( 2026:HHC:9628 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 89 of 2025.

Date of Decision: 31.03.2026.

Ishwar Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.

Versus

State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

For the Petitioners: Mr. Sudhir Thakur, Senior

Advocate with Mr. Karun Negi and

Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocates.

For Respondent No.1: Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional

Advocate General.

For Respondent No.2: Mr. R.L. Verma, Advocate. .

Sandeep Sharma, J.

The instant criminal revision petition filed under

Section 438 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,

lays challenge to order dated 07.01.2025 passed by the learned

Special Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P. in Case No. 5-S/7 of

2019, titled as State of H.P. vs. Ishwar Thakur & Ors., whereby

the afore Court while rejecting the prayer made on behalf of the

petitioners (hereinafter, “accused”) for their discharge,

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

proceeded to frame charges against them for the offences

punishable under Sections 307, 341 of the IPC and Section 3(1)

(s), 2(va) of the Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, ‘Act’).

2. Precisely the grouse of the petitioners, as has been

highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Shri Sudhir

Thakur, learned Senior Advocate representing the accused is

that the Court below while framing charge under Section 307 of

the IPC and Section 3(1)(s), 2(va) of the Act has fallen in grave

error, for the reason that no cogent and convincing evidence

ever came to be adduced on record by the prosecution suggestive

of the fact that the alleged injuries inflicted by the petitioners on

the person of the complainant besides being grievous, were

dangerous to his life. While referring to Section 307 of the IPC,

Mr. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel further argued that to

invoke provisions of Section 307 of the IPC, it is incumbent upon

the prosecution to prove the intention and knowledge of the

accused, if any, to inflict injury on the person of the complainant

which could be dangerous to his life. While referring to MLC

adduced on record by the prosecution to prove the injuries

sustained by the complainant in the alleged incident, Mr.

3 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

Thakur, learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that doctor

attending upon the complainant nowhere opined the injuries,

which were though opined to be grievous, to be dangerous to

life. If it is so, no case under Section 307 of the IPC is made out

against the accused named in the FIR and at the best accused

could have been charged under Section 325 of the IPC for theirs

having inflicted grievous injuries on the person/body of the

complainant. While referring to MLC, Mr. Thakur, learned

Senior Counsel further argued that no injury was ever inflicted

by the accused on the vital organs/parts of the body of the

complainant, rather as per the own case of the prosecution blow

of danda/stick was given by the accused on the arms and

shoulders of the complainant, as a result of which, he suffered

dislocation and fracture which was subsequently opined to be

grievous injury. He further argued that bare perusal of

statement of the complainant recorded under Section 154 of the

Cr.P.C. and thereafter under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,

suggestive of the fact that the accused inflicted injuries on the

person of the complainant with the intention to kill him, are not

sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 307 of the IPC. Mr.

Thakur, further argued that bare perusal of statement of

4 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

complainant under Section 154 Cr.P.C., nowhere suggests that

casteist remarks/abuses, if any, were made/hurled by the

accused, rather in his statement under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.,

he simply stated that accused, namely, Ankush Dharmender

Thakur and Pushpender Sharma came to him and forcefully

took him to Garima Dhaba, where accused Ishwar Thakur was

already present. He alleged that accused named in the FIR

thereafter gave him beatings with danda, fist and kicks. Mr.

Thakur, learned senior counsel submitted that there is no

specific mention with regard to hurling of abuses and making of

casteist remarks, if any, by the accused in the FIR, but

subsequently, with a view to falsely implicate the accused

named in the FIR, in his supplementary statement recorded

under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, he alleged that, while giving

beatings the accused also hurled abuses and called him

‘chamar’. Mr. Thakur, submitted that though FIR, which is

lodged at the first instance immediately after the incident, was

lodged on 29.01.2019, wherein there is no specific mention with

regard to casteist remarks made by the accused, but on

30.01.2019, the complainant made allegations of casteist

remarks allegedly made by the accused on the date of incident.

