K. Shivakumar, Punjab National Bank, K. Dhanapal, mortgage dispute, recovery proceedings, civil court jurisdiction, limitation, res judicata, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Order VII Rule 11 CPC
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K. Shivakumar Vs. Punjab National Bank and K. Dhanapal

  Madras High Court AS Nos. 266 & 267 of 2021
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Case Background

As per case facts, the plaintiff, a subsequent mortgagee, filed a suit challenging a prior equitable mortgage, recovery proceedings by Punjab National Bank, the resulting Recovery Certificate, auction sale, and ...

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Applied Acts & Sections
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Document Text Version

AS No. 266 of 2021

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Page1 of 25

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

RESERVED ON : 13-11-2025

PRONOUNCED ON: 24 .03.2026

CORAM

THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE A.D.MA RIA CLETE

AS Nos. 266 & 267 of 2021

A.S.No.266 OF 2021

K. Shivakumar

S/o.Late K.Swamy,

No.P-6, (OLD No.P-11),

19

th

Street, Anna Nagar,

Chennai – 600 040.

..Appellant/1st

respondent/Plaintiff

Vs

1.Punjab National Bank

Rep By Its Chief Manager,

Asset Recovery Management Branch,

Khivraj Building , 1st Floor,

No.624, Anna Salai,

Chennai -600 006.

2.Recovery Officer

DRT-I, Chennai.

3.H.Asiya Bhanu

W/o. V.M.S. Hajee Mohammed,

No.W-27, Block-W,

Anna Nagar, Chennai - 600 040.

4.K.Dhanapal

S/o. R.Krishna Nadar,

No.W-27, Block W,

Anna Nagar, Chennai - 600 040.

..1st respondent/1st defendantt/Petitioner/1st Defendant

and Respondents 2 to 4/

Respondents 2 to 4 /

Defendants 2 to 4 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

AS No. 266 of 2021

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PRAYER IN A.S.No.266 of 2021: The appeal suit filed under Section 96 of

CPC to allow the appeal by dismissing the Fair and decreetal order dated

06/01/2021 passed in IA.No.1/2019 in OS No.3969/2019 on the file of VI

Additional City Civil Court, Chennai

A.S.NO.267 OF 2021

Mr.K.Shivakumar,

S/o.Late K.Swamy,

No.P-6, (Old No.P-11),

19

th

Street, Anna Nagar,

Chennai – 600 040. … Appellant/1st

Respondent/Plaintiff

Vs.

1.Mr.K.Dhanapal

S/o.R.Krishna Nadar,

No.W-27, Block W,

Anna Nagar, Chennai – 600 040.

2.Punjab National Bank,

Represented by its Chief Manager,

Asset Recovery Management Branch,

Khivraj Building, 1

st

Floor,

No.624, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 006.

3.Recovery Officer,

DRT – I, Chennai.

4.Mrs.H.Asiya Bhanu,

W/o.V.M.S.Hajee Mohammed,

No.W-27, Block – W,

Anna Nagar, Chennai – 600 040.

… 1

st

respondent/petitioner/4th

defendant/Respondents 2 to

4/ Respondents 2 to 4/

Defendants 1 to 3. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

AS No. 266 of 2021

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PRAYER IN A.S.No.267 of 2021: The appeal suit filed under Section 96 of

CPC to allow the appeal by dismissing the Fair and decreetal order dated

06/01/2021 passed in IA.No.2/2019 in OS No.3969/2019 on the file of VI

Additional City Civil Court, Chennai.

For Appellant(s):

in both cases Mr.T.Sai Krishnan

For Respondent(s):Mr.M.L.Ganesh

for R1 in A.S.No.266 of 2021/

R2 in A.S.No.,267 of 2021

Ms.R.Meenalochini

for R4 in A.S.No.266 of 2021/

R1 in A.S.No.267 of 2021

R2 – DRT in A.S.No.266 of 2021

R3 – DRT in A.S.No.267 of 2021

R3 – No appearance in A.S.No.266 of 2021

R4 – No appearance in A.S.No.267 of 2021

COMMON JUDGMENT

These two appeals arise from the fair and decretal orders dated

06.01.2021 made in I.A. Nos.1 and 2 of 2019 in O.S. No.3969 of 2019, by

which the learned VI Additional City Civil Judge, Chennai, allowed the

applications filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC and consequently

rejected the plaint. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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2.Since both applications arose from the same suit and the impugned

orders rest on substantially similar reasoning, these appeals are taken up

together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

3.For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to in the

same rank in the suit .

