As per case facts, the Petitioner, an ASI, was arrested for corruption, suspended, and dismissed from service after an inquiry found him guilty of demanding and accepting a bribe. His ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
1032 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
****
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M)
Reserved on: 27.11.2025
Pronounced on: 02.12.2025
Ishwar Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and Others
...Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present:- Mr. R.K. Malik Senior Advocate with
Mr. Bhupinder Malik, Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Rajni Gupta, Addl. A.G., Haryana.
****
JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of orders
dated 18.01.2008, 14.03.2008 and 07.02.2009 whereby he was dismissed
from service.
2. The petitioner joined Haryana Police Force as Constable on
14.11.1975. He was promoted from time to time. He was posted as
Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) at Police Station, Sector-5, Panchkula on
15.02.2006. He came to be arrested alleging commission of offence
punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘P.C.
Act’). FIR No.01 dated 15.02.2006 under Sections 7 and 13 of P.C. Act
was registered against him. He was suspended vide order dated
18.02.2006. He was issued charge sheet and Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Panchkula (DSP) was appointed as Inquiry Officer who in his
report dated 29.12.2007 declared the petitioner guilty of demanding and
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -2-
accepting bribe from Shri Avinash Kumar S/o Shri Moti Lal, resident of
House No.126, New Hamida Colony, Yamunanagar. The Inquiry Officer
placed the matter before Superintendent of Police (SP) who issued a
show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon to show cause as to why
he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner filed reply to said
show cause notice. The Disciplinary Authority-SP vide order dated
18.01.2008 dismissed him from service. He preferred an appeal which
came to be dismissed by Appellate Authority. He preferred revision which
also came to be dismissed by Director General of Police (DGP).
3. Learned counsel representing the petitioner submits that
impugned orders are bad and deserve to be set aside on following counts:
(i) The SP was not Competent Authority to pass impugned
order. The Appointing Authority of petitioner was Deputy Inspector
General of Police (DIG), thus, dismissal order could be passed by DIG;
(ii) The department initiated inquiry without seeking approval of
District Magistrate as envisaged under Rule 16.38 of PPR. Prior
permission was mandatory;
(iii) The Inquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority were two
different authorities. The Disciplinary Authority could not accept inquiry
report without calling comments from the petitioner whereas in the
instant case issued show cause notice calling upon the petitioner to show
cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service;
(iv) The State Government has issued instructions to all the
authorities that in the show cause notice punishment shall not be
proposed;
(v) The petitioner was having 32 years’ service and authorities
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -3-
passed impugned orders without considering his length of service as
required by Rule 16.2 of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as applicable to
State of Haryana) (in short ‘PPR’)
4. Per contra, learned State counsel reiterates contents of
orders passed by authorities below. She submits that there is no infirmity
in the impugned orders. This Court in Naresh Kumar Versus State of
Haryana and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 2865 has already held
that SP is Competent Authority to pass punishment order in case of an
ASI. The respondent issued show cause notice prior to passing order of
punishment and copy of inquiry report was supplied to petitioner, thus,
there was compliance of principles of natural justice. The petitioner filed
reply to said show cause notice, thus, it cannot be held that there was no
opportunity of hearing.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record with their able assistance.
6. The petitioner’s first contention is that he was holding rank
of ASI, thus, Superintendent of Police was not his appointing authority,
therefore, could not award him punishment of dismissal from service.
Contention of the petitioner is mis-conceived and deserves to be turned
down. This Court in Naresh Kumar (supra) has already held that
Superintendent of Police is appointing authority of Assistant Sub
Inspectors and Sub Inspectors. He has power to inflict punishment of
dismissal from service.
7. Second contention of petitioner is that departmental
proceedings could be initiated only after getting approval from District
Magistrate. Contention of petitioner is based upon reading of Rule 16.38
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -4-
of PPR. This Court in Narender Kumar Versus State of Haryana and
Others, 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 3242 has held that permission as
contemplated by Rule 16.38 of PPR is not required in case of allegations
of corruption. Rule 16.40 of PPR is applicable and Rule 16.38 of PPR is
inapplicable. The petitioner was found involved in corruption. He was
arrested and thereafter made to face trial.
