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LPA No.124/2023

Sr. No.2

Suppl. List.

IN THE HIGH C0URT 0F JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT SRINAGAR

LPA No.124/2023 in

WP (Crl) No.157/2022

Reserved on:29.03.2024

Pronounced on:01.04.2024

JAHANGIR AHMAD WANI

…Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)

Through: Mr. G.N. Shaheen, Advocate with Mr. Asif Nabi, Advocate

Vs.

UNION TERRITORY OF J AND K AND

ANR. (HOME DEPARTMENT)

...Respondent(s)

Through: Mr. Zahid Ahmad Noor, GA

CORAM:

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE

JUDGMENT

N.KOTISWAR SINGH, CJ

01. Heard Mr. G.N. Shaheen, learned counsel assisted by Mr. Asif Nabi,

appearing on behalf of appellant as also Mr. Zahid Ahmad Noor, learned

GA, appearing on behalf of respondents.

02. The present appeal has been filed questioning the correctness of the

judgment dated 12.06.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP

(Crl) No.157/2022 titled Jahangir Ahmad Wani versus UT of J&K, by

which the challenge made by the detenue of his detention order

no.15/DMP/PSA/22 dated 08.04.2022 was rejected.

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03. Mr. G.N. Shaheen, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has

submitted before us that learned Single Judge, unfortunately, did not

consider and deal with various grounds of challenge to the said detention

order raised in the writ petition and the same was dismissed without

proper application of mind by the learned Single Judge.

04. Be that as it may, he has submitted that otherwise also, the detention

order cannot sustain judicial scrutiny for the following reasons: -

(i) First of all, it has been submitted that perusal of the detention

order dated 08.04.2022 would indicate that it was not a

detention order but a notice to detain the detainee as mentioned

in the order of detention while furnishing a copy to the Senior

Superintendent of Police, Pulwama for execution of the order as

provided for under Section 9 of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978,

in which it has been mentioned that notice of the order be given

to the detainee Jahangir Ahmad Wani.

(ii) It has been further submitted that when so called detention

order was issued, it did not accompany the other relevant

materials on the basis of which the detention order was issued,

which had prevented the petitioner from making effective

representation which is a fundamental right guaranteed under

Article 22 (5) of Constitution of India.

(iii) The third limb of the argument of Mr. G.N. Shaheen, learned

counsel for the appellant, is that the detenue is merely a class

12

th

passed student, not well versed in English language and the

order of detention as well as grounds of detention are only in

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English that too couched in complicated legal language which

he did not understand fully, which has also prevented him from

making effective representation to the detaining

authority/Government.

(iv) It has been submitted that the executing officer who had

allegedly explained the documents to the detenue in Kashmiri

and Urdu has not filed any affidavit, as is required under law.

(v) Fourthly, it has been also submitted that detention order does

not indicate as to who is the competent authority who passed

the detention order.

(vi) Fifthly, it has been submitted that the grounds of detention are

vague as they are very general in nature without specifics which

can be made against any person, and in view of vagueness of

the grounds it was not possible to give a proper and effective

representation.

(vii) It has been further submitted that at the time of the passing of

the detention order, the detenue was already in judicial custody

in connection with FIR No.47/2020 registered under Sections

7/25 I.A. Act and 23, Section 39 UAP Act registered at Police

Station Rajpora, and since he did not apply for bail, there was

no question of his being released on bail in which event, the

question of detaining him by invoking the preventive detention

law on the ground that the detenue is likely to be released does

not arise, as has been held by a number of decisions of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, it has been submitted

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that apprehension of the detaining authority that he is likely to

be released on bail is based on no material and it clearly shows

non-application of mind on the part of detaining authority and

hence, on this ground alone the detention order cannot be

sustained and is liable to be quashed.

(viii) It has also been submitted that perusal of the grounds of

detention will reveal that it is a cyclostyled copy of the dossier

prepared by the police and as such by engaging in a cut and

paste method indicates non-application of mind while passing

the detention order by detaining authority and as such, it would

vitiate the detention order.

