[2026:RJ-JP:22211]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16033/2024

Hcl Infosystems Limited, 806, Siddharth, 96 Nehru Place, New

Delhi- 110019 Through Its Authorised Signatory Mr. Arif Jamal.

----Petitioner

Versus

1. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Old Power House,

Banipark, Jaipur, Rajasthan Through Its Managing

Director.

2. Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, New Power House,

Jodhpur Rajasthan Through Its Managing Director.

3. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Opposite 220 Kv Gss

Naka Mandir, Ajmer, Rajasthan Through Its Managing

Director.

----Respondents

Connected With

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7066/2026

1. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Old Power House,

Banipark, Jaipur, Rajasthan, Through Its Managing

Director

2. Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Near Power House,

Jodhpur, Rajasthan Through Its Managing Director

3. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Opposite 220 Kv Gss

Naka Mandir, Ajmer, Rajasthan Through Its Managing

Director

----Petitioners

Versus

Hcl Infosys. Limited, Registered Office At- 806, Siddharth, 96,

Nehru Place, New Delhi - 110019, Through Its Authorized

Signatory Sh. Arif Jamal

----Respondent

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Advocate

General (for petitioners in SBCWP

No.7066/2026 and for respondent in

SBCWP No.16033/2024) assisted by

Mr. Kartik Seth

Ms. Shilpa Saini

Ms. Dhriti Laddha

For Respondent(s) : Mr. RN Mathur, Senior Counsel

(for petitioner in SBCWP

No.16033/2024 and for respondent in

SBCWP No.7066/2026) assisted by

Mr. Shailesh Kapoor

Mr. Lokesh Atrey

Ms. Sakshi Chaturvedi

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (2 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN

Judgment

1Arguments concluded on 14/05/2026

2Judgment Reserved on 14/05/2026

3Full Judgment or Operative Part Pronounced Full Judgment

4Pronounced on 27/05/2026

REPORTABLE :

1. In view of the intrinsically intertwined nature of the controversy

at hand, coupled with the strikingly identical factual substratum

permeating the present batch of petitions, and upon express

consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties,

this Court, being persuaded by the congruence of the issues

involved and in furtherance of the cause of expeditious and

efficacious adjudication, proceeds to determine the instant petitions

by way of this composite and common judgment. The ratio

decidendi rendered herein shall, accordingly, govern the connected

matters mutatis mutandis, subject to contextual adaptation on

facts. For the purposes of maintaining factual coherence and

narrative forbearance, the pleadings and averments as delineated

in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7066/2026 (Jaipur Vidyut

Vitran Nigam Limited & Ors. vs. HCL Infosys Limited) are

hereby treated as the lead case and adopted as the foundational

factual matrix for adjudication of the present lis. For the sake of

reference and procedural lucidity, the tabular depiction ad infra

delineates the constituent segments into which the present

judgment stands bifurcated, thereby facilitating analytical

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (3 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

coherence and navigational convenience.

Part Head Note Page Numbers

A.Prayers and reliefs canvassed by the

petitioner(s) in the respective petitions

3 to 5

B.The factual narrative and the chronological

particulars which culminated in the instant

lis:

a.Proceedings before the learned arbitral

tribunal

b.The procedural trajectory and the

contentions advanced before this court

in the present petition assailing the

proceedings before the learned Arbitral

Tribunal

5 to 11

C.Submissions by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of and for the

petitioner-DISCOMs

11 to 18

D.Submissions by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of and for the

respondent-HCL

18 to 24

E.Consideration of the written submissions

furnished by the learned interveners via e-

mail

25

F.Discussion of the rival arguments and

adjudicatory findings of this Court

a.Relevant excerpts from the impugned

orders and the relevant provisions

from the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996

b.The issues arising for determination

in the instant lis

26 to 103

G.Conclusion 103 to 106

H.Directions 106 to 110

A. PRAYERS AND RELIEFS CANVASSED BY THE

PETITIONER(S) IN THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONS:

2. SBCWP No. 7066/2026 is filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (4 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

Court over subordinate courts and tribunals, assailing the legality,

propriety, and tenability of the order dated 24.02.2026 passed by

the Commercial Court No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, in Case

No.34/2026 (CIS No.68/2025), whereby the mandate of the

Arbitral Tribunal has been extended till 30.09.2026; and SBCWP

No. 16033/2024 has been filed assailing the impugned order

dated 17.09.2024, pertaining to the initial extension granted under

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1996”), on an application

moved by the respondents–complainants therein, which came to be

allowed subject to certain stipulated terms and conditions. Both

matters, being inextricably interlinked and resting upon a common

legal and factual foundation, have, with the concurrence of learned

counsel for the respective parties, been taken up for conjoint and

final adjudication.

3. In the present matters, the following prayers have been made:

“SBCWP No.7066/2026:

1. Allow the present Petition and set aside the order

dated 24.02.2026 passed by the Commercial Court

No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur, in CMNC

NO.34/2026 (CIS No.68/2025), whereby the

mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal has been extended

from 30.04.2025 up to 30.09.2026.

2. In the alternative, and without prejudice, suitable

modify the Impugned Order by:

directing that, for any period beyond 30.04.2025, (a)

the Respondent shall bear the full additional fees of

the Arbitral Tribunal; (b) no further interest shall

accrue in favour of the Petitioner on any eventual

award; and/or (c) such order cost-related conditions

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (5 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit, in line with

Sections 29A(5), 29A (8) , 31(8) and 31A of the Act

and the principles laid down in ONGC v. Afcons.

SBCWP No.16033/2024:

i. issue an appropriate writ/order thereby setting

aside the directions issued by the Ld. Commercial

Court No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur in para 64

to 68 of its order dated 17.09.2024 in CMNC

No.255/2024, CIS No.258/2024, CNR NO.RJJT1

A0009882024;

ii. issue an appropriate writ/order thereby setting

aside the directions issued by the Ld. Commercial

Court No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur in para 63

of its order dated 17.09.2024 in CMNC

No.255/2024, CIS No.258/2024, CNR NO.RJJT1

A0009882024 to the extent of imposing exemplary

cost of Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid by the Petitioner to

the Litigants Welfare Fund Maintained by the

Registrar General, Hon’ble High Court Rajasthan,

Jodhpur within 7 days from the date of the order;

iii. issue an appropriate writ/order thereby

directing the refund of the exemplary cost of

Rs.1,00,000/- paid by the Petitioner under protest

to the Litigants Welfare Fund maintained by the

Registrar General, Hon’ble High Court Rajasthan,

Jodhpur under protest;

iv.to issue any other writ, order or direction

which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper

under the facts and circumstances of the case, so

that justice be met.

B. THE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND THE CHRONOLOGICAL

PARTICULARS WHICH CULMINATED IN THE INSTANT LIS :

a. Proceedings before the learned arbitral tribunal:

4. The petitioner-DISCOMs herein are statutory electricity

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (6 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

distribution companies, wholly owned by the State Government,

having been incorporated under the provisions of the Companies

Act, and are entrusted with the sovereign and public function of

distribution and supply of electricity to consumers across the State,

and the respondent is a private limited company engaged in the

domain of information technology and system integration,

undertaking large-scale infrastructural and technological projects.

The genesis of the arbitral proceedings emanates from a composite

reference arising out of the Restructured Accelerated Power

Development and Reforms Programme (hereinafter referred to as

‘RAPDRP’), approved by the Ministry of Power, Government of India

(in its 11

th

Five Year Plan) under which contracts were awarded in

the year 2009, to the respondent company-HCL, with the primary

objective of reduction of the AT&C loss for the project areas to

15%; wherein the said program was divided into two parts, i.e.

Part A and Part B, wherein Part A included project for establishment

of Base Line Data and IT Application like meter data acquisition

system, metering, billing, collection, GIS, Energy Audit , New

Connection etc. and Part B was for distribution strengthening

projects, and allied smart infrastructure across the State of

Rajasthan. The project, of a substantial financial magnitude

approximating Rs. 528.20 crores, envisaged an extensive rollout

spanning 87 towns and 534 distinct locations, thereby entailing

multifarious operational, technical, and logistical components,

which now form the substratum of the present dispute. The

principal issues which fell for consideration before the learned

Arbitral Tribunal pertained to the gamut of work orders in question,

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (7 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

and more particularly to the alleged irregularities, lapses, and

deviations in their execution, which are asserted to have

culminated in inordinate delays and consequent non-performance

and/or deficient performance of the contractual obligations

incumbent upon the parties. The details of the work orders is

reproduced hereinbelow:

No.DISCOM WORK ORDER NUMBERS VALUE

1 AVVNL Work Order number

AVVNL/SE (IT)/TN-33/D.135

dated 30.09.2009.

421,227,349

2 AVVNL Work Order number

AVVNL/SE (IT)/TN-33/D.136

dated 30.09.2009.

836,531,421

3 JVVNL Work Order number JPD/SE

(IT &CRP)IT/F.TN-33/D.727

dated 30.09.2019.

1,81,80,26,969.55

4 JVVNL Work Order number JPD/SE

(IT &CRP)IT/F.TN-33/D.728

dated 30.09.2019.

51,89,62,589.99

5 JdVVNL Work Order number

JdVVNL/SE (M&P_PC)/IT/JPD

TN 33/D 1484 dated

30.09.2009.

71,31,48,294.43

6 JdVVNL Work Order number

JdVVNL/SE (M&P_PC)/IT/JPD

TN 33/D 1485 dated

30.09.2009.

97,40,61,672.45

5. Consequently, being aggrieved thereof the petitioners

instituted substantial claims before the learned Arbitral Tribunal,

asserting that certain deductions had been effected in an arbitrary

and unsubstantiated manner, devoid of any contractual or legal

basis. In this backdrop, a notice dated 27.09.2019 invoking the

provisions of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, read with Clause 8.2 of the GCC for appointment of

arbitrator and for reference of disputes between the parties, came

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (8 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

to be served upon the petitioner-DISCOMs. The arbitral

proceedings were set into motion with the first preliminary hearing

convened on 27.07.2020, whereupon the matter was posted before

the learned Arbitral Tribunal for 20.08.2020. Subsequently, a three-

member Arbitral Tribunal came to be duly constituted, comprising

one nominee arbitrator from each of the contesting parties, and a

Presiding Arbitrator appointed by mutual concurrence. Owing,

however, to the unprecedented disruption occasioned by the

COVID-19 pandemic, and by virtue of a consensual understanding

inter-se the parties, the commencement of claims was reckoned, in

conformity with the stipulations enshrined under Section 23(4) of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The initial reckoning of

the arbitral timeline, in terms of Section 29A governing the

mandate of the Tribunal, was determined to expire on 28.02.2023.

However, by mutual consent of the parties, the mandate stood

extended up to 31.08.2023. Prior to the expiry thereof, on

14.07.2023, the respondent-HCL invoked the provisions of Section

29A (4 and 5) of the Act of 1996 and moved an application before

the learned Commercial Court seeking a further extension of one

year beyond 31.08.2023.

6. The petitioners, being dissatisfied with the prayer for

extension, raised manifold objections assailing the same on diverse

grounds. However, upon affording an extensive hearing to the

parties and after due deliberation on the rival submissions, the

learned Commercial Court, vide impugned order dated 17.09.2024,

proceeded to allow the application for extension, being satisfied as

to the existence of sufficient cause. Such satisfaction was

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (9 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

predicated, inter alia, upon the inherent complexity of the dispute,

the voluminous documentary record, the breadth of evidentiary

material, and the multiplicity of proceedings reflected in the order

sheets. Consequently, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal came to

be extended for a further period of 20 months, i.e., from

01.09.2023 to 30.04.2025. Notwithstanding the grant of extension,

the learned Commercial Court unequivocally recorded a finding that

the delay was primarily attributable to the respondent-claimant

therebefore.

7. In that backdrop, and with a view to ensuring expeditious

culmination of the arbitral proceedings, specific directions were

issued mandating disposal of the matter within 14 sittings,

preferably through oral submissions, save and except at the

discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal. Furthermore, an exemplary cost

of Rs. 1,00,000/- was imposed upon the claimant; it was directed

that the arbitral fees accruing post 17.12.2023 shall be borne

exclusively by the claimant; and a further stipulation was

incorporated restraining the grant of interest in favour of the

claimant for the period subsequent to 12.02.2024.

b.The procedural trajectory and the contentions

advanced before this court in the present petition(s),

assailing the proceedings before the learned Arbitral

Tribunal:

8. Thus being further aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated

17.09.2024, the respondent–claimant-HCL instituted a writ petition

before this Court, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (10 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

No.16033/2024 . This Court, upon a prima facie consideration of

the matter, vide interim order dated 22.10.2024, granted an

interim order to stay the operation of the conditions imposed by

the learned Commercial Court, save and except the grant of

extension of the arbitral mandate, thereby rendering the ancillary

directions, including those pertaining to costs, fee liability, and

embargo on interest, inoperative during the pendency of the said

proceedings.

9. As the extended mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was

approaching its terminus on 30.04.2025, the respondent–claimant

once again invoked the jurisdiction of the learned Commercial

Court by moving a successive and second application under Section

29A of the Act of 1996 on 22.04.2025, seeking a further extension

of the learned Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate for an additional period

of one year beyond i.e. 30.04.2025. The petitioners herein stoutly

opposed the said application, inter alia, on the grounds of

maintainability, contending that such successive extensions were

impermissible in law and contrary to the legislative intent

underlying Section 29A of the Act of 1996, particularly in the

absence of demonstrable and sufficient cause attributable to

circumstances beyond the control of the claimant.

10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid objections, the learned

Commercial Court, vide the impugned order dated 24.02.2026,

proceeded to extend the mandate of the learned Arbitral Tribunal

till 30.09.2026. The said extension, however, is assailed as being

couched in vague and indeterminate terms, bereft of a cogent

articulation of reasons or a discernible application of judicial mind

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (11 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

to the objections raised by the petitioners. It was contended that

the impugned order neither adequately addresses the issue of

delay attributable to the respondent–claimant-HCL nor delineates

any compelling or exceptional circumstances warranting such

further prolongation of the arbitral proceedings. The extension is

thus alleged to suffer from the vice of arbitrariness, lack of

reasoned justification, and non-adherence to the statutory

discipline envisaged under Section 29A of the Act of 1996, thereby

rendering it susceptible to interference in exercise of the

supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.

C. SUBMISSIONS BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING

ON BEHALF OF AND FOR THE PETITIONER-DISCOMs

11. At the outset, it was averred that that the present petition is

maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as it

confers express jurisdiction upon this Court to regulate, extend, or

terminate the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. The present

proceedings are confined to issues of delay, procedural discipline,

and compliance with statutory timelines, and do not trench upon

the merits of the dispute. It was further submitted that the

principle of minimal judicial interference under Section 5 does not

operate as a bar in the present case, as the intervention sought is

statutorily sanctioned and aimed at effectuating the legislative

mandate of expeditious adjudication. Thus, when there is apparent

errors in the order(s) impugned, the supervisory jurisdiction of the

High Court, is ought to be invoked, in order to curtail the

deficiencies and errors which the learned Tribunal might do.

12. In the aforesaid factual conspectus, learned Advocate

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (12 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

General, ably assisted by Shri Kartik Seth, unanimously submitted

that by way of the present petitions the orders dated 24.02.2026

and 17.09.2024 have been assailed, on the grounds noted, inter

alia, ad infra:

12.1 That the successive application moved under Section 29A

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read conjointly with

the provisions of Sections 23 and 29A thereof, is ex facie not

maintainable, particularly in light of the fact that a prior extension

had already been granted upon due consideration and judicial

scrutiny vide order dated 17.09.2024. Moreover, the impugned

order is vitiated by an over-reliance on the request made by the

learned Arbitral Tribunal qua its internal administrative difficulties,

and the interim order of this Court staying certain conditions of the

earlier order dated 17.09.2024, without independently evaluating

the statutory requirements under Section 29A of the Act of 1996.

12.2 That post 31.08.2023, the petitioner-DISCOMs have not

expressed any consent, at any stage, qua grant of extension for

the lis pending before the learned Arbitral Tribunal; as vide order

dated 19.12.2022 the parties have mutually extended the mandate

of the Arbitral Tribunal only up to 31.08.2023; the same is also

recorded in the learned Commercial Court’s order dated

17.09.2024.

12.3 That the petitioner-DISCOMs have consistently objected

the plea of grant of time extensions, as and when made by the

respondents-HCL. The first objection being recorded in the reply

dated 07.09.2023, qua the application moved by the respondent-

HCL; second in the reply dated 15.05.2025, as submitted in the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (13 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

application moved by the respondent-HCL on 22.04.2025; third in

the application dated 13.09.2025 moved under the provisions of

Section 151 of CPC, before the learned Arbitral Tribunal itself.

12.4 That the expression “sufficient cause” as contemplated

under Section 29A (5) of the Act of 1996 stands authoritatively

expounded in a catena of judgments, inter alia, M/s. Ajay

Protech Pvt. Ltd. vs. General Manager & Anr.: 2024 INSC

889 and Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Berger Paints

Ltd.: (2025) 10 SCC 802. It was submitted that the order dated

17.09.2024 had already made a categorical finding attributing the

delay primarily to the respondent-claimant-HCL, taking into

account repeated adjournments sought by its counsel, the

indulgent approach adopted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, the

voluminous and complex nature of evidence, multiplicity of claims,

and the alleged force majeure elements.

12.5 That in such a scenario, subsequent factors such as

allegations of mala fides, recurring arbitral fees, non-determination

of fee structure in advance, pendency of objections relating to fees,

issues arising under Section 31(6) of the Act of 1996, and the

passing of an interim award qua bank guarantees during the

pendency of the extension proceedings, cannot, by any stretch,

constitute “sufficient cause.” It was further submitted that the

learned Commercial Court, in effect, has undertaken a review of its

earlier order dated 17.09.2024 on identical facts and

circumstances, which is impermissible in law.

12.6 That the impugned order places undue reliance upon interim

orders passed by this Court, whereby certain terms and conditions

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (14 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

imposed vide order dated 17.09.2024 had been stayed. It was

contended that the said interim order cannot be construed as a

final adjudication on merits, the earlier order still being sub judice,

and thus could not have been relied upon to dilute or override the

findings recorded therein.

12.7 That the learned Commercial Court was bound to adhere to

the principles of judicial discipline, including the doctrine of res

judicata and consistency in judicial decision-making, and could not

have reviewed, modified, or diluted its own earlier reasoned order

while adjudicating a subsequent application under Section 29A of

the Act of 1996, in the absence of any statutory sanction or

emergent grounds justifying such deviation.

13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner have

additionally contended that the impugned order is vitiated by a

grave jurisdictional error, inasmuch as it reflects a complete erosion

of judicial control envisaged under Section 29A of the Act of 1996.

