As per case facts, Jagdish Narain, his sons, and two friends were accused of rioting and murdering Jagdish Narain's step-brother. The trial court acquitted them, but the High Court reversed ...
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PETITIONER:
JAGDISH NARAIN & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF U.P.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/1996
BENCH:
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
BENCH:
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
ANAND, A.S. (J)
CITATION:
JT 1996 (3) 89 1996 SCALE (2)650
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
M.K. MUKHERJEE,J.
Jagdish Narain, the appellant No.1, alongwith his two
sons Avdhesh and Avinash and two friends Rameshwar Dayal,
the appellant No.2, and Surya Prakash was tried by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit, for rioting and murder
of his step brother Jitendra Nath. The trial ended in an
acquittal; and aggrieved thereby the State preferred an
appeal. During the pendency of the appeal Avdesh and Surya
prakash died and consequently their appeal abated. As
regards others, the High Court affirmed the acquittal of
Avinash but reversed that of the two appellants (the
respondents therein) and convicted and sentenced them under
Sections 148 and 302, read with Section 149 IPC. The above
order of conviction and sentence is under challenge in this
appeal preferred under Section 379 Cr.P.C.
Shorn of details the prosecution case is that on
February 11, 1977 the deceased, his son Achal Kumar (P.W.1)
and his servant Devi Ram (P.W.2) were carrying sugarcane in
a bullock-cart from their village Mar to a mill in Bilsanda
for getting the same weighed. While P.Ws. 1 and 2 were in
the bullock cart with the latter driving it, the deceased
was following the cart on foot. At or about 2 P.M. when the
cart had, after crossing a culvert situated on the kachha
road, reached near the field of one Ram Autar, the five
accused persons came out from behind a heap of straws armed
with deadly weapons including guns. Then the appellant No.1
fired a shot at Jitendra Nath felling him down. The gun
which the deceased was carrying also fell down. On the
exhortation of Avinash and Avdesh, the appellant No.2 also
fired a shot hitting Jitendra Nath. Thereafter the
miscreants fled away alongwith the gun of the deceased.
Achal Kumar (P.W.1) then rushed to Bilsanda Police
Station, which was at a distance of one mile, and lodged an
information about the incident. On that information a case
was registered against the accused persons and Inspector
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D.R. Thapalyal (P.W.6) took up investigation. He went to the
scene of occurrence accompanied by other police personnel
and after holding inquest upon the dead body sent it for
post-mortem examination. He prepared a site plan and seized
some blood stained earth, two pellets and one pair of shoes
from the site. On completion of investigation he submitted
chargesheet against the accused persons and in due course
the case was committed to the Court of Session.
The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges
levelled against them and their defence was that they had
been falsely implicated.
To sustain the charges levelled against the accused
persons the prosecution relied upon the ocular accounts of
Achal Kumar (P.W.1) and Devi Ram (P.W.2), who were allegedly
in the cart, and Daya Ram (P.W.3) who claimed that he was
passing along the road at the material time. Besides, the
prosecution examined the doctor, who held post-mortem
examination upon the deceased, the Investigating Officer and
some other formal witnesses. The reasons which weighed with
the trial Court to disbelieve the evidence of the eye
witnesses and, for that matter the prosecution case, are as
under:
i) The testimonies of the eye witnesses stood contradicted
by their earlier statements recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C.;
ii) Though, according to the eye witnesses, the deceased
was attacked while going along the sait (road) his dead body
was found in the field (of Ram Autar) and no explanation was
offered by the prosecution to reconcile the anomaly;
iii) Even though the Investigating Officer admitted that he
knew from the very beginning about the importance of the
place from where the shots were fired he did not indicate
that place in the site plan he prepared and such failure
made the investigation faulty and suspicious;
iv) No attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to
ascertain to whom the pair of shoes found near the dead body
belonged; and
v) A number of documents were filed on behalf of the
accused persons to show that the deceased had enmity with
other persons also and, therefore, it could not be said that
they were the only persons who were likely to commit the
murder of Jitendra Nath, more so when he was armed with a
gun.