5 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

While referring to supplementary statement recorded under

Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., Mr. Thakur, learned senior counsel

further argued that the allegations in the afore statements are

made by the complainant with a view to falsely implicate the

accused. He further submitted that since none of the persons

had an occasion to see the alleged incident as has been stated by

the complainant himself, the alleged casteist remarks, claimed

to have been made by the accused, otherwise cannot be said to

have been made in public view, which is otherwise necessary

ingredient for invoking the provisions of Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va)

of the Act. Mr. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate further

submitted that no evidence has been adduced on record by the

prosecution to prove the aforesaid allegations of casteist

remarks allegedly made by the accused. He submitted that since

there is no independent witness to corroborate the version of

the complainant coupled with the fact that there are material

contradictions in the statements given by the complainant

under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,

trial, if permitted to be continued against the accused named in

the FIR for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va)

of the Act, would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. He

6 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

further submitted that otherwise also for want of evidence, the

case of the prosecution is likely to fail and as such no fruitful

purpose would be served by subjecting the accused to protracted

trial. In support of his afore contentions, learned senior counsel

placed reliance on certain judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court

which shall be discussed in the later part of this judgment.

3. To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned

Additional Advocate General and Mr. R.L. Verma, learned

counsel representing the respondent/complainant supported

the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge thereby

framing charges against the petitioners for the offences

punishable under Sections 325, 341 of the IPC and Section 3(1)

(s), (2)(va) of the Act.

4. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate

General for the State and Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the

complainant argued that very opinion of the doctor that the

injuries suffered by the complainant are grievous in nature

coupled with the fact that had the complainant not raised his

arms to save himself, he would have received injuries on his

head which could further result in serious consequences are

7 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

sufficient to invoke Section 307 of the IPC. Learned Additional

Advocate General and Mr. Verma, learned counsel further

argued that there is ample material adduced on record

suggestive of the fact that the accused named in the FIR actually

had made an attempt to inflict injuries on the head of the

complainant but since complainant had raised his arms to save

himself, he received injuries on his arms. They further

submitted that whether the accused had any intention or

knowledge to commit the crime punishable under Section 307 of

the IPC, is a question to be decided by the Court below in totality

of evidence, but here in the present case mere availability of

MLC on record is sufficient to conclude the complicity of the

accused in the commission of offence punishable under Section

307 of the IPC. Learned Additional Advocate General for the

respondent-State and Mr. Verma, learned counsel representing

the complainant further argued that once it is not in dispute

that the complainant was given beatings in open place i.e. bazar

and they had also made casteist remarks, it cannot be said that

casteist remarks were not made in public view. It is further

submitted by the aforesaid counsel that the complainant alleged

that the accused, while giving beatings to him, also made

8 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

casteist remarks. They further argued that the statement of

complainant itself is sufficient to prove the guilt, if any, of the

accused in the commission of offence punishable under Section

3(1)(s), (2) (va) of the Act and even if the afore version is not

corroborated by independent witness, the act can be said to be

done in public view, as such it would be sufficient to charge the

accused under Section 3(1)(s), (2) (va) of the Act. They further

submitted that otherwise also it is matter of trial whether the

casteist remarks were made in public view and were heard by

any other person or not?

5. Learned Additional Advocate General for the

State/respondent No.1 and Mr. Verma, learned counsel

representing the complainant/respondent No.2 further argued

that it is well settled law that, while framing the charge, the

court is not required to appreciate the evidence, rather at that

stage it is to be be seen, whether prima facie case, if any, is

made out from the documents filed along with the final report

submitted under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., or not?

6. Learned Additional Advocate General as well as

learned counsel representing the complainant further

9 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

contended that this Court, while exercising the revisional

jurisdiction has no wider powers to re-appreciate the evidence.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have

also gone through the entire record carefully.

8. Since, specific issue with regard to the limited

jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of

the BNSS) has been raised at the behest of the respondents, this

Court deems it fit to deal with it at the first instance.

9. True it is that this Court has limited jurisdiction

under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of the BNSS) to

re-appreciate evidence in view of the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala vs. P:uttumana IIIath

Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452, wherein it has ben

held as under:-

“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call

for and examine the record of any proceedings for the

purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness,

legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.

