IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI

****

CRIMINAL PETITION No. 7020 of 2014

Between:

K.Venkatachalam Chetty,

S/o.Late K.Narayana Chetty, Aged about 69 years,

R/o.Dandapalli Road, Kothapeta,

Palamaner Town, Palamaner Post and Mandal,

Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh.

... Petitioner/A.1

And

1. The State of A.P., Represented by Station House Officer,

Palamaner Police Station, Chittoor District through Public

Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.

.... Respondent/Complainant

2. K.V.Ramana Reddy, S/o.Not known to the petitioner,

Aged not known, Working as Zonal Manager,

A.P.Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited,

Palamaner, Chittoor District,

Andhra Pradesh. .... Respondent/Defacto Complainant

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 06-09-2023

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL :

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters / Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to

see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No

DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA, J

2

* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

+ CRIMINAL PETITION No.7020 of 2014

% 06-09-2023

Between:

K.Venkatachalam Chetty,

S/o.Late K.Narayana Chetty, Aged about 69 years,

R/o.Dandapalli Road, Kothapeta,

Palamaner Town, Palamaner Post and Mandal,

Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh.

... Petitioner/A.1

And

1. The State of A.P., Represented by Station House Officer,

Palamaner Police Station, Chittoor District through Public

Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.

.... Respondent/Complainant

2. K.V.Ramana Reddy, S/o.Not known to the petitioner,

Aged not known, Working as Zonal Manager,

A.P.Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited,

Palamaner, Chittoor District,

Andhra Pradesh. .... Respondent/Defacto Complainant

! Counsel for Petitioner : Sri N.Bharat Babu

^ Counsel for Respondents : Asst.Public Prosecutor (State)

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. AIR 1992 SC 604

2. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 976

3. (2019) 16 SCC 739

This Court made the following:

3

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

CRIMINAL PETITION No. 7020 of 2014

ORDER:

In this Criminal Petition filed under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”) the

petitioner/A.1 seeks to quash the criminal proceedings against

him in Crime No.123 of 2014 of Palamaner Police Station,

Chittoor District, registered for the offence under Section 420

IPC.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the

learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State.

3. The facts in issue are that APIIC/Government have

acquired the lands in Sy.No.532-2 Ac.0.12 cents; Sy.No.533-4

Ac.2.44 cents; Sy.No.533-5 Ac.1.58 cents and in Sy.No.533-6

Ac.1.48 cents, through Award No.2/Genl./95-96, dated

18.09.1995 for establishment of the Industrial Development

Area at Palamaner, Chittoor District. The said lands were

handed over to APIIC by the Revenue Department on

25.02.2002 and ever since, the possession was taken and the

lands were under the control of APIIC. It is further alleged that

during the inspection, on 23.04.2014, the APIIC officials have

observed that somebody laid fencing to the subject land and a

ground breaking ceremony was performed. O n enquiry, they

4

came to know that one of the land owners namely,

K.Venkatachalam Chetty, has given a power of attorney in

favour of one G.Govardhan in respect of the land to an extent of

Ac.1.48 cents situated in Sy.No.533/6 and they have sold the

said land to 44 different persons for house sites duly making

plots. The Sub-Registrar, Palamaner entertained the illegal

activity and accepted for registration of the said plots in their

favour. As such, the present complaint was filed for taking

action against the petitioner/A.1 and two others.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit

that the Government intended to acquire the land to an extent of

Ac.14.54 cents situated in different survey numbers at

Palamaner Village and Mandal and some lands of

Nagamangalam and issued a Draft Notification under Section

4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 21.01.1993. He would

further submit that under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition

Act, within two years from the date of the notification, award

has to be passed, whereas, in the present case, award has been

passed beyond two years. Later, the Writ Petition filed by the

petitioner questioning the land acquisition proceedings was also

dismissed by this Court on 23.07.2001. He would further

submit that after lapse of 20 years, in order to cover up their

laches, a false and fictitious complaint has been lodged on

5

15.05.2014 by the 2

nd respondent. Further, he would submit

that the petitioner/A.1 has not received any compensation for

the land said to have been acquired in Sy.No.533/6 . Even

according to the Government, the petitioner is the owner of the

subject land. He would further submit that the dispute is of

civil nature and is to be decided by a competent Civil Court and

the 2

nd respondent initiated the present criminal proceedings by

giving the colour of criminal offence and therefore, the

ingredients of Section 420 IPC are not attracting against the

petitioner and hence, the proceedings in the above crime are

liable to be quashed.

5. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that

the land to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents in Sy.No.533/6 has been

acquired by APIIC/Government for establishment of the

Industrial Development Area at Palamaner and in this

connection, land acquisition proceedings were initiated by the

Land Acquisition Officer and a Draft Notification under Section

4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was submitted to the

Government and the notification was published. Further, he

would submit that since the Land Acquisition Officer/Revenue

Divisional Officer, Madanapalle, was authorized to perform the

functions of the Collector to conduct enquiry under Section 5-A

of the Land Acquisition Act, he invited objections from the

6

respective land owners and their objections were overruled and

petitioner’s land was acquired for establishment of Industrial

Development Area and an Award was passed and immediately,

the APIIC officials had taken over the possession of the subject

land from the Revenue Department on 25.02.2002. He would

further submit that having knowledge about the acquisition of

the land, the petitioner/A.1