8. In the wake of above cited judgments of this Court,
arguments of petitioner regarding competence of Superintendent of Police
to pass punishment order and requirement of prior permission of District
Magistrate under Rule 16.38 of PPR are liable to be rejected and
accordingly rejected.
9. Third limb of arguments of the petitioner is that Disciplinary
Authority being different from Inquiry Officer was bound to call
comments of the petitioner prior to accepting inquiry report. The
Disciplinary Authority straightway issued show cause notice proposing
punishment. It was in gross violation of principles of natural justice.
The inquiry is adumbrated in Rule 16.24 of PPR. The said
Rule prescribes complete procedure of inquiry and punishment which is
reproduced as below:
“16.24. Procedure in departmental enquiries. (1) The
following procedure shall be followed in departmental
enquiries –
(i) The police officer accused of misconduct shall be
brought before an officer empowered to punish him,
or such superior officer as the Superintendent may
direct to conduct the enquiry. That officer shall
record and read out to the accused officer a
statement summarizing the alleged misconduct in
such a way as to give full notice of the
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circumstances in regard to which evidence is to be
recorded. A cop of the statement will also be
supplied to the accused officer free of charge.
(ii) If the accused police officer at this stage admits the
misconduct alleged against him, the officer
conducting the enquiry may proceed forthwith to
frame a charge, record the accused officer's plea
and any statement he may wish to make in
extenuation and to record a final order, if it is within
his power to do so, or a finding to be forwarded to
an officer empowered to decide the case. When the
allegations are such as can form the basis of a
criminal charge, the Superintendent shall decide at
this stage, whether the accused shall be tried
departmentally first and judicially thereafter.
(iii) If the accused police officer does not admit the
misconduct, the officer conducting the enquiry shall
proceed to record such evidence, oral and
documentary, in proof of the accusation, as is
available and necessary to support the charge.
Whenever possible, witnesses shall be examined
direct, and in the presence of the accused, who shall
be given opportunity to take notes of their
statements and cross examine them. The officer
conducting the enquiry is empowered, however, to
bring on to the record the statement of any witness
whose presence cannot, in the opinion of such
officer, be procured without undue delay and
expense or inconvenience, if he considers such
statement necessary, and provided that it has been
recorded and attested by a police officer superior in
rank to the accused officer or by a magistrate, and
is signed by the person making it. This statement
shall also be read out to the accused officer and he
shall be given an opportunity to take notes. The
accused shall be bound to answer any questions
which the enquiring officer may see fit to put to him
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -6-
with a view to elucidating the facts referred to in
statements or documents brought on the record as
herein provided.
(iv) When the evidence in support of the allegations has
been recorded the enquiring officer shall, (a) if he
considers that such allegations are not
substantiated, either discharge the accused himself,
if he is empowered to punish him, or recommend his
discharge to the Superintendent, or other officer,
who may be so empowered, or (b) proceed to frame
a formal charge or charges in writing, explain them
to the accused officer and call upon him to answer
them.
(v) The accused officer shall be required to state the
defence witnesses whom he wishes to call and may
be given time, in no case exceeding forty eight
hours, to prepare a list of such witnesses, together
with a summary of the facts as to which they will
testify. The enquiring officer shall be empowered to
refuse to hear any witnesses whose evidence he
considers will be irrelevant or unnecessary in
regard to the specific charge framed. He shall
record the statements of those defence witnesses
whom he decides to admit in the presence of the
accused, who shall be allowed to address questions
to them, the answers to which shall be recorded;
provided that the enquiring officer may cause to be
recorded by any other police officer superior in
rank to the accused the statement of any such
witness whose presence cannot be secured without
undue delay or inconvenience, and may bring such
statement on to the record. The accused may file
documentary evidence and may for this purpose be
allowed access to such files and papers, except such
as form part of the record of the confidential office
of the Superintendent of Police, as the enquiring
officer deems fit. The supply of copies of documents
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -7-
to the accused shall be subject to the ordinary rules
regarding copying fees.