It was urged that arbitral proceedings are inherently litigant-

centric, premised upon cost-efficiency, party autonomy, and

procedural diligence. However, in the present case, the learned

Arbitral Tribunal is alleged to have adopted a manifestly casual and

lackadaisical approach since inception, granting protracted

adjournments and fixing distant dates, in derogation of the

mandate of Section 24 of the Act of 1996, which contemplates day-

to-day hearings. It was further contended that the learned Arbitral

Tribunal have disregarded the binding directions contained in the

order dated 17.09.2024, resulting in pendency of arbitration

proceedings, involving a claim of approximately Rs. 528 crores, for

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (15 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

a period exceeding five years.

14. Additionally, it was contended that the petitioners being

State Public Sector Undertakings (DISCOMs), have been subjected

to undue prejudice, particularly when the delay is predominantly

attributable to the respondent–claimant-HCL, and the learned

Arbitral Tribunal is alleged to be misusing the arbitral process,

thereby occasioning serious procedural improprieties. In this

regard, learned Advocate General further emphasized that the

legislative intent underpinning the introduction and subsequent

amendment of Section 29A in the year 2019, pursuant to the

recommendations of the Law Commission, was to render time the

essence of arbitral adjudication, and to impose stringent checks on

routine and mechanical extensions. It was contended that the

prolonged continuation of arbitration proceedings for over five

years, coupled with the imposition of exorbitant arbitral fees,

including reading fees, administrative expenses, and venue

charges, cannot be construed as implied consent on the part of the

petitioners, particularly when such extensions have been

consistently opposed, and an application for reduction of costs, in

light of the ratio encapsulated in ONGC vs. Afcons Gunanusa JV:

(2024) 4 SCC 481.

15. Furthermore, it was argued that the mandate of Section 24 of

the Act of 1996, which envisages expeditious, preferably day-to-

day hearings, has been rendered otiose in the present case, and

thus the foundational objective of the Act namely, the speedy and

efficient resolution of disputes through a time-bound arbitral

mechanism stands wholly frustrated. It was also argued that the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (16 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

impugned order fails to adequately consider the prejudice and

financial burden imposed upon them, being public DISCOM entities,

on account of recurring arbitral fees beyond the statutorily

prescribed period under Section 29A of the Act of 1996; and that

the interim award purportedly passed under Section 31(6) of the

Act of 1996, during the pendency of the extension application is

non est in the eyes of law, and is tainted by bias and mala fide

exercise of authority, as the continued pendency of fee-related

issues since 2022, coupled with the imposition of recurring charges

such as reading fees and expenses at the rate of 10%, is alleged to

reflect a pre-determined and prejudicial stance, particularly in light

of payments being made by the respondent-claimant-HCL.

Nevertheless, the convenience or preference of the learned Arbitral

Tribunal cannot be the determinative factor for extension of

mandate under Section 29A of the Act of 1996, which mandates

the existence of cogent and sufficient reasons. The earlier order

dated 17.09.2024 had duly appreciated these considerations,

whereas the impugned order dated 24.02.2026 reflects a

contradictory and impermissible review by the successor

Commercial Court. It was apprised to the Court that an amount of

approximately Rs. 13 crores, half of which has been borne by the

petitioner-DISCOMs constitutes a substantial and unwarranted

financial burden, resulting in improper utilization of public funds

under compulsion.

16. It was further urged that the impugned order has failed to

take into account the adverse findings recorded against the

respondent–claimant-HCL in the earlier order dated 17.09.2024,

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (17 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

including delay attributable to it, failure to conclude proceedings

within the prescribed timeframe, and the grant of extension beyond

the period prayed for. Thus, it can be derived that the subsequent

extension has been granted without imposing any conditions, solely

on the basis of the Tribunal’s request and internal constraints, while

disregarding the conduct of the claimant, the resultant prejudice,

and the status of the petitioners as public sector entities.

17. Lastly, it was contended that the notion of a de novo hearing,

purportedly necessitated on account of changes within the learned

Arbitral Tribunal, cannot constitute a valid ground for extension,

inasmuch as Section 29A of the Act of 1996 contemplates

substitution of arbitrators with continuity of proceedings as the

governing norm, rather than recommencement. In support of the

submissions made, learned Advocate General placed reliance upon

the a catena of judgments, inter alia, Rohan Builders (India)

Pvt. Ltd. vs. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2025 (10) SCC 802;

Skylark Cagers India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Institute of Liver and

Biliary Sciences (OMP (Misc.) No.14/2019, decided on

01.03.2023 by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court); NBCC Ltd. Vs.

J.G. Engineering Pvt. Ltd.: (2010) 2 SCC 385; Union of India

vs. Singh Builders Syndicate, (2009) 4 SCC 523; Oil and

Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Afcons Gunanusa JV,

(2024) 4 SCC 481; IFFCO V. Bhadra Products : (2018) 2 SCC

534; Mohan Lal Fatehpuria Vs. Bharat Textiles & Ors. : 2025

SCC OnLine SC 2754; Lancor Holdings Limited Vs. Prem

Kumar Menon and Ors. : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2319; Regenta

Hotels Private Limited Vs. Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors.:

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (18 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

2026 SCC OnLine SC 35; C.Velusamy Vs. K. Indhera : 2026

SCC OnLine SC 142; 76

th

Law Commission of India Report on

Arbitration Act, 1940.

18. In light of the foregoing submissions, it was fervently prayed

that the impugned order dated 24.02.2026 be set aside as being

vitiated by patent jurisdictional error; that the conditions imposed

in the order dated 17.09.2024 be restored and maintained in

consonance with the mandate of Section 29-A(4 and 5) of the Act

of 1996; that the arbitral costs be suitably reduced in view of the

alleged non-conduct and delay attributable to the Arbitral Tribunal;

and that the Tribunal itself be substituted in the interest of justice

and to secure the expeditious culmination of the arbitral

proceedings.

D. SUBMISSIONS BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING

ON BEHALF OF AND FOR THE RESPONDENT-HCL :

19. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel, Mr. R.N. Mathur, ably

assisted by learned counsel Mr. Shailesh Kapoor and Mr. Lokesh

Atrey, have opposed the present petition with considerable

vehemence, contending at the threshold that the invocation of

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India is misconceived and not maintainable in view of the statutory

embargo engrafted under Section 5 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, which circumscribes judicial interference in

arbitral proceedings. In support of the said submission, reliance

was placed upon the ratio encapsulated in Radhey Shyam & Anr.

vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 423.

20. It was contended that the learned Commercial Court, upon

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (19 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

a due and comprehensive evaluation of the factual matrix,

including attribution of delay, has exercised its jurisdiction in

accordance with law, and no case for supervisory interference is

made out. It was further urged that, in view of Section 4 of the Act

of 1996 and the cardinal principle of party autonomy underpinning

arbitral jurisprudence, this Court ought to exercise restraint and

refrain from interdicting the arbitral process; and that arbitration,

being an alternate dispute resolution mechanism, is fundamentally

predicated upon mutual consent and party autonomy. Further, it

was contended that in the present case, no allegations pertaining

to mala fides, exorbitant arbitral fees, or maintainability of

successive applications were ever raised before the learned Arbitral

Tribunal, at the appropriate stage. Thus, learned Advocate General

has transgressed the contours of the pleadings in the writ petition

by advancing arguments beyond the scope thereof, rendering such

submissions untenable.

21. Learned Senior Counsel had also drawn attention to the

intrinsic technical complexity and voluminous nature of the dispute,

submitting that the learned Arbitral Tribunal comprising one former

Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and two former Judges of the

High Court, has, till date, conducted as many as 162 sittings. It

was urged that the delay is substantially attributable to the

unprecedented disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and

the recalibration of timelines was undertaken with the consent of

the parties. It was further submitted that even the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of and granted extensions

in limitation and timelines during the pandemic period. It was

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (20 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

further contended that the existence of “sufficient cause” stood

recognized even in the earlier order dated 17.09.2024, albeit

subject to imposition of conditions, which, however, have been

stayed by this Court. It was contended that both the first and

second extensions are amply justified, having regard to the

magnitude and complexity of the dispute involving claims of

approximately Rs. 528 crores, spanning 47 distinct heads across

multiple locations, with pleadings extending to approximately 1,500

pages and accompanied by a voluminous documentary.

22. It was further urged that the arbitral proceedings have

entailed examination and cross-examination of as many as 22

witnesses, involving intricate technical issues, and that till date,

162 sittings have already been conducted and that the final

arguments on behalf of the respondent–claimant-HCL stand

concluded after exhaustive consideration of evidence and

documentation. It was contended that the conduct of the

petitioners themselves has contributed to the delay, inasmuch as

they initiated the arbitral process and have, on record, sought

documents over prolonged durations. Thus, the petitioners’

portrayal of delay is asserted to be factually inaccurate and

misleading. It was also submitted that the determination of

“sufficient cause” is necessarily contingent upon the prevailing

circumstances, and the learned Commercial Court has rightly

exercised its discretion in light of the complexity of the dispute, the

reasons reflected in the order sheets, and the governing judicial

precedents, including Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd.

(supra), C. Veluswamy (supra), and Oil and Natural Gas

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (21 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

Corporation Ltd. (supra), wherein extensions have been upheld

in appropriate cases.

23. Learned Senior Counsel had further submitted that the

interim order passed under Section 31(6) of the Act of 1996 was

delivered consequent upon completion of certain works, which is

not in dispute, and the issue pertaining to performance guarantees

no longer retains material significance. It was thus contended that

the interim measures granted by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section

17 of the Act of 1996 are lawful and justified. Subsequently, it was

argued that neither the statutory framework nor judicial precedent

prescribes any rigid outer limit for extension of time under Section

29A of the Act of 1996, and that the Court is required to exercise a

balanced and circumspect approach, harmonizing the rights of all

stakeholders.

24. In support of the contentions made insofar, learned counsel

have placed reliance upon the ratio encapsulated inter alia, AMR

India Ltd. Vs. NTPC Ltd.: OMP (Misc.) (COMM.) 389/2019;

Bareilly Highway Project Limited Vs. National Highway

Authority of India: OMP (Misc.) (COMM.) 144/2023 ;

Infosys Ltd. Vs. Software Technology Parks of India: OMP

(Misc.) (COMM.) 493/2019; Whirlpool Corporation Vs.

Registrar of Trade Marks: (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; Harbanslal

Sahnia Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.: (2003) 2 SCC 107; L.

Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. : (1997) 3 SCC

261; Rohitash Prasad & Ors. Vs. Saifuddin & Anr.: Civil

Appeal No.5115/2007 ; Patil Rail Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs.

Ministry of Railways (S.B. Civil Misc. Application

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (22 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

No.125/2019).

25. It was auxiliary urged that, in the absence of any express

statutory prohibition, successive applications for extension are

maintainable, and that the conditions imposed by the learned

Commercial Court in its earlier order dated 17.09.2024 qua the

costs, restriction on interest, and limitation on hearings, are

contrary to the statutory scheme, particularly Sections 31A and 18

of the Act of 1996, which respectively govern costs and mandate

equal treatment and fairness to parties; specially when the delay,

at this stage, is attributable to the petitioner-DISCOMs.

26. Learned Senior Counsel had further submitted that the

arbitral proceedings are at a highly advanced stage and are on the

verge of culmination, subject only to cooperation from the

petitioner-DISCOMs. It was contended that the requirements of

Section 24 of the Act of 1996 stand duly complied with, and that

the timelines have been mutually adjusted under the principle of

party autonomy embodied in Section 4 of the Act; thus once such

rights stand waived and no timely objection has been raised, the

petitioner-DISCOMs cannot be permitted to resile therefrom. It was

further urged that day-to-day hearing is not an inflexible mandate

under Section 24(1), and the same must yield to practical

considerations such as availability of parties, health conditions,

witness availability, and other bona fide constraints. It was further

submitted that the allegations of mala fides, bias, and pre-

determination, having been raised for the first time during oral

submissions, before this Court, are clearly an afterthought.

Nevertheless, qua the said issue, if any, the petitioners had

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (23 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

adequate statutory remedies under Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the

Act of 1996 to raise such grievances before the Arbitral Tribunal,

and the present proceedings under Section 29A of the Act, do not

constitute the appropriate forum for adjudication of such issues.

27. Additionally, it was contended that the plea seeking

substitution of the learned Arbitral Tribunal is wholly untenable in

the facts of the case, particularly in light of the advanced stage of

proceedings and the complexity involved, and the stipulation in the

order dated 17.09.2024 regarding completion of proceedings within

14 sittings was not mandatory, being qualified by the expression

“unless the learned Arbitral Tribunal itself permits/asks for the

same.” Learned Senior Counsel had also cautioned that substitution

of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, at this juncture would lead to grave

prejudice, unnecessary duplication, and unwarranted delay, thereby

defeating the very object of arbitration, especially when the

proceedings are at the fag end. It was further submitted that no

costs have been incurred on account of non-effective adjournments

or cancelled hearings, and that the conduct of proceedings at

various venues, including Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Delhi, whether in

physical or virtual mode, was undertaken with mutual consent and

without objection, at that time.

28. It was also submitted that the arbitral fees, including reading

fees and allied expenses, were determined in advance and were

never objected to by the petitioner-DISCOMs, as no application for

re-determination or recalculation of fees was pressed, and

therefore, the present challenge is devoid of merit. Thus,

summarizing the legal propositions advanced, it was contended

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (24 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

that:

28.1 The successive applications for extension under Section 29A

are maintainable;

28.2 Upon demonstration of sufficient cause, extensions are not

circumscribed by any rigid outer limit;

28.3 Imposition of conditions relating to interest, costs, and fee

structure is contrary to the principle of party autonomy and the

scheme of Section 31A;

28.4 Issues concerning independence and impartiality of

arbitrators do not fall within the ambit of Section 29-A proceedings;

and

28.5 Ad hoc arbitral tribunals operate distinctly from institutional

arbitration, and statutory fee schedules are not strictly applicable,

the determination of fees being governed by party autonomy.

29. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed

upon a catena of judgments, inter alia, Kranti Associates Pvt.

Ltd. & Anr. vs. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Anr.,

MANU/SC/0682/2010; Raviraj Udupa vs. United India

Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., MANU/SC/1003/2011;

Cycle Equipments (P) Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi,

MANU/DE/0166/1982; Mekaster Trading Corporation vs.

Union of India, MANU/DE/0701/2003; Siemens Ltd. vs.

Jindal India Thermal Power Ltd.: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7158;

and Patel Engineering Ltd. vs. Himachal Pradesh Power

Corporation Ltd.: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4481. In light of the

aforesaid submissions, it was fervently prayed that the present

petition, being devoid of merit and not maintainable, be dismissed

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (25 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

with exemplary cost, and the reliefs as prayed by the respondent-

HCL in the connected petition, be awarded.

E. CONSIDERATION OF THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

FURNISHED BY THE LEARNED INTERVENERS VIA E-MAIL :

30. During the course of arguments, and in compliance with the

principles of natural justice and the mandate of Section 29A(4) of

the Act of 1996, this Court had directed the Registrar (Judicial) to

notify the learned Arbitral Tribunal and its members, affording them

an opportunity of hearing in the present proceedings. The parties

were likewise directed to intimate the Arbitral Tribunal. It is noted

that pursuant thereto, the learned Arbitral Tribunal vide an

application dated 05.05.2026, sought time of thirty days to file its

response and to participate in the proceedings, which request was

duly allowed, and liberty was granted by this Court, including

facilitation through video conferencing. However, it was pointed out

by the learned counsel representing the parties, that despite such

opportunity, and notwithstanding continuous hearings conducted by

this Court, none of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal have

entered appearance, either in person or through counsel, whether

physically or virtually; however, a brief submission was submitted

by the learned Arbitral Tribunal on 07.05.2026, wherein they have

submitted the time-line of the proceedings.

31. Upon a cautious perusal and consideration thereof, it is

observed that the submissions encompass the scope of limited

response furnished by the Arbitral Tribunal, the factual matrix

underlying the arbitral proceedings, and a request seeking liberty

to file additional submissions.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (26 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

F. DISCUSSION OF THE RIVAL ARGUMENTS AND

ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS OF THIS COURT

a. Relevant excerpts from the impugned orders and the

relevant provisions from the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996:

32. Having accorded careful consideration to the rival

submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, and ante-

proceeding to advert to the merits of the instant lis, this court

deemeth it apposite to reproduce the relevant excerpts from the

impugned orders, along with the pertinent statutory provisions of

the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996, upon which the present

controversy hinges:

Relevant excerpts from the impugned order dated

24.02.2026:

“"37. बहस उभयपक वविद्वान अवधिविक्तागण सुनी गई। पत्राविली का

अध्ययन, अविलोकन तथा उभयपकों की ओर से प्रसुत वलखखित बहस

एविं प्रसुत वकये गये न्यावयक दृष्टान्तों पर मनन वकया जाकर न्यायालय

का वनष्करर वनम प्रकार से है वक-

38. यह सही एविं स्वीकृ्व त है वक मध्यस्थता अवधिवनयम, 1996 का मूल

उदेश समयबद प्रवकया है। लेवकन समयबद प्रवकया मे हमको यह

देखिना होगा वक विह समय कै से, क्यों लग रहा है और क्या लगा हुआ

समय विावजब है या नहीं। यहां प्रकरण मे प्राथर/विादी ने प्रतेक पेशी

विार अपना सष्टीकरण वदया है जो सही एविं उवचत प्रतीत होता है।

समयबदता का मूलांकन पररखस्थवतयों के संदभरमे वकया जाना

आविशक है। मात्र समय व्यतीत हो जाना स्वतः घातक नहीं है।

न्यायालय को यह देखिना होगा वक वविलंब असम्यक है या न्यायोवचत

कारणों से हुआ। यह पत्राविली से सष्ट है वक प्रतेक वतवथ पर प्राथर

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (27 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

