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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.445 OF 2016

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.3821 of 2010)

J.RAMESH KAMATH & ORS. .......APPELLANTS

VERSUS

MOHANA KURUP & ORS. .......RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Respondents nos.4 to 7 herein describing themselves as

members of the All Kerala Chemists and Druggists Association

(hereinafter referred to as `the Association’), filed a written

complaint to the City Police Commissioner, Ernakulam against

respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent No.1 – Mohana Kurup was the

President of the Association during the relevant period from 2004

to 2006 and thereafter from 2006 to 2008. Respondent No.2 –

Raveendran was the Secretary of the Association during the same

period, and respondent no.3 – Sayed was the Treasurer of the

Association during the relevant period. It was alleged in the

complaint filed by respondent nos.4 to 7, that respondent nos.1 to

3, in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, and with common

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intention, misappropriated huge amounts of funds of `the

Association', by misusing their position as office bearers of `the

Association'. On the basis of the complaint preferred by respondent

nos.4 to 7, First Information Report bearing Crime No.675/2008 was

registered at Central Police Station, Ernakulam.

3. Appellant No.2 in the present appeal – Giri Nair (also

claiming to be an active member of the Association), likewise filed

a complaint before the City Police Commissioner, Ernakulam, making

similar allegations against respondent nos.1 to 3.

4. The police filed a final report before the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Ernakulam, on 22.03.2009, based on an affirmation

during investigation, for offences under Sections 406, 408, 409,

477A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Needless to mention, that

the aforesaid chargesheet was based on the complaint addressed by

respondents nos.4 to 7 on 09.04.2008, and not the complaint made by

the appellants before this Court.

5. Dissatisfied with the initiation of action against them,

respondent nos.1 to 3 filed Criminal M.C.No.4154 of 2009 before the

High Court of Kerala (hereinafter referred to as `the High Court’)

under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for

quashing of the final report (filed by the police in C.C.No.90 of

2009, on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam

arising out of Crime No.675/2008). The case projected by respondent

nos.1 to 3 before the High Court was, that the allegations

contained in the complaint dated 09.04.2008 were in the nature of a

private dispute, and was of a purely personal nature, without any

involvement of public policy, and as such, the matter could be

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settled between the parties through an amicable settlement. And

that, it had been so settled.

6. Along with the aforesaid Criminal M.C.No.4154 of 2009,

respondent nos.1 to 9 filed a joint petition seeking compounding

under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code. At this juncture,

it would be relevant to mention, that respondent nos.4 to 7 were

the original complainants on whose complaint, the case came to be

registered against respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent nos.8 and 9

herein, were the General Secretary and Treasurer of `the

Association', at the time when Criminal M.C.No.4154/2009 was filed.

7. According to the assertions made before this Court, the

High Court was informed, that the matter had been settled between

the parties, and that, no useful purpose would be served in

continuing the prosecution. The High Court, in the above view of

the matter, passed the impugned order dated 22.12.2009, whereby,

proceedings in CC No.90/2009, pending before the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Ernakulam, were quashed. Paragraph 2 of the impugned

order is extracted herein:-

“2. A compounding petition is filed jointly by the

petitioners and respondents 1 to 6 stating that

entire disputes were settled with the petitioners,

who were the former office bearers and respondents 1

to 4, the complainants and respondents 5 and 6, the

present office bearers and respondents 1 to 4 admit

that there was no misappropriation of the amounts of

AKCDA as alleged and respondents 5 and 6 agreed the

same. In view of the settlement, it is contended

that they may be permitted to compound the

offences.”

(emphasis is ours)

A perusal of paragraph 2 extracted above, reveals, that the

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complainants (namely, respondent nos. 4 to 7 herein) and the

accused (namely, respondent nos.1 to 3 herein) had admitted, that

there was no misappropriation of the amounts of the Association,

and respondents nos.8 and 9 herein, who were the General Secretary

and Treasurer (were impleaded in the joint petition as respondent

Nos.5 and 6) endorsed the above position.