(vi) At the conclusion of the defence evidence, or, if the
enquiring officer so directs, at any earlier stage
following the framing of a charge, the accused shall
be required to state his own answer to the charge.
He may be permitted to file a written statement and
may be given time, not exceeding one week, for its
preparation, but shall be bound to make an oral
statement in answer to all questions which the
enquiring officer may see fit to put to him, arising
out of the charge, the recorded evidence, or his own
written statement.
(vii) The enquiring officer shall proceed to pass orders of
acquittal or punishment, if empowered to do so, or
to forward the case with his finding and
recommendations to an officer having the necessary
powers. Whenever the officer passing the orders of
punishment proposes to take into considerations the
adverse entries on the previous record of the
accused police officer, he shall provide reasonable
opportunity to the defaulter to defend himself; and a
copy or at least a gist of those entries shall be
conveyed to the defaulter and he shall be asked to
convey to the defaulter and he shall be asked to give
such explanation as he may deem fit. The
explanation furnished by the defaulter shall be
taken into account by the officer before passing
orders in the case.
(viii) Nothing in the foregoing rule shall debar a
Superintendent of Police from making or causing to
be made a preliminary investigation into the
conduct of a suspected officer. Such an enquiry is
not infrequently necessary to ascertain the nature
and degree of misconduct which is to be formally
enquired into. The suspected police officer may or
may not be present at such preliminary enquiry, as
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -8-
ordered by the Superintendent of Police or other
gazetted officer initiating the investigation, but shall
not cross examine witnesses. The file of such a
preliminary investigation shall form no part of the
formal departmental record, but statements
therefrom may be brought to the formal record when
the witnesses are no longer available in the
circumstances detailed in clause (iii) above. All
statements recorded during a preliminary
investigation should be signed by the person making
them and attested by the officer recording them.
(2) (i) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub rule (1)
a Superintendent of Police or any officer of rank
higher than Superintendent, may instituted, or cause
to be instituted, ex parte proceedings in any case in
which he is satisfied that the defaulter cannot be
found or that in spite of notice to attend the
defaulter is deliberately evading service or refusing
to attend without due cause.
(ii) The procedure in such ex parte proceedings shall,
as far as possible, conform to the procedure laid
down in sub rule (1):
Provided that the defaulter shall be deemed –
(a) not to have admitted the allegations contained in
the summary of misconduct, and
(b) to have entered a plea of not guilty of the charge:
Provided further that the defaulter, if he
subsequently appears at any stage during the course of the
proceedings shall not be entitled to claim de novo
proceedings or to recall for cross examination any witness
whose evidence has already been recorded. He shall,
however, be fully informed of the evidence which has been
led against him and shall be permitted to take notes
thereof. Не shall also be furnished with a copy of the
summary of misconduct and of the charge or charges
framed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules,
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -9-
where an officer, empowered to dismiss, remove or reduce
in rank the police officer accused of misconduct, is
satisfied at any stage during an enquiry that for reasons, to
be recorded in writing by that officer, it is not reasonably
practicable to hold the enquiry after that stage, he will
straight away award the punishment.
Explanation2G24I32TF02YW3YI-0-2IP2-W8G3WJ02C,U(2BNBTBHTBIN2
of disciplinary proceedings against the police officer on
the grounds of,
(i) indulging in spying or smuggling activities;
(ii) disrupting the means of transport or of
communication;
(iii) damaging public property;
(iv) creating indiscipline amongst fellow policemen;
(v) promoting feelings of enmity or hatred between
different classes of citizens of India on grounds of
religion, race, caste, community or language;
(vi) going on strike or mass casual leave or resorting to
mass abstentions;
(vii) spreading disaffection against the Government; and
(viii) causing riots and the like;
shall be sufficient reason for concluding that it is
not reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry
[Emphasis supplied].”