द्वारा सष्टीकरण वदया गया था तथा स्थगन के कारण आदेश-पत्रों मे

दजर है। इसवलए वविलंब को एकपकीय रूप से अनुवचत नहीं कहा जा

सकता। इसवलए उक्त आकेप अप्राथर का स्वीकार नहीं वकया जाता

है।

39. पत्राविली के अविलोकन से यह सष्ट है वक अप्राथरगण का आकेप

यह भी है वक अवधिवनयम , 1996 का उदेश समयबद वनसारण है। इस

तथ से न्यायालय पूणरतः सहमत है। तथावप यहां यह भी स्वीकृ्व त तथ

है जो प्राथर एविं अप्राथरगण ने वकया है वक इस वविचाराधिीन मध्यस्थता

की प्रवक्रिया के समक भारी वविविाद है , जो वक 6 कायर आदेश के भारी

प्रकरण है , जो लगभग 530 करोड रूपये की रावश के संबंधि मे

वविचाराधिीन है , इसवलए इतने बडे प्रकरण को ऐसा नहीं कहा जा

सकता वक शीघ ही वनसाररत कर वदया जाए। शीघता के नाम पर

न्यावयक संतुलन से समझौता नहीं वकया जा सकता। अवधिदेश समाप

करने से पूरी प्रवक्रिया पुनः प्रारंवभक अविस्था मे जाएगी। इससे न्यावयक

समय और संसाधिनों का अपव्यय होगा। धिारा 29A न्यायालय को

पयारप कारण होने पर वविसार का अवधिकार देती है। उक्त वितरमान

पररखस्थवतयों मे पयारप कारण वविद्यमान है। ऐसी खस्थवत मे उक्त तकर

भी अप्राथर का स्वीकार नहीं है। प्राथर को ओर से माननीय राजस्थान

उच न्यायालय मे ररट अभी वविचाराधिीन है। यह अप्राथर का तकर भी

वक स्थगन 'दूसरी समय बढ़ाने का प्राथरना पत्र नहीं लग सकता, क्योंक्यवक

ना तो अवधिवनयम और ना ही माननीय उच न्यायालय ने अवधिदेश

बढ़ाने के संबंधि मे दूसरा प्राथरना पत्र पर कोई मनाही की है।

40. यहां यह भी उलेखिनीय है वक जहां तक वक बहस के दौरान प्राथर

की ओर से कथन वकया गया वक विे वपछले जून , 2025 मे ही अपनी

बहस पूरी कर चुके है , अनाविशक समय अप्राथर की ओर से ही वलया

जा रहा है। अब हम आज वितरमान मे फरविरी , 2026 मे है , वजसमे

यथासमवि प्राथर के द्वारा 2023, 2024 वि 2025 मे सुनविाई होना बताया

गया है। ऐसी खस्थवत मे प्राथर की बहस जून , 2025 मे ही पूणर हो चुकी

है। अब तो अप्राथर की बहस ही हाकर प्रकरण का वनसारण होना ही

बाकी रहा है।

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (28 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

41. अप्राथरगण का दूसरा आकेप यह है वक 05 विरर से लंवबत प्रवक्रिया

को समाप कर पुनः प्रारंभ करना उवचत होगा। न्यायालय इस तकर से

सहमत नहीं है, क्योंक्यवक वितरमान मे कायरविाही उन्नत अविस्था मे है। प्राथर

की अंवतम बहस जून, 2025 मे पूणर हो चुकी है, के विल अप्राथरगण की

बहस शेर है। इस सर पर अवधिदेश समाप करने से पुनः जवटलता

उत्पन्न होगी। वविशाल अवभलेखि का पुनपारठ आविशक होगा। इससे

समय और संसाधिनों की और अवधिक हावन होगी। अतः यह आपवत

इस न्यायालय के समक अस्वीकायर है।

42. इस न्यायालय के वविनम मत मे अवधिवनयम, 1996 की धिारा 5 के

अनुसार न्यावयक हसकेप सीवमत है। धिारा 14 (1) (क) मे असम्यक

वविलंब की खस्थवत का उलेखि है। न्यायालय को यह देखिना है वक क्या

ऐसा वविलंब वसद हुआ है। अवभलेखि मे ऐसा कोई सष्ट संके त नहीं है

वक न्यायावधिकरण वनखष्क्रिय रहा हो। कई अविसरों पर स्थगन

न्यायावधिकरण के कारण भी हुआ हुआ है। कु छ स्थगन पककारों की

व्यखक्तगत कवठनाइयों से संबंवधित थे। ऐसी खस्थवत मे असम्यक वविलंब

का वनष्करर नहीं वनकाला जा सकता। अतः अवधिदेश समाखप का

आधिार नहीं बनता।

43. पत्राविली के अविलोकन से यह भी सष्ट है वक अप्राथरगण द्वारा

न्यायावधिकरण की वनष्पकता पर संदेह व्यक्त वकया गया। वकन्तु इस

संबंधि मे कोई ठोस दस्साविेज पत्राविली पर प्रसुत नहीं वकया गया।

धिारा 29A की कायरविाही चुनौती का मच नहीं है। यवद पकपात का

विासवविक आधिार हो तो पृ्वथक वविवधिक उपाय उपलब है। के विल संदेह

मात्र पयारप नहीं है। प्राथर का न्यावयक अवधिकरण पर गमीर संदेह

उत्पन्न करना , वकस कारण हुआ , जो भी उवचत प्रतीत नहीं हो रहा है ,

जबवक ऐसा कोई ठोस कारण अप्राथर की ओर से नहीं बताया गया वक

उनको संदेह है। अवभलेखि मे न्यायावधिकरण द्वारा पकपातपूणर आचरण

का संके त नहीं है। कायरविाही दोनों पकों को सुनकर संचावलत की गई।

अतः अप्राथरगण का यह आकेप भी वनरस वकये जाने योग है।

44. इस न्यायालय के वविनम मत मे वदनांक 17.09.2024 के आदेश मे 07

सत्रों की शतर अवधिरोवपत की गई थी। उक्त शतर पर माननीय

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (29 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

राजस्थान उच न्यायालय द्वारा स्थगन प्रदान वकया गया है। स्थगन

आदेश का प्रभावि व्यापक है। इससे पूविर शतर का वक्रियान्वयन स्थवगत

माना जाएगा। अप्राथरगण का यह तकर वक 07 सत्रों मे ही कायरविाही पूणर

होनी चावहए, स्वीकायर नहीं है। उच न्यायालय के आदेश के आलोक

मे शतर प्रभाविी नहीं है। अतः इस आधिार पर वविसार अस्वीकार नहीं

वकया जा सकता। यह आपवत भी अप्राथरगण की अस्वीकार की जाती

है। साथ ही अप्राथर का यह तकर वक मध्यस्थ की फीस / शुल कम की

जाविे। इस संबंधि मे धिारा 29A(4) के परंतुक मे प्राविधिान है वक फीस को

कम करने से पूविर मध्यस्थ को सुनविाई का मौका वदया जाएगा। यहां

उक्त प्रकरण मे ऐसा कोई आधिार प्रतीत नहीं है वजससे मध्यस्थ की

फीस को कम वकया जाविे। अप्राथरगण की उक्त आपवत भी अस्वीकार

की जातीं है।

45. उपरोक्त समस कारणों के आधिार पर अप्राथरगण की सभी

आपवतयाँ वनरस की जाती है। यह न्यायालय पाता है वक माध्यस्थम

कायरविाही अंवतम चरण मे है, के विल अप्राथरगण की बहस शेर है।

'प्रकरण की जवटलता और पररमाण वविसार की मांग करते है।

इसवलए धिारा 29A (5) के अंतगरत प्राथरना पत्र स्वीकार वकये जाने योग

है।

-: आदेश :-

46. अतः उपरोक्त तथ एविं पररखस्थवतयों मे प्राथर द्वारा प्रसुत प्राथरना

पत्र अन्तगरत धिारा 29ए माध्यस्थम एविं सुलह अवधिवनयम, 1996 बाबत

वविद्वान मध्यस्थ न्यायावधिकरण के अवधिदेश का वविसार वकये जाने हेतु,

स्वीकार वकया जाकर आदेवशत वकया जाता है वक-

i. प्राथर द्वारा अपने प्राथरना पत्र के माध्यम से अवधिदेश वविसार वदनांक

01.05. 2025 से 30.04.2026 तक मांगा गया है। वितरमान मे माह फरविरी ,

2026 चल रहा है तथा मांगी गई अविवधि अप्रैल , 2026 तक सीवमत है।

अतः पूविर मे व्यतीत अविवधि को समावविष्ट करते हुए तथा कायरविाही को

प्रभाविी रूप से पूणर कराने के उदेश से मध्यस्थ अवधिकरण का

अवधिदेश वदनांक 30.04. 2025 से बढाकर 30.09.2026 तक वविसाररत

वकया जाता है।

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (30 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

ii. मध्यस्थ अवधिकरण को वनदरक्यवशत वकया जाता है वक विह वदनांक

30.09. 2026 तक समस माध्यस्थम कायरविावहयाँ पूणर कर अंवतम

अवधिवनणरय पाररत करने का प्रयास वकया जाविे।

iii. पककार अनाविशक स्थगन से परहेज करेगे तथा कायरविाही मे पूणर

सहयोग प्रदान करेगे।

iv. प्राथरना पत्र का व्यय पककारान स्वयं विहन करेगे। "

(Emphasis supplied)

Relevant excerpts from the impugned order dated

17.09.2024:

"56. However, unfortunately the hearing on the dates

fixed in the month of August and September (from

01.09.2024 to 03.09.2024) could not be resumed on

account of different reasons and now hearing is fixed

for 28.09.2024 onwards.

57. Therefore, it is amply clear that reasons of delay

in conclusion of arbitral tribunal are largely

attributable to the applicant/claimant, if not solely.

58. In the considered opinion of this court the

applicant/claimant alone cannot be blamed for

the delay in the teeth of the hard fact that

neither learned tribunal declined to accede to

the unreasonable requests of adjournments

made from applicant/claimant's side, nor even

non-applicant/respondents objected to the

same.

59. Be that as it may, the applicant/claimant

side nevertheless has to face some befitting

consequences for the delay occurred in

conclusion of arbitration proceedings on account

of his active role, ignoring the passive role of

learned arbitral tribunal and non-

applicant/respondents, if this court forms its

opinion in favor of extension of learned arbitral

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (31 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

tribunal's mandate.

60. Although, as discussed herein above, the

reasons for delay concluding the arbitration

proceedings have been found largely

attributable to the applicant/claimant.

61. However, looking to the advance stage at which

the arbitration proceedings are presently pending

(final arguments) and considerable time as well as

expenses already invested by the parties,

treating these factors as constituting sufficient

cause for further extension of learned arbitral

tribunal's mandate for another 20 months from

31.08.2023, this court is inclined to extend the

mandate accordingly, subject however to

imposing exemplary costs on applicant/claimant

side and laying certain terms and conditions to

be abided by all concerned in discharge of

obligations imposed on the court under Section

29A (5) & (8) of the Act.

62. Thus, in view of the opinion formed while

adverting to Point Nos. 1 to 4, this court is inclined to

extend the mandate for further 20 months time period

from 31.08.2023 on payment of exemplary costs by

applicant/claimant side and laying certain terms and

condition as envisaged under Section 29A (5) & (8) of

the Act in order to ensure timely conclusion of

arbitration proceedings.

ORDER

63. Therefore, the mandate of learned arbitral tribunal

in this matter is hereby extended for further 20

months time period from 31.08.2023, i.e. uptil 30th

April 2025, subject to payment of Rs. 1,00,000/- (one

lac only) as exemplary costs by the

applicant/claimant.

64. The applicant/claimant shall deposit the amount of

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (32 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

exemplary costs in the 'Litigants Welfare Fund'

maintained by the Registrar General, Hon'ble

Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur and submit the 1

receipt thereof in this court within 07 days from

today, else the instant application shall stand

dismissed without extension of the mandate of

learned arbitral tribunal.

65 . Each side shall be afforded a maximum of 07

hearings (14 sessions) in all for addressing verbal

arguments (except permitted otherwise by learned

arbitral tribunal) and thereafter no written

submissions shall be accepted on behalf of the party

availing opportunity of verbal hearing, unless learned

arbitral tribunal itself permits/asks for the same.

66. Entire expenses in arranging meetings of arbitral

tribunal as well as entire fees payable to the members

of learned arbitral, tribunal, for the hearings post

17.12.2023 onwards, shall be exclusively borne/paid

by the applicant/claimant alone (otherwise required to

be shared by both the sides).

67. Consequentially, the applicant/claimant shall

refund to non-applicant/respondents their share, if

already paid by them qua оn or before the arbitration

proceedings are reserved for passing the award by the

learned arbitral tribunal, else the mandate of learned

arbitral tribunal shall stand expired on the date when

arbitration proceedings are reserved for passing the

award.

68. No interest from 18.02.2024 till award is passed

shall be awarded to applicant/claimant by learned

arbitral tribunal, in case its claim(s) is/are allowed.

69. Instant application filed by applicant/claimant is

hereby disposed of accordingly."

(Emphasis supplied)

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (33 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

XXXX

Relevant excerpts from the provisions of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:

Section 2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the

context otherwise requires,-

a) ....

b) ....

c) “arbitral award” includes an interim award;

Section 4. Waiver of right to object .—A party who

knows that—

(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties

may derogate, or

(b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement,

has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the

arbitration without stating his objection to such non-

compliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is

provided for stating that objection, within that period

of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so

object.

Section 5. Extent of judicial intervention. —

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law

for the time being in force, in matters governed by this

Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where

so provided in this Part.

Section 8. Power to refer parties to arbitration

where there is an arbitration agreement.-

(1) ..

(2) ..

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made

under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (34 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be

commenced or continued and an arbitral award made .

Section 11. Appointment of arbitrators -

XXXX

14.The arbitral institution shall determine the fees of

the arbitral tribunal and the manner of its payment to

the arbitral tribunal subject to the rates specified in

the Fourth Schedule.

Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby

clarified that this sub-section shall not apply to

international commercial arbitration and in

arbitration's (other than international commercial

arbitration) where parties have agreed for

determination of fees as per the rules of an arbitral

institution.] [Substituted by Act No. 33 of 2019, dated

9.8.2019.]

Section 12. Grounds for challenge

(1)XXXXX

(2) XXXXX

(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—

(a) circumstances exist that give rise to

justifiable doubts as to his independence or

impartiality, or

(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed

to by the parties.

(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator

appointed by him, or in whose appointment he

has participated, only for reasons of which he

becomes aware after the appointment has been

made.

(5) XXXX

Section 13. Challenge procedure .—(1) Subject to

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (35 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

sub-section (4), the parties are free to agree on a

procedure for challenging an arbitrator.

(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section

(1), a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator

shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the

constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming

aware of any circumstances referred to in sub-section

(3) of section 12, send a written statement of the

reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal.

(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub-section

(2) withdraws from his office or the other party agrees

to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on

the challenge.

(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by

the parties or under the procedure under sub-section

(2) is not successful, the arbitral tribunal shall

continue the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral

award.

(5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub-section

(4), the party challenging the arbitrator may make an

application for setting aside such an arbitral award in

accordance with section 34.

(6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an

application made under sub-section (5), the Court may

decide as to whether the arbitrator who is challenged

is entitled to any fees.

Section 14. Failure or impossibility to act. —(1)

The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate and he

shall be substituted by another arbitrator, if-

(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform

his functions or for other reasons fails to act without

undue delay; and

(b) he withdraws from his office or the parties agree to

the termination of his mandate.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (36 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the

grounds referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), a

party may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties,

apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the

mandate.

(3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of section

13, an arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party

agrees to the termination of the mandate of an

arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity

of any ground referred to in this section or sub-section

(3) of section 12.

Section 18. Equal treatment of parties —The

parties shall be treated with equality and each party

shall be given a full opportunity to present this case.

Section 19. Determination of rules of procedure-

(1) The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).

(2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to agree

on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal

in conducting its proceedings.

(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section

(2), the arbitral tribunal may, subject to this Part,

conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers

appropriate.

(4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub-

section (3) includes the power to determine the

admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any

evidence.

Section 20. Place of arbitration-(1) The parties are

free to agree on the place of arbitration.

(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (37 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

(1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the

arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of

the case, including the convenience of the parties.

(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section

(2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed

by the parties, meet at anyplace it considers

appropriate for consultation among its members, for

hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for

inspection of documents, goods or other property.

Section 23. Statement of claim and defense-

1)...

2)...

3)..

4) The statement of claim and defence under this

section shall be completed within a period of six

months from the date the arbitrator or all the

arbitrators, as the case may be, received notice, in

writing of their appointment.

Section 24. Hearings and written proceedings -

(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral

tribunal shall decide whether to hold oral hearings for

the presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or

whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the

basis of documents and other materials:

Provided that the arbitral tribunal shall hold oral

hearings, at an appropriate stage of the proceedings,

on a request by a party, unless the parties have

agreed that no oral hearing shall be held:

Provided further that the arbitral tribunal shall,

as far as possible, hold oral hearings for the

presentation of evidence or for oral argument on

day-to-day basis, and not grant any

adjournments unless sufficient cause is made

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (38 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

out, and may impose costs including exemplary

costs on the party seeking adjournment without

any sufficient cause.

(2) The parties shall be given sufficient advance notice

of any hearing and of any meeting of the arbitral

tribunal for the purposes of inspection of documents,

goods or other property.

(3) All statements, documents or other information

supplied to, or applications made to the arbitral

tribunal by one party shall be communicated to the

other party, and any expert report or evidentiary

document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in

making its decision shall be communicated to the

parties.

Section 29A. Time limit for arbitral award .—

(1)The award in matters other than international

commercial arbitration shall be made by the

arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve

months from the date of completion of pleadings

under sub-section (4) of section 23 :

Provided that the award in the matter of international

commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously

as possible and endeavor may be made to dispose of

the matter within a period of twelve months from the

date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4)

of section 23.

(2) If the award is made within a period of six months

from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the

reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to

receive such amount of additional fees as the parties

may agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period

specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a

further period not exceeding six months.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (39 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

(4) If the award is not made within the period

specified in sub-section (1) or the extended

period specified under sub-section (3), the

mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate

unless the Court has, either prior to or after the

expiry of the period so specified, extended the

period:

Provided that while extending the period

under this sub-section, if the Court finds

that the proceedings have been delayed

for the reasons attributable to the arbitral

tribunal, then, it may order reduction of

fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five

per cent. for each month of such delay.

Provided further that where an

application under sub-section (5) is

pending, the mandate of the arbitrator

shall continue till the disposal of the said

application:

Provided also that the arbitrator shall be

given an opportunity of being heard

before the fees is reduced.

(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-

section (4) may be on the application of any of

the parties and may be granted only for

sufficient cause and on such terms and

conditions as may be imposed by the Court .

(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-

section (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute

one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the

arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings

shall continue from the stage already reached and on

the basis of the evidence and material already on

record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this

section shall be deemed to have received the said

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (40 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under

this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted

shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously

appointed arbitral tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or

exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this

section.

(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be

disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible

and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter

within a period of sixty days from the date of service

of notice on the opposite party.

Section 29B. Fast track procedure. —(1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,

the parties to an arbitration agreement, may, at

any stage either before or at the time of

appointment of the arbitral tribunal, agree in

writing to have their dispute resolved by fast

track procedure specified in sub-section (3).

(2) The parties to the arbitration agreement, while

agreeing for resolution of dispute by fast track

procedure, may agree that the arbitral tribunal shall

consist of a sole arbitrator who shall be chosen by the

parties.