4. The plaintiff’s case, in brief, is as follows: According to the plaintiff,

the third respondent, Mrs. H. Asiya Bhanu, executed a simple mortgage deed

dated 28.03.2008 in respect of the suit schedule property to secure a loan of

Rs.1,00,00,000/-, agreeing to repay the principal together with interest at 24%

per annum within a period of three months. The said mortgage deed was

registered on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Anna Nagar, as Document No.1217

of 2008. Since the third defendant failed to repay the amount, the plaintiff

instituted C.S. No.560 of 2008 on 09.06.2008 on the file of this Court for

recovery of the mortgage amount.

5.The plaintiff further states that he subsequently came to know that

certain criminal cases had been registered against the third defendant by the

Central Bureau of Investigation in relation to bank fraud. According to the

plaintiff, he also came to know, through an advertisement issued by the first

defendant Bank, that the first defendant had treated the very same property as

collateral security for the credit facilities availed by the third defendant and had

initiated recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal in O.A. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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No.137 of 2003, culminating in the issuance of Recovery Certificate in DRC

No.119 of 2008. Though the advertisement stated that the original title deeds

relating to the properties were in the custody of the CBI, the plaintiff asserts that

the original sale deed pertaining to the suit property, standing in the name of the

third defendant, is in his possession. On that basis, the plaintiff alleges that the

first defendant Bank and the third defendant had colluded with each other and

that the loan amount had been disbursed in a fraudulent manner; the bank’s

claim is fraudulent since the original deeds were with the plaintiff. It is further

alleged that the officials of the first defendant Bank, in collusion with the third

defendant, instituted O.A. No.137 of 2003 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal

and obtained orders fraudulently, and that, consequently, the Recovery

Certificate issued therein is a nullity.

6.The plaintiff thereafter filed I.A. No.2 of 2009 in DRC.No.119/2009 in

O.A. No.137 of 2003 before the Recovery Officer seeking a declaration that the

equitable mortgage and the Recovery Certificate were null and void, and also

filed an application to reopen O.A. No.137 of 2003. Both applications came to

be dismissed on 28.07.2009. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred Appeal

No.11 of 2009 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. During the pendency of the

said appeal, an auction was conducted on 27.10.2009, in which the fourth

defendant emerged as the successful bidder, and the sale was subsequently

confirmed on 03.03.2010. Thereafter, Appeal No.11 of 2009 was dismissed on https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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09.12.2015. The plaintiff states that he then preferred an appeal before the Debt

Recovery Appellate Tribunal, but the same could not be processed for want of a

Presiding Officer. In the meanwhile, the fourth defendant took possession of the

suit property, effected mutation in the revenue records, and demolished the

building standing thereon. It is further stated that the third defendant had also

challenged the auction proceedings and carried the matter up to the Supreme

Court of India, but without success. According to the plaintiff, a fresh cause of

action thereafter arose, and on that basis he instituted the present suit on

20.07.2016 seeking a declaration that the entire proceedings initiated on the

strength of the alleged mortgage said to have been executed by the third

defendant in favour of the first defendant in O.A. No.137 of 2003 on the file of

the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the Recovery Certificate issued pursuant thereto,

the auction conducted in respect of the suit property, and the demolition of the

building are all null and void and non est in law.

7.Brief contents of the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No.1 of 2019:

This application has been filed by the first defendant, Punjab National Bank,

seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. According to the

first defendant, the suit is not maintainable, since the jurisdiction of the civil

Court is expressly barred under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to

Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. It is further contended that the suit

is also liable to be rejected as barred by limitation. The plaintiff had filed I.A. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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No.2 of 2009 in DRC.No.119/2009 in O.A. No.137 of 2003, which came to be

dismissed on 28.07.2009; O.A. No.137 of 2003 had already been allowed on

04.04.2008; the Recovery Certificate was thereafter issued; auction was

conducted on 27.10.2009; and the sale was confirmed and sale certificate issued

on 03.03.2010. In such circumstances, the present suit, having been filed only

on 20.07.2016, is stated to be clearly barred by limitation.