From the perusal of the above quoted Rule, it is evident that
Clause (vii) of Rule 16.24(1) deals with situation post conclusion of
inquiry. It provides that Inquiry Officer shall proceed to pass order of
acquittal or punishment, if empowered to do so or forward the case with
his findings and recommendations to an officer having the necessary
powers. There is nothing in the rule which provides that Disciplinary
Authority if is different from Inquiry Officer, would seek comments of
delinquent before forming any opinion on the inquiry report. The
petitioner is claiming that seeking opinion of delinquent before forming
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -10-
any opinion on inquiry report is part of natural justice. It is true that in the
absence of embargo, the delinquent should be given full opportunity to
put forth his stand. Compliance of requirement of opportunity of hearing
or opportunity to file response depends upon facts and circumstances as
well as nature of proceedings. There is no absolute and straight jacket
formula. Rule 16.24 of PPR is silent with respect to opportunity to
delinquent before forming any opinion by Disciplinary Authority on
inquiry report. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority supplied
inquiry report to the delinquent and called upon him to show cause as to
why he should not be awarded punishment. The delinquent filed his reply.
He raised all possible pleas. The Disciplinary Authority further granted
him opportunity of hearing. In such circumstances, it is difficult to
conclude that petitioner was not granted due opportunity to put forth his
stand qua inquiry report and proposed punishment. The Inquiry Officer
conducted inquiry as per Rule 16.24 of PPR prescribed. The delinquent as
admitted by him in reply dated 16.01.2008 was given opportunity to
submit his defence against charges and evidence. He submitted a defence
statement proving as to how charges against him stood disproved from
the evidence on record. It is apt to notice here that petitioner did not raise
issue of seeking his comments before Disciplinary Authority. He has
raised issue before this Court. It is not a pure question of law which can
be raised at any stage.
From the above discussion, it is evident beyond the pale of
doubt that petitioner was granted due opportunity to file his written
response as well as opportunity of personal hearing. There was due
compliance of principles of natural justice. The claim of petitioner is
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -11-
solely based upon principles of natural justice. He is not claiming
violation of procedure contemplated by Rule 16.24 of PPR. This Court
finds that there was due compliance of principles of natural justice as
well as mandate of Rule 16.24 of PPR qua procedure to be adopted
before imposing punishment of dismissal from service.
10. As per petitioner, the respondent did not comply with
Government instructions dated 30.07.1975 underscoring that authorities
competent to inflict punishment should strictly avoid to mention proposed
punishment either in the chargesheet or show cause notice.
As per first proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of
India, the Disciplinary Authority may impose penalty on the basis of
evidence adduced during inquiry and it is not necessary to give
delinquent any opportunity of making representation on the penalty
proposed. Article 311(2) reads as:
“No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in
which he has been informed of the charges against him
and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges;
Provided that where it is proposed after such
inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty
may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced
during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give
such person any opportunity of making representation on
the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed
or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which
has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss
or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -12-
satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by
that authority in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as
the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of
the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold
such inquiry.”
In the light of aforesaid proviso to Article 311(2), it can be
inferred that there is no need to give opportunity of making representation
after conclusion of inquiry though Courts have held that it would be in
compliance of principles of natural justice if Disciplinary Authority
before passing final order grants opportunity to delinquent to rebut
findings of Inquiry Officer. The instructions relied upon by petitioner are
neither statutory nor binding upon Courts. These are advisory in nature.