8. Paragraph 5 of the impugned order, is also being

extracted hereunder:

“5. Prosecution case as against the petitioners is that

they committed the offences as against AKCDA and its

members. The allegation is that they opened two separate

accounts and converted the cheques and demand drafts

received in the name of AKCDA to their personal accounts

and thereby misappropriated the amounts. The offences

alleged are purely personal in nature as against the

Association, represented by respondents 5 and 6 . The

case was investigated on the complaint filed by

respondents 1 to 4. When compounding petition filed by

the petitioners along with respondents 1 to 6

establishes that there has been a complete settlement of

the disputes and the offences alleged are purely

personal in nature , as held by the Apex court in Madan

Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab (2008 (3) KLT 19) it is

not in the interest of justice to continue the

prosecution. In the light of the settlement and the

joint petition filed, even if petitioners are to be

tried, there is no likelihood of a successful

prosecution. In such circumstances, it is not in the

interest of justice to continue the prosecution.

Petition is allowed. C.C.No.90/2009 on the file of Chief

Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Ernakulam is quashed.”

(emphasis is ours)

A perusal of paragraph 5 of the impugned order reveals, that the

acknowledged position between the parties (the accused, the

complainants, and the office bearers of `the Association') which

was projected before the High Court was, that the offences alleged

in the complaint were purely personal in nature.

9. Premised on the acknowledged admitted position, that

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there was no misappropriation, as well as, the fact that the

offences alleged in the complaint were purely personal in nature,

the High Court agreed with the settlement between the parties, and

quashed the proceedings in CC No.90/2009.

10. It is also imperative for us to notice, that in the

compounding petition, which was filed by respondent nos.1 to 3

herein (the accused), as petitioners impleaded respondents nos.4 to

7 herein (the complainants), and respondent nos.8 and 9 (the then

General Secretary and Treasurer of `the Association') herein. A

clear and categorical stance was adopted in the compounding

petition, that there was no misappropriation of the funds of the

Association, and that, not only the complainants, but also

respondent nos.8 and 9 herein, namely, the General Secretary and

the Treasurer of the Association, confirmed the above position.

11. The first contention advanced at the hands of the learned

counsel for the appellants was, that the respondents-accused have

been charged of offences under Sections 406, 408, 409, 477A and

120B of the Indian Penal Code. It was the pointed contention of the

learned counsel for the appellants, that most of the provisions

under which the accused-respondents had been charged, were

non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

And as such, the matter could not have been compounded.

12. Whilst it is not disputed at the hands of the learned

counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2, that most of the offences under

which the accused were charged are non-compoundable, yet it was

asserted, that the jurisdiction invoked by the High Court in

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quashing the criminal proceedings against respondent nos.1 to 3,

was not under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but was

under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as interpreted by

this Court.

13. Insofar as the decisions of this Court are concerned,

reference, in the first instance, was made to Madan Mohan Abbot v.

State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, wherefrom, our attention was

invited to the following observations:

“5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the

application was filed in the High Court for quashing

of proceedings which has been dismissed by the

impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR

and the other documents on record that the dispute

was purely a personal one between two contesting

parties and that it arose out of extensive business

dealings between them and that there was absolutely

no public policy involved in the nature of the

allegations made against the accused. We are,

therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose

would be served in continuing with the proceedings in

the light of the compromise and also in the light of

the fact that the complainant has on 11-1-2004,

passed away and the possibility of a conviction being

recorded has thus to be ruled out.

6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps

advisable that in disputes where the question

involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court

should ordinarily accept the terms of the

compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping

the matter alive with no possibility of a result in

favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the

courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot

afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in

deciding more effective and meaningful litigation.

This is a common sense approach to the matter based

on ground of realities and bereft of the

technicalities of the law.”

(emphasis is ours)

A perusal of the conclusions extracted above, with a reading of the

FIR and the supporting documents in the above case reveal, that the

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dispute was purely of a personal nature, between two contesting

parties. Further that, the dispute arose out of private business

dealings between two private parties. And furthermore, there was

absolutely no public involvement, in the allegations made against

the accused. Based on the aforesaid considerations, this Court had

held, that in disputes where the question involved was of a purely

personal nature, it was appropriate for Courts to accept the terms

of compromise, even in criminal proceedings. It was sought to be

explained, that in such matters, keeping the matters alive would

not result, in favour of the prosecution. We are of the view, that

the reliance on the above judgment would have been justified, if

the inferences drawn by the High Court were correct, namely, that

admittedly there was no misappropriation of the funds of the

Association, and secondly, the offences alleged were purely

personal in nature. We shall examine that, at a later stage.