In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory

jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting

miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power

cannot be equated with the power of an appellate

court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate

10 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be

appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the

evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same

when the evidence has already been appreciated by

the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,

unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of

the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to

gross miscarriage of justice.”

10. Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another v.

Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has

held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or

misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is

not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the

abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct

irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal

Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.

11. Now being guided by the aforesaid principle of law,

this Court, while exercising the powers under Section 397 of the

Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of the BNSS), shall make an endavour

to find out, whether the Court below while passing the

impugned order, has failed to deliver justice or misused the

judicial mechanism or procedure.

11 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

12. In nut shell, the case of the petitioners is that no

cause is made out against them under Section 307 of the IPC and

Section 3 (1)(s), (2) (va) of the Act since the injuries suffered by

the complainant in the alleged incident have been opined to be

grievous by the doctor attending upon him and there is no

specific mention that the injuries opined to be grievous in

nature could be dangerous to life, accused could not have been

charged under Section 307 of the IPC, rather at the best they

could have been charged under Section 325 of the IPC. At this

stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 307 of the IPC.

Section 307 of the IPC reads as under:-

“Whoever does any act with such intention or

knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by

that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall

be punished with imprisonment of either description for

a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be

liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such

act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment

for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore

mentioned.”

13. A bare perusal of the afore provisionsof law clearly

reveals that the prosecution is under obligation to prove that

the person charged with the aforesaid provisions of law had

intention or knowledge that any act of him may cause death of a

12 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

person, against whom such act is done. In the case at hand, as

per the complainant, accused namely Ankush Verma,

Dharmender Thakur and Pushpender firstly took him to Garima

Dhaba where fourth accused Ishwar Thakur was already present

and thereafter they gave him beatings. If statements of the

complainant recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and Section 161

of the Cr.P.C. are read in conjunction, it transpires that he

nowhere stated that accused named in the FIR gave him

beatings with an intention to kill him. It appears from the

statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of the

Cr.P.C. that there was some rivalry inter se Ishwar Thakur and

the complainant on account of gram panchayat elections, but

such fact, if any, may not be sufficient to conclude the intention

or knowledge of the petitioners to do away the life of

complainant. Complainant, nowhere specifically stated that

while he was being given beatings by the accused, they also

threatened to kill him, rather, as per own case of complainant,

accused gave him beatings with the help of a danda/stick and he

with a view to save his head, raised his arms, as a result of which

he suffered injuries on his arms/shoulder. MLC adduced on

record nowhere suggests injuries on the vital part of the body.

13 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

Though, the injuries suffered by the complainant on his arms

and shoulder were found to be grievous in nature but doctor

nowhere mentioned the kind of weapon, used to cause the

injuries and whether the injuries inflicted could be dangerous to

life, which is otherwise essential to attract the provisions of

Section 307 of the IPC.

14. At this stage, Mr. R.L. Verma, learned counsel

representing the complainant, made a reference to the judgment

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Shoyeb Raja vs. State of

Madhya Pradesh & Ors., Cr. Appeal No. 3327 of 2024, decided on

25.09.2024 wherein it came to be ruled that the nature or extent

of injury suffered are irrelevant factors for conviction under

Section 307 of the IPC , so long as the injury is inflicted with

animus. However, on careful perusal of the afore judgment, this

Court finds no application of the same, as far as the case of the

complainant is concerned, rather the same is applicable to the

case of the petitioners. Hon’ble Apex Court while taking the

note of the judgments passed in State of Maharashtra vs.

Kashirao, (2003)10 SCC 434 has held as under:-

14 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

“11.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao, the Court

identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of

the section. The relevant extract is as below:

“The essential ingredients required to be proved

in the case of an offence under Section 307 are:

(i) that the death of a human being was attempted;

(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by,

or in consequence of the act of the accused; and

(iii) that such act was done with the intention of

causing death; or that it was done with the

intention of causing such bodily injury as : (a) the

accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b)

was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death, or that the accused attempted to

cause death by doing an act known to him to be so

imminently dangerous that it must in all

probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily

injury as is likely to cause death, the accused

having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing

such death or injury.”