In reversing the order of acquittal and passing the
impugned order the High Court first reappraised the evidence
in the light of the above findings and demonstrated that
each of them was perverse. It then considered the evidence
of the three eye witnesses to ascertain whether it could be
safely relied upon to base a conviction. On such
consideration the High Court found that PWs 1 and 2 were the
most probable and natural witnesses and that their evidence
was credit worthy. The High Court, however, left the
evidence of PW 3 out of consideration as, according to it,
he was not an independent witness. The High Court further
found that the evidence of P.W.1 stood fully corroborated by
the PIR which was lodged within half an hour of the incident
and that the evidence of both P.Ws. 1 and 2 stood
corroborated by the medical evidence.
This being a statutory appeal we have, for ourselves,
carefully perused the evidence adduced by the prosecution
(no evidence was led by the defence) particularly that of
P.W.1 and 2 keeping in view the judgments of the learned
Courts below; and we are constrained to say that none of the
grounds canvassed by the trial Court to acquit the
appellants can be sustained. The contradictions which
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persuaded the trial Court to disbelieve the eye witnesses
related to their omissions to make certain statements before
the Investigating Officer, which they made before the Court.
On perusal thereof we find that the omissions were so minor
and insignificant that they did not amount to contradictions
at all. To eschew prolixity of this judgment we, however,
refrain from detailing them except referring to one, to
illustrate the entirely wrong approach of the trial Court in
this regard. PW 2 testified that while driving the cart he
was sitting on the bundles of the sugarcane but in his
statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. he did not
state that he was so seated. Indeed, it is only for this
minor omission that the trial Court found the evidence of PW
2 wholly unreliable.
As regards the comment of the trial Court that the
prosecution made no attempt to dispel the anomaly about the
place where the deceased was attacked and his dead body was
found, we are in complete agreement with the observations of
the High Court that the above comment was the outcome of non
consideration of the evidence. P.W.1 testified that while
the cart was proceeding on the kacha road and it had reached
the place where the road turned towards the east, his father
moved on to the pagdandi, (hilly circuitous track) which
passes through the field of Ram Autar. According to the
evidence of P.W.6, which remained uncontroverted, the dead
body of Jitendra was found lying near the pagdandi and he
held inquest there. The evidence of the prosecution
witnesses thus clearly proves that Jitendra Nath met with
his death at the place where his dead body was Lying. The
finding of the trial Court in this regard must therefore be
said to be perverse.
In responding to the next criticism of the trial Court
regarding the failure of the Investigating Officer to
indicate in the site plan prepared by him the spot wherefrom
the shots were allegedly tired by the appellants and its
resultant effect upon the investigation itself, the High
Court observed that such failure did not detract from the
truthfulness of the eye witnesses and only amounted to an
omission on the part of the Investigating Officer. In our
opinion neither the criticism of the trial Court nor the
reason ascribed by the High Court in its rebuttal can be
legally sustained. While preparing a site plan an
Investigating Police Officer can certainly record what he
sees and observes, for that will be direct and substantive
evidence being based on his personal knowledge; but as, he
was not obviously present when the incident took place, he
has to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it
happened from persons who had seen the incident. When a
witness testifies about what he heard from somebody else it
is ordinarily not admissible in evidence being hearsay, but
if the person for whom he heard is examined to give direct
evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the Evidence
Act, the former's evidence would be admissible to
corroborate the latter in accordance with Section 157
Cr.P.C.. However such a statement made to a Police Officer,
when he is investigating into an offence in accordance with
Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used
to even corroborate the maker thereof in view of the embargo
in Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. appearing in that chapter and can
be used only to contradict him (the maker) in accordance
with the proviso thereof, except in those cases where sub-
section (2) of the section appeals. That necessarily means
that if in the site plan P.W.6 had even shown the place from
which the shots were allegedly fired after ascertaining the
same from the eye witnesses it could not have been admitted
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in evidence being hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. The law on this
subject has been succinctly laid down by a three Judge Bench
of this Court in Tori Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC
399. In that case it was contended on behalf of the
appellant therein that if one looked at the sketch map, on
which the place where the deceased was said to have been hit
was marked, and compared it with the statements of the
prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence, it would be
extremely improbable for the injury which was received by
the deceased to have been caused on that part of the body
where it had been actually caused if the deceased was at the
place marked on the map. In repelling the above contention
this Court observed, inter alia,:
"..........the mark on the sketrh-
map was put by the Sub-Inspector
who was obviously not an eye-
witness to the incident. He could
only have put it there after taking
the statements of the eye
witnesses. The marking of the spot
on the sketch-map is really
bringing on record the conclusion
of the Sub-Inspector on the basis
of the statements made by the
witnesses to him. This in our
opinion would not be admissible in
view of the provisions of S. 162 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, for
it is in effect nothing more than
the statement of the Sub-Inspector
that the eye-witnesses told him
that the deceased was at such and
such place at the time when he was
hit. The sketch-map would be
admissible so far as it indicates
all that the Sub-Inspector saw
himself at the spot; but any mark
put on the sketch-map based on the
statements made by the witnesses to
the Sub-Inspector would be
inadmissible in view of the clear
provisions of S.162 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure as it will be no
more than a statement made to the
police during investigation."