14. Having placed reliance on the judgment in the Madan Mohan

Abbot case (supra), which was determined by a two-Judge Division

Bench of this Court, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 to 3 went

on to place reliance on Gian Singh vs. State of Punajb (2012) 10

SCC 303, which was decided by a three-Judge Division Bench.

Insofar as the instant judgment is concerned, learned counsel for

respondent Nos.1 to 3, in the first instance, invited this Court's

attention to paragraph 37 thereof, wherein the earlier decision

rendered by this Court in the Madan Mohan Abbot case, was duly

noticed. Thereupon, the Bench recorded its conclusion as under:

“59. B.S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675, Nikhil Merchant

(2008) 9 SCC 677, Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 and

Shiji (2011) 10 SCC 705 do illustrate the principle

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that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or

FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power

under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not

limit or affect the powers of the High court under

Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal

proceedings in B. S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj

Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the

non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think

so. There does exist the distinction between

compounding of an offence under Section 320 and

quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in

exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two

powers are distinct and different although the

ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of

the accused or dismissal of indictment .

60. We find no incongruity in the above principle

of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia

(1990) 2 SCC 437, Dharampal (1993) 1 SCC 435, Arun

Shankar Shukla (1999) 6 SCC 146, Ishwar Singh (2008)

15 SCC 667, Rumi Dhar (2009) 6 SCC 364 and Ashok

Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321. The principle

propounded in Simrikhia that the inherent jurisdiction

of the High Court cannot be invoked to override

express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In

Dharampal the Court observed the same thing that the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot

be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly

barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made

in Arun Shankar Shukla. In Ishwaqr Singh the accused

was alleged to have committed an offence punishable

under Section 307 IPC and with reference to Section

320 of the Code, it was held that the offence

punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable

offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that

no offence shall be compounded if it is not

compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar although

the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the

settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery

before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was

being proceeded with for the commission of the

offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471 IPC

along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted

under Section 13(2) read with 13 (1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to

quash the charge against the accused by holding that

the Court would not quash a case involving a crime

against the society when a prima facie case has been

made out against the accused for framing the charge.

Ashok Sadarangani was again a case where the accused

persons were charged of having committed the

offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471,

IPC and the allegations were that the accused

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secured the credit facilities by submitting forged

property documents as collaterals and utilised such

facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by

opening letters of credit in respect of foreign

supplies of goods, without actually bringing any

goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the

letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and

also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court

was alive to the reference made in one of the

present matters and also the decisions in B.S.Joshi,

Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma and it was held

that B.S.Joshi, and Nikhil Merchant dealt with

different factual situation as the dispute involved

had overtures of a civil dispute but the case

under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani was more on

the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The

decision in Ashok Sadarangani supports the view that

the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil

dispute stand on a different footing.

61. The position that emerges from the above

discussion can be summarised thus: the power of

the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding

or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent

jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power

given to a criminal court for compounding the

offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent

power is of wide plenitude with no statutory

limitation but it has to be exercised in accord

with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to

secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse

of the process of any Court. In what cases power to

quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R

may be exercised where the offender and the victim

have settled their dispute would depend on the facts

and circumstances of each case and no category can

be prescribed. However, before exercise of such

power, the High Court must have due regard to the

nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious

offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,

rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even

though the victim or victim’s family and the

offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are

not private in nature and have serious impact on

society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim

and the offender in relation to the offences under

special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act

or the offences committed by public servants while

working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for

any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving

such offences. But the criminal cases having

overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour

stand on a different footing for the purposes of

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quashing, particularly the offences arising from

commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership

or such like transactions or the offences arising out

of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family

disputes where the wrong is basically private or

personal in nature and the parties have resolved

their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the

High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its

view, because of the compromise between the offender

and the victim, the possibility of conviction is

remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal

case would put the accused to great oppression

and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused

to him by not quashing the criminal case despite

full and complete settlement and compromise with

the victim. In other words, the High Court must

consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to

the interest of justice to continue with the

criminal proceeding or continuation of the

criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of

process of law despite settlement and compromise

between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to

secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that

the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer

to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the

High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to

quash the criminal proceeding.”

