Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another … Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others … Respondents

WITH

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.932 OF 2013

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37 OF 2015

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012

O R D E R

1.In this batch of matters, a scheme propounded by the

Government of India popularly known as “Aadhaar Card Scheme” is

under attack on various counts. For the purpose of this order, it is

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Page 2 not necessary for us to go into the details of the nature of the

scheme and the various counts on which the scheme is attacked.

Suffice it to say that under the said scheme the Government of

India is collecting and compiling both the demographic and

biometric data of the residents of this country to be used for various

purposes, the details of which are not relevant at present.

2.One of the grounds of attack on the scheme is that the very

collection of such biometric data is violative of the “right to privacy”.

Some of the petitioners assert that the right to privacy is implied

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India while other petitioners

assert that such a right emanates not only from Article 21 but also

from various other articles embodying the fundamental rights

guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India.

3.When the matter was taken up for hearing, Shri Mukul

Rohatgi, learned Attorney General made a submission that in view

of the judgments of this Court in M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish

Chandra & Others, AIR 1954 SC 300 and Kharak Singh v. State

of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1295, (decided by Eight and Six

Judges respectively) the legal position regarding the existence of the

fundamental right to privacy is doubtful. Further, the learned

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Page 3 Attorney General also submitted that in a catena of decisions of this

Court rendered subsequently, this Court referred to “right to

privacy”, contrary to the judgments in the abovementioned cases

which resulted in a jurisprudentially impermissible divergence of

judicial opinions.

“A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence

an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security

and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the

Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such

regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a

fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth

Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally

different fundamental right, by some process of strained

construction. [See: M.P. Singh & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others,

AIR 1954 SC 300, page 306 para 18]

“… Nor do we consider that Art. 21 has any relevance in the

context as was sought to be suggested by learned counsel for the

petitioner. As already pointed out, the right of privacy is not a

guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore the

attempt to ascertain the movement of an individual which is

merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an

infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.” [See:

Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1295, page 1303

para 20]

[Emphasis supplied]

4.Learned Attorney General submitted that such impermissible

divergence of opinion commenced with the judgment of this Court

in Gobind v. State of M.P. & Another, (1975) 2 SCC 148, which

formed the basis for the subsequent decision of this Court wherein

the “right to privacy” is asserted or at least referred to. The most

important of such cases are R. Rajagopal & Another v. State of

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Page 4 Tamil Nadu & Others, (1994) 6 SCC 632 (popularly known as

Auto Shanker’s case) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties

(PUCL) v. Union of India & Another, (1997) 1 SCC 301.

5.All the judgments referred to above were rendered by smaller

Benches of two or three Judges.

6.Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for one

of the respondents submitted that the decision of this Court in

Gobind (supra) is not consistent with the decisions of this Court in

M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh. He submitted that such

divergence is also noticed by the academicians, Shri F.S. Nariman,

Senior Advocate of this Court and Shri A.M. Bhattacharjee

1

, Former

Chief Justice, High Court at Calcutta and High Court at Bombay.

7.Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Attorney General and

Shri Venugopal that to settle the legal position, this batch of

matters is required to be heard by a larger Bench of this Court as

1

A.M. Bhattacharjee , Equality, Liberty & Property under the Constitution of India, (Eastern Law House,

New Delhi, 1997)

4

Page 5 these matters throw up for debate important questions – (i) whether

there is any “right to privacy” guaranteed under our Constitution.

(ii) If such a right exists, what is the source and what are the

contours of such a right as there is no express provision in the

Constitution adumbrating the right to privacy. It is therefore

submitted that these batch of matters are required to be heard and

decided by a larger bench of at least five Judges in view of the

mandate contained under Article 145(3)

2

of the Constitution of

India.

8.On behalf of the petitioners Shri Gopal Subramanium and

Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel very vehemently opposed

the suggestion that this batch of matters is required to be heard by

a larger bench. According to them:

(i)The conclusions recorded by this Court in R. Rajagopal and

PUCL are legally tenable for the reason that the observations made

in M.P. Sharma regarding the absence of right to privacy under our

2

Article 145(3). The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a

substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference

under Article 143 shall be five:

Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this chapter other than

Article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that

the appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of

which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court

constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on

receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion

5

Page 6 Constitution are not part of ratio decidendi of that case and,

therefore, do not bind the subsequent smaller Benches.