(emphasis supplied)
While on this point, it will be pertinent to mention that if
in a given case the site plan is prepared by a draftsman -
and not by the Investigating Officer - entries therein
regarding the place from where shots were fired or other
details derived from other witnesses would be admissible as
corroborative evidence as has been observed by this Court in
Tori Singh's case (supra) in the following passage:
"This Court had occasion to
consider the admissibility of a
plan drawn to scale by a draftsman
in which after ascertaining from
the witnesses where exactly the
assailants and the victims stood at
the time of the commission of
offence, the draftsman put down the
places in the map, in Santa Singh
v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC
526. It was held that such a plan
drawn to scale was admissible if
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the witnesses corroborated the
statements of the draftsman that
they showed him the places and
would not be hit by S.162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure."
(emphasis supplied)
The trial Court ought not to have also made much out of the
failure on the part of the Investigating Officer to find out
to whom the pair of shoes found near the dead body belonged
for the prosecution rested its case upon eye-witnesses and
not circumstantial evidence. If the prosecution intended to
prove the accusation levelled against the appellants by
circumstantial evidence, then proof of the circumstance that
the shoes belonged to one of them would certainly have been
incriminating but when the prosecution rested its case upon
the evidence of the eye witnesses that question was of no
such moment. In any event, the lacunae as pointed out by the
trial Court could not have in any way impaired the evidence
of the eye witnesses nor affected the prosecution case, as
rightly observed by the High Court.
The last reason given by the trial Court to disbelieve
the prosecution case in the context of the fact that the
deceased had enmity with others is absurd for such a plea
would have been available to anyone who might have been
arraigned for the murder. The High Court, was therefore
fully justified in observing that the deceased might have
enmity with others but the question as to who had committed
the murder was to be answered by the Court on the basis of
the evidence adduced.
Coming now to the evidence on record, we find that both
PWs 1 and 2 were the most probable witnesses, as they were
accompanying the deceased at the material time and that
inspite of a detailed searching cross-examination nothing
could be elicited by the defence to discredit or contradict
them. Besides, we find the FIR that P.W. 1 promptly lodged
within half an hour of the incident, fully corroborates
P.W.1. The evidence of the doctor (PW 4), who held autopsy
and found two gunshot wounds on the person of the deceased
also corroborates the evidence of the above two eye
witnesses. We are, therefore, in agreement with the High
Court that the prosecution succeeded in proving that owing
to the two shots fired by the appellants Jitendra Nath met
with his death. The High Court, however, was not legally
justified in convicting the appellants under Sections 148
and 149/302 IPC for consequent upon the order of acquittal
recorded by it in favour of Avdhesh, Section 148 and 149 IPC
could not have any manner of application - it being the
positive case of the prosecution that only the five
arraigned were the miscreants. Since, however, the manner in
which the incident took place clearly indicates that the
appellants shared the common intention of committing the
murder of Jitendra Nath they are liable for conviction for
the murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC.