11.2 This Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab,1961 SCC

OnLine SC 72 as far back as 1961, observed the

constituents of the Section, having referred to various

judgments of the Privy Council, as under:

“a person commits an offence under Section 307

when he has an intention to commit murder and,

in pursuance of that intention, does an act

towards its commission irrespective of the fact

whether that act is the penultimate act or not. It

is to be clearly understood, however, that the

intention to commit the offence of murder means

15 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

that the person concerned has the intention to do

certain act with the necessary intention or

knowledge mentioned in Section 300. The

intention to commit an offence is different from

the intention or knowledge requisite for

constituting the act as that offence. The

expression “whoever attempts to commit an

offence” in Section 511, can only mean

“whoever : intends to do a certain act with the

intent or knowledge necessary for the

commission of that offence”. The same is meant

by the expression “whoever does an act with such

intention or knowledge and under such

circumstances that if he, by that act, caused

death, he would be guilty of murder” in Section

307. This simply means that the act must be done

with the intent or knowledge requisite for the

commission of the offence of murder. The

expression “by that act” does not mean that the

immediate effect of the act committed must be

death. Such a result must be the result of that act

whether immediately or after a lapse of time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

15. As per the aforesaid judgment most relevant

ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC are that the death of a

human being was attempted and such an act was done with the

intention of causing death or that it was done with the intention

of causing such bodily injury which the accused knows is likely

to cause death or is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature,

16 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

to cause death or that the accused attempted to cause death by

doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous, that

it must, in all probabilities cause death, or such bodily injury, as

is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for

incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.

16. In the case in hand, the description of the weapon of

offence has not been mentioned and it is also not opined that

with which weapon the injuries have been caused. There is also

no specific opinion that the injuries caused could be dangerous

to life. The doctor attending upon the complainant after having

examined the complainant opined the injuries to be grievous in

nature, which does not appear to be sufficient to invoke the

provisions of Section 307 of the IPC, rather at best case under

Section 325 could have been registered against the accused.

17. Another argument raised at the behest of the accused

is that no case is made out under Section3(1) (s), 2(va) of the Act

for the reason that the alleged casteist remarks were neither

made in public view nor in the presence of any independent

witness. To ascertain correctness of the afore claim made by the

learned senior counsel representing the petitioners, this Court

17 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

perused the record of the court below, which was summoned.

Bare perusal of the statement of the complainant recorded

under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. clearly suggests that the

complainant nowhere alleged that the accused named in the FIR

while giving him beatings also made casteist remarks. It is after

a day from his recording of statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C,

he got recorded supplementary statement under Section 161 of

the Cr.P.C. on 30

th

January, 2019 alleging therein that the

accused also made casteist marks and called him ‘chamar’. No

doubt, supplementary statement recorded under Section 161 of

the Cr.P.C. is the part of the final report submitted under Section

173 of the Cr.P.C. and as such it cannot be overlooked, but this

Court is persuaded to accept the submission made by the

learned senior counsel for the petitioners that there is no

explanation that what prevented the complainant from stating

with regard to the alleged “casteist remarks” made by the

accused at the first instance. Omission on the part of the

complainant to make specific mention with regard to “casteist

remarks” allegedly made by the accused at first instance

certainly compels this Court to agree with the learned senior

counsel, that an attempt has been made by the prosecution to

18 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

improve the case. Most importantly, as per the own statement

of the complainant, none was present at the time of his being

beaten by the accused, hurling of abuses and making of casteist

remarks. Though, there is no reason to disagree with the

submission of Mr. R.L. Verma, learned counsel representing the

complainant that the statement of complainant, wherein he has

alleged that accused made casteist remarks, is sufficient to

invoke the provisions of Section 3(1) (s), (2)(va) of the Act, but

in the entirety of the facts as discussed above coupled with the

fact that there is no witness to corroborate the version of the

complainant, this Court is of the view that no fruitful purpose

would be served in case charge under Section 3(1) (s), (2)(va) of

the Act is permitted to sustain at this stage, rather in that

situation petitioners/accused herein would be unnecessarily

subjected to protracted trial.