8.It is further stated in the affidavit that the third defendant and her family

members had filed M.A. No.471 of 2010 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal to

set aside the ex parte order passed in O.A. No.137 of 2003, and the said

application was dismissed on 31.05.2011. Challenging the same, the third

defendant filed W.P. No.13710 of 2011 before this Court, which also came to

be dismissed on 03.08.2011. Against the said order, SLP Nos.24063 and 24064

of 2011 were preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, and the

same were dismissed on 12.09.2011. On the above grounds, rejection of the

plaint is sought.

9.Brief contents of the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No.2 of 2019:

This application has been filed by the fourth defendant in the suit, the auction

purchaser of the suit property, seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII

Rule 11 CPC. According to the fourth defendant, the suit is not maintainable in

view of Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993. It is stated that the third defendant, as guarantor for the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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loan availed by V.M.S. Jaffarulla from the first defendant Bank, had created an

equitable mortgage over the suit property and executed letters of personal

liability in favour of the Bank on 23.04.1998. It is further stated that the Bank

filed O.A. No.137 of 2003 and obtained an ex parte order on 04.04.2008. In the

execution proceedings in DRC No.119 of 2009, the Recovery Officer conducted

auction sale on 27.10.2009, in which the petitioner emerged as the successful

bidder and purchased the suit property for a sale consideration of

Rs.2,02,50,000/-. The sale was confirmed on 03.03.2010, and the sale certificate

was issued and registered on the same day. On that basis, it is contended that the

fourth defendant’s purchase has become lawful and final.

10.The third defendant instituted C.S. No.796 of 2009 on 27.08.2009,

raising substantially the same challenge as in the present suit, namely, that no

valid mortgage had been created in favour of the first defendant, Punjab

National Bank, and also assailing the order passed by the Debt Recovery

Tribunal in O.A. No.137 of 2008, the Recovery Certificate in D.R.C. No.119 of

2008, and the consequential auction sale proceedings. In the said suit, the first

defendant, Punjab National Bank, filed Application No.5583 of 2009 under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, and the same was

allowed on 02.03.2010. The appeals preferred by the third defendant in O.S.A.

Nos.64 and 65 of 2010 were dismissed by a Division Bench on 30.03.2010. The

Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment of the Division Bench in https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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SLP No.13608-13609 of 2010 was also dismissed by the Supreme Court of

India on 08.07.2010.

11.Likewise, the third defendant and the other guarantor had filed an

application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal to condone the delay in filing a

petition to set aside the ex parte order; the said application was dismissed, and

the matter was carried up to the Supreme Court of India, but without success.

Inasmuch as the reliefs sought in the present suit and in C.S. No.796 of 2009 are

substantially the same, it is contended that the present suit is hit by estoppel and

barred by res judicata. It is further stated that the plaintiff had admitted

knowledge of the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, yet chose to

institute the present suit only after a lapse of about eight years, and therefore,

according to the fourth defendant, the suit is barred by limitation.

12.The brief contents of the counter affidavits filed by the first

respondent/plaintiff in I.A. Nos.1 and 2 of 2019 are as follows: With regard

to the plea of ouster of civil Court jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Recovery

of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, it is contended that

the bar of jurisdiction applies only to matters falling within Section 17, namely,

applications filed by Banks and Financial Institutions, and that, therefore, the

civil Court’s jurisdiction is excluded only in respect of such proceedings.

According to the plaintiff, the present suit having been instituted by an

individual, the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. It is further https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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stated that the plaintiff was not a party to O.A. No.137 of 2003, in which only

the third defendant had been arrayed as the fourth respondent, and that, having

advanced a substantial sum to the third defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to

approach the civil Court. It is also contended that the plaint discloses triable

issues, including the bona fides of the transaction, the custody of the original

title deeds, and the genuineness of the title deeds, and therefore rejection of the

plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC is unwarranted. The plaintiff

further asserts that he was not a party to C.S. No.796 of 2009 and, therefore, the

principles of estoppel and res judicata have no application to the present suit.