On the conclusions as above we set aside the conviction
and sentence of the appellants under Section 148 IPC; and
alter their conviction under Section 302/149 to 302/34 IPC
but maintain the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed
for the former. With the above modifications the appeal is
dismissed. The appellants, who are on bail, will now
surrender to their bail bonds to serve out the sentence.
In the landmark ruling of Jagdish Narain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P., the Supreme Court of India delivered a critical judgment on the principles of evidence appreciation, particularly clarifying the rules surrounding a Section 302/34 IPC conviction and the admissibility of a police site plan under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. This pivotal case, now extensively documented on CaseOn, explores the circumstances under which an appellate court can overturn an acquittal and highlights the crucial distinction between common intention and common object in criminal law.
The Supreme Court was tasked with addressing several key legal questions arising from the High Court's decision to reverse a trial court's acquittal:
The Court's decision was anchored in established principles of criminal jurisprudence and statutory provisions:
The testimony of an eyewitness forms the foundation of the prosecution's case. Minor omissions, discrepancies, or contradictions that do not fundamentally alter the core narrative are often considered natural and do not automatically render the entire testimony unreliable. Appellate courts can re-evaluate such evidence to determine if the trial court's assessment was perverse or erroneous.
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the use of any statement made to a police officer during an investigation as evidence, except for the limited purpose of contradicting the witness during trial. The Supreme Court, referencing its earlier decision in Tori Singh vs. State of U.P., clarified that any marking on a site plan made by an IO based on information provided by a witness (e.g., the exact spot of the crime) is treated as a statement made to the police. Therefore, it is inadmissible for corroboration and can only be used for contradiction.
Section 149 IPC (Common Object): This section applies to members of an "unlawful assembly," which legally requires a minimum of five persons. If a crime is committed by any member in pursuit of the assembly's common object, all members are held vicariously liable.
Section 34 IPC (Common Intention): This section deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of a "common intention." It requires a pre-arranged plan or a meeting of minds, which can be formed just before the commission of the act. It can apply to two or more persons. If a charge under Section 149 fails (e.g., due to acquittal reducing the number below five), a conviction can be altered to Section 34 if the evidence clearly establishes a shared intention to commit the crime.
The Supreme Court systematically dismantled the trial court's reasons for acquittal, finding them to be flawed and perverse, thereby affirming the High Court's re-appreciation of the evidence.
The Court concurred with the High Court that the trial court had erred by giving undue weight to insignificant issues. It found that:
Navigating such intricate evidentiary rules can be challenging. For legal professionals looking to quickly grasp the nuances of rulings like the admissibility of site plans under Section 162 Cr.P.C., CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distill complex judgments into concise, actionable insights.
The most significant legal modification made by the Supreme Court was in the framing of the charge. The High Court had convicted the appellants under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC. However, with the acquittal of one accused and the abatement of appeals for two others who had died, only two appellants remained. This made a conviction for being part of an unlawful assembly (which requires five people) legally untenable.
The Court then examined the actions of the two appellants. The evidence clearly showed that they emerged together, armed, and both fired shots at the deceased. This sequence of events was sufficient to prove a meeting of minds and a shared, or "common," intention to murder Jitendra Nath. Consequently, the Court found it just to alter the conviction from Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC to Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction for murder. It set aside the conviction under Section 148 IPC and altered the conviction under Section 302/149 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC, while maintaining the sentence of life imprisonment. The appellants, who were on bail, were directed to surrender and serve their sentences.
The case involved an appeal against a High Court judgment that had reversed the trial court's acquittal of the appellants for the murder of their step-brother. The trial court had acquitted the accused based on minor contradictions in witness statements and certain investigative lapses. The High Court found these reasons perverse and convicted the appellants. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's assessment of the evidence, holding the eyewitness testimony to be credible and reliable. However, it noted that since only two accused remained convicted, the charge of unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC could not be sustained. Based on the evidence of their concerted actions, the Court altered the conviction to murder in furtherance of a common intention under Section 34 IPC and upheld the life sentence.
Disclaimer: This article is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. For any legal issues, please consult with a qualified legal professional.
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