(ix) Mr. Shaheen, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

preventive detention law is basically a detention without trial in

order to prevent any person from committing a crime, who,

according to authorities believe, engaged in certain prejudicial

acts, but cannot be used as a substitute for trial. It has been

submitted that the petitioner has been merely accused of

committing certain illegal acts of which the trial is yet to

commence and as such, before the charges against the detenue

has been proved the authorities could not have invoked the

preventive detention law on the same ground he was arrested in

the aforesaid FIR case.

05. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:-

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(i) Shri LallubhaiJogibhai Patel versus Union of India and others,

AIR 1981 SC 728, in which it has been held that non-supply of

relevant materials to the detenue would vitiate the order of

detention as it would prevent the detenue from making an effective

representation. The same principle was reiterated in Abdul Razak

Nannekhan Pathan Versus Police Commissioner Ahmadabad,

AIR 1989 SC 2265.

(ii) Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana and Ors., AIR 2021

AIR SC 3656, in which it was held that preventive detention is not

substitute for trial and cannot be invoked indiscriminately.

(iii) Relying on the decision in Abdul Razak Nanekhan Pathan

Versus Police Commissioner Ahmadabad, AIR 1989 SC 2265,

it has been contended that if no application has been moved for

bail, there was no likelihood of detenue being released from jail

and as such, mere false statement that he would be released on bail

does not amount to proper application of mind by the authorities

and as such, the detention order would be vitiated. To the same

effect the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision

in Dharmendra SuganchandChelawat and another v. Union of

India and others AIR 1990 SC 1196 wherein it was held that

there must be cogent material to arrive at a satisfaction that he is

likely to be released on bail, which is missing in the present case

and accordingly, it has been submitted that detention of the

detenue is liable to be set aside on the aforesaid grounds.

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(iv) Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision

rendered by this Court in case titled Athar Mushtaq Khan versus

UT of J&K and others, decided on 26.03.2024, wherein it has

been held that the detaining authority before passing the order of

detention has not applied its mind to draw subjective satisfaction

to order preventive detention of the detenue and on this ground

alone the same is not sustainable.

06. Heard also Mr. Zahid Noor, learned counsel appearing for the State, who

has vociferously defended the impugned judgment as well as the detention

order.

07. It has been submitted by Mr. Zahid that as regards the submission that

grounds of detention were furnished in English and not in the language

understood by the detenue and as such, he was prevented from making an

effective representation, the execution order would clearly show that the

detenue was explained the detention order and the documents in Kashmiri

and Urdu language by the Executing Officer to which he appended his

signature thereby acknowledging that he understood the contents of

grounds of detention and as such, it does not lie in the mouth of the

detenue at this stage to make the submission that he did not understand the

grounds of detention and the contents of the documents. Since, he did not

raise any objection at that stage but knowingly put his signature it will be

deemed that he understood the contents and hence this plea is hit by

acquiescence.

08. Coming to the challenge to the detention order on the ground of

vagueness, it has been submitted that perusal of the grounds of detention

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would clearly reveal that the detenue was in-fact an over ground

worker(OGW) of the banned terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammad

(JeM) and specific instances have been mentioned in the grounds of

detention how he was in contact with certain members of the militants and

the names of such militants have been mentioned in the grounds of

detention.

09. It has been mentioned in the grounds of detention that he was in touch

with active militants namely Yasir R/o Qasbayar, Manzoor Ahmad Kar

R/o Sirnoo and Furkan Bhai and that these militants had visited his house

and remained there for 24 hours and that the detenue had also arranged

fishes for them as an Eid meal from Budgam by using his personal vehicle

WagonR bearing Registration No.JK13-8758 and in this criminal act he

has also been aided by his brother namely, Adil Nabi Wani S/o Ghulam

Nabi Wani. Thus, it cannot be said that the grounds of detention are vague

as the grounds mention specifically the acts committed by the detenue

being in touch with the militants and helping them. Further, it was

specifically mentioned that on 11.06.2020, Police Station Rajporawhile

carrying out frisking duty, the detenue was found travelling along-with his

brother in the aforesaid WagonR vehicle and the police personnel

recovered one hand grenade from the possession of Adil Ahmad Wani, his

brother, and 15 AK-47 live rounds were recovered from his possession in

connection with which afore-mentioned the FIR no.47/2020 under

Sections 7/25 I.A. Act and 23, 39 UAP Act was registered at Police

Station Rajpora, and investigations were taken up and as such, it cannot

be said that the grounds of detention are vague.