(emphasis is ours)

15. A perusal of the above determination, leaves no room for

any doubt, that this Court crystalised the position in respect of

the powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the

Criminal Procedure Code, to quash criminal proceedings. It has now

been decisively held, that the power vested in the High Court under

Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is not limited to

quashing proceedings within the ambit and scope of Section 320 of

the Criminal Procedure Code. The three-Judge Division Bench in the

above case, clearly expounded, that quashing of criminal

proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, could

also be based on settlements between private parties, and could

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also on a compromise between the offender and the victim. Only

that, the above power did not extend to crimes against the society.

It is also relevant to mention, that the jurisdiction vested in the

High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for

quashing criminal proceedings, was held to be exercisable in

criminal cases having an overwhelming and predominatingly civil

flavour, particularly offences arising from commercial, financial,

mercantile, civil, partnership, or such like transactions. Or even

offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. Or family

disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal. In all

such cases, the parties should have resolved their entire dispute

by themselves, mutually.

16. The question which emerges for our consideration is,

whether the allegations levelled in the complaint against

respondent nos.1 to 3, would fall within the purview of the High

Court, so as to enable it to quash the same, in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

17. We shall now venture to determine the above issue. A

perusal of the complaint on the basis of which criminal prosecution

came to be initiated against respondent nos.1 to 3 reveals, that

the accused persons were described as office bearers of `the

Association', during the period from 2004 to 2008. During the

course of hearing, it was not disputed, that at the relevant time,

respondent no.1 – Mohana Kurup was the President of `the

Association'; respondent no.2 – Raveendran was the Secretary of

`the Association'; and respondent no.3 – Sayed was the Treasurer of

the Association. It was alleged, that during their tenure, as

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office bearers of the State Committee of `the Association', they

had exclusive access to the funds of `the Association'. They, at

their own, managed the funds, for and on behalf of `the

Association'. Consequent upon their resignation in 2008, when an

ad hoc Committee took up charge of the State Committee, it

discovered serious misappropriation of funds of the State

Committee, which were in the name of the State Committee, and were

not accounted for. Even the account books maintained by the State

Committee, made no reference to the receipt of such amounts. A

specific reference was made to M/s Micro Labs Ltd., Bangalore,

which paid a sum of Rs.19,00,000/- two demand drafts being

D.D.No.718573 and D.D.No.718574 in the sum of Rs.9,50,000/- each,

drawn on the Canara Bank, both dated 17.04.2007. It was also

asserted in the complaint, that `the Association' issued two

receipts dated 30.04.2007 and 15.05.2007 in acknowledgement of the

receipt of the said amounts. It was alleged, that the said amount

was never incorporated in the account books of `the Association'.

It was also alleged, that respondent nos.1 to 3 dishonestly

misappropriated the said amount to themselves, in violation of

bye-laws and other regulations/directions of the State Committee,

by creating false and fictitious accounts, by altering, destroying

and mutilating the original accounts of the State Committee, with a

willful intention to obtain illegal financial gains, and to defraud

the State Committee. It is also relevant to mention, that

consequent upon completion of investigation, the chargesheet dated

22.03.2009, filed against respondent nos.1 to 3, stated thus:-

“The accused persons being the office bearers of the

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State Committee, All Kerala Chemists & Druggists

Association, in furtherance of their common intention

to obtain illegal financial gain conspired conjointly

and cheated the Association and its members by

misappropriating the funds given by various drug

companies to AKCDA functioning near South Railway

Station, Ernakulam during the period from 17.04.2007

to 11.04.2008. The Demand Drafts and Cheques received

were not credited in the account of AKCDA. The

accused falsified the accounts of AKCDA and

unauthorisedly opened accounts in South Malabar

Gramin Bank, Palakkad Branch and ICICI Bank,

Edappally Branch and credited the amounts in the said

accounts. The DD's and cheques received were

encashed in the aforesaid accounts on various dates

and an amount of Rs.80,00,000/- was diverted for

their own use. The accused thereby cheated the

members and the association and committed criminal

breach of trust. The accused also committed the

offence alleged.”

(emphasis is ours)

18. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied that

the allegations levelled against respondent nos.1 to 3 were of a

nature, which could not be treated as purely of a personal nature.