18. Though, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the

Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned senior counsel representing the

petitioners that the place of occurrence cannot be said to be

“public place” in terms of Section 3 (1)(s), (2)(va) of the Act

merely on the ground that none save and except the

complainant heard utterances of casteist remarks, if any, made

19 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

by the accused named in the FIR, but since, it is not in dispute

that the complainant was allegedly given beatings in the bazar

that too in front of one ‘dhaba’, the place of occurrence beside

being a “public place” can also be construed to be a place in

public view in terms of Section 3(1) (s),(2)(va) of the Act but

relevant factor for construing the case, if any, under Section 3

(1)(s), (2)(va) of the Act against the accused is whether casteist

remarks allegedly made in public view were heard by any third

person or not. In FIR, which came to be lodged at the first

instance, there is no specific mention with regard to casteist

remarks, if any, made by the accused. Secondly, as per the own

statement of the complainant, none at the time of alleged

incident was present on the spot. Otherwise also documents

adduced on record along with the chargesheet filed under

Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., nowhere suggest that any third person

had an occasion to see the alleged incident. Though, the place

of occurrence was a public place and the alleged incident also

can be said to have happened in public view, but since, none save

and except the accused and the complainant, were witness to

such incident, the version put forth by the complainant with

regard to the casteist remarks allegedly made by the accused

20 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

named in the FIR, has become doubtful on account of omission

on the part of the complainant to report such act at the first

instance i.e at the time of lodging of FIR.

19. Similarly, the bare perusal of supplementary

statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of the

Cr.P.C., which was recorded after 23 days of lodging of FIR,

further reveals that the allegations of making casteist remarks,

if any, by the accused named in the FIR, has been made in most

casual manner by the complainant, which act of his certainly

compels this Court to draw an inference that the act of adducing

new facts thereby levelling serious allegation of hurling abuses

and making casteist remarks is afterthought. At this juncture, it

would be apt to take note of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex

Court in case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar

Pradesh & Ors., Cr. Appeal No. 1617/2023, decided on 19.05.2023,

wherein it has been held as under:-

“16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the

complainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and

who, being a member of the public, was present when the

appellant is alleged to have hurled caste related abuses at

the complainant. However, on a reading of the second

F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears

that the incident took place at the house of the appellant.

21 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

17. The first question that calls for an answer is

whether it was at a place within public view that the

appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant

with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to

humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21 st

January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the

prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three

witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant

of committing offences under Sections 323 and 506 IPC

and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none

other than the complainant, his wife and their son.

Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the

presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at

the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the

complainant, his wife and their son). Since the

utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in

any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for

attracting Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was

missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant

point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related

abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member

of the public was present.

18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant

had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a

view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not

advance the case of the complainant any further to bring

it within the ambit of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We

have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-

sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances

of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or

to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except

for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses

22 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that

every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person

would not amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(x)of

the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or

intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being

a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one

calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a

thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would

obviously constitute an act intended to insult or

humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even

if the same be directed generally to a person, who

happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may

not be sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(x) unless such

words are laced with casteist remarks. Since Section 18 of

the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction

under Section 438 Cr.PC and having regard to the

overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is

desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for

alleged commission of offence under Section 3(1)(x) the

utterances made by him in any place within public view

are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to

be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least

in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on

statements of witnesses recorded in course of

investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to

ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of

an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed

for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the

situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the

offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in

a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21 st

January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence

23 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

having been committed by the appellant under  section

3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.”

20. In the afore case Hon’ble Apex Court though held

that the place outside the house of the complainant can be said

to be a public place or the alleged incident has occurred within

public view, but since in the instant case, the alleged incident of

hurling abuses and making casteist remarks was not seen by any

third party, as fairly admitted by the complainant in his

statement, the provisions of Section 3(1)(s),(2)(va) of the Act

cannot be invoked.

21. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment of the

Hon’ble Apex Court in Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand

and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020, decided on 05.11.2020,

wherein it has been held that the key ingredient of the offence

under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is insult or intimidation in any

place within public view. The Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of

of earlier decision in Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State though

Standing Counsel and Ors., (2008)8 SCC 435, has held that if an

offence is committed outside the building or in a lawn outside a

house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or

lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be

24 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is

made inside a building, but some members of the public are

there, not merely relatives or friends, then it would not be an

offence since it is not in the public view. In the afore case

before Hon’ble Apex Court, the allegations of abusing the

informant were within the four walls of her building and the

informant nowhere stated that there was any member of public

present at the time of incident, rather in that case the alleged

incident was seen by the family members. Hence, the Hon’ble

Apex Court has held that since the alleged incident had taken

place within the four walls of the building, as such it cannot be

said to be a “place within public view”. In the instant case none

was present at the place of incident though the alleged incident

took place at a public place which can also be said to be within

public view but none other than the accused and the

complainant had the occasion to see the alleged incident.

22. In afore case the Hon’ble Apex Court further held

that offence must have been committed against the person on

the ground that such persons is a member of a Scheduled Caste

or a Scheduled Tribe. Though, in the instant case there is no

dispute that the complainant belongs to scheduled caste

25 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

category but there is no evidence to show that the offence was

committed only on the ground that the complainant was a

member of scheduled caste, therefore, the case under Section 3

(1)(s), (2)(va) of the Act is not sustainable. Most importantly, in

the afore judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court it has been held

that the offence under Act is not established merely on the fact

that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there

is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or

Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such

caste. Though, in the instant case, as per the own statement of

complainant no person was there on the spot to witness the

incident but if the supplementary statement of the complainant

recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. is perused, he made a

specific averment that he had past rivalry with one of co-

accused Ishwar Thakur on account of gram panchayat elections.

The relevant paras No.15 to 23 of Hitesh Verma’s case (supra)

read as under:-

“15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the

informant were within the four walls of her building. It is

not the case of the informant that there was any member

of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time

of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic

26 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place

within public view” is not made out. In the list of

witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain

witnesses are named but it could not be said that those

were the persons present within the four walls of the

building. The offence is alleged to have taken place

within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view

of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot

be said to be a place within public view as none was said

to be present within the four walls of the building as per

the FIR and/or charge-sheet.

16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land

which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the

parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute,

appellant and others were not permitting respondent

No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since

the matter is regarding possession of property pending

before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of

possession of the said property would not disclose an

offence under the Act unless the victim is abused,

intimated or harassed only for the reason that she

belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

17.In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v.

State of Madhya Pradesh,2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104  this

Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)

(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to

Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced

punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to

suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant

only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste.

The Court held as under:

27 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

“15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must

be such so as to attract the offence under Section

3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been

committed against the person on the ground that

such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and

Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that

the deceased was belonging to “Khangar”-

Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no

evidence to show that the offence was committed

only on the ground that the victim was a member of

the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction

of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”

18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established

merely on the fact that the informant is a member of

Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate

a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the

reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the

present case, the parties are litigating over possession of

the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a

person who claims title over the property. If such person

happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence

under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.

19. This Court in a judgment reported as Dr. Subhash

Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(2018)

6 SCC 454 issued certain directions in respect of

investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In

a review filed by the Union against the said judgment,

this Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v.

State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(2020) 4 SCC 761 reviewed

28 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

the directions issued by this Court and held that if there

is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, the proceedings under

Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as

under:

“52. There is no presumption that the members of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may

misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not

resorted to by the members of the upper castes or

the members of the elite class. For lodging a false

report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person

is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not

due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to

such an act. On the other hand, members of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to

backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge

even a first information report, much less, a false

one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated,

it may be due to the faulty investigation or for

other various reasons including human failings

irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain

cases which may be false that can be a ground for

interference by the Court, but the law cannot be

changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it

can be taken care of in proceeding under Section

482 CrPC.”

20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the

provisions of the Amending Act (Central Act No. 27 of

2018), this Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj

Chauhan v. Union of India & Ors.,(2020) 4 SCC 727 held

that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the

Code. It was held as under:

29 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

“12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise

power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the

cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled

parameters, as already observed while deciding

the review petitions. The legal position is clear,

and no argument to the contrary has been

raised.”

21. In Gerige Pentaiah, one of the arguments raised was

non-disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts

were almost similar as there was civil dispute between

parties pending and the allegation was that the accused

has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim.