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10. It has been further submitted that as far as the subjective satisfaction of

detaining the detenue is concerned, the same cannot be subjected to

judicial review as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena

of decisions. It has been accordingly submitted that these materials were

sufficient for the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction

that the detenue would be required to be detained under preventive

detention law.

11. As regards the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner

that since the detenue was already in judicial custody and that he had not

applied for bail and detaining authority could not have arrived at the

satisfaction that he may be released on bail, the respondents have relied

upon the decision of the Hon’be Supreme Court in Union of India and

another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad, AIR 2019 SC 3428, wherein the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the observation by the detaining

authority that the detenue who is already in custody is likely to be released

from custody is a matter of subjective satisfaction which will be beyond

judicial review and in the aforesaid case of Dimple Happy Dhakad

(supra), it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High

Court had erred in quashing the detention order merely on the ground that

the detaining authority has not expressly recorded the finding that there

was a real possibility that the detenue is to be released on bail which was

in violation of the principle laid down in Kamarunnissa vs. Union of

India and Anr., AIR 1991 SC 1640 and the other judgments and

guidelines issued in that regard, and accordingly, set aside the quashment

of the detention order by the High Court.

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12. It has also been submitted that it was observed by the Apex Court in the

aforesaid case of Dimple Happy Dhakad (supra) while the personal

liberty is of immense importance and the Courts have been rigorously

upholding the personal liberty of individual, yet liberty of an individual

must be subordinate to reasonable bounds for the good of the people and

the order of detention is clearly a preventive measure devised to provide

protection to the society and when the preventive detention is aimed to

protect the society and security of nation, balance has to be maintained

between liberty of an individual and needs of the society.

13. In the present case, it is clearly evident from the grounds of detention

that the detenue has been actively associated with the militants of Jaish-E-

Mohammad (JeM) which has been declared a banned terrorist

organization under the UPA Act and also he has been apprehended with

15 AK 47 live rounds along-with his brother who was found possessing a

hand grenade.

14. Under such circumstances, a person who has been found involved in

anti-national activities, the detention of the said person cannot be said to

be illegal.

15. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on

record as well the records relating to the detention produced before us.

16. The right to submit representation against a detention order is a facet of

the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution of

India. Article 22 (5) reads as follows:

“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases:

(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being

informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be

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denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his

choice.

(2) ………………………….

(3) ………………………….

(4) ………………………….

(5)When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law

providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as

soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order

has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a

representation against the order.

(6) ………….………………..

(7) ………………………….. ”

Thus, the right to submit representation against the detention order is a

Fundamental Right, if breached, can be fatal for the continued detention

of the detenue.

17. But the question herein is, did the detenue submit any representation to

the competent authority which according to the detenue, was not

effective?

In the present case, it is seen from the records that the detenue never

submitted any representation to any of the authorities. If he has not

submitted any representation, how can it be said that he could not submit

any representation which was effective. If he choose not to file the

representation, can it be said now that he could not file any effective

representation?

18. In our opinion, this issue has to be examined in the context of the

representation he might have submitted.