11. As per Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the
punishment cannot be awarded without conducting inquiry except in
exceptional circumstances. Article 311 was amended by Constitution
(42
nd
Amendment) Act, 1976. By said amendment, the portion of Article
311(2) which required a reasonable opportunity of making representation
on the proposed penalty was deleted and it was expressly provided that it
is not necessary to give to a delinquent Government Servant any
opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty. Amended
and unamended Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India in
juxtaposition are reproduced below: -
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -13-
Unamended
Article 311(2)
Amended
Article 311(2)
No such person as aforesaid shall be
dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank until he has been given a
reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him:
Provided that this clause shall not
apply—
(a) where a person is dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank on the
ground of conduct which has led to
his conviction on a criminal charge;
(b) where an authority empowered
to dismiss or remove a person or to
reduce him in rank is satisfied that
for some reason, to be recorded by
that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to give to
that person an opportunity of
showing cause; or
(c) where the President or Governor
or Rajpramukh, as the case may be,
is satisfied that in the interest of the
security of the State it is not
expedient to give to that person such
an opportunity.
No such person as aforesaid shall be
dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank except after an inquiry in which
he has been informed of the charges
against him and given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect
of those charges;
Provided that where it is proposed
after such inquiry, to impose upon him
any such penalty, such penalty may be
imposed on the basis of the evidence
adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such
person any opportunity of making
representation on the penalty
proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall
not apply
(a) where a person is dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank on the
ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to
dismiss or remove a person or to
reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
some reason, to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, is
satisfied that in the interest of the
security of the State, it is not expedient
to hold such inquiry.
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -14-
11. A Constitution Bench in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel,
(1985) 3 SCC 398 considered the scope and effect of aforesaid
amendment. The Court clearly held that after said amendment, there is no
requirement of granting opportunity of hearing on the proposed penalty.
The relevant extracts of the judgment read as: -
“68. The question which then arises is, “Whether the
Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976, which
further amended the substituted clause (2) of Article 311
with effect from January 1, 1977, has made any change in
the law?” The amendments made by this Act are that in
clause (2) that portion which required a reasonable
opportunity of making representation on the proposed
penalty to be given to a government servant was deleted
and in its place the first proviso was inserted, which
expressly provides that it is not necessary to give to a
delinquent government servant any opportunity of making
representation on the proposed penalty. Does this affect the
operation of the original proviso which, by the
Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, became the
second proviso? Such obviously was not and could not
have been the intention of Parliament. The opening words
of the second proviso remain the same except that the word
“further” was inserted after the word “provided”, because
the original proviso by reason of the insertion of another
proviso before it became the second proviso. It should be
borne in mind that the show cause notice at the
punishment stage was originally there as a result of the
interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee in Lall
case [AIR 1948 PC 121] and by this Court in Khem Chand
case [AIR 1958 SC] upon the phrase “a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed
to be taken in regard to him”. Clause (2) as substituted by
the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act merely
reproduced the substance of what was held in Khem Chand
case [AIR 1958 SC 300]. The words which originally
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found a place in clause (2), “a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in
regard to him”, do not any more feature in clause (2). All
that clause (2) now provides is an inquiry in which the
government servant is informed of the charges against him
and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges. Clause (2) taken by itself even
without the first proviso does not provide, expressly or
impliedly, for any opportunity to make a representation
against the proposed penalty. After the Constitution
(Fifteenth Amendment) Act this second opportunity formed
a separate part of clause (2), which part was deleted by
the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act. Thus,
when the second proviso states in its opening words that
“Provided further that this clause shall not apply”, it
means that whatever safeguards are to be found in clause
(2) are wholly taken away in a case where any of the three
clauses of the second proviso is attracted. In this
connection, the following observations of this Court in the
case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [AIR
1969 SC 198] (at pp. 326 27) are pertinent:
“There seems to be an erroneous impression in
certain quarters evidently influenced by the
provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution
particularly as they stood before the amendment of
that article that every disciplinary proceeding must
consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show
cause notice to be followed by another inquiry
thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the
principles of natural justice. Law may or may not
prescribe such a course.”
In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T.C.