13.By separate orders, the trial Court held that the plaint did not disclose

a cause of action, that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred under

Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions

Act, 1993, and that the suit was also barred by limitation. On those findings,

both the applications were allowed and, consequently, the plaint came to be

rejected.

14. Aggrieved by the rejection of the plaint, the plaintiff has preferred the

present appeals. The appellant contends that the trial Court erred in rejecting the

plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, since the plaint, when read as a

whole, discloses a cause of action and raises triable issues. Reliance is placed on

the settled principle that rejection of a plaint is permissible only where the bar is

apparent on the face of the plaint itself. The appellant would further submit that https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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the present suit is independent of the earlier mortgage suit in C.S. No.560 of

2008 and is not hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC, as the cause of action for the

declaratory relief is stated to have arisen subsequently. It is also contended that

the question whether the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and

the recovery proceedings are binding on the plaintiff, who claims to be a

registered mortgagee, as well as the issues relating to fraud, collusion,

genuineness of title deeds, and bona fides, are matters requiring a full-fledged

trial and cannot be decided at the threshold. The appellant further disputes the

finding regarding the bar of jurisdiction under the Recovery of Debts Due to

Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, contending that the civil Court is

competent to adjudicate such disputes. As regards limitation, it is pleaded that

the same is a mixed question of law and fact and that the plaintiff’s mortgage

right continues until discharge of the mortgage.

15. The points that arise for consideration in these appeals are as follows:

i.Whether the suit is barred under Sections 18 of the Recovery of

debts due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act 1993?

ii.Whether the suit is ex facie barred by limitation?

iii.Whether the suit is barred by resjudicata?

iv.Whether the order and decretal order passed in I.A.No.1 & 2 of

2019 are liable to set aside?

16.Point No.1: On the side of the applicants/defendants, it is contended

that the suit is barred under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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Bankruptcy Act, 1993, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the civil Court is

expressly excluded.

17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that

Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court only in respect of matters

falling under Section 17 of the Act, and that the said bar operates only in

relation to applications by Banks and Financial Institutions. It is therefore

contended that, the plaintiff being an individual, the present suit before the civil

Court is maintainable.

18.This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on

either side. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the

present suit is maintainable in the light of the bar contained in Section 18 of the

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993.

19. It is the contention of the defendants that the suit is barred, since the

subject matter relates to recovery proceedings, auction sale, and issuance of the

sale certificate, all of which, according to them, fall within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. On the other hand, the plaintiff

would contend that the bar under Section 18 applies only in respect of Banks

and Financial Institutions and does not extend to an individual litigant such as

the plaintiff. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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20. This contention of the plaintiff is misconceived and is liable to be

rejected. Section 18 of the Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts in

respect of matters falling within the ambit of Section 17. The language

employed in Section 18 is clear and categorical, inasmuch as it provides that

“no court or authority” shall exercise jurisdiction in relation to such matters.

The statutory bar is, therefore, absolute in its operation and is not confined only

to proceedings initiated by Banks or Financial Institutions.

21. The Supreme Court, in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon,

(2010) 8 SCC 110, has categorically held that where a special statute provides a

complete mechanism for redressal of grievances, the jurisdiction of the civil

Court stands excluded and the parties must work out their remedies in the

manner provided under the statute. Likewise, in Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal,

(2014) 1 SCC 479, the Apex Court held that any challenge to the measures

taken in respect of secured assets, including auction sale, falls exclusively

within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and that the jurisdiction of the civil Court

is barred.

22.On the side of the appellant/plaintiff, reliance is placed on the

judgment of the Madras High Court in Deenadayalan v. N. Sathish Kumar

(represented by Power Agent N. Ashok), 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 16531. It

is contended that, since the plaintiff is neither a borrower nor a guarantor, the

bar under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 would https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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not apply, and that, therefore, the suit before the civil Court is maintainable.