(3) The arbitral tribunal shall follow the following

procedure while conducting arbitration proceedings

under sub-section (1):—

(a) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the

dispute on the basis of written pleadings,

documents and submissions filed by the

parties without any oral hearing;

(b) The arbitral tribunal shall have power to call

for any further information or clarification from

the parties in addition to the pleadings and

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (41 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

documents filed by them;

(c) An oral hearing may be held only, if, all the

parties make a request or if the arbitral

tribunal considers it necessary to have oral

hearing for clarifying certain issues;

(d) The arbitral tribunal may dispense with

any technical formalities, if an oral hearing is

held, and adopt such procedure as deemed

appropriate for expeditious disposal of the

case.

(4) The award under this section shall be made

within a period of six months from the date the

arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference.

(5) If the award is not made within the period

specified in sub-section (4), the provisions of sub-

sections (3) to (9) of section 29A shall apply to the

proceedings.

(6) The fees payable to the arbitrator and the manner

of payment of the fees shall be such as may be agreed

between the arbitrator and the parties.

Section 31. Form and contents of arbitral award-

1)....

(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the

arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award

on any matter with respect to which it may make a

final arbitral award

Section 31A. Regime for costs .—(1) In relation to

any arbitration proceeding or a proceeding under any

of the provisions of this Act pertaining to the

arbitration, the Court or arbitral tribunal,

notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Civil Procedure,1908 (5 of 1908), shall have the

discretion to determine—

(a) whether costs are payable by one party to

another;

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (42 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

(b) the amount of such costs; and

(c) when such costs are to be paid.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,

“costs” means reasonable costs relating to—

(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, Courts

and witnesses;

(ii) legal fees and expenses;

(iii) any administration fees of the institution

supervising the arbitration; and

(iv) any other expenses incurred in connection with

the arbitral or Court proceedings and the arbitral

award.

(2) If the Court or arbitral tribunal decides to make an

order as to payment of costs,—

(a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party

shall be ordered to pay the costs of the successful

party; or

(b) the Court or arbitral tribunal may make a

different order for reasons to be recorded in writing.

(3) In determining the costs, the Court or arbitral

tribunal shall have regard to all the circumstances,

including—

(a) the conduct of all the parties;

(b) whether a party has succeeded partly in the

case;

(c) whether the party had made a frivolous

counterclaim leading to delay in the disposal of the

arbitral proceedings; and

(d) whether any reasonable offer to settle the

dispute is made by a party and refused by the other

party.

(4) The Court or arbitral tribunal may make any order

under this section including the order that a party shall

pay—

(a) a proportion of another party’s costs;

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (43 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

(b) a stated amount in respect of another party’s

costs;

(c) costs from or until a certain date only;

(d) costs incurred before proceedings have begun;

(e) costs relating to particular steps taken in the

proceedings;

(f) costs relating only to a distinct part of the

proceedings; and

(g) interest on costs from or until a certain date.

(5) An agreement which has the effect that a party is

to pay the whole or part of the costs of the arbitration

in any event s

hall be only valid if such agreement is made after the

dispute in question has arisen.

THE FOURTH SCHEDULE

[See section 11(14)]

Sr.No. Sum in dispute Model fee

(1) (2) (3)

1. Up to Rs. 5,00,000 Rs. 45,000

2. Above Rs. 5,00,000 and

up to Rs. 20,00,000

Rs. 45,000 plus 3.5 per cent.

of the claim amount over and

above Rs. 5,00,000

3. Above Rs. 20,00,000

and up to Rs.

1,00,00,000

Rs. 97,500 plus 3 per cent. of

the claim amount over and

above Rs. 20,00,000

4. Above Rs.1,00,00,000

and up to Rs.

10,00,00,000

Rs. 3,37,500 plus 1 per cent.

of the claim amount over and

above Rs. 1,00,00,000

5. Above Rs. 10,00,00,000

and up to Rs.

20,00,00,000

Rs. 12,37,500 plus 0.75 per

cent. of the claim amount

over and above Rs.

1,00,00,000

6. Above Rs. 20,00,00,000 Rs. 19,87,500 plus 0.5 per

cent. of the claimamount over

and above Rs. 20,00,00,000

with a ceiling of Rs.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (44 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

30,00,000

Note:—In the event, the arbitral tribunal is a sole arbitrator, he

shall be entitled to an additional amount of twenty-five per cent.

on the fee payable as per the table set out above.”

(Emphasis supplied)

This Court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case, has tabulated the relevant dates for the sake of clarity and

convenience, which are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

Date Particulars of

Order/Proceedings

Hearing

No.

Delay Attributable to

STAGE-I- Pre-Arbitration & Constitution of Tribunal

27.09.2019 Notice u/S. 11 of the Arbitration &

Conciliation Act, 1996, Invoking

Arbitration by Claimant

-

20.08.2020

(VC)

1st Order passed by Arbitral

Tribunal, Time to file Statement of

Claim granted till 31.10.2020

NDOH: 06.11.2020

1st Hearing

STAGE-II-Pleadings

31.08.2021

(VC)

Pleadings Complete

NDOH: 27.11.2021 (For recording

of evidence)

7th HearingPleadings Completed

STAGE V - 1st Mandate Expiry (28.02.2023) & Continued Proceedings

28.02.2023 Mandate of Arbitral Tribunal

Expired for the first time (12-

months statutory period)

- 1st Mandate Expiry

14.07.2023 1st Application seeking extension

of Mandate filed before the

Rajasthan High Court

- 1st S.29A Application

filed by Claimant

31.08.2023 Mandate of Arbitral Tribunal

expired for the second time (by

consent till 31.08.2023)

- 2nd Mandate Expiry

STAGE VII - Commerical Court Order (S.29A) Dated 17.09.2024 & Post-

Extension Proceedings

17.09.2024 Order passed by Commercial

Court: Mandate of Tribunal

extended from 31.08.2023 to

30.04.2025 (20 Months)

- S.29A Extension on

1

st

Application (2

nd

)

11.10.2024 Arguments heard on S.17

Application filed by Claimant;

NDOH: 28.10.2024

105th

Hearing

-

28.10.2024 At order (para 7): 'From NDOH,

de novo hearing of the matter

would commence.' *Arbitrator J.

VL Gupta's mandate terminated;

Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Kumar

nominated as Co-Arbitrator*

NDOH: 20-22.12.2024, 16-

18.01.2025

106th

Hearing

Tribunal

reconstituted

de novo hearing

orders

22.04.2025 2nd Application seeking extension - 2nd S.29A

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (45 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

of Mandate filed before the

Commercial Court

Application filed by

Claimant

30.04.2025 Mandate of Arbitral Tribunal

Expired for the Third Time

- 3rd Mandate Expiry

16-

18.06.2025

Final Arguments on behalf of

Claimant Completed on

17.06.2025. Final Arguments on

behalf of DISCOMs to commence.

*Total for Claimant: 27 hearing-

dates/ 50 Sessions.*

145th

-150th

Hearing (50

Sessions

Total)

Claimant's final

arguments concluded

STAGE VIII - Respondents' Final Arguments & Interim Award

25.09.2025 Interim Award passed by Arbitral

Tribunal (during pendency of

S.29A application before

Commercial Court)

NDOH: 06.10.2025

24-

26.02.2026

Final Arguments on behalf of

DISCOMs commenced

NDOH: 28.04.2026

157th -

162nd

Hearing

Petitioners

Arguments

Commenced

24.02.2026 Order passed by the Hon'ble

Commercial Court Jaipur to

extend the mandate till

30.09.2026

- 2

nd

Application

granting

Extension

b. The issues arising for determination in the instant lis :

33. Upon according solicitous consideration to the rival contentions

advanced by the learned counsel qua the substantive particulars

delineated supra, and upon a meticulous scrutiny of the

documentary evidence in conjunction with the governing legal

tenets, and the judgments cited at the Bar, this court proceedeth to

record its opinion, noteworthy record, qua the undisputed facts and

adjudicatory determinations on the issues framed, ad-seriatim.

34. Before adverting to the rival contentions and the issues

framed for determination, it would be apposite to delineate the

undisputed factual matrix emerging from the record, which forms

the foundational backdrop of the present lis, as:

34.1 That it is an admitted position that disputes arose between

the parties, pursuant to which a notice invoking arbitration dated

27.09.2019 was issued. The relevant clause i.e. Clause 8.2 of the

GCC which empowered the aggrieved party, to proceed with the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (46 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

arbitration proceedings, is reproduced hereinbelow:

" Clause 8:

8.1XXXXX

8.2The formal mechanism for the resolution of

disputes shall be:

If the parties fail to resolve such a dispute or

difference by mutual consultation within twenty-

eight (28) days from the commencement of such

dispute and difference, either party may require

that the dispute be referred for resolution to the

formal mechanisms, described below (The date of

commencement of the dispute shall be taken from

the date when this clause reference is quoted by

either party in a formal communication clearly

mentioning existence of dispute or as mutually

agreed):

a. The mechanism for resolution of disputes for

bidders shall be in accordance with the Indian

Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. The Arbitral

Tribunal shall consist of 3 (Three) Arbitrators. Each

Party shall nominate an Arbitrator and the two

nominated Arbitrators shall mutually agree and

nominate a third Presiding Arbitrator.

b. The Arbitrators shall necessarily be retired

High Court Judges and the umpire shall be a

retired Chief Justice.

C. The place for arbitration shall be the state

of Rajasthan."

(Emphasis supplied)

34.2 That the arbitral proceedings commenced, and the first

preliminary hearing was conducted on 27.07.2020, with the first

effective date before the Arbitral Tribunal fixed as 20.08.2020. A

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (47 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

three-member Arbitral Tribunal was duly constituted, comprising

one nominee arbitrator from each side and a Presiding Arbitrator

appointed with mutual consent.

34.3 That owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and with mutual

understanding between the parties, the timeline for

commencement of claims was reckoned from 01.03.2022 in terms

of Section 23(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is

also not in dispute that the arbitral proceedings involve claims of

approximately Rs. 528 crores, accompanied by voluminous

pleadings and documents, and that approximately 162 hearings

have been conducted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.

34.4 That the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal, in terms of Section

29A, was initially determined to expire on 28.02.2023, which was

subsequently extended by mutual consent of the parties till

31.08.2023.

34.5 That an application seeking further extension of the

mandate was filed by the respondent-claimant on 14.07.2023

before the competent Commercial Court under Section 29A(4) of

the Act of 1996.

34.6 That vide a conditional order dated 17.09.2024, the

Commercial Court extended the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal for

a further period of 20 months, i.e., from 01.09.2023 to

30.04.2025, while imposing certain conditions including costs and

restrictions on fee and interest. However, the said conditions,

except the grant of extension, were stayed by this Court in SB Civil

Writ Petition No.16033/2024 vide order dated 22.10.2024.

34.7 That prior to the expiry of the extended mandate on

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (48 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

30.04.2025, a second application for extension under Section 29A

was moved by the respondent-claimant-HCL on 22.04.2025; and

the petitioner-DISCOMs have opposed the maintainability of the

said successive application.

34.8 That the learned Commercial Court, vide impugned order

dated 24.02.2026, further extended the mandate of the Arbitral

Tribunal till 30.09.2026.

34.9 That as on date, it is an admitted position that the arbitral

proceedings have reached an advanced stage, with evidence having

been recorded and final arguments substantially concluded.

35. In light of the aforesaid undisputed factual matrix, and

having regard to the rival submissions advanced at the Bar, this

Court now deems it apposite to proceedth an issue-wise analysis

for the purpose of an effective and comprehensive adjudication of

the matter at hand.

Issue No. 1 : Whether the present petition is maintainable

under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of

India, before this Court?

36. At the outset, it is well settled that though the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained code, the

constitutional remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India remain available in exceptional circumstances.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering

Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 , categorically held that orders passed by

courts or judicial authorities including the Tribunals under the Act

are amenable to judicial review under Article 227, albeit within a

narrow compass. This position has been further clarified and

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (49 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

reinforced in Deep Industries Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas

Corporation Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 706 , wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, while cautioning against excessive interference,

held that petitions under Articles 226/227 would be maintainable

against orders passed in arbitration proceedings, provided that the

Court exercises such jurisdiction sparingly, in cases of patent lack

of jurisdiction, perversity, or manifest injustice. The Court observed

that though Section 37 of the Act of 1996 provides for limited

appeals, it does not completely bar constitutional remedies. The

relevant extract from Deep Industries Ltd. (supra) is

reproduced hereinbelow:

“15. Most significant of all is the non- obstante

clause contained in Section 5 states that

notwithstanding anything contained in any

other law, in matters that arise under Part I

of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority

shall intervene except where so provided in

this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of

first appeal against certain judgments and orders

and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also

provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a

second appeal being field.

16. This being the case, there is no doubt

whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders

passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire

arbitral process would be derailed and would not

come to fruition for many years. At the same

time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a

constitutional provision which remains

untouched by the non-obstante clause of

Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances,

what is important to note is that though

petitions can be filed under Article 227

against judgments allowing or dismissing first

appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the

High Court would be extremely circumspect in

interfering with the same, taking into account

the statutory policy as adumbrated by us

herein above so that interference is restricted

to orders that are passed which are patently

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (50 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

lacking in inherent jurisdiction.”

(Emphasis supplied)

37. Further, in the ratio encapsulated in Bhaven Construction

v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd.,

(2022) 1 SCC 75, the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively held

that while the legislative policy is to minimize judicial interference,

recourse to Articles 226/227 is not absolutely barred. However,

such intervention is warranted only in rare and exceptional cases

where one party is left remediless under the statute or where there

is a clear bad faith, arbitrariness, or jurisdictional error. The Court

emphasized that the High Court must be circumspect and should

not entertain petitions which can be effectively addressed within

the arbitral framework.

38. Thus, applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of

the present case, it is evident that the impugned order passed by

the Commercial Court under Section 29A, extending the mandate

of the Arbitral Tribunal in an allegedly ambiguous and legally

unsustainable manner, is not amenable to any statutory appeal

under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Consequently, the petitioners

are left without an efficacious alternative remedy under the statute.

In such circumstances, where (i) the impugned order is alleged to

suffer from jurisdictional infirmities, (ii) the statutory scheme does

not provide for an appellate mechanism against such an order, and

(iii) grave prejudice is stated to have been caused to the

petitioners, the invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this

Court cannot be said to be barred. Therefore, in view of the law laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments,

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (51 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

this Court holds that the present petition is maintainable under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, albeit within the self-

imposed limitations governing the exercise of such jurisdiction in

arbitral matters.

Issue No. 2 : Whether the subsequent second application

under Section 29A of the Act of 1996 is maintainable?

39. A careful and purposive interpretation of Section 29A of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when read in light of the

evolving jurisprudence of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, makes it

abundantly clear that while the provision does not expressly

prohibit successive applications for extension of the mandate of the

Arbitral Tribunal, the same cannot be permitted in a routine or

mechanical fashion so as to defeat the very object of the statute.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the dictum enunciated in Associate

Builders v. Delhi Development Authority : (2015) 3 SCC 49,

though in a different context, emphasized that arbitral proceedings

must adhere to the principles of efficiency, expedition, and minimal

judicial interference, which form the backbone of the Act of 1996;

and that procedural provisions under the Act must be construed in

a manner that advances the cause of justice rather than defeats it,

while simultaneously cautioning that statutory timelines are not to

be rendered otiose.

40. Qua the matter at hand, it is noteworthy that as per the

ratio encapsulated in Rohan Builders (supra), and the above

cited dictum; the jurisprudential thread running through these

authorities is that while the Court retains the power to extend the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (52 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

mandate, even more than once, such power is circumscribed by the

requirement of “sufficient cause,” which must be construed strictly.

The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be elastic to the extent of

accommodating indolence, tactical delays, or procedural laxity on

the part of the claimant or the tribunal. Rather, the Court must

adopt a calibrated approach, balancing the need for expeditious

resolution with the demands of substantive justice, particularly in

complex, document-heavy arbitrations. In this context, it is also

apposite to note that the scheme of Section 29A(4) and (5)

contemplates judicial intervention only as an exception, and not as

the norm. Repeated recourse to extensions risks undermining the

statutory discipline envisaged under Section 23(4) and Section

29A, thereby converting arbitration into a time-consuming process

akin to traditional litigation, an outcome that the legislature

consciously sought to avoid. The relevant extract from Rohan

Builders (supra), is reproduced hereinbelow:

“18.The legislature vide the 2015 Amendment

envisions arbitration as a litigant-centric process

by expediting disposal of cases and reducing the

cost of litigation. A narrow interpretation will be

counterproductive. The intention is appropriately

captured in the following observations made in the

176th Report of the Law Commission of India :

2.21.1 (...)But the omission of the provision for

extension of time and therefore the absence of any

time limit has given rise to another problem, namely,

that awards are getting delayed before the arbitral

tribunal even under the 1996 Act. One view is that

this is on account of the absence of a provision as to

time limit for passing an award.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (53 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

xx xx xx

2.21.3 (...) The time limit can be more realistic

subject to extension only by the court. Delays

ranging from five years to even fourteen years

in a single arbitration have come to the

Commission's notice. The Supreme Court of

India has also referred to these delays of the

arbitral tribunal. The point here is that these

delays are occurring even in cases where there

is no court intervention during the arbitral

process. The removal of the time limit is having

its own adverse consequences. There can be a

provision for early disposal of the applications

for extension, if that is one of the reasons for

omitting a provision prescribing a time limit, say

one month. Parties can be permitted to extend

time by one year. Pending the application for

extension, we propose to allow the arbitration

proceedings to continue.

xx xx xx

2.21.4 It is, therefore, proposed to implement the

recommendation made in the 76th Report of the Law

Commission with the modification that an award must

be passed at least within one year of the arbitrators

entering on the reference. The initial period will be

one year. Thereafter, parties can, by consent,

extend the period upto a maximum of another

one year. Beyond the one year plus the period

agreed to by mutual consent, the court will have

to grant extension. Applications for extension

are to be disposed of within one month. While

granting extension, the court may impose costs

and also indicate the future procedure to be

followed by the tribunal. There will, therefore, be a

further proviso, that further extension beyond the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (54 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

period stated above should be granted by the Court.

We are not inclined to suggest a cap on the

power of extension as recommended by the Law

Commission earlier. There may be cases where

the court feels that more than 24 months is

necessary. It can be left to the court to fix an

upper limit. It must be provided that beyond 24

months, neither the parties by consent, nor the

arbitral tribunal could extend the period. The

court's order will be necessary in this regard. But in

order to see that delay in disposal of extension

applications does not hamper arbitration, we propose

to allow arbitration to continue pending disposal of the

application.