In R. Keshava v. M.B. Prakash, (2001) 2 SCC 145it was as follows:

“17. We are satisfied that the detenu in this case was apprised

of his right to make representation to the appropriate

Government/authorities against his order of detention as

mandated in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Despite

knowledge, the detenu did not avail of the opportunity. Instead

of making a representation to the appropriate Government or

the confirming authority, the detenu chose to address a

representation to the Advisory Board alone even without a

request to send its copy to the authorities concerned under the

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Act. In the absence of representation or the knowledge of the

representation having been made by the detenu, the appropriate

Government was justified in confirming the order of detention

on perusal of record and documents excluding the

representation made by the detenu to the Advisory Board. For

this alleged failure of the appropriate Government, the order of

detention of the appropriate Government is neither rendered

unconstitutional nor illegal. (emphasis added)

Further, in Veeramani v. State of T.N., (1994) 2 SCC 337 it was held

that,

“17. However, there may be scope to contend that even within

12 days, the detaining authority has the power to revoke and

therefore in view of the safeguards provided under Article 22(5)

the detenu if told, can make a representation within that period

to the detaining authority in which case it would be under an

obligation to consider the same. It may be noted that Article

22(5) casts an obligation on the detaining authority to

communicate to the detenu the grounds and to afford to the

detenu the earliest opportunity of making the representation.

The article does not say to whom such representation is to be

made but the right to make a representation against the

detention order undoubtedly flows from the constitutional

guarantee enshrined therein. The next question as to whom such

representation should be made, depends on the provisions of the

Act and naturally such a representation must be made to the

authority who has power to approve, rescind or revoke the

decision. …………………………………. Therefore, the

representation to be made by the detenu, after the earliest

opportunity was afforded to him, can be only to the

Government which has the power to approve or to revoke. That

being the position the question of detenu being informed

specifically in the grounds that he had also a right to make a

representation to the detaining authority itself besides the State

Government does not arise.”

19. Reading of the two decisions would clearly demonstrate that while it is

incumbent upon the authority to inform the detenue that he has right to

submit a presentation, and the authorities are to consider the same at the

earliest. However, if the representation is submitted to an authority which

has no power to revoke the detention order he cannot have a grievance.

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There is no obligation on the part of the authority to redirect such wrongly

addressed representation to the competent authority.

The inference from the above two decisions is inescapable. If the

detenue does not submit any representation to the competent authority, no

fault could be found with the authorities as there is no obligation of the

authorities to remind him to file any representation. At the time of the

execution of the detention order, it was clearly mentioned that the detenue

was requested to submit a representation.

20. Yet, it may still be contended that the detenue could not make an

effective representation since he was not furnished with the relevant

documents.

As regards this, one may refer to the decision inState of

Bombay vs. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157where it

was held that,

“30. While cl. (5) does not allow the authority, after making the order

of detention and communicating the grounds of such order, to put

forward fresh grounds in justification of that order, I can find nothing

in that clause to preclude the authority furnishing particulars or details

relating to the grounds originally communicated, or the person under

detention availing himself of such particulars and making a better or a

further representation. Nor is there anything to prevent such person

from asking for, or the authority from providing, further and better

particulars of those grounds where it is in a position to do so…..…”

Thus, if the detenue was furnished with inadequate materials as he claims

because of which he could not submit an effective representation, nothing

prevented him from asking the authorities for the same. But he chose to

remain silent and did not ask for the same. In such event, how the

authorities could come to know that documents being supplied are not

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sufficient for him to make an effective representation? The detenue does

not make any request for better particular and does not even submit any

representation alleging deficiency of materials.

21. Be that as it may, we have also perused the documents produced

before us including copies of the documents which were furnished to the

detenue. What we have noted is that he was furnished with copies of the

FIR, copies of statements made by the witnesses including his own

statement made under section 161 CrPC during the investigation. The

dossier prepared by the Police which was the basis for the grounds of

detention was also furnished, which contains all the particulars of his

activities as mentioned above.

In view of the above legal and factual position obtaining, we reject the

plea of the petitioner detenue that his right to submit effective

representation due to non-furnishing of relevant documents as devoid of

merit.

22. The other contention of the petitioner that the grounds are vague and

these could not been the basis for his preventive detention is also without

any merit. The dossier and grounds of detention specifically refer to

various activities of the detenue, by way being in personal and physical

touch with the militants of a banned terrorist organization and the detenue

himself was alleged to have caught with incriminating materials in the

form of live ammunitions along with his brother who was also

apprehended with a grenade. The grounds as mentioned in the grounds of

detention furnished to him cannot by any stretch of imagination be

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considered vague. These grounds in our view were sufficient for the

detenue to make a representation, if he so desired.