(ii)Coming to the case of Kharak Singh, majority in Kharak

Singh did hold that the right of a person not to be disturbed at his

residence by the State and its officers is recognized to be a part of a

fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 which is nothing

but an aspect of privacy. The observation in para 20 of the majority

judgment at best can be construed only to mean that there is no

fundamental right of privacy against the State’s authority to keep

surveillance on the activities of a person. Even such a conclusion

cannot be good law any more in view of the express declaration

made by a seven-Judge bench decision of this Court in Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India & Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248

3

.

3

Para 5. .. It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 that the question as to the proper scope and

meaning of the expression 'personal liberty' came up pointedly for consideration for the first time before this Court.

The majority of the Judges took the view "that 'personal liberty' is used in the article as a compendious term to

include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the 'personal liberties' of man other than those-

dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19(1). In other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular species or

attributes, of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue". The minority judges,

however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained their position in the following words: "No

doubt the expression 'personal liberty' is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal

liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression

'personal liberty' in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are

independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of

another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in

Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the

action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as

the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned". There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this

Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 298 the minority view must be regarded as correct and the

majority view must be held to have been overruled.

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Page 7 (iii)They further argued that both M.P. Sharma (supra) and

Kharak Singh (supra) came to be decided on an interpretation of

the Constitution based on the principles expounded in A.K.

Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27. Such principles

propounded by A.K. Gopalan themselves came to be declared

wrong by a larger Bench of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper

v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248. Therefore, there is no need

for the instant batch of matters to be heard by a larger Bench.

9.It is true that Gobind (supra) did not make a clear declaration

that there is a right to privacy flowing from any of the fundamental

rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India, but

observed that “Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the

right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create

an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can

characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute”. This

Court proceeded to decide the case on such basis.

10.However, the subsequent decisions in R. Rajagopal (supra)

and PUCL (supra), the Benches were more categoric in asserting the

existence of “right to privacy”. While R. Rajagopal’s case

4

held

that the “right to privacy” is implicit under Article 21 of the

4

Para 9. “Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution but has been inferred from

Article 21.”

7

Page 8 Constitution, PUCL’s case held that the “right to privacy” insofar as

it pertains to speech is part of fundamental rights under Articles

19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution

5

.

11.Elaborate submissions are made at the bar by the learned

counsel for the petitioners to demonstrate that world over in all the

countries where Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is followed, ‘privacy’ is

recognised as an important aspect of the liberty of human beings. It

is further submitted that it is too late in the day for the Union of

India to argue that the Constitution of India does not recognise

privacy as an aspect of the liberty under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. At least to the extent that the right of a

person to be secure in his house and not to be disturbed

unreasonably by the State or its officers is expressly recognized and

protected in Kharak Singh (supra) though the majority did not

5

Para 18. “The right to privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may

be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a

given case would depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy

of one’s home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as “right to privacy”. Conversations on the

telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man’s life.

It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets.

Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man’s private life. Right to privacy would certainly include

telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of

the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.

19. Right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

This freedom means the right to express one’s convictions and opinions freely by word of mouth, writing, printing,

picture, or in any other manner. When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of

speech and expression. Telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions under Article 19(2)

would infract Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.”

8

Page 9 describe that aspect of the liberty as a right of privacy, it is nothing

but the right of privacy.

12.We are of the opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching

questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution.

What is at stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights

including that precious and inalienable right under Article 21. If

the observations made in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh

(supra) are to be read literally and accepted as the law of this

country, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution

of India and more particularly right to liberty under Article 21

would be denuded of vigour and vitality. At the same time, we are

also of the opinion that the institutional integrity and judicial

discipline require that pronouncement made by larger Benches of

this Court cannot be ignored by the smaller Benches without

appropriately explaining the reasons for not following the

pronouncements made by such larger Benches. With due respect

to all the learned Judges who rendered the subsequent judgments -

where right to privacy is asserted or referred to their Lordships

concern for the liberty of human beings, we are of the humble

opinion that there appears to be certain amount of apparent

unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court.

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Page 10 13.Therefore, in our opinion to give a quietus to the kind of

controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it is better that

the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh

(supra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the

subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to privacy is

either asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided

by a Bench of appropriate strength.