2.21.5 One other important aspect here is that if

there is a delay beyond the initial one year and

the period agreed to by the parties (with an

upper of another one year) and also any period

of extension granted by the Court, there is no

point in terminating the arbitration proceedings.

We propose it as they should be continued till

award is passed. Such a termination may indeed

result in waste of time and money for the parties after

lot of evidence is led. In fact, if the proceedings were

to terminate and the claimant is to file a separate suit,

it will even become necessary to exclude the period

spent in arbitration proceedings, if he was not at fault,

by amending Section 43(5) to cover such a situation.

But the Commission is of the view that there is a

better solution to the problem.

The Commission, therefore, proposes to see that

an arbitral award is ultimately passed even if the

above said delays have taken place. In order

that there is no further delay, the Commission

proposes that after the period of initial one year

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (55 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

and the further period agreed to by the parties

(subject to a maximum of one year) is over, the

arbitration proceedings will nearly stand

suspended and will get revived as soon as any

party to the proceedings files an application in

the Court for extension of time. In case none of

the parties files an application, even then the arbitral

tribunal may seek an extension from the Court. From

the moment the application is filed, the arbitration

proceedings can be continued. When the Court takes

up the application for extension, it shall grant

extension subject to any order as to costs and it shall

fix up the time schedule for the future procedure

before the arbitral tribunal. It will initially pass an

order granting extension of time and fixing the time

frame before the arbitral tribunal and will continue to

pass further orders till time the award is passed. This

procedure will ensure that ultimately an award is

passed.

19. Rohan Builders highlights that an

interpretation allowing an extension application

post the expiry period would encourage rogue

litigants and render the timeline for making the

award inconsequential. However, it is apposite

to note that Under Section 29-A(5), the power of

the court to extend the time is to be exercised

only in cases where there is sufficient cause for

such extension. Such extension is not granted

mechanically on filing of the application. The

judicial discretion of the court in terms of the

enactment acts as a deterrent against any party

abusing the process of law or espousing a

frivolous or vexatious application. Further, the

court can impose terms and conditions while

granting an extension. Delay, even on the part of

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (56 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

the Arbitral Tribunal, is not countenanced. The

first proviso to Section 29-A(4) permits a fee

reduction of up to five percent for each month of

delay attributable to the Arbitral Tribunal.

21. As per the second proviso to Section 29-A(4),

the mandate of the arbitral tribunal continues where

an application Under Sub-section (5) is pending.

However, an application for extension of period of the

arbitral tribunal is to be decided by the court in terms

of Sub-section (5), and Sub-sections (6) to (8) may

be invoked. The power to extend time period for

making of the award vests with the court, and not

with the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, the arbitral

tribunal may not pronounce the award till an

application Under Section 29A(5) of the A & C Act is

sub-judice before the court. In a given case, where an

award is pronounced during the pendency of an

application for extension of period of the arbitral

tribunal, the court must still decide the application

Under Sub-section (5), and may even, where an

award has been pronounced, invoke, when required

and justified, Sub-sections (6) to (8), or the first and

third proviso to Section 29A(4) of the A & C Act.

22.While interpreting a statute, we must strive to

give meaningful life to an enactment or rule and avoid

cadaveric consequences that result in unworkable or

impracticable scenarios. An interpretation which

produces an unreasonable result is not to be imputed

to a statute if there is some other equally possible

construction which is acceptable, practical and

pragmatic.

23.In view of the above discussion, we hold

that an application for extension of the time

period for passing an arbitral award Under

Section 29-A(4) read with Section 29-A(5) is

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (57 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

maintainable even after the expiry of the

twelve-month or the extended six-month period,

as the case may be. The court while adjudicating

such extension applications will be guided by

the principle of sufficient cause and our

observations in para 19 of the judgment."

(Emphasis supplied)

41. In order to draw strength to this stance, this Court deems it

apposite to place reliance upon the ratio encapsulated in C.

Veluswamy (supra). The relevant extract of which is reproduced

hereinbelow:

"13. Section 29A, as explained in recent decisions of

this Court in Rohan Builders (supra), Lancor Holdings

(supra) and Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule

can be formulated as under:

(I) Sub-section (1) of Section 29A mandates

that the award shall be made within 12 months

of the completion of pleadings before the

Arbitral Tribunal. While Sub-section (2)

incentivises expeditious making of the Award,

proviso to Sub-section (4) and Sub-section (8)

authorises the Court to impose penalty for

delay in making the award.

(II) Sub-section (3) enables parties, by consent,

to extend the period of 12 months for making

the award by a further period not exceeding 6

months.

(III) If the award is not made within the

stipulated period of 12 months or the extended

period of 6 months, the mandate of the

arbitrator(s) shall terminate.

(IV) This termination is subject to the power of the

Court to extend the period.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (58 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

(V) The 'Court' Under Section 29A shall be the Civil

Court of ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and

includes the High Court in exercise of its original civil

jurisdiction Under Section 2(1)(e), and shall not be

the High Court or the Supreme Court Under Section

11(6) of the Act. Section 42 of the Act relating to

jurisdiction for applications will also not apply to

Section 11 of the Act.

(VI) There is no statutory prescribed time limit

for the Court to exercise the power Under

Section 29A(4) for extending the period, except

for its own discretion. The Court can exercise

the power before or after the expiry of the

period Under Sub-sections 29A(1) or (3).

Further, there is no prescription of an outer

limit for extending the time for the conclusion

of arbitral proceedings. Given this power, the

Court will exercise it with circumspection,

balancing the remedy with the rights of other

stakeholders.

(VII) The power of the Court to extend the time

Under Sub-section (4) may be exercised on an

application by any of the parties. Once such an

application for extension of time is pending, the

mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the

disposal of such application Under Sub-section (9).

The Court shall endeavour to dispose of such an

application within 60 days.

(VIII) Delay in the delivery of an arbitral award, by

itself, is not sufficient to set aside that award. It is

only when the effect of the undue delay in the

delivery of an arbitral award is explicit and adversely

reflects on the findings therein, such delay and, more

so, if it remains unexplained, can be construed to

result in the award being in conflict with the public

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (59 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

policy of India.

(IX) Under Section 29A (6), while exercising the

power of extension, it shall be open to the Court to

substitute one or all the arbitrators. This is a

discretionary power that the Court would exercise in

the facts and circumstances of the case. Upon

substitution, the reconstituted tribunal shall be

deemed to be in continuation of the previously

appointed tribunal as per Section 29A(7) and shall

continue from the stage already reached and on the

basis of evidence already on record. The newly

appointed arbitrators shall be deemed to have

received the evidence and materials.

(X) Vesting of the power of substitution, Under

Section 29A(6), is on the "Court" and this Court is

the "Court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e). The text,

as well as the context for identifying the Court in

Section 29A(6), as well as in Section 29A(4), is the

Court in Section 2(1)(e). The expression 'Court' in

other provisions must be guided by the meaning

given in Section 2(1)(e).

18.Intention of the Parliament to secure the

arbitral proceedings and to ensure that they are

taken to their logical conclusion of a binding

award is evident from provisions such as,

enabling Courts to exercise the power of

extension before or after the expiry of the 18

month period [Section 29A(4)], declaring

continuation of the proceedings till the

application for extension is pending [proviso to

29A(4)], declaring that upon extension, the

existing proceedings would continue

uninterruptedly [Section 29A(6) & (7)]. These

provisions make it evident that the intention of

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (60 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

the Parliament is to safeguard the conduct and

conclusion of arbitral proceedings.

20.Vesting of power and jurisdiction in the Court,

in our opinion, is a complete answer to any

apprehension that extension of time, even in cases

where an 'award' is passed, could introduce a culture

of indiscipline, as arbitrator(s) and/or counsels could

become indifferent to the mandatory timelines. This

apprehension is not true. There is no automatic

extension of time. The Court will and must

exercise its discretion only after evaluating the

facts and circumstances after close scrutiny.

Section 29A, in terms, enables the court to

adopt distinct measures to ensure dynamic and

efficient conduct of arbitral proceedings with

integrity and expedition. The following

empowerments are in the nature of instruments in

the toolkit of Section 29A, enabling the courts to

deploy them as and when the factual matrix

demands:

i)Court has the power to extend the time

before or after the expiry of the statutorily

stipulated period. [Section 29A(4)]

ii)Court is empowered to take measures to reduce

the fee of the arbitrators if the Court is of the opinion

that the proceedings are delayed for the reasons

attributable to the Arbitrators. [Proviso to Section

29A(4)]

iii)Court can grant an extension of the time

period upon a finding that there is sufficient

cause for such extension. [Section 29A(5)]

iv)Court, while extending the mandate even when

there is sufficient cause, is empowered to impose

such terms and conditions as it thinks fit for

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (61 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

efficiency and integrity of the arbitral proceedings.

[Section 29A(5)]

v)Courts are specifically empowered to substitute

any one or all the arbitrators, if in the opinion of the

Court the facts demand. This is a discretion that the

Court would exercise with caution and

circumspection15. [Section 29A(6)]

vi) The Court is empowered not only to grant costs

but also to impose exemplary and actual costs upon

any of the parties, if the situation so demands.

[Section 29A(8)]

23. In conclusion, we hold that an application

Under Section 29A(5) for extension of the

mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable even

after the expiry of the time Under Sections

29A(1) and (3) and even after rendering of an

award during that time. Such an award is

ineffective and unenforceable. But the power of

the court to consider extension is not impaired

by such an indiscretion of the arbitrator. While

considering the application, the Court will

examine if there is sufficient cause for

extending the mandate, and in the process, it

may impose such terms and conditions as the

situation demands. The Court will also take into

account other factors such as reduction of the

fee of the arbitrator under proviso to Section

29A(4) and also impose costs on parties if the

fact situation so demands. Substitution is an

option for the Court as the provision itself says, "it

shall be open for the Court to substitute", and it will

be exercised carefully. If the mandate is extended,

the arbitral tribunal will pick up the thread from

where it was left, and seamlessly continue the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (62 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

proceeding from the stage at which the mandate had

expired, and conclude within the time granted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

42. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court is of the

considered opinion that successive applications under Section 29A

are not barred per se and may, in appropriate cases, be held to be

maintainable. However, such maintainability is not automatic and

must be tested on the touchstone of demonstrable, compelling, and

bona fide reasons warranting extension of the arbitral mandate. In

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, having

regard to the complexity of the dispute, the voluminous record, and

the procedural history, this Court holds that the second application

seeking extension is maintainable in law. At the same time, this

Court cannot remain oblivious to the fact that the conduct of the

Arbitral Tribunal, coupled with the approach adopted by the learned

counsel appearing therein, reflects an easy and convenience-based

approach in the conduct of proceedings. Such an approach has had

direct and adverse consequences upon the parties, who are

ultimately burdened with the escalating costs of litigation and

arbitral expenses. This runs contrary to the litigant-centric

framework underlying the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,

particularly the mandate of Section 24, which envisages

expeditious and effective hearings.

43. The material on record clearly indicates that the delay in the

proceedings is substantially, if not entirely, attributable to the

Arbitral Tribunal. The primary objective of the Act of 1996 is to

facilitate efficient, cost-effective dispute resolution and to prevent

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (63 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

absurd or unjust results arising from procedural laxity. Therefore,

while the extension application is held to be maintainable, but the

grant of such extension cannot be mechanical or unconditional. It

must be balanced by imposing appropriate terms and conditions, so

as to ensure adherence to the statutory mandate and to safeguard

the interests of the parties, in consonance with the spirit and object

of the Act.

Issue No. 3 : Whether sufficient cause existed in the instant

matter for extension of mandate, and whether the orders

dated 17.09.2024 and 24.02.2026 satisfy the requirements

of Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, and are in consonance with the conduct of the parties

and the Arbitral Tribunal, both in letter and spirit?

44. Section 29A(4) of the Act of 1996 empowers the Court to

extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal upon being satisfied

that “sufficient cause” exists. The provision, read with the scheme

of Sections 23(4) and 29A, reflects a clear legislative intent to

ensure that arbitral proceedings are conducted with expedition and

procedural discipline, and that extensions are granted only in

exceptional and justified circumstances. In the factual conspectus

of the present case, it is not in dispute that the arbitration pertains

to a large-scale infrastructure project under the RAPDRP scheme,

involving a contract value of approximately Rs. 528.20 crores,

spanning 87 towns and 534 locations, with voluminous

documentary evidence and technical complexities. The constitution

of a three-member Arbitral Tribunal, the disruption caused by the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (64 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

COVID-19 pandemic, and the deferment of effective proceedings till

01.03.2022 are all relevant considerations which legitimately

contributed to delay in the initial stages.

44.1 Qua Order dated 17.09.2024: The Commercial Court,

while passing the order dated 17.09.2024, appears to have

undertaken a detailed examination of the material on record and

recorded reasons pertaining to the complexity of the dispute,

volume of evidence, and multiplicity of hearings required.

Importantly, the learned Court did not grant an unqualified

extension; rather, it imposed structured conditions, including,

limiting the extension to a defined period (till 30.04.2025);

directing expeditious conclusion within 14 sessions; imposing

exemplary costs of Rs. 1,00,000/-; fixing financial consequences

upon the claimant (including bearing tribunal fees post a specified

date); and curtailing entitlement to interest beyond a particular

stage. These conditions clearly demonstrate that the Court was

alive to the statutory mandate of expedition and sought to balance

the equities by penalizing delay attributable primarily to the

respondent-claimant. The order, thus, satisfies the requirement of

“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 29A(4), as it is

reasoned, conditional, and structured to ensure time-bound

completion.

44.2 Qua Order dated 24.02.2026 : In contrast, the

subsequent order dated 24.02.2026 extending the mandate till

30.09.2026 does not appear to meet the same threshold of judicial

scrutiny. From the material placed on record, it emerges that, the

extension has been granted in a comparatively ambiguous and

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (65 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

unstructured manner, without adequately addressing whether the

earlier conditions imposed (including timelines and cost

consequences) were complied with; there is no detailed attribution

of delay, particularly in light of the earlier categorical finding that

the delay was primarily attributable to the claimant; the order does

not sufficiently examine whether the proceedings progressed in

accordance with the directions to conclude within 14 sittings; the

impact of the interim order dated 22.10.2024 passed by this Court

(staying substantive conditions of the earlier order) has not been

meaningfully reconciled while assessing “sufficient cause.”; the

requirement of “sufficient cause” under Section 29A(4) is not a

mere formality, it casts a duty upon the Court to undertake a

rigorous and reasoned evaluation of the conduct of the parties and

the Tribunal. Applying these principles, the second extension order

appears to dilute the rigour envisaged under Section 29A. The

absence of cogent reasoning, lack of accountability for prior non-

compliance, and failure to impose corrective or deterrent conditions

render the satisfaction of “sufficient cause” questionable.

Consequently, while the power to grant successive extensions is not

in dispute, its exercise in the present instance, qua the second

extension, appears to be legally unsustainable, being inconsistent

with the legislative intent of ensuring time-bound and efficient

arbitral adjudication.

45. In consonance with the aforesaid analysis, this Court is

constrained to observe that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has

adopted an ordinary, casual, and convenience-driven approach in

the conduct of proceedings, which is in clear derogation of the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (66 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

mandate of Section 24 of the Act of 1996, requiring expeditious

and continuous hearings. The record reflects that the Tribunal has

neither adhered to the discipline imposed by the earlier order dated

17.09.2024 nor accorded due weight to the structured conditions

contained therein. On the contrary, the subsequent order dated

24.02.2026, in effect, revisits and dilutes the earlier order,

amounting to an impermissible review, which is not contemplated

within the scheme of Act. The categorical directions for time-bound

disposal i.e. within sixty days, including the requirement of

adherence to specified timelines, have been rendered otiose.

46. It is further evident that despite the prayer for extension

being confined to a limited duration of one year, the extension

granted travels beyond the scope of such prayer, without recording

cogent reasons justifying such enlargement. Withal, the order also

fails to prescribe any definitive upper limit or structured framework

for completion of proceedings, thereby leaving the adjudication

open-ended and contrary to the legislative intent of finality within a

stipulated timeframe. Such an approach not only undermines the

discipline envisaged under Section 29A but also defeats the

objective of preventing indefinite prolongation of arbitral

proceedings.

Issue No. 4 : Whether the conduct of the Arbitral Tribunal

and the parties adhered to the statutory mandate of

Sections 24 and 29A of the Act of 1996?

47. Sections 24 and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (67 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

1996, when read conjointly, cast a positive and continuous

obligation upon the Arbitral Tribunal to ensure that proceedings are

conducted in an efficient, expeditious, and time-bound manner.

Section 24 mandates that hearings be conducted with procedural

economy, avoiding unnecessary adjournments, while Section 29A

introduces a statutory timeline, thereby transforming expedition

from a mere guideline into a binding legislative command. In the

present factual matrix, the record of proceedings, as borne out

from the order sheets, unmistakably reveals a pattern of protracted

adjournments and discontinuous hearings. Hearings were not

conducted on a day-to-day or even proximate basis; rather, they

were spaced out over intervals ranging from one to five months.

This pattern persisted even after the expiry of the original mandate

and during the subsistence of extended timelines. Such gaps

cannot be countenanced in a statutory regime that mandates strict

adherence to timelines.

48. The explanation of complexity and volume of documents,

though relevant at the stage of initial extension (as reflected in the

order dated 17.09.2024), cannot indefinitely justify procedural

laxity. The earlier order had, in fact, specifically directed conclusion

of proceedings within 14 effective sittings, preferably through oral

arguments, and imposed monetary and procedural consequences

upon the claimant to counterbalance delays attributable to it.

However, the subsequent conduct of proceedings does not reflect

meaningful compliance with these directions. This indicates not

merely delay, but a systemic failure to internalize and implement

judicial directions aimed at expedition. The conduct of the Arbitral

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (68 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

Tribunal, therefore, reflects a departure from the statutory

discipline envisaged under Sections 24 and 29A. Equally, the

parties, particularly the respondent-HCL, to whom delay had

already been attributed, cannot be absolved, as repeated

adjournments appear to have been either sought or acquiesced to,

thereby contributing to the prolongation of proceedings.

49. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conduct of the

Arbitral Tribunal, coupled with the acquiescent approach of the

parties, particularly the claimant, has fallen short of the statutory

mandate under Sections 24 and 29A of the Act of 1996. The

repeated and prolonged adjournments, absence of continuity in

hearings, and non-adherence to earlier judicial directions constitute

a clear deviation from the legislative intent of expeditious dispute

resolution. Such deviation, therefore, justifies corrective judicial

intervention, both to restore procedural discipline in the present

proceedings and to uphold the sanctity of the arbitral framework as

envisaged under the Act.