Hence, we also reject his plea of the grounds being vague.

23. As regards the plea of the detenue that he was not well versed with

English and he was not furnished the documents in Kashmiri language

which he understood, cannot be also accepted now at this stage, as he

never made any protestation at the time of furnishing the documents. He

neither submitted any representation to the authorities for supplying of

materials in the language he understands. In the records it is seen that he

put his signature in English. Even if the executing officer did not file any

affidavit before this Court to support that the documents were explained in

the language the detenue understood, it would not be fatal, as he never

raised any objection at the time of furnishing the documents nor submitted

any application for furnishing documents in Kashmiri language soon

thereafter. Therefore, the contention of the Respondents that this plea has

been taken at a belated stage and hit by acquiescence cannot be brushed

aside.

24. It has been also submitted that the grounds of detention is the carbon

copy of the dossier prepared by the police shows non application of mind

by the detaining authority is also devoid of merit as mere reproduction

does not necessarily prove non application of mind by the detaining

authority.

25. As regards the plea of the petitioner that the impugned detention order

does not disclose who was detaining authority on whose subjective

satisfaction the detention order was issued, the same is also devoid of

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merit as it has been clearly mentioned in the detention order that it was the

District Magistrate of Pulwama who issued the order.

26. Thus, we reject the pleas of the petitioner that the grounds of detention

were vague, that he was not furnished with better particulars and that he

was not served with documents which he understood which prevented him

from making an effective representation, as devoid of merit for the

reasons discussed above.

27. However, we find force with the plea of the petitioner that since he

was already in judicial custody, and as he did not apply for bail and hence,

there was no possibility of being released, there was no material basis for

arriving at the satisfaction that there is every apprehension that he may

succeed in obtaining bail from the court and may again indulge in similar

activities.

28. As regards this plea we have minutely examined the decision rendered

by the Apex Court in Dimple Happy Dhakad (supra), on which the

counsel for the respondent has heavily relied on by contending that this

opinion/subjective satisfaction of the authority that there is every

apprehension that he may succeed in obtaining bail from the court and

may again indulge in similar activities, is not subject to judicial review

and hence, this subjective satisfaction does not warrant interference.

29. As we examine this decision cited, it may be noted that, it was

mentioned in the grounds of detention about this apprehension in the

following words,

“You are presently in judicial custody at Central Jail Srinagar

and there is every apprehension that you may obtain bail from the

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Hon’ble Court of Law and may again indulge in similar

activities.”

The aforesaid sentence consists of three components.

A. Firstly, that the petitioner is in judicial custody. As far as this

component is concerned, it is a factual statement which is not

denied by anyone. Hence, there is no controversy about this aspect.

B. Secondly, there are two apprehensions/expressions in the said

sentence. Apprehension is not an objective state of mind, but

subjective state of mind or belief or inferences one may draw based

on certain facts or materials.

The first apprehension is that he may obtain bail from the court.

The second apprehension is that he may again indulge in similar

activities.

30. Both these apprehensions to sustain must be based on certain

facts/materials, sufficiency of which however, will certainly be beyond

judicial review, as also correctly submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the

respondent.

As far as the second apprehension is concerned, in our opinion there

are materials to suggest and to make the authorities feel that he may

indulge in similar activities if released on bail from the materials disclosed

in the ground of detention. He was found to be in collaboration with

wanted militants, providing logistic support, and he himself also was

engaged in acts prejudicial to the security of the State. These are not

isolated incidents. There is a pattern visible from the acts as disclosed in

the grounds of detention.

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Therefore, if the detaining authorities feel and apprehend that he may

indulge in similar activities on being released on bail, such an

apprehension cannot be said to be unwarranted. Moreover, this subjective

satisfaction of the authorities cannot be subjected to judicial review.