We are also astonished, that the complainants, who are arrayed in

the present appeal as respondent nos.4 to 7 affirmed (in the

compounding petition) that “no misappropriation of the amounts of

All Kerala Chemists and Druggists Association is committed by the

petitioners/accused persons”. We are also amazed, that respondent

nos.8 and 9 herein, who were the General Secretary and the

Treasurer respectively of the Association, at the time of filing of

the compounding petition, confirmed the stand adopted by the

complainants, in the compounding petition. The accusations levelled

against respondent nos.1 to 3, in our considered view, do not

pertain to a dispute which can be described as purely of a personal

nature. It is also not possible for us to acknowledge the position

adopted by the complainants, and the then members of the

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Association, that no misappropriation had been committed by the

accused. We cannot appreciate how such a statement could have been

made after the investigation had been completed, and charges were

framed, which were pending trial before a court of competent

jurisdiction.

19. We are of the view, that the basis on which the impugned

order was passed, was incorrectly determined as of a personal

nature. Additionally, the accusations were not of a nature which

can be classified by this Court, as were amenable to be quashed,

under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

20. To be fair to the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1

to 3, we may also refer to Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab,

(2014) 6 SCC 466, wherein one of the offences for which the accused

was proceeded against was under Section 307 of the Indian Penal

Code. It was submitted, that even for such criminal offences, a

Court of competent jurisdiction, under Section 482 of the Criminal

Procedure Code, could quash the criminal proceedings. Reference in

this behalf was made to the conclusions drawn by this Court in

paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7, which are extracted hereunder:

“29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the

category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are

to be generally treated as crime against the society and

not against the individual alone. However, the High Court

would not rest its decision merely because there is a

mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is

framed under this provision. It would be open to the High

Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section

307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead

to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this

purpose, it would be open to the High court to go by the

nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is

inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body,

nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of

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injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the

guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie

analysis, the High court can examine as to whether there

is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of

conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it

can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal

proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be

permissible for the High Court to accept the plea

compounding the offence based on complete settlement

between the parties. At this stage, the court can also be

swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties

is going to result in harmony between them which may

improve their future relationship.

29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under

Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play

a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is

arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of

offence and the matter is still under investigation, the

High court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to

quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is

because of the reason that at this stage the investigation

is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.

Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the

evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at

infancy stage, the High court can show benevolence in

exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie

assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.

On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is

almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence

the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High

Court should refrain from exercising its power under

Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court

would be in a position to decide the case finally on

merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the

offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already

recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the

appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise

between the parties would not be a ground to accept the

same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has

already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is

proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already

recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no

question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a

crime.”

(emphasis is ours)

21.It is not possible for us to accept the submissions advanced

at the hands of the learned counsel for respondent nos.1 to 3, on

the basis of the observations extracted hereinabove. In the above

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judgment, this Court was of the view, that it would be open to the

High Court to examine, as to whether there was material to

substantiate the charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code,

and also, to determine whether the prosecution had collected

sufficient evidence to substantiate the said charge. And in case

sufficient evidence to sustain the charges did not emerge, it would

be open to the High Court to quash the proceedings. We are of the

view, that the instant judgment had no relevance, to the facts and

circumstances of this case. Herein, the investigation has been

completed, and the final report was filed before the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Ernakulam, on 22.03.2009. More than 6 years have gone

by since then. It is not the case of the accused, that the final

report does not contain adequate material to substantiate the

charges. J.Ramesh Kamath, appellant no.1 herein, has been cited as

charge witness no.5; Giri Nair- appellant No.2 herein, has been

cited as charge witness no.6; and Antony Tharian – appellant no.3

herein, has been cited as charge witness no.18. It is their

contention, that the charges are clearly made out on the basis of

documentary evidence. We would say no more. But that, the

inferences are those of the appellants, and not ours. The eventual

outcome would emerge from the evidence produced before the trial

court.

22. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we allow the appeal

and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. CC

No.90 of 2009 is accordingly restored on the file of the Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. We direct the trial court to

proceed further with the matter, in accordance with law.

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23. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we

cannot endorse or appreciate the stand adopted by respondent Nos.4

to 9. We accordingly direct further investigation in this matter,

pertaining to the role of respondent nos.4 to 9, and direct

initiation of proceedings against them, if made out, in accordance

with law.

..........................J.

(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

..........................J.

(C.NAGAPPAN)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 04, 2016.

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