The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this

Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale as it was not a case

about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused

was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the

FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the

proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused

was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence

under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an

appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court,

this Court held that this will be the matter of

investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to

or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the

quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench

judgment.

22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-

sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make

out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely

because respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the

30 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

property dispute was not on account of the fact that

respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property

disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a

person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under

the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the

victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding

that the appellant was aware of the caste of the

informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge

does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a

procedure established by law.

23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap

Singh & Ors.v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2018) 13 SCC

612 held that there is no prohibition under the law for

quashing the charge-sheet in part. In a petition filed

under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is required

to examine as to whether its intervention is required for

prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice. The Court held as under:

“9. Having regard to the settled legal position on

external interference in investigation and the

specific facts of this case, we are of the view that

the High Court ought to have exercised its

jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to secure the

ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law

for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person

may be accused of several offences under

different penal statutes, as in the instant case. He

could be aggrieved of prosecution only on a

particular charge or charges, on any ground

available to him in law. Under Section 482, all

that the High Court is required to examine is

31 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

whether its intervention is required for

implementing orders under the  Criminal

Procedure Code or for prevention of abuse of

process, or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice. A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of

somebody other than the police would amount to

abuse of the process of law and hence the High

Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers

under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse.

There is no requirement that the charge-sheet

has to be quashed as a whole and not in part.

Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The

supplementary report filed by the police, at the

direction of the Commission, is quashed.”

23. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Konde

Nageshwar Rao vs. A. Srirama Chandra Murty and Ors., Criminal

Appeal No. 555 of 2018, decided on 23.07.2025, held that merely

because the complainant belongs to the Scheduled Caste or

Scheduled Tribe cannot be sole ground for prosecution. The

offences alleged must have been committed solely on the basis

of the victim’s caste status. Misuse of the statute to settle

personal scores or to harass individuals cannot be permitted if it

is apparent. Most importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

held that the prosecution needs to be quashed at an early stage

to prevent undue harassment of the accused where there is clear

legal infirmity in the prosecution case, such as the allegations,

32 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

even if taken at their face value, do not disclose an offence or the

entire case is a bad faith exercise weaponized to settle personal

scores, rather than seeking justice. The relevant paragraphs No.

22 to 24 of the aforesaid judgment read as under:-

“22. Perusal of the complaint would also indicate that

the grievance was not really relatable to the false and

malicious involvement in the criminal proceedings

against the Appellant and his family members because of

them belonging to Scheduled Caste. The very intent being

absent, the offences for which the prosecution has been

launched are not made out. That apart, merely because a

number of cases and various litigations are pending

between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2, in itself

cannot be a ground for presuming that the prosecution

initiated against the appellant was at the behest of and

with a false and malicious intent, by now deceased

Respondent No. 1. For attracting the offences, as alleged

to have been committed by the private respondents,

specific instances and incidents supported by evidence

are required to be present, which is missing in this case.

23. In Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of

Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 5571, this Court has

emphasized that merely because the complainant belongs

to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes cannot be the

sole ground for prosecution. The offences alleged must

have been committed solely on the basis of the victim’s

caste status. Misuse of the statute to settle personal

scores or to harass individuals cannot be permitted if it is

apparent. The Court should in such situation be not

hesitant to step in and stop the said misuse. Prosecution

33 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

needs to be quashed at an early stage to prevent undue

harassment of the accused where there is clear legal

infirmity in the prosecution case, such as the allegations,

even if taken at their face value, do not disclose an offence

or the entire case is a bad faith exercise weaponized to

settle personal scores, rather than seeking justice

(Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and others, (2013) 9 SCC

245 ’).

24. This court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v.

State of Maharashtra and another, (2018) 6 SCC 454 had

also observed that there has been an alarming increase in

false complaints under the SC/ST Act, particularly against

public servants and judicial officers with an oblique

motive to settle personal scores or to harass individuals.

Such acts cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and need to

be stopped at the very outset so that there is no

miscarriage of justice.”