23.Though the above contention may appear attractive at first blush, it

cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is no

doubt true that where a plaintiff, as a third party, seeks a limited or independent

relief in respect of his own rights, such as enforcement of a subsequent

mortgage, without calling in question the recovery proceedings initiated by the

Bank, such a suit may not fall within the bar under Section 18.

24. However, in the case on hand, the relief sought is not confined to the

plaintiff’s independent rights said to arise out of the subsequent mortgage dated

28.03.2008. On the contrary, the plaintiff has directly challenged: (i) the order

passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal; (ii) the Recovery Certificate issued

pursuant thereto; and (iii) the auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer,

together with all consequential proceedings. All these actions are integral parts

of the statutory recovery proceedings initiated against the borrower/guarantor,

namely, the third defendant.

25. Such matters squarely fall within the exclusive domain of the Debts

Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. Once the relief sought relates to

the validity of the recovery proceedings and the measures taken pursuant

thereto, the bar under Section 18 is clearly attracted, irrespective of whether the

plaintiff is the borrower, the guarantor, or a third party. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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26. In fact, the very decision relied on by the plaintiff fortifies the above

position. In Deenadayalan (supra), the High Court observed that where the

title to the secured property stands in the name of the borrower/guarantor and

the Bank has initiated recovery proceedings on the basis of such security

interest, it is the Debts Recovery Tribunal alone that would have jurisdiction,

and the jurisdiction of the civil Court would stand barred.

27. Applying the above principle to the facts of the present case, since the

property in question formed the subject matter of recovery proceedings initiated

against the guarantor and such proceedings culminated in the issuance of the

Recovery Certificate and the auction sale, any challenge thereto can be

adjudicated only by the DRT/DRAT and not by the civil Court.

28.Therefore, the judgment relied on by the plaintiff is clearly

distinguishable on facts and, on the contrary, lends support to the case of the

defendants. Hence, the said decision does not advance the plaintiff’s case.

29. In the present case, the relief sought by the plaintiff is to declare as

null and void the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, including the

auction sale and the sale certificate issued by the Recovery Officer. Such relief

squarely relates to matters falling within Section 17 of the Act, namely,

recovery proceedings and the consequential sale of secured assets. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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30.Once it is found that the subject matter of the suit falls within the

ambit of Section 17, the bar under Section 18 operates with full force. The

exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court extends to all persons, including

borrowers, guarantors, purchasers, and subsequent mortgagees, and is not

confined only to Banks or Financial Institutions.

31. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the present suit is

expressly barred under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy

Act, 1993. A reading of the plaint, on its face, makes it clear that the reliefs

sought pertain to matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Debts

Recovery Tribunal. Hence, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII

Rule 11(d) CPC as being barred by law. Thus, point no.1 is answered against

plaintiff.

32.Point No.2: The learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners/defendants would contend that the suit is barred by limitation. It is

no doubt true that the question of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of

law and fact. However, it is equally well settled that where, on a meaningful

reading of the plaint, the suit appears ex facie to be barred by limitation, the

plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. On the other hand,

where the issue of limitation requires adjudication upon disputed questions of

fact, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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33.In the present case, it is necessary to examine, on the basis of the

averments contained in the plaint, whether the suit is ex facie barred by

limitation. The plaintiff has instituted the suit seeking a declaration that: (i) the

equitable mortgage alleged to have been executed by the third defendant in

favour of the first defendant Bank is null and void; (ii) the Recovery Certificate

issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai, in O.A. No.137 of 2003 is

null and void; (iii) the auction sale conducted by the second defendant in D.R.C.

No.119 of 2008 is null and void; and (iv) all consequential proceedings,

including delivery of possession to the fourth defendant and demolition of the

building, are null, void and non est in law.

34.In the case of a suit seeking declaratory relief, the applicable provision

under the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 58, which prescribes a period of three

years from the date on which the right to sue first accrues.

35.In the case on hand, the material dates, as borne out by the plaint

averments, are as follows: the equitable mortgage in favour of the first

defendant Bank is stated to have been created on 23.04.1998; the Recovery

Certificate in O.A. No.137 of 2003 is stated to have been issued on 28.07.2008;

the auction sale was conducted on 27.10.2009; and the sale was confirmed on

03.03.2010. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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36. The present suit came to be instituted only on 20.07.2016, originally

before this Court in C.S. No.512 of 2016, and was thereafter transferred and

renumbered as O.S. No.3969 of 2019 on the file of the IV Additional City Civil

Court, Chennai.