50. For the sake of convenience and ready reference, the

relevant extracts from the order sheets, reflecting the lackadaisical

and dilatory approach adopted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, are

reproduced hereinbelow:

Order dated 20.08.2020 i.e. First Preliminary Hearing:

"3.At the outset, the Arbitral Tribunal declared u/s

12 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(for short the Act) that it has no financial or other

interest in the Parties to Arbitral proceeding and it is

in a position to act independently and impartially. The

Presiding Arbitrator further informed the Parties that

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (69 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

he is a nominated Arbitrator for HCL Technologies Ltd.

in one arbitration. However, both the Parties informed

that they have no objection to the appointment of the

Presiding Arbitrator as the Claimant, HCL Infosysteins

Ltd., is a different company and separate legal entity

from HCL Technologies Ltd.

4.The time for pronouncement of the Award

shall commence after pleadings of the parties

are completed within 6 months from the first

date of Hearing. Today Ld. Counsel for Claimant

prayed for time till 31st October 2020 to file its

Statement of claim together with the documents, on

which it places its reliance. Further timeline and dates

of hearing shall be decided after such date when the

Claimant would submit its Statement of Claim. The

Claimant shall strictly adhere to the time

requested and it is clarified that no extension

shall be granted as Claimant has specifically

agreed to abide by it, failing which serious

consequences would follow against the

Claimant.

5 Learned Counsel/Authorised Representatives of the

parties explained their respective cases in brief.

6 The Arbitrators fees will be determined after

exchange of pleadings. In the meantime, each

party will deposit Rs. Five Lakh, for each

Arbitrator as on account payment, within a

month, to be adjusted in the determination of

the fees on filing of Statement of Claims and

Counter Claims, if any. Both parties will. deposit the

Arbitrators fees for each Arbitrator by Cheque/RTGS

with a covering letter with details of TDS deducted. In

other words, both parties have to deposit Rs. 10

lakh with each of the Arbitrator.

7.In addition to the Fee, an amount

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (70 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

calculated @ 10% of fee will be payable to the

Presiding Arbitrator, for administrative

expenses, by both the Parties as mentioned

herein above. The fees and expenses of the

Arbitrators have to be shared equally by both

the parties at all times. The exact proportion of

the fees and expenses to be finally borne by the

Claimant or Respondents will be decided in the

Award."

Order dated 19.12.2022 (Hearing No. 60

th

and 61

st

@

Delhi)

"4.In consultation with the Ld. Counsel for the

Parties, following new dates have been appointed for

further meetings of the Tribunal:-

March 20, 21 and 22, 2023 from 11:00 A.M. to

4:00 Ρ.Μ.

April 20, 21 and 22, 2023 from 11:00 Α.Μ. to

4:00 Ρ.Μ.

5.In the Tribunal's Order dt. 13.11.2022, read with

the Order dt. 12.11.2022, it was observed that the

period in terms of Section 29A of the Arbitration

& Conciliation Act, 1996 shall be expiring on

28th February 2023. Today, Ld. Counsel for both

the Parties, upon instructions submit that the

parties are agreeable for extension of six

months from 1st March 2023 of the period for

completion of these proceedings in terms of

Section 29A (Supra). Accordingly, based on the

aforesaid agreement of the parties and with

their consent, the period for the completion of

the proceedings now stands extended uptil 31st

August 2023 in terms of Section 29A (supra).

6.The Tribunal also takes this opportunity of

observing that looking to the present schedule of

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (71 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

dates and the likely time to be taken for

completion of proceedings, after April 2023,

there is a strong possibility of further extension

being required beyond 31st August 2023, for

which application would need to be made before

the competent Court. The Ld. Counsel accordingly

are requested to obtain instructions from their

respective clients."

Minutes of 81

st

and 82

nd

Meeting, dated 19.05.2023

@ Jaipur

“5. In consultation with the learned counsel for

both the parties the following new dates are

appointed for further meetings of the tribunal :-

Dates

23.09.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

24.09.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

25.09.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

06.10.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

07.10.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

08.10.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

31.10.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

01.11.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

02.11.2023 from 11.00 AM to 4.00 PM

6. It is further agreed to and consented by both

the parties that the aforesaid meeting shall be

held in physical mode at New Delhi.

7. Vide order dated 19.12.2022 passed by this

Tribunal recording the fact of the consent of the

parties in terms of sub section (3) of Section 29-A of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the time

period for completion of these arbitration

proceedings by the tribunal stood extended

uptill 31.08.2023. In view of the fact that the

schedule of dates has been fixed in para 5 above

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (72 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

whereby the recording of the evidence of the

parties is most likely to be over, it becomes

imperative that a further extension of time is

granted by the Hon'ble Court in terms of sub

section (4) of Section 29-A of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996. The claimant

undertakes to file such an application before a

competent jurisdictional court as soon as

possible, preferably within 6 weeks from today.

Even though Mr. Bipin Gupta, learned counsel for the

respondent today submitted that in the absence of

specific instruction from his client on the subject he

shall not be in a position to give the consent of

the respondent for not opposing such an

application in the court, as and when filed, the

tribunal nonetheless request the respondent to

cooperate with the claimant with respect to the

aforesaid application so that the parties are able

to obtain a favourable order.

11.Shri Justice Deepak Verma, the learned presiding

Arbitrator shall participate in tomorrow's meeting in

virtual mode. The claimant is directed to arrange link

for this meeting and provide the same to Shri Justice

Verma latest by 8.00 AM tomorrow morning.

12. The meetings of the Tribunal scheduled in

September 2023 in Delhi shall be held at D-19,

Geetanjali Enclave, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi.”

Order dated 28.10.2024 (Hearing No. 106) – Through Video

Conferencing:

"13.We have also been informed that the Order

has been passed by the Ld. Commercial Court on

17.09.2024 whereby and wherein the term of

the Tribunal has been extended upto 30.04.2025

for pronouncement of the Award by the Tribunal.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (73 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

14.It has also been informed that on account of

certain conditions, which have been imposed by the

Ld. Commercial Court, matter has been taken up in

the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan Jaipur Bench,

that portion alone has been stayed. However, there

is no restriction imposed by the Court to hear

the matter on merits.

16.So far, no Reading Fee has been fixed to be

paid to each of the Arbitrators, to be shared

equally by both the parties. The same shall be

fixed on the next date of hearing.

17.Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Kumar is entitled to

receive from both the parties the same amount of

hearing fee, which has been fixed earlier for all the

three Arbitrators.

18. With the consent of Ld. Counsel for the parties,

matter is fixed on the following dates/timings:-

(i) 20.12.2024 - 10:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.

(ii)21.12.2024 - 10:30 Α.Μ. to 3:30 P.M.

(iii)22.12.2024 - 10:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.

(iv)16.01.2025 - 10:30 Α.Μ. to 3:30 P.Μ.

(v)17.01.2025 - 10:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.

(vi)18.01.2025 - 10:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.

To be posted on 20.12.2024 at 10:30 A.M. at D-19,

3rd Floor, Geetanjali Enclave, New Delhi - 110017”

Order dated 20.12.2024 (Hearing Nos. 107 and 108) @ New

Delhi

"7.Tribunal has been informed that the time

fixed for pronouncement of the Award by the

Hon'ble Commercial Court, Jaipur is expiring on

30th April 2025. If need be, the Claimant may

apply for further extension of time for

pronouncement of the Award by the Tribunal at

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (74 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

an appropriate time before the Jurisdictional Court."

Combined orders dated 23.02.2025 and 24.02.2025

(Hearing Nos. 115 to 118) @ New Delhi

“7.Apart from the above, a fact cannot be given a

go by that after the hearing is complete in all

respects, the Tribunal shall also take a

reasonable time to have internal Meetings

amongst the members of the Tribunal, to

prepare a draft Award, its circulation amongst

themselves, then only it can be pronounced.

Obviously, all this exercise is going to take

longer time than is expected.

8. In the given facts and circumstances , Ld.

Counsel for the Claimant submitted that he

would move an appropriate Application, u/s 29A

of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act before the

Ld. Commercial Court, Jaipur for getting further

extension of atleast one year from 30th April

2025. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent will be

served with an advance copy of the same, so

that minimum time is spent before the Court. It

was further suggested to him that on instructions

from the Respondents, he may not seriously oppose

the said prayer so that the time could be extended as

is going to be prayed for.

10.Ld. Counsel for Parties on instructions

informed today that both are ready and willing

to pay Reading Fees to each member of the

Tribunal. Tribunal suggested and both Parties

along with their Ld. Counsel agreed that the

Reading Fee be fixed equivalent to 6 (Six)

hearings, payable to each one of the Arbitrator,

to be shared equally by both. Thus, it will come

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (75 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

to Rs. 15 Lakhs payable to each of the Arbitrator

shared by both."

Order dated 26.02.2026 @ New Delhi

“4.Several dates for the next hearings, were

suggested to the Ld. Counsel for the parties

commencing from 10th of March 2026 to 27th of April

2026. The said dates suggested were suitable and

convenient to the Members of the Tribunal as also the

Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Claimant. However, Ld.

Counsel for the Respondent, Mr Kartik Seth,

informed the Tribunal that no other dates prior

to 28th of April 2026 are suitable to him .

6.With the consent of Ld Counsel for the parties,

following dates/timings have been fixed, through

hybrid mode:-

(i) 28.04.2026

(ii) 29.04.2026

(iii) 17.05.2026

(iv)18.05.2026

(v)19.05.2026

(vi)20.05.2026

(vii) 21.05.2026

(viii)22.05.2026

(ix)23.05.2026

(x)25.05.2026

(xi)26.05.2026

(xii)27.05.2026

(xiii)28.05.2026

(xiv)29.05.2026

(xv)30.05.2026

(xvi)31.05.2026

On all the aforesaid dates between 11:00 A.M. to

4:00 P.M. (Two Sessions on each day), through

hybrid mode."

Minutes of the Meeting held on 19.05.2023 @ Jaipur

"11.Shri Justice Deepak Verma, the learned presiding

Arbitrator shall participate in tomorrow's meeting in

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (76 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

virtual mode. The claimant is directed to arrange link

for this meeting and provide the same to Shri Justice

Verma latest by 8.00 AM tomorrow morning.

12.The meetings of the Tribunal scheduled in

September 2023 in Delhi shall be held at D-19,

Geetanjali Enclave, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi."

51. In culmination of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds

that the present case does not disclose the existence of “sufficient

cause” within the meaning of Section 29A(4) of the Act of 1996 so

as to justify the manner in which successive extensions have been

granted. The ratio laid down in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd.

(supra), particularly paragraph 18 thereof, makes it abundantly

clear that extension of mandate cannot be granted as a matter of

routine and that the Court must be satisfied that the delay is

justified, bona fide, and not attributable to a casual or inefficient

conduct of the arbitral process. In the present case, however, the

record reveals an easy, callous, and convenience-driven approach

adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal, which stands compounded by the

acquiescence of the parties. It is further a matter of concern that,

as per general practice, arbitral proceedings ordinarily envisage

multiple sittings within a month, however, in the instant matter on

an average three sessions per month were scheduled; despite

repeated extensions granted both by the Court and, at times, by

mutual consent of the parties, the proceedings have failed to reach

finality. This persistent lack of progress, despite the availability of

adequate opportunity and time, clearly militates against the

statutory objective of expeditious resolution.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (77 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

52. Accordingly, this Court is of the firm view that the

continuation of such proceedings without strict corrective measures

would not only defeat the mandate of Sections 24 and 29A but

would also erode the efficacy and credibility of arbitration as an

alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The facts, therefore,

warrant judicial intervention to arrest further delay and to realign

the proceedings with the discipline and purpose envisaged under

the Act of 1996.

Issue No. 4 : Whether the financial structure of arbitral fees,

venue of arbitration, and procedural practices adopted have

contributed to delay and prejudice to the parties?

53. The scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,

particularly post the year 2015 and 2019 amendments, places

significant emphasis not only on expeditious but also cost-effective

dispute resolution. Arbitration, as an alternative to traditional

litigation, is intended to reduce both temporal and financial burdens

on the parties. However, in the present case, the cumulative effect

of the fee structure, venue determination, and procedural practices

demonstrates a marked deviation from this objective.

54. At the outset, the financial architecture of arbitral fees

assumes critical importance. The record reflects that each hearing

session entailed an expenditure of approximately Rs. 7.5 lakhs

(exclusive of reading fee, travel, accommodation, and stationery

charges). While it is not disputed that such fee structure was

initially consented to by the parties, such consent cannot be viewed

in isolation from the statutory framework. This Court is of a stern

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (78 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

view that consent operates within the bounds of law and is

necessarily subordinate to the legislative mandate of time-bound

adjudication under Section 29A. The continuation of a session-

based fee model, particularly in circumstances where hearings are

sporadic and widely spaced, creates an unintended yet significant

perverse incentive structure. Instead of encouraging expedition,

such a model, when coupled with frequent adjournments, risks

normalizing delay, as each additional sitting directly translates into

increased financial outflow. This becomes especially problematic

where the proceedings extend beyond the prescribed timelines and

repeated extensions are sought. In such a situation, the arbitral

process may cease to remain economically viable, thereby

frustrating one of its core objectives.

55. It is further borne out from the record that the petitioner–

DISCOMs, following the authoritative pronouncement in Oil and

Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (supra), had moved an

application dated 15.12.2022 seeking review/revision of the arbitral

fee structure. However, the said application has remained pending

consideration, and in the interregnum, additional fees have been

sought and/or quoted by the Arbitral Tribunal; nevertheless the

petitioner - DISCOMs continued to pay the said fee. Such a course

of conduct is prima facie inconsistent with the ratio laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation

Ltd. (supra) and Union of India v. Singh Builders Syndicate :

(2009) 4 SCC 523 wherein it has been emphatically held that

arbitral fees must remain reasonable, transparent, and

commensurate with the object of arbitration, and that the process

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (79 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

ought not to be rendered prohibitively expensive so as to deter or

prejudice the parties. The continuation of an escalating and

unregulated fee regime, despite a pending challenge, further

compounds the financial burden on the parties and runs counter to

the cost-effective ethos underpinning the Act of 1996.

56. In this context, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court Singh Builders Syndicate (supra) assume considerable

significance. The Court therein took judicial notice of the growing

disquiet among litigants regarding the escalating and, at times,

disproportionate costs of ad hoc arbitration, particularly arising

from session-based fee structures, multiplicity of sittings, and non-

productive hearings being treated as chargeable events. It was

emphatically underscored that arbitration must be “saved from the

arbitration cost”, and that reasonableness, transparency, and

certainty in fee structures constitute indispensable attributes for

the healthy development of arbitration as an efficacious dispute

resolution mechanism. The Apex Court further cautioned that, in

the absence of prior disclosure and regulatory discipline, parties are

often placed in a position of helpless acquiescence, being

constrained to accept unilateral fee determinations by the Arbitral

Tribunal for fear of prejudice.

57. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this

Court finds that the continuation of a per-sitting fee regime,

coupled with widely spaced and frequently adjourned hearings, has

resulted in precisely the mischief that was cautioned against in

dictum passed in Singh Builders (supra). The absence of timely

consideration of the petitioner–DISCOMs’ application for revision of

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (80 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

fees, the persistence of high-cost sittings, and the prolongation of

proceedings despite multiple extensions, cumulatively reflect a

departure from the standards of fairness and procedural discipline

envisaged by the Apex Court. Such a course not only undermines

the cost-effectiveness of arbitration but also erodes party

confidence in the arbitral process. The conduct, therefore, cannot

be countenanced and warrants corrective judicial oversight to

realign the proceedings with the foundational principles of

efficiency, economy, and fairness that govern arbitration under the

Act of 1996.

58. In this regard, reliance can be rightly placed upon the ratio

encapsulated in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.(supra).

Relevant paras of the said judgment are also quoted hereunder for

ready reference :

“39.Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel,

assisting this Court as amicus curiae made the

following submissions:

39.1Party autonomy is the overarching

principle of arbitration and is crystallised in

Section 2(6) of the Arbitration Act. It allows

parties to determine the relevant law and procedure

that will govern the arbitration and limits court

intervention. The principle of party autonomy

extends to parties' freedom to decide the fees

payable to the arbitrator(s);

39.2 Prior to the amendment of the Arbitration Act

in 2015, the issue of arbitrators' fees would have

been a subject of agreement between the parties and

the arbitrators. However, this Court in Singh Builders

(supra) noted that the arbitrators have been

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (81 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

unilaterally, arbitrarily and disproportionately fixing

their fees. This observation was made in the context

of court-appointed arbitrators where this Court was

concerned with the fact that parties were being sent

for arbitration by courts and were being forced to pay

the fees fixed by such arbitrators. This Court noted

that institutional arbitration has already remedied

this problem since the arbitral institution fixes the

fees and not the arbitrators in terms of the Rules of

the institution;

39.3In the above backdrop, the Law

Commission recognised that the issue of

arbitrator fees in ad hoc arbitration must be

resolved by the introduction of a mechanism to

rationalise the fee structure. A model Schedule

of fees, the Fourth Schedule, was added to the

Arbitration Act through the Arbitration

Amendment Act 2015, which was to serve as a

guide for High Courts to frame Rules governing

the fixation of fees payable to the arbitrators.

This model Schedule of fees was based on the

Schedule of fees developed by DIAC and was

suitably revised;

39.4The Fourth Schedule is to be read along with

provisions for appointment of arbitrators Under

Section 11. It does not apply to international

commercial arbitration and is not applicable when the

parties have agreed to the fees in terms of the Rules

of an arbitral institution;

39.5The High Courts have been slow in framing

Rules for the determination of fees payable to

arbitrator(s);

39.6Some High Courts have been of the view

that the Fourth Schedule is merely suggestive

and not mandatory, while others have held that

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (82 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

it is mandatory. Thus, there is an uncertainty

regarding the nature of the Fourth Schedule. In

Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Ltd. (supra), this Court held

that if the fee Schedule is fixed by the parties in an

agreement, they would not be bound by the Fourth

Schedule. Pursuant to this decision, many High

Courts have proceeded to hold that the Fourth

Schedule is only applicable to court-appointed

arbitrators if stated expressly or if the parties and

arbitrators have agreed to its applicability;

39.7Section 11 has been further amended by the

Arbitration Amendment Act 2019. Sub-section (14) of

Section 11 now reads that "[t]he arbitral institution

shall determine the fees of the arbitral tribunal and

the manner of its payment to the arbitral tribunal

subject to the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule".