Shrivastava [1984 Supp SCC 87] this Court held that
“neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under
industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against
the proposed punishment is necessary”. Since a right to
such opportunity does not exist in law, it follows that the
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only right which the government servant had to make a
representation on the proposed penalty was to be found in
clause (2) of Article 311 prior to its amendment by the
Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act. This right
having been taken away by the Constitution (Forty second
Amendment) Act, there is no provision of law under which
a government servant can claim this right.”
In view of afore-cited judgment and amended Article 311(2),
there is no need to issue show cause notice with respect to proposed
punishment. The instructions were issued prior to aforesaid amendment
of Article 311. In the light of amended Article 311, the instructions relied
upon by petitioner have lost significance.
12. The petitioner lastly claims that Disciplinary Authority while
passing punishment order as per Rule 16.2 of PPR is supposed to
consider length of service as well as entitlement of the delinquent to
pension. The petitioner, at the time of passing impugned order, was
having 32 years’ service to his credit apart from many commendation
certificates. The Disciplinary Authority did not consider his length of
service which was contrary to judgments of this Court in Shiv Raj Singh
Sidhu Versus Union of India and Others, 2011(2) S.C.T. 626 and State
of Haryana and Others Versus Jai Dev, 2012(3) S.C.T. 648 as well as
mandate of Rule 16.2 of PPR.
It is true that Disciplinary Authority as per Rule 16.2 of PPR
is required to consider length of service as well as entitlement of pension
prior to passing order of dismissal from service. Rule 16.2 of PPR reads
as:
“16.2. Dismissal.
(1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of
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misconduct or as the cumulative effect or continued
misconduct proving Incorrigibility and complete unfitness
for police service. In making such an award regard shall
be had to the length of service of the offender and his
claim to pension.
Explanation. For the purposes of sub rule (1), the
following shall, inter alia, be regarded as gravest acts of
misconduct in respect of a police officer, facing
disciplinary action:
(i) indulging in spying or smuggling activities;
(ii)disrupting the means of transport or of communication;
(iii) damaging public property;
(iv) causing indiscipline amongst fellow policemen;
(v) promoting feeling of enmity or hatred between different
classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion, race,
caste, community or language;
(vi) going on strike or mass casual leave or resorting to
mass abstentions;
(vii) spreading disaffection against the Government; and
(viii) causing riots and the like
(2) An enrolled police officer sentenced judicially to
rigorous imprisonment exceeding one month or to any
other punishment not less severe, shall, if such sentence is
not quashed on appeal or revision, be dismissed. An
enrolled police officer sentenced by a criminal court to a
punishment of fine or simple imprisonment, or both, or to
rigorous imprisonment not exceeding one month, or who,
having been proclaimed under Section 87 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure fails to appear within the statutory
period of thirty days may be dismissed or otherwise dealt
with at the discretion of the officer empowered to appoint
him. Final departmental orders in such cases shall be
postponed until the appeal or revision proceedings have
been decided, or until the period allowed for filing an
appeal has lapsed without appellate or revisionary
proceedings having been instituted. Departmental
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punishments under this rule shall be awarded in
accordance with the powers conferred by rule 16/1.
(3) When a police officer is convicted judicially and
dismissed, or dismissed as a result of a departmental
inquiry, in consequence of corrupt practices, the
conviction and dismissal and its cause shall be published
in the Police Gazette. In other cases of dismissal when it is
desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be re
employed elsewhere, a full description roll, with
particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for
publication in the Police Gazette.”
From the perusal of aforesaid Rule, it is evident that
Disciplinary Authority in making award of dismissal from service ought
to consider length of service of the offender and his claim to pension.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab Versus Ram Singh, (1992) 4
SCC 54 while considering Rule 16.2 of PPR has observed that single act
of corruption despite long service may entail dismissal from service.