31. However, as regards the other apprehension that he may obtain bail from

the court, on examination of the records, we did not find any material to

support such an inference and apprehension. It is not denied by the

respondent that the detenue had not filed any application for bail. If no

such application for bail had been filed, how one can draw the inference

that he may succeed in obtaining bail from the court. Even if one does not

file any application for bail, there may instances where similarly situated

persons have been released on bail, which may trigger an apprehension

that he may also succeed in obtaining bail, and considering his

antecedents, the authorities may be warranted to issue the preventive

detention order inspite of being in judicial custody.

As also held by the Apex Court, there is no inflexible law that a

person in judicial custody cannot be subjected to preventive detention.

Such a person can still be subjected to preventive detention order under

certain circumstances. The related law had been succinctly put inRekha v.

State of T.N., (2011) 5 SCC 244by a three Judges Bench wherein it was

held as follows:

“27. In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a

person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved

a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if

no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the

person in custody being released on bail, and hence the

detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an

exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case

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stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases,

the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is

likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no

bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally

grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged

similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the

authority cannot be believed.” (emphasis added).

32. The aforesaid decision was also followed in HuidromKonungjao Singh

v. State of Manipur, (2012) 7 SCC 181,wherein it was held as follows:

“9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no

prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a

person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case.

However, if the detention order is challenged the detaining

authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts:

(1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the

detenu was actually in custody.

(2) There was reliable material before the said authority

on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there

was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being

released he would probably indulge in activities which are

prejudicial to public order.

(3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to

prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore,

detention order was necessary.”

33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dimple Happy Dhakad (supra) also

endorsed the aforesaid view as reflected in the following paragraph of the

aforesaid decision.

“36. Whether a person in jail can be detained under the

detention law has been the subject-matter for consideration

before this Court time and again. In HuidromKonungjao Singh

v. State of Manipur (2012) 7 SCC 18, the Supreme Court

referred to earlier decisions including Dharmendra Suganchand

Chelawat v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 746 and reiterated

that if the detaining authority is satisfied that taking into

account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is

likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in

prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to

prevent him from engaging in such activities.”

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34. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Dimple

Happy Dhakad (supra) found certain materials because of which the Apex

court declined to interfere with the detention order of the detenue who was

already in detention based on the subjective satisfaction which was based on

certain materials before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as evident from the

following paragraph no.40.

“40. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu may be

released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the

facts and circumstances of the present case, the subjective satisfaction

of the detaining authority that the detenu is likely to be released on

bail is based on the materials……………………….”

(emphasis added)

35. In the present case, while shuffling through the pages of the records,

nothing has come to our notice that there was any such instance of others

who were similarly situated, were granted bail which would make the

authorities apprehend that the petitioner may succeed in obtaining bail,

even though he had not yet filed any bail application.

Thus, unfortunately, as discussed above, we do not find any such

material on records as in the case of Dimple Happy Dhakad (supra)

which led the detaining authority to apprehension that the detenue may be

released on bail

36. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the subjective

satisfaction or the apprehension of the authorities that he may be released

on bail does not appear to be based on any cogent material which would

render the aforesaid apprehension a mere figment of imagination and,

hence not substantiated, thus, not sustainable in law.

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37. For the reasons discussed above, the appellant detenue succeeds solely

on this ground, and appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned

detention order No.15/DMP/PSA/22 dated 08.04.2022 passed by District

Magistrate Pulwama is set aside.

Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order dated 12.06.2023

passed by the Ld. Single Judge in WP (Crl). 157 of 2022 is also set aside.

Consequently, the detenue Jahangir Ahmad Wani, S/o Gh. Nabi

Wani, R/o Rahmoo, Tehsil Rajpora, District Pulwama shall be set free

unless detained/required to be detained in connection with any other case.

(MOHAMMAD YOUSUF WANI ) (N. KOTISWAR SINGH)

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

SRINAGAR

01.04.2024

Shameem H.

Reportable: Yes.