37. It is further evident from the averments in the plaint that the plaintiff

entered into the transaction on 28.03.2008 by advancing a sum of Rs.1 crore to

the third defendant on the strength of a mortgage. The plaintiff has also

categorically stated that he had become aware of the proceedings before the

Debts Recovery Tribunal and of the Recovery Certificate issued therein, and

that he had, in fact, filed I.A. No.2 of 2009 before the Recovery Officer

challenging the same. It is thus clear that the plaintiff had knowledge of the

prior mortgage, the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and the

Recovery Certificate, at least by the year 2009.

38. Further, during the pendency of Appeal No.11 of 2009, the auction

sale was conducted on 27.10.2009 and the sale was confirmed on 03.03.2010. It

is, therefore, manifest that the plaintiff had full knowledge of all the material

transactions at least by the year 2010.

39. Despite such knowledge, the present suit came to be filed only on

20.07.2016, well beyond the prescribed period of three years. Hence, on the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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face of the plaint averments, the suit is clearly barred by limitation under Article

58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

40. On the side of the appellant/plaintiff, reliance is placed on the

judgment of the Madras High Court in C.S. Ramaswamy v. Nanjammal and

others, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 28045. In the said case, the suit had been

instituted in 2016 seeking cancellation of a sale deed dated 12.09.2005. An

application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was filed for rejection of the plaint

on the ground of limitation; however, the same was dismissed. The High Court

confirmed the said dismissal on the ground that the plaint contained specific

averments of fraud and that the plaintiff had pleaded knowledge of the sale deed

only in April 2015, immediately upon which the suit came to be filed. In those

circumstances, the Court held that the issue of limitation, being dependent upon

proof of fraud and the date of knowledge, required a full-fledged trial and could

not be decided at the threshold.

41. However, the said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In

the present case, the plaintiff has admitted knowledge of the entire transaction

as early as the year 2009 and had, in fact, filed I.A. No.2 of 2009 before the

Recovery Officer challenging the recovery proceedings. Thus, the plaintiff’s

knowledge of the prior mortgage, the proceedings before the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, and the consequential actions taken in respect of the suit property is

not in dispute. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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42. Despite such admitted knowledge in the year 2009, the present suit

came to be filed only in the year 2016, far beyond the prescribed period of

limitation of three years. Therefore, unlike the decision relied on by the

plaintiff, where the date of knowledge itself was in dispute and required

adjudication, in the present case the date of knowledge stands admitted and

undisputed.

43. Hence, the judgment relied on by the plaintiff does not advance his

case. On the contrary, a reading of the plaint itself makes it clear that the present

suit is barred by limitation and is, therefore, liable to be rejected.

44. The further contention of the plaintiff that, since he is in possession

of the original title deeds, the cause of action is a continuing one, cannot be

accepted. Section 22 of the Limitation Act applies only to cases of continuing

breach of contract or continuing tort, where each successive breach gives rise to

a fresh cause of action. In the present case, the acts complained of, namely, the

execution of the mortgage, issuance of the Recovery Certificate, conduct of the

auction sale, and confirmation of the sale, are all completed events. Therefore,

the doctrine of continuing cause of action has no application to the facts of the

present case.

45. Accordingly, this Court holds that the suit is ex facie barred by

limitation and is, therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d)

CPC. Thus, point no.2 is answered against plaintiff. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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46. Point No.3: On the side of the applicants/defendants, it is

contended that the plaint is liable to be rejected on the grounds of res judicata

and estoppel. In Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat and

others, (2021) 9 SCC 99, the Apex Court held that the plea of res judicata

cannot be made a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The said principle has also been reiterated in Pandurangan v. T. Jayarama

Chettiar and another, Civil Appeal No.7743 of 2025, dated 14.07.2025. In

view of the above Apex court citations the plea of resjudicata is not fit for

consideration. Thus this point is answered.