Relevant extracts of the judgment read as:
“7. Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part
is referable to gravest acts of misconduct which entails
awarding an order of dismissal. Undoubtedly there is
distinction between gravest misconduct and grave
misconduct. Before awarding an order of dismissal it shall
be mandatory that dismissal order should be made only
when there are gravest acts of misconduct, since it
impinges upon the pensionary rights of the delinquent
after putting long length of service. As stated the first part
relates to gravest acts of misconduct. Under General
Clauses Act singular includes plural, “act” includes acts.
The contention that there must be plurality of acts of
misconduct to award dismissal is fastidious. The word
“acts” would include singular “act” as well. It is not the
repetition of the acts complained of but its quality,
insidious effect and gravity of situation that ensues from
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -19-
the offending ‘act’. The colour of the gravest act must be
gathered from the surrounding or attending circumstances.
Take for instance the delinquent who put in 29 years of
continuous length of service and had unblemished record;
in thirtieth year he commits defalcation of public money or
fabricates false records to conceal misappropriation. He
only committed once. Does it mean that he should not be
inflicted with the punishment of dismissal but be allowed
to continue in service for that year to enable him to get his
full pension. The answer is obviously no. Therefore, a
single act of corruption is sufficient to award an order of
dismissal under the rule as gravest act of misconduct.”
[Emphasis supplied]
In the case in hand, the petitioner was dismissed from service
on account of allegation of corruption. He was found guilty of demanding
and accepting bribe. He was caught in a trap. An FIR was registered
against him. Police filed its report, however, he was acquitted on
technical grounds. As petitioner was guilty of demanding and accepting
bribe, there was no need to hang upon his length of service. If an Officer
despite being found guilty of corruption is awarded punishment less than
dismissal from service, there would be no other occasion to award
punishment of dismissal from service. Rule 16.40 has been specifically
inserted in PPR to deal with cases of corruption. No lenient view is
warranted.
13. From the above discussion and findings, it is evident that
petitioner has challenged impugned orders on technical grounds. The
petitioner did not raise dispute on merit. It is very difficult to get FIR
registered against a Police Officer. There is no allegation of mala fide or
connivance against Disciplinary Authority or complainant. In such
circumstances, it would be inequitable and unfair to interfere with
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -20-
impugned orders awarding punishment of dismissal from service. Court
is not oblivious of the fact that interference in such type of cases
discourages higher Police Officials to take action against erring
subordinates.
14. Scope of interference while exercising jurisdiction under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary proceedings
is very limited. The Court has no power to look into quantum of
sentence/punishment unless and until Court finds that sentence awarded
is disproportionate to alleged offence. It is further settled proposition of
law that High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
Constitution of India can look into the procedure followed by authorities.
In case, it is found that enquiry officer or disciplinary authority has not
considered any evidence on record or misread the evidence or procedure
as prescribed by law has not been followed, the Court can interfere. A
two-judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and
others vs. Subrata Nath, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 998 while adverting with
scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
disciplinary proceedings has held that departmental authorities are fact
finding authorities. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable
during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the
discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee
keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has considered its judicial precedents including a two-judge Bench
judgment in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran (supra).
15. A Constitution Bench in Syed Yakoob Vs K.S.
Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 and a two judge bench of the Hon’ble
CWP-18776-2009 (O&M) -21-
Supreme Court recently in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic
Sciences and another Vs Bikartan Das and others 2023 SCC Online SC
996 have reminded us that there are two cardinal principles of law
governing issuance of writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India i.e. (i) High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate
Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the
order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but
does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ
of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the
record; (ii) in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the
writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while
exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it
with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. It is perfectly
open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as
public interest dictates & equity projects. The High Court would be failing
in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final
order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would
render the High Court a normal Court of appeal which it is not.
16. In the wake of above discussion and findings, this Court is of
the considered opinion that present petition being bereft of merit deserves to
be dismissed and accordingly dismissed.
17.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
02.12.2025
Prince Chawla
Date of Uploading: 02.12.2025
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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