14.We, therefore, direct the Registry to place these matters before

the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

………… .………………….. J.

(J. Chelameswar)

………… .………………….. J.

(S.A. Bobde)

………… .………………….. J.

(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi

August 11, 2015

10

Page 11 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another … Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others … Respondents

WITH

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.932 OF 2013

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37 OF 2015

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012

Page 12 -2-

O R D E R

Having regard to importance of the matter, it is desirable

that the matter be heard at the earliest.

………… .………………….. J.

(J. Chelameswar)

………… .………………….. J.

(S.A. Bobde)

………… .………………….. J.

(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi

August 11, 2015

12

Page 13 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another … Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others … Respondents

WITH

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.932 OF 2013

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37 OF 2015

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012

I N T E R I M O R D E R

After the matter was referred for decision by a larger Bench,

the learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for further interim

13

Page 14 orders. The last interim order in force is the order of this Court

dated 23.9.2013 which reads as follows:-

“....

All the matters require to be heard

finally. List all matters for final hearing

after the Constitution Bench is over.

In the meanwhile, no person

should suffer for not getting the Aadhaar

card inspite of the fact that some authority

had issued a circular making it mandatory

and when any person applies to get the

Aadhaar card voluntarily, it may be

checked whether that person is entitled for

it under the law and it should not be given

to any illegal immigrant.”

It was submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned counsel for the

petitioners that the petitioners having pointed out a serious breach

of privacy in their submissions, preceding the reference, this Court

may grant an injunction restraining the authorities from proceeding

further in the matter of obtaining biometrics etc. for an Aadhaar

card. Shri Shyam Divan submitted that the biometric information

of an individual can be circulated to other authorities or corporate

bodies which, in turn can be used by them for commercial

exploitation and, therefore, must be stopped.

The learned Attorney General pointed out, on the other hand,

that this Court has at no point of time, even while making the

interim order dated 23.9.2013 granted an injunction restraining the

Unique Identification Authority of India from going ahead and

14

Page 15 obtaining biometric or other information from a citizen for the

purpose of a Unique Identification Number, better known as

“Aadhaar card”. It was further submitted that the respondents

have gone ahead with the project and have issued Aadhaar cards to

about 90% of the population. Also that a large amount of money

has been spent by the Union Government on this project for issuing

Aadhaar cards and that in the circumstances, none of the

well-known consideration for grant of injunction are in favour of the

petitioners.

The learned Attorney General stated that the respondents do

not share any personal information of an Aadhaar card holder

through biometrics or otherwise with any other person or authority.

This statement allays the apprehension for now, that there is a

widespread breach of privacy of those to whom an Aadhaar card

has been issued. It was further contended on behalf of the

petitioners that there still is breach of privacy. This is a matter

which need not be gone into further at this stage.

The learned Attorney General has further submitted that the

Aadhaar card is of great benefit since it ensures an effective

implementation of several social benefit schemes of the Government

like MGNREGA, the distribution of food, ration and kerosene

through PDS system and grant of subsidies in the distribution of

LPG. It was, therefore, submitted that restraining the respondents

from issuing further Aadhaar cards or fully utilising the existing

15

Page 16 Aadhaar cards for the social schemes of the Government should be

allowed.

The learned Attorney General further stated that the

respondent Union of India would ensure that Aadhaar cards would

only be issued on a consensual basis after informing the public at

large about the fact that the preparation of Aadhaar card involving

the parting of biometric information of the individual, which shall

however not be used for any purpose other than a social benefit

schemes.

Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the

balance of interest would be best served, till the matter is finally

decided by a larger Bench if the Union of India or the UIDA proceed

in the following manner:-

1.The Union of India shall give wide publicity in the electronic

and print media including radio and television networks that it is

not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhaar card;

2.The production of an Aadhaar card will not be condition for

obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen;

3.The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card will not

be used by the respondents for any purpose other than the PDS

Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of

foodgrains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar

16

Page 17 card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution

Scheme;

4.The information about an individual obtained by the Unique

Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar card shall

not be used for any other purpose, save as above, except as may be

directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation.

Ordered accordingly.

………… .………………….. J.

(J. Chelameswar)

………… .………………….. J.

(S.A. Bobde)

………… .………………….. J.

(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi

August 11, 2015

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