer was itself substantially concerned with the

termination/retrenchment of these wor kers. The termination was

considered on 16.06.2026 and 29.06.2026, and on 29.06.2026, the

Conciliation Officer recorded maintenance of status quo during

pendency of conciliation. The question, therefore, cannot be answered

merely by saying that the initial notice preceded conciliation.

42. Even assuming that the petitioner establishes a valid commercial

reason for initiating retrenchment, or that a particular conclusion

recorded by the Conciliation Officer on 01.09.2026 is legally

unsustainable, that does not retrospectively extinguish the industrial

dispute or invalidate the statutory conciliation proceeding. The

existence and commencement of conciliation are distinct from the

ultimate adjudication of the legality of retrenchment. The petitioner's

challenge, at its highest, concerns the legal consequence of the

12

termination; it does not establish absence of jurisdiction to conduct

conciliation.

43. Finally, the respondent no.6 argues that the petitioner may contend

that the retrenchment process commenced on 26.05.20 26, but that

fact alone cannot determine the applicability of Section 90. The

petitioner's own documents stipulate 30.06.2026 as the effective date

of termination, whereas statutory conciliation commenced on

16.06.2026. The alleged prior closure of the commercial contract may

explain the genesis of the retrenchment, but does not automatically

establish the date of cessation of the workers' employment or answer

the question of its connection with the pending dispute. Accordingly,

the mere date of the retrenc hment notice cannot furnish a

jurisdictional basis for quashing the entire conciliation proceeding.

44. The following judgments are relied upon by the respondent no.6:-

(i)North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC

879;

(ii)Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, (1999) 6

SCC 275;

(iii)Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai Karimbhai, (1977) 2 SCC

350;

45. The respondent no.6 also relies upon Sections 60, 70 and 90 of the

Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

46. On hearing the learned counsels for the parties and on perusal of the

materials on record including the impugned orders, it appears that the

Conciliation Officer being the Respondent no.2 herein has made a

13

wrong observation that no application had been made by any of the

employers to the Conciliation Officer before discharge/dismissal of the

workmen, as mandated by Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The officer

has stressed upon the word “shall”.

47. The petitioner’s contention is that the said observation of the

Conciliation Officer is erroneous as in the present case the

workers were retrenched on the ground that the services for which

they had been engaged through the sub -contractors had been

withdrawn/closed down.

48. The decision of the Conciliation Officer is as follows:-

“The above judgement of Hon. Supreme Court makes it very

clear that once the application is not made under Section

90(2)(b) or is not approved by the concerned authority which

in the instant dispute is the undersigned Conciliation

Officer, the result would be that the action taken by him

would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed

never to have been dismissed or discharged and would

remain in the service of the employer. The undersigned

Conciliation Officer is bound by the above settled law

pronounced by the Hon. Supreme Court and any further

interpretation or change in the said law can only be done at

the appropriate forum. None of the employers had made any

application before terminating these workers pending

conciliation. However, they have only served 30 day

notice period but t he Code mandates both the

conditions 30 day wage and application for approval.

Accordingly, the facts in this dispute being materially same,

the workers have deemed never to have been

dismissed or discharged and remains in the service of

the employers as per settled law. Once, the workers are

already in service, cause of action with respect to this

dispute being termination does not arise and thereby matter

being pre mature is disposed off as "OD"

In view of the above, the employers being IndusInd/

Hitachi/ CSS/ An Hour (whatever their individuals

14

agreements/contracts with each other may be) are advised

to release the dues with respect to applicant workers

at earliest as they are deemed to in service. In case of

default, the applicant union/workers are at liberty to

approach competent authority for payment of their pending

dues.”

49. “Conciliation officers” is defined under Section 4 of the I.D. Act as

follows:-

“4. Conciliation officers.-

(1)The appropriate Government may, by notification in the

Official Gazette, appoint such number of persons as it thinks

fit, to be conciliation officers, charged with the duty of

mediating in and promoting the settlement of industrial

disputes.

(2)A conciliation officer may be appointed for a specified area

or for specified industries in a specified area or for one or

more specified industries and either permanently or for a

limited period.”

50. The Job of such officers is primarily mediating in and promoting

settlement in industrial disputes.

51. Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, lays down:-

“33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged

under certain circumstances during pendency of

proceedings.- (1)During the pendency of any conciliation

proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any

proceeding before [an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or

Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial

dispute, no employer shall…………”

52. Admittedly one month retrenchment notice was issued, as 43 ATM’s of

the respondent no. 3 Bank had closed down and the Bank had directed

the petitioner herein to remove the caretakers as the 43 ATM’s of the

Bank was closed as requirement for such ATM’s was no more

necessary.

15

53. a) The notice for termination by retrenchment was issued on

26.05.2026.

b) The strike notice was given on 29.05.2026.

c) First meeting on 16.06.2026.

d) Order of Status quo by conciliation officer 29.06.2026.

e) Termination 30.06.2026 as per date mentioned in notice d ated

26.05.2026.

54. Thus, on 26

th

May, 2026, the date of the letter of termination of

employment due to closure of service contract, there was admittedly

no industrial dispute already pending before the conciliation officer.

55. Section 90 of the Industrial Relations Code, lays down:-

“Section 90. Conditions of service, etc. to remain

unchanged under certain circumstances during

pendency of proceedings.- (1) Where an industrial dispute

pertaining to an establishment or undertaking is already

pending before a conciliation officer or an Arbitrator or a

Tribunal or a National Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be,

with regard to matters not covered by the notice of change

issued by an employer under section 40, no employer

shall…..”

56. As such, as the letter of termination by way of retrenchment was issued

on 26

th

May, 2026, which is prior to initiation of the industrial dispute

before the conciliation officer, and thus there is no prima facie violation

of Section 90 of the Industrial Relations, Code, 2020. Thus the letter

of termination dated 26.05.2026 already initiated the proceeding,

prior to an industrial dispute being raised by the union and the

notice period expiring during pendency of the proceeding is valid

and this is not a case where the conditions of service have been

changed during pendency of an industrial dispute.

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57. Regarding the impugned orders passed in the conciliation proceedings

by the conciliation officer relying upon Section 90(2)(b) of the Code, it

appears that the said orders are bad in law, as the findings and

observations made in the impugned orders are beyond the scope

and power of a conciliation officer under Section 4 of the

Industrial Disputes Act.

58. Section 90(2)(b) of the Code has also been erroneously applied

considering that there was no industrial dispute pending at the

time of issuance of letter of termination by way of retrenchment.

59. Thus the impugned orders dated 29

th

June, 2026 and 1

st

September,

2026 passed by the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Relation

Code, 2020 & Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), Kolkata, are hereby

quashed and set aside.

60. WPA 27330 of 2026 along with WPA 27944 of 2026 are allowed.

61. Applications, if any, connected thereto stand disposed of consequently.

62. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

63. Photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the

parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)