47. Point No.4: From the averments in the plaint, it is seen that the

third defendant had earlier instituted C.S. No.796 of 2009 seeking substantially

identical reliefs, namely, a declaration that no valid mortgage had been created

over the suit property and that the recovery proceedings culminating in D.R.C.

No.119 of 2008 are illegal, void and non est in law. The plaint in the said suit

came to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by order dated 02.03.2010.

48. The appeals preferred against the rejection of the plaint, in O.S.A.

Nos.64 and 65 of 2010, were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on

30.03.2010, and the Special Leave Petitions in SLP Nos.13608 and 2309 of

2010 were also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 08.07.2010. Thus,

the issue relating to the validity of the equitable mortgage and the consequential

recovery proceedings has attained finality. Though the plaintiff was not a party https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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to the earlier suit/proceedings, the pleadings unmistakably disclose that he is

setting up a claim through and under the third defendant. The foundation of the

present suit is also identical, namely, the denial of the execution of the equitable

mortgage by the third defendant in favour of the Bank and the challenge to the

recovery proceedings, on grounds that were directly raised and decided in the

earlier proceedings.

49. The plaintiff’s case is not founded on any independent or distinct

cause of action, but is wholly derivative of the rights asserted by the third

defendant. The allegations of fraud, non-availability of the original title deeds,

and invalidity of the mortgage are only a reiteration, or at best a re-

characterisation, of the very same grounds urged by the third defendant in the

earlier suit in C.S. No.796 of 2009.

50.Further, the very same grounds were also raised by the first

respondent/plaintiff in I.A. No.2 of 2009 in D.R.C. No.119 of 2008 in O.A.

No.137 of 2003 before the Recovery Officer, seeking a declaration that the

mortgage and the Recovery Certificate were nullities. The said application was

dismissed on merits after contest. The appeal preferred before the Debt

Recovery Tribunal in Appeal No.11 of 2009 was also dismissed on merits, after

contest, on 27.2.2015. The further appeal filed before the Debt Recovery

Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, in A.I.R. No.229 of 2015 was dismissed on https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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01.08.2017. No further appeal having been preferred thereafter, the matter has

attained finality.

51. Thus, the challenges laid on the very same grounds by the third

defendant, as plaintiff in C.S. No.796 of 2009 before this Court, and by the

present plaintiff in I.A. No.2 of 2009 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, were

both negatived on merits. Despite the same, the plaintiff has now instituted the

present suit in O.S. No.3969 of 2019 on the very same grounds.

52. When the third defendant had already failed in her challenge, and the

findings rendered therein have attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, and when the present plaintiff had also challenged the very same

proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and failed, he cannot now be

permitted to reagitate the very same issues under the guise of a fresh suit. Such

an attempt, in the considered view of this Court, amounts to a clear abuse of

process of law, and the present suit is vexatious in nature. Hence, as held by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC

467, such a suit is liable to be rejected at the threshold. In the above

circumstances, the fair and decretal orders passed by the learned trial Judge in

I.A. Nos.1 and 2 of 2019 in O.S. No.3969 of 2019 are liable to be confirmed.

Thus, point no.4 is answered. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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53. In the result, in view of the findings rendered on Point Nos.1, 2

and 4, the fair and decretal orders passed in I.A. Nos.1 and 2 of 2019 in O.S.

No.3969 of 2019 are confirmed, and the rejection of the plaint in O.S. No.3969

of 2019 is upheld. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed with costs.

Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, are closed.

24.03.2026

Index: Yes/No

Speaking/Non-speaking order

Neutral Citation: Yes/No

sms

To

1.VI Addl City Civil Court,

Chennai.

2.Punjab National Bank

Rep By Its Chief Manager, Asset Recovery Management Branch, Khivraj

Building , 1st Floor, No.624, Anna Salai, Chennai -600 006

3.Recovery Officer

DRT-I, Chennai

4.V.R.Section

High Court, Madras. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

AS No. 266 of 2021

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Page25 of 25

DR.A.D.MARIA CLETE, J.

sms

Pre-delivery order made

in

AS Nos. 266 & 267 of 2021

24-03-2026 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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