24. True it is that the complainant cannot be expected to

disclose each and every fact at the time of his recording FIR and

as such the police at the time of preparing or presenting the

challan under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is permitted to take note

of the supplementary statement, if any, recorded under Section

161 of the Cr.P.C. of the complainant as well as of the other

witnesses, who had the occasion to see the alleged incident or

had the knowledge of the same. However, in the instant case the

very omission on the part of the complainant to lodge the

complaint with regard to his having been humiliated or insulted

34 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

on account of his being from Scheduled Caste category coupled

with the fact that the allegations with regard of casteist remarks

allegedly made by the accused were reported on the next day of

the lodging of the FIR certainly compels this Court to draw an

inference that an attempt has been made by the complainant to

misuse the provisions of the Act on account of his being a

member of Scheduled Caste category. Otherwise also for the

detailed discussion made above, no case is made out against the

accused named in the FIR under Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va) of the

Act.

25. Though, at this stage, Mr. R.L. Verma, learned

counsel representing the complainant made an attempt to argue

that at the time of framing of charge the court cannot sift entire

evidence but he was unable to dispute that at the time of

framing of charge the court concerned is required to sift/peruse

the material adduced on record along with final report for

inferring prima facie case, if any. For inferring a prima facie

case, the court concerned is expected to arrive at a conclusion

that the basic ingredients of sections with which the accused are

proposed to be charged are met. As such, at the time of framing

of charge in a criminal case, the Court concerned after going

35 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

through the material on record can also proceed to discharge the

accused in case it comes to the conclusion that no prima facie

case is made out against the accused named in the FIR. Since,

the consequence of framing of charge is serious because in that

situation the accused may have to face the ordeal of protracted

trial, the court concerned while framing charge is expected to

apply its mind to ascertain that the material adduced on record

to bring home the guilt of accused is sufficient to frame charge.

26. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Anand Rai vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., Special Leave Petition (Criminal)

No. 10711 of 2025, decided on 10.02.2026 has held as under:-

“19. A different discipline governs cases arising at the

stage of discharge, framing of charge, or prima facie

satisfaction. The Court has consistently held that at this

stage the Court is not concerned with proof of guilt or

the sufficiency of evidence for conviction. In State of

Bihar v. Ramesh Singh(1977) 4 SCC 39 and later in Union

of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4 , the

Court clarified that the test is whether the material on

record, taken at face value, discloses the essential

ingredients of the alleged offence and gives rise to a

strong or grave suspicion against the accused. The Court

is expressly cautioned against conducting a roving

inquiry or weighing the evidence as if at trial. When

these generally applicable principles are applied to an

appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act arising from

36 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

a threshold order, the High Court’s role, though

appellate in nature, stands circumscribed by the limits

governing discharge. The High Court may examine

whether the allegations disclose the basic statutory

ingredients of the offence under the Act, including

whether the alleged act was committed on account of

the victim’s caste and whether other foundational

requirements are satisfied. Where these ingredients are

conspicuously absent, interference is justified, as

continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse

of the process of law. This form of scrutiny does not

amount to appreciation of the material but is an exercise

in legal evaluation of the allegations as they

stand……………...”

27. After having gone through the entire material

adduced on record along with the final report filed under Section

173 of the Cr.P.C., before the Court below, this Court is fully

convinced that no case is made out under Section 307 of the IPC

and Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the

accused, as such this Court, while exercising its revisional

jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., can interefere to

prevent the abuse of process of law or miscarriage of justice.

Further this Court, is of the view that the material adduced on

record along with final report suggests prima facie case under

Sections 325 and 341 of the IPC against the accused named in the

37 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )

FIR and as such they are only required to be charged with the

aforesaid provisions of law.

28. Consequently the instant petition is allowed. Order

dated 7.1.2025 passed by learned Special Judge, Solan is set

aside. Accused shall be discharged from commission of offence

punishable under Section 307 IPC and S. 3(1)(s), (2)(va) of the

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act. However, since this court has already observed

that case under Section 325 and 341 read with Section 34 of the

IPC is made out for framing of charge, learned Special Judge,

Solan is directed to assign/transfer the case to the court of

competent jurisdiction, for proceeding further, in accordance

with law.

(Sandeep Sharma)

Judge

31

st

March, 2026

(jai)