The amended Section 11 has not been brought into

force and is subject to two exceptions. Crucially, once

the amendment comes into force, the fee of the

arbitral tribunal would be fixed by the arbitral

institution appointing the arbitrator. This Court's

interpretation regarding the nature of the Fourth

Schedule would also have an impact on the amended

Section 11 when it is brought into force;

39.8To determine if the term "sum in dispute" refers

to both the claim and counter-claim, it has to be

considered whether a counter-claim can be treated

as an independent claim for which a legal proceeding

may be instituted. Section 23 of the Arbitration Act

provides the basis on which a counter-claim is to be

adjudicated. Section 23 does not stipulate that the

counter-claim must be linked or related to the claim;

rather it only states that the counter-claim must

come within the scope of the arbitration agreement;

39.9The independent nature of the counter-claim is

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (83 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

recognised Under Sections 38(1) and 38(2) of the

Arbitration Act in the following terms, where the

arbitral tribunal is empowered to:

a) Determine separate amount of deposits on a claim

and counter-claim; and

b) Suspend or terminate the proceedings in respect

of the claim or counter-claim, in the event, the

deposit directed to be paid by the tribunal is not paid

by the parties;

39.10 Claims and counter-claims are treated

separately under the analogous provisions of Order

VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure;

39.11 Proceedings relating to a counter-claim

can survive even if the proceedings relating to a

claim are terminated;

39.12 Section 2(9) only provides that provisions

of the Arbitration Act relating to a claim would

mutatis mutandis apply to a counter-claim. It is not a

definition Clause but it is intended to apply to only

procedural aspects. In fact, it fortifies the argument

that the "claim amount" under the Fourth Schedule

would mutatis mutandis apply to counter-claims and

is not an aggregate of claims and counter-claims;

39.13 An arbitral tribunal is not restrained

from deciding its fees under the Fourth

Schedule for claims and counter-claims

separately;

39.14 The Fourth Schedule does not

explicitly state that the "sum in dispute"

includes a counter-claim;

39.15 Until the amendment to Section 11 is

notified, the court appointing arbitrators should

ensure that the parties are made aware of the terms

on which the appointment is made and specifically

whether or not the Fourth Schedule is applicable.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (84 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

The court should also ensure that the parties

have clarity on the fees and expenses payable

to the arbitrator(s);

39.16 This Court may recommend that either

prior to or at the time of notifying the

amendments to Section 11, the rates specified

in the Fourth Schedule may be revised to reflect

the rates that are realistic in present times;

39.17 None of the provisions of the

Arbitration Act entitle the arbitrators to fix their

own fees. The scheme of the Act indicates that

the arbitral tribunal is only empowered to

apportion costs (including the arbitrators' fee)

incurred during the arbitration as between the

parties at the time of passing the award;

39.18 Remuneration of arbitrators is subject to

direct negotiation and agreement between the

arbitrators and the parties and ought to be

determined at the inception of the proceedings. The

fee that has been agreed upon between the parties

and the arbitrators is apportioned as a part of the

costs at the time when the award is passed. This

view is supported by the decision of this Court in

Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Ltd. (supra), where it was

observed that "...it is true that the arbitrator's fees

may be a component of costs to be paid but it is a far

cry thereafter to state that Section 31(8) and 31A

would directly govern contracts in which a fee

structure has already been laid down";

39.19 Section 39 of the Arbitration Act also

empowers the arbitral tribunal to only hold the

award from the parties for any unpaid costs of

arbitration. These unpaid costs could include

arbitrators' fees previously agreed upon

between the parties and not paid;

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (85 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

39.20 Any deviation from the fees agreed

between the parties and the arbitrator(s) would

require the consent of the parties. It would be

unreasonable and unfair to the parties if the

arbitral tribunal is allowed to alter its fees at a

later stage of the arbitration proceedings. At an

advanced stage, parties may be apprehensive

to disagree with the arbitral tribunal and may

agree to an unreasonable and arbitrary fee

sought by it;

39.21 The fee payable under the Fourth

Schedule would be applicable to each member

of the arbitral tribunal. It cannot be considered

as a lump sum to be split among the members.

The Note to the Fourth Schedule provides that

where the tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator,

they would be entitled to 25 per cent over and

above the fee payable under the Fourth

Schedule. It would be absurd if the sole

arbitrator would be entitled to 25 per cent over

and above the stipulated sum under the Fourth

Schedule but in the case of an arbitral tribunal

consisting of three or more members, the entire

fee would have to split;

39.22 Under Section 10 of the Arbitration Act,

parties are free to determine the number of

arbitrators. If there is no agreement, then the default

Rule is of appointing a sole arbitrator. Parties can

always appoint a sole arbitrator, but if there are

unwilling to derogate from the agreement which

provides for appointment of three or more

arbitrators, then they would have to bear the costs

accordingly;

39.23 The ceiling of Rs. 30,00,000 in the Fourth

Schedule is only applicable to the sum of 0.5% of the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (86 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

claim amount over and above Rs. 20 crores. The

expression "+" that appears after Rs. 19,87,500 is

disjunctive; and

39.24 The Fourth Schedule was introduced in

English while the Hindi version was the translation.

Thus, precedence must be given to the English

version. A comma is not conclusive for determining

the meaning of a statutory provision.

76. The Arbitration Act recognises the

principle of party autonomy in various

provisions. It allows the parties to derogate

from the provisions of the Act on certain

matters. Several provisions of the Arbitration

Act explicitly embody the principle of party

autonomy. Section 2(6)88 of the Arbitration Act

provides that parties have the freedom to

authorise any person, including an arbitral

institution, to determine the issue between

them. Section 19(2)89 provides that the parties

are free to choose the procedure to be followed

for the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Section

11(2)90 provides that parties are free to decide on

the procedure for the appointment of arbitrators. In

Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical

Services, this Court observed that party autonomy is

the "brooding and guiding spirit" of arbitration. In

Centrotrade Minerals & Metal Inc. v. Hindustan

Copper Ltd., this Court referred to party autonomy as

the backbone of arbitration.

79. In Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran

Charitable Trust, this Court in a similar vein

observed that arbitrators in ad hoc arbitrations

in India are charging disproportionately high

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (87 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

fees. While interpreting Section 11 of the

Arbitration Act, this Court held that the word

"appointment" does not merely refer to

nominating or designating a person to act as an

arbitrator, but it includes the court's power to

stipulate the fees that can be charged by an

arbitrator appointed by the court. The fees

should be stipulated after hearing the parties

and, if required, after ascertaining the fees

structure from prospective arbitrators. This will

avoid a situation where parties have to

negotiate the terms of the fees of the

arbitrators, after their appointment. Referring to

Singh Builders (supra), this Court acknowledged the

increased complaints against disproportionate fees

being charged by the arbitrators and made certain

suggestions for the healthy development of

arbitration in India. One such remedy suggested by

this Court was disclosure of the fee structure prior to

the appointment of arbitrators to enable any party to

express their unwillingness to bear such expenses.

This Court observed thus:

"41. There is a general feeling among the

consumers of arbitration (parties settling

disputes by arbitration) that ad hoc

arbitrations in India--either international

or domestic, are time consuming and

disproportionately expensive. Frequent

complaints are made about two sessions in a

day being treated as two hearings for the

purpose of charging fee; or about a session of

two hours being treated as full session for

purposes of fee; or about non-productive

sittings being treated as fully chargeable

hearings. It is pointed out that if there is an

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (88 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

Arbitral Tribunal with three arbitrators and if

the arbitrators are from different cities and the

arbitrations are to be held and the arbitrators

are accommodated in five star hotels, the cost

per hearing (arbitrator's fee, lawyer's fee, cost

of travel, cost of accommodation, etc.) may

easily run into rupees one million to one-and-

half million per sitting. Where the stakes are

very high, that kind of expenditure is not

commented upon. But if the number of

hearings become too many, the cost

factor and efficiency/effectiveness factor

is commented. That is why this Court in

Singh Builders Syndicate observed that

the arbitration will have to be saved from

the arbitration cost.

42. Though what is stated above about

arbitrations in India, may appear rather

harsh, or as a universalisation of stray

aberrations, we have ventured to refer to

these aspects in the interest of ensuring

that arbitration survives in India as an

effective alternative forum for disputes

resolution in India. Examples are not

wanting where arbitrations are being

shifted to neighbouring Singapore, Kuala

Lumpur, etc. on the ground that more

professionalised or institutionalised

arbitrations, which get concluded

expeditiously at a lesser cost, are

available there. The remedy for healthy

development of arbitration in India is to

disclose the fees structure before the

appointment of arbitrators so that any

party who is unwilling to bear such

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (89 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

expenses can express his unwillingness.

Another remedy is institutional

arbitration where the arbitrator's fee is

prefixed. The third is for each High Court

to have a scale of arbitrator's fee suitably

calibrated with reference to the amount

involved in the dispute. This will also

avoid different designates prescribing

different fee structures. By these methods,

there may be a reasonable check on the fees

and the cost of arbitration, thereby making

arbitration, both national and international,

attractive to the litigant public.

Reasonableness and certainty about total

costs are the key to the development of

arbitration. Be that as it may.

80. It was in the above context that the LCI 246th

Report proposed reforms for regulating arbitrators'

fees in ad hoc arbitrations. The Commission

recommended that a model Schedule of fees should

be inserted into the Arbitration Act, which was to

serve as a guide for High Courts to frame their own

Rules governing the fixation of arbitrators' fees. The

Commission accepted that different values and

standard of fees may be adopted in international

commercial arbitrations, which led to the exclusion of

the applicability of the Fourth Schedule to the

Arbitration Act to international commercial

arbitrations. The Commission adversely commented

on the practice of charging fees on "per sitting" basis

in ad hoc arbitrations where sometimes there are 2-3

sittings in a day in the same matter between the

same parties. The Commission also noted that costs

are further increased by continuation of proceedings

for years since dates are given with significant gaps,

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (90 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

resulting in the denial of timely delivery of justice to

the aggrieved party

91. Based on the above discussion, we summarise

the positio as follows:

91.1(i) In terms of the decision of this Court in

Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Ltd. and the cardinal

principle of party autonomy, the Fourth Schedule is

not mandatory and it is open to parties by their

agreement to specify the fees payable to the

arbitrator(s) or the modalities for determination of

arbitrators' fees; and

91.2(ii) Since most High Courts have not framed

Rules for determining arbitrators' fees, taking into

consideration Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act,

the Fourth Schedule is by itself not mandatory on

court-appointed arbitrators in the absence of Rules

framed by the concerned High Court. Moreover, the

Fourth Schedule is not applicable to international

commercial arbitrations and arbitrations where the

parties have agreed that the fees are to be

determined in accordance with Rules of arbitral

institutions. The failure of many High Courts to notify

the Rules has led to a situation where the purpose of

introducing the Fourth Schedule and Sub-section (14)

to Section 11 has been rendered nugatory, and the

court-appointed arbitrator(s) are continuing to

impose unilateral and arbitrary fees on parties. As we

have discussed in Section C.2.1, such a unilateral

fixation of fees goes against the principle of party

autonomy which is central to the resolution of

disputes through arbitration. Further, there is no

enabling provision under the Arbitration Act

empowering the arbitrator(s) to unilaterally issue a

binding or enforceable order regarding their fees.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (91 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

This is discussed in Section C.2.3 of this judgment.

Hence, this Court would be issuing certain directives

for fixing of fees in ad hoc arbitrations where

arbitrators are appointed by courts in Section C.2.4

of this judgment.

180. The Fourth Schedule was added to the

Arbitration Act pursuant to the Arbitration

Amendment Act 2015, which in itself was based upon

the recommendations in the LCI 246th Report. The

Report referred to the judgment in Singh Builders,

which raised the issue of arbitrators charging

exorbitant fees: (SCC pp. 527-28, paras 20-23)

"20. Another aspect referred to by the

Appellant, however requires serious

consideration. When the arbitration is by

a tribunal consisting of serving officers,

the cost of arbitration is very low. On the

other hand, the cost of arbitration can be

high if the Arbitral Tribunal consists of

retired Judge(s).

21. When a retired Judge is appointed as

arbitrator in place of serving officers, the

Government is forced to bear the high

cost of arbitration by way of private

arbitrator's fee even though it had not

consented for the appointment of such

nontechnical non-serving persons as

arbitrator(s). There is no doubt a

prevalent opinion that the cost of

arbitration becomes very high in many

cases where retired Judge(s) are

arbitrators. The large number of sittings

and charging of very high fees per

sitting, with several add-ons, without

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (92 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

any ceiling, have many a time resulted in

the cost of arbitration approaching or

even exceeding the amount involved in

the dispute or the amount of the award.

22. When an arbitrator is appointed by a court

without indicating fees, either both parties or

at least one party is at a disadvantage.

Firstly, the parties feel constrained to agree to

whatever fees is suggested by the arbitrator,

even if it is high or beyond their capacity.

Secondly, if a high fee is claimed by the

arbitrator and one party agrees to pay

such fee, the other party, which is unable

to afford such fee or reluctant to pay

such high fee, is put to an embarrassing

position. He will not be in a position to

express his reservation or objection to

the high fee, owing to an apprehension

that refusal by him to agree for the fee

suggested by the arbitrator, may

prejudice his case or create a bias in

favour of the other party which readily

agreed to pay the high fee.

23. It is necessary to find an urgent solution

for this problem to save arbitration from the

arbitration cost. Institutional arbitration has

provided a solution as the arbitrators' fees is

not fixed by the arbitrators themselves on

case-to-case basis, but is governed by a

uniform rate prescribed by the institution

under whose aegis the arbitration is held.

Another solution is for the court to fix the

fees at the time of appointing the

arbitrator, with the consent of parties, if

necessary in consultation with the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (93 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

arbitrator concerned. Third is for the

retired Judges offering to serve as

arbitrators, to indicate their fee structure

to the Registry of the respective High

Court so that the parties will have the

choice of selecting an arbitrator whose

fees are in their "range" having regard to

the stakes involved.

250.The arbitrators are conscious of the role they

perform as adjudicators, which is very different from

and cannot be equated with advocates. While it is

possible to choose and change an advocate keeping

in view one's pocket, an arbitrator once appointed

stands on a different footing. When an arbitral

tribunal has been duly constituted, either party,

irrespective of the fact whether they can afford the

fee or not, is unlikely to displease the arbitral tribunal

stating that the fee fixed is not reasonable. At the

same-time, any challenge to the arbitrator's fee by

those who are willingly paying similar professional fee

to those who argue for them before the arbitrator

would be discordant. To avoid any controversy

and litigation, the fee structure fixed in the

Fourth Schedule, or by the respective High

Courts, when adopted by the arbitral tribunal,

in my opinion should be considered as 'fair and

reasonable'. The court would not permit a party

to question the fee if it is in terms of the Fourth

Schedule, or the Rules framed by the High

Court. I, therefore, albeit for different grounds and

reasons, concur with the observations made in para

129 by my Brother D.Y. Chandrachud, J.”

(Emphasis supplied)

59. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has underscored that the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (94 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

amendments to the Act were intended to make arbitration both

time-efficient and cost-effective, and any practice that undermines

these twin objectives must be viewed with circumspection. Further,

in ONGC Ltd. (supra) the Court emphasized the need for

rationalization of arbitral costs and cautioned against structures

that render arbitration prohibitively expensive. Equally significant is

the change in venue of arbitration from Rajasthan to New Delhi.

The material on record does not disclose any compelling or

unavoidable justification necessitating such a shift. The

consequence of this relocation is not merely geographical; it

imposes substantial logistical, financial, and administrative burdens

upon the parties, including travel, accommodation, and coordination

costs. For proceedings already characterized by delay, such

additional burdens operate as a further impediment to efficient

participation and timely conclusion. The venue of arbitration,

though procedurally flexible, must be exercised in a manner that

facilitates convenience and efficiency, rather than exacerbating

hardship.

60. The procedural practices adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal

further compound the issue. The order sheets reflect a pattern of

routine adjournments, absence of strict calendaring, and lack of

continuous hearings. This stands in stark contrast to the mandate

under Section 24, which obligates the Tribunal to conduct

proceedings with procedural discipline, minimizing unnecessary

adjournments. The earlier judicial direction to conclude the matter

within 14 effective sittings has not been meaningfully adhered to,

indicating a systemic dilution of procedural rigor. When these

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (95 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

factors are viewed cumulatively, a clear picture emerges, as that

the high per-session fee structure, when combined with

discontinuous hearings, has escalated costs disproportionately; the

change in venue has added avoidable financial and logistical strain;

the procedural laxity has prolonged the proceedings beyond

reasonable limits. These elements, taken together, have

undermined the foundational principles of arbitration, namely,

efficiency, economy, and expedition, and have resulted in manifest

prejudice to the parties, particularly in terms of financial burden

and delayed adjudication. This Court is, therefore, of the

considered opinion that the financial structure of arbitral fees, the

unjustified shift in venue, and the procedural practices adopted by

the Arbitral Tribunal have collectively contributed to delay and

caused substantial prejudice to the parties. Such factors warrant

judicial correction to realign the proceedings with the statutory

objectives of the Act of 1996, including, where necessary, the

imposition of cost-regulatory measures, restructuring of hearing

schedules, and issuance of strict directions to ensure time-bound

and cost-effective completion of arbitration.

61. Thus, having addressed the issues as framed and upon a

comprehensive consideration of the factual matrix, statutory

framework, and the legal principles governing the field, this Court is

of the considered view that the impugned exercise of jurisdiction

warrants interference to the extent indicated herein, so as to

realign the arbitral process with the mandate of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, ensuring both expeditious and cost-effective

adjudication. The ratio of the judgment, as discussed hereinabove,

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (96 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

unequivocally reflects that the legislature, in its wisdom, through

the amendments introduced to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 in the years 2015 and 2019, while also taking into

consideration the recommendations of the Law Commission, has

sought to reinforce the foundational objectives of arbitration. These

include its character as an efficacious alternate dispute resolution

mechanism, premised on a litigant-centric approach, party

autonomy, expeditious adjudication, and reduction of litigation

costs. The statutory framework further contemplates that extension

of the arbitral mandate may be granted only upon demonstration of

“sufficient cause,” as per the mandate of Section 29A, subject to

appropriate terms and conditions, including attribution of delay.

Significantly, it also envisages accountability of the Arbitral Tribunal,

empowering the Court to reduce arbitral fees or even substitute the

Tribunal in cases of delay attributable to it. Additionally, where an

application for extension remains sub judice, the Tribunal is

expected to exercise restraint in proceeding to pronounce any

award, including an interim award, within the meaning of the Act.

The scheme also postulates that such applications for extension

ought to be decided by the Court with due expedition, preferably

within a period of sixty days, so as to preserve the efficacy and

integrity of the arbitral process.

62. It is also noteworthy that the Hon’ble Supreme Court took

judicial notice of the growing concerns surrounding ad hoc

arbitrations in India, observing that they often become unduly time-

consuming and disproportionately expensive due to certain

undesirable practices adopted by arbitrators, in the ratio

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (97 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

encapsulated in ONGC Ltd. (supra), relevant extract from which is

already reiterated hereinabove. These include shifting the agreed

venue to different cities, conducting proceedings in high-end venues

such as five-star hotels, and imposing excessive per-hearing costs

comprising arbitrators’ fees, legal fees, travel, accommodation,

administrative charges, reading fees, and ancillary expenses,

thereby frustrating the very objective of cost-effectiveness and

efficiency. The Court further emphasized that the introduction of

Schedule IV to the Act of 1996 was a conscious legislative step

aimed at instilling reasonableness, certainty, and uniformity in

arbitral fee structures, providing a model fee regime which ought to

be ordinarily adhered to, particularly to prevent exploitation and to

promote institutional discipline in arbitration. It was also noted that

the practice of conducting multiple sittings in a day while charging

separate fees for each sitting, coupled with prolonged and

fragmented proceedings with significant intervals, leads to denial of

timely justice and escalates costs unjustifiably.

63. While reiterating that judicial intervention must remain

minimal in view of Section 5 of the Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

clarified that provisions such as Section 29A(4) and Section 31A(5)

have been introduced as corrective safeguards, enabling the Court

to maintain a check on such practices by reducing arbitral fees,

imposing costs, or even substituting arbitrators in appropriate

cases. It was further observed that insistence on high arbitral fees

may create an imbalance between the parties, as refusal by one

party to accede to such demands may inadvertently prejudice its

case or create a perception of bias in favour of the party willing to

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (98 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

comply. Thus, the judgment reinforces that while party autonomy

governs the fixation of arbitral fees, the same must be exercised

within the confines of fairness, transparency, and statutory intent,

failing which judicial intervention becomes not only permissible but

necessary to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process.

64. It is noteworthy that the record, particularly the order

sheets, unmistakably demonstrates repeated non-compliance with

the statutory scheme envisaged under Sections 24 and 29A of the

Act of 1996. The mandate of expeditious and continuous

adjudication has been diluted by granting adjournments at

prolonged intervals ranging from one to five months, even after

expiry of the arbitral mandate. Such conduct is indicative of a

casual and mechanical approach, both on part of the Arbitral

Tribunal and the parties, which stands in direct contravention of the

legislative intent of time-bound dispute resolution. The provisions of

Section 29A(4), which empower the Court to intervene where delay

is attributable to the Tribunal, have clearly been attracted in the

present case. The material on record establishes that extensions

were granted in a routine manner without recording sufficient

cause, thereby frustrating the discipline imposed by the statute.

Further, the fixation of fees on a session-wise basis appears to have

had the unintended effect of disincentivizing day-to-day hearings,

thereby contributing to protraction of proceedings.

65. It is also a matter of serious concern that, despite the

admitted position that the cause of action arose within the State of

Rajasthan and the governing contractual framework (GCC)

stipulated the venue of arbitration to be within the State of

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (99 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

Rajasthan, the proceedings were shifted to New Delhi without any

cogent or recorded justification. Such deviation from the agreed

venue not only militates against the principle of party autonomy

enshrined under Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, but has also resulted in manifest prejudice to the petitioner–

DISCOMs. The change in venue has entailed substantial escalation

in logistical and incidental costs, including travel, accommodation,

and allied expenditures, thereby rendering participation in the

proceedings financially onerous and, at times, prohibitively

expensive. This unwarranted shift has further compounded delays

and undermined the principles of accessibility, efficiency, and cost-

effectiveness that form the cornerstone of the arbitral process

under the Act. The resulting financial burden, when viewed in

conjunction with the already high session-based fee structure, has

made the continuation of proceedings economically unsustainable,

defeating the very object of arbitration as an expeditious and

affordable dispute resolution mechanism.

66. It is further evident from the record that even after the

substitution of the learned Arbitrator upon the demise of Justice

V.K. Gupta, the continuity of proceedings, as contemplated under

Section 29A, was not maintained. Instead, directions akin to a de

novo commencement were issued, thereby prolonging the

adjudicatory timeline in disregard of the statutory mandate of time-

bound completion. Such an approach is also inconsistent with the

spirit of the Act of 1996, which contemplates continuation of

proceedings from the stage already reached, unless otherwise

warranted. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid conduct, as borne

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (100 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

out from the note sheets, reflects a pattern of what may aptly be

termed as “luxury litigation”, wherein procedural indulgences have

been granted without due regard to statutory discipline under

Sections 18, 20, 24, and 29A of the Act of 1996. The arbitral

process, in the present case, has thus deviated from its

foundational principles, resulting in avoidable delay, excessive

costs, and procedural inefficiency, warranting corrective judicial

intervention. For the sake of reference and brevity, the proceedings,

and the delay attributable is tabulated hereinbelow:

“PRE-31.8.2023

• Order dt. 30.10.2020: Period to file Statement of Claim

extended for further 4 weeks i.e. till 30.11.2020 (HCL

request)

• Order dt. 14.4.2021: Period to file Rejoinder till

31.5.2021 (HCL request)

• Order dt. 3.6.2021: Period to file Rejoinder further

extended till 22.6.2021 (HCL request)

• Order dt. 22.6.2021: Period to file Rejoinder further

extended till 20.7.2021 (HCL request)

• Order dt. 12.8.2021: Hearing of 7.8.2021 Cancelled

(Personal difficulty of Presiding Arbitrator)

• Order dt. 4.2.2022: Hearings between 5.5.2022 to

8.5.2022 Cancelled & adjourned (HCL request)

• Order dt. 12.4.2022: Hearings between 13.6.2022 to

15.6.2022 Cancelled & adjourned (Personal difficulty of Co-

Arbitrator)

• Order dt. 18.4.2023: Hearings between 20.4.2023 to

22.4.2023 Cancelled & adjourned (HCL request)

• Order dt. 19.5.2023: Hearings between 12.6.2023 to

14.6.2023 Cancelled & adjourned (HCL request)

POST 31.8.2023

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (101 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

• Order dt. 21.9.2023: Hearings between 23.9.2023

to 25.9.2023 Cancelled & adjourned (HCL request)

• Order dt. 7.10.2023: Hearing of 2nd session and

8.10.2023 Cancelled & adjourned (Para 3 & 4) (HCL

request and Arbitral Tribunal)

• Order dt. 7.2.2024: Hearing between 18.2.2024 to

20.2.2024 Cancelled & adjourned (HCL request)

• Order dt. 9.3.2024 & 10.3.2024: Counsel for

Claimant not available for further arguments/ hearing on

dates in the month of March, April, June, July 2024 till

any date prior to 12th August 2024. (HCL request)

• Order dt. 10.8.2024: Hearing between 12.8.2024

to 14.8.2024 and 16.8.2024 Cancelled & adjourned (HCL

request)

• Order dt. 28.8.2024: Hearing between 1.9.2024 to

3.9.2024 Cancelled & adjourned (Co-Arbitrator

unavailability)

• Order dt. 14.9.2024: Hearing between 28.9.2024 to

1.10.2024 Cancelled & adjourned (Co-Arbitrator

unavailability)

POST-EXTENSION ORDER DT. 17.9.2024: FOR 20

MONTHS UNTIL 30.4.2025

• Order dt. 19.9.2024: Hearing between 7.10.2024 to

9.10.2024 Cancelled & adjourned (Co-Arbitrator

unavailability)

• Order dt. 3.1.2025: Hearing scheduled for

18.1.2025 Cancelled & adjourned (Presiding-Arbitrator

unavailability)

• Order dt. 16.1.2025: Hearings already scheduled

for 17.01.2025 to 19.01.2025 Cancelled & adjourned

(HCL request/ Presiding-Arbitrator unavailability)

• Order dt. 23.2.2025 & 24.2.2025: Hearings

scheduled for 17.2.2025 and 18.2.2025 Cancelled &

adjourned (Presiding-Arbitrator unavailability).

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (102 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

Request made to cut short arguments due to limited

time available but the Arbitral Tribunal opposed the

same vehemently.

• Order dt. 22.3.2025: Hearing already scheduled for

10.04.2025 Cancelled & adjourned (Co-Arbitrator

unavailability)

• Order dt. 24.3.2025: Fee for said hearing "naturally

enhanced"

• Order dt. 16.6.2025: Arguments concluded by Sr.

Counsel representing Claimant-HCL

• Order dt. 17.6.2025: Arguments commenced by

Briefing Counsel for HCL-Claimant”

67. This Court finds that the Commercial Court, while exercising

jurisdiction under Section 29A, has exceeded the permissible

contours by granting extensions far beyond what was prayed for,

and in a manner inconsistent with the statutory cap and intent. The

extension of time for periods such as 20 months and 17 months,

without strict adherence to the requirement of sufficient cause,

effectively renders the legislative safeguards otiose. The statutory

scheme does not envisage indefinite or excessive extensions,

particularly where delay is attributable to the Tribunal itself.

68. Thus, in view of the cumulative effect of the above

circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the delay in conclusion of

arbitral proceedings is substantially attributable to the conduct and

procedural approach of the Arbitral Tribunal. This Court observes

that the principles underlying Sections 18, 24, and 29A of the Act of

1996, namely fairness, expedition, and procedural efficiency, have

not been adhered to in their true spirit. The jurisprudence laid down

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (103 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

in precedents inter alia, ONGC Ltd. (supra), Rohan Builders

(supra), and C. Veluswamy (supra), reinforces that while

extension of time may be granted to prevent failure of justice, the

same must be balanced with appropriate safeguards to prevent

abuse and ensure timely adjudication.

CONCLUSION:

69. There is a famous saying forming Hon’ble the Chief Justice of

India, P. N. Bhagwati that “Procedure is but a means to an end,

not an end in itself.” ; and I believe that this assumes particular

significance in the realm of arbitration. It underscores that

procedural rules are intended to facilitate justice, not to obstruct or

delay it. In the context of arbitral proceedings, where the

legislative intent is to ensure a swift, efficient, and cost-effective

resolution of disputes, procedure must remain subservient to the

ultimate goal of adjudication. Elaborated in this spirit, the principle

conveys that arbitral tribunals must not become overly fixated on

procedural formalities, adjournments, or technicalities at the cost

of substantive progress. When procedure is allowed to dominate

the process, manifesting in repeated delays, excessive hearings, or

inflated fee structures, it defeats the very purpose for which

arbitration exists. Instead of being a streamlined alternative to

litigation, it risks replicating the inefficiencies of conventional

courts.

70. Thus, the orbiter serves as a reminder that procedural

discretion must be exercised judiciously, ensuring that it advances,

rather than impedes, the resolution of disputes. Efficiency,

expedition, and fairness must guide the conduct of proceedings, so

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (104 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

that arbitration remains a pragmatic and litigant-centric

mechanism, yielding meaningful and timely outcomes rather than

devolving into a prolonged and burdensome exercise.

71. In the matter at hand upon an analytical summation of the

aforementioned issues and a circumspect evaluation of the factual

and legal matrix, this court deemeth fit to conclude as follows: 71.1

That the present case exemplifies a clear deviation from the

foundational objectives of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, which is intended to be litigant-friendly, cost-effective, and

expeditious, so as to avoid protracted proceedings and absurd

delayed results. The principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the ratio of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.

(supra) Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and C.

Velusamy (supra) unequivocally mandate that arbitral

proceedings must be conducted with procedural discipline, judicial

oversight where necessary, and without permitting the process to

degenerate into a mechanism of delay or financial burden.

71.2 That in the present facts, the conduct of the Arbitral

Tribunal, marked by a lethargic and casual approach, repeated and

unwarranted adjournments, and fixation of disproportionately high

fee structures, including session wise or “reading” fees, has

undermined the very spirit of arbitration. This is despite the

Tribunal’s own assertion that the proceedings were not to be

governed by financial considerations but aimed at effective dispute

resolution.

71.3 That the record, however, reflects that the learned

Commercial Court has granted extensions not only beyond the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (105 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

specific prayer made by the applicant, but also in excess of the

statutory contemplation under Section 29A of the Act of 1996.

Such extensions appear to have been granted in a routine and

discretionary manner, without due regard to the legislative

mandate that treats time as the essence of arbitral proceedings.

The statutory scheme, including the prescribed outer timelines and

the limited window (such as the sixty-day framework for

consideration of extension applications), has not been adhered to in

its true spirit.

71.4 That the impugned orders disclose an impermissible exercise

of jurisdiction, whereby an earlier order has effectively been

revisited and modified through a subsequent order, in the absence

of any express power of review. This, coupled with the grant of

repeated and open-ended extensions, runs contrary to the

discipline envisaged under Section 29A and defeats the very object

of time-bound adjudication. The approach adopted, therefore, is

not in consonance with the statutory mandate, but rather reflects a

departure therefrom, rendering the process legally unsustainable.

71.5 Thus, applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgments,

particularly the power of the Court under Section 29A(4) to

intervene where delay is attributable to the Tribunal, this Court

finds it just and necessary to impose corrective measures, including

reduction of arbitral fees, so as to balance equities and restore

adherence to statutory discipline. The cumulative effect of these

circumstances compels this Court to hold that unchecked

procedural indulgence and excessive financial imposition cannot be

permitted to defeat the legislative intent, and that arbitration must

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (106 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

remain a forum of efficient, fair, and pragmatic dispute resolution,

rather than an instrument of delay and inequity.

DIRECTIONS:

72. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the instant

batch of petitions is disposed, with the directions enumerated ad

infra:

72.1 The impugned order dated 17.09.2024 stands partly

affirmed, as to the extent whereby the learned Commercial Court

had granted the extension to the parties, and the order dated

24.02.2026 stand modified in the terms jotted ad infra.

72.2 The Arbitral Tribunal is directed to resume and conduct

the arbitral proceedings forthwith, commencing from 31.05.2026,

at 11.00 a.m., at the Jaipur Arbitration and Mediation Centre at

Vidhik Sewa Sadan, adjoining Rajasthan High Court Bench at

Jaipur. The proceedings shall be conducted strictly in compliance

with the mandate of Sections 18, 24 and 29A of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, on a day-to-day basis. It is expected that

the matter shall, as far as practicable, be concluded within an

upper limit of thirty days i.e. by 30.06.2026.

72.3 The petitioners shall be at liberty to raise all permissible

objections concerning the independence and impartiality of the

learned Arbitrator under Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Act of 1996,

such objections having not been raised earlier in accordance with

the statutory scheme; as it is already dealt hereinabove that the

present proceedings are not appropriate, to raise such claims, as

per the mandate of Section 29A of the Act of 1996. Any such

application shall be treated as a preliminary issue and adjudicated

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (107 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

in priority. Any application in terms of this direction, if so advised,

shall be filed within a period of one week from the date of

pronouncement of this judgment.

72.4 Having regard to the delay squarely attributable to the

Arbitral Tribunal, as delineated hereinabove, this Court is of the

considered view that the arbitral fee already paid warrants

proportionate reduction. The material on record reflects that the

Tribunal has exceeded the statutory mandate under Sections 24

and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and has

proceeded in a cursory and convenience-oriented manner, without

making earnest efforts towards effective and time-bound

adjudication. The conduct of proceedings reveals irregular and

widely spaced sittings, at varying locations, coupled with a lack of

procedural continuity. Further, the Tribunal appears to have, on the

basis of assumptions and presumptions, required the respondent–

HCL, to move repeated applications seeking extensions of time,

which is contrary to the scheme of Section 29A that casts a primary

obligation upon the Tribunal to conclude proceedings within the

prescribed timeline.

72.4.1 It is also evident that the judicial directions contained in

the order dated 17.09.2024, wherein a structured timeline and

limited sittings were prescribed, have not been adhered to in their

true letter and spirit, despite the fact that the said order attained

finality and was never assailed by either of the parties. Instead, the

subsequent course of proceedings reflects a tacit revisiting and

dilution of the said directions, without any legal basis, thereby

compounding delay and inefficiency.

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (108 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

72.4.2 Significantly, the arbitration proceedings commenced as

far back as the year 2019, qua a dispute/work order of the year

2009, and yet remain inconclusive. This prolonged pendency runs

contrary to the very object of arbitration, which is conceived as a

mechanism for speedy dispute resolution and for reducing the

burden on courts. The continuance of proceedings in such a

lethargic manner defeats the foundational purpose of the Act, and

in the instant matter the same is solely attributable to the learned

Arbitral Tribunal.

72.4.3 Further, the financial dimension aggravates the concern,

as it is borne out from the record that arbitral fees to the tune of

approximately Rs. 13 crores have already been incurred in a

dispute valued at about Rs. 528 crores. Such disproportionate

escalation of costs, without commensurate progress in

adjudication, renders the process both inefficient and economically

burdensome.

72.4.4 In such circumstances, and considering a delay period

i.e. from 30.04.2025 onwards (till the upper limit, as set, for

conclusion of the proceedings by the learned Arbitral Tribunal i.e.

30.06.2026) occasioned by unwarranted adjournments and lack of

procedural discipline, is solely attributable to the learned Arbitral

Tribunal, the arbitral fee already paid shall stand reduced at the

rate of 5% per month of delay, till final disposal of the lis by the

learned Arbitral Tribunal, i.e. the date passing of the award, as

within the stipulated period herein. The said return of fee shall be

made to the respective parties, in proportion to their contributions,

within a period of two weeks prior to the pronouncement of the

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (109 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

arbitral award. This direction is necessitated not only to remedy the

financial prejudice caused to the parties, but also to reinforce

adherence to the statutory mandate and restore accountability

within the arbitral process.

72.5 The learned Arbitral Tribunal shall conclude the proceedings

and render the award within a period of 45 days from the date of

pronouncement of this judgment, after affording due opportunity of

hearing to the parties; as by 30.06.2026 the proceedings qua the

parties shall stand concluded and thereafter within a period of next

fifteen days, the learned Arbitral Tribunal shall pass its award.

72.6 The fee structure and any incidental procedural directions

shall stand regulated strictly in terms of the statutory guidelines.

Costs, or expenses, shall only be paid qua the actual pocket

expenses, no payment other than those expressly permitted

herein, shall be payable henceforth, in relation to the present

arbitral proceedings. Withal, no additional financial burden

attributable to the conduct of the learned Arbitral Tribunal, shall be

imposed upon the parties.

73. With the aforesaid directions and modifications, the present

petitions stand disposed of. All pending applications, including the

stay application, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. In

order of disposal of the instant petitions, parties shall bear the

costs on their own.

74. Member Secretary, Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority,

is directed and expected to extend all necessary assistance and

provide requisite infrastructural support for the conduct of the

arbitral proceedings at the designated Arbitration Centre, strictly in

[2026:RJ-JP:22211] (110 of 110) [CW-16033/2024]

accordance with the applicable rules and regulations.

75. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of the present

judgment by fax/mail, in the office of learned Arbitral Tribunal and

members thereof, and Member Secretary, Rajasthan State Legal

Services Authority, for necessary compliance.

(SAMEER JAIN),J

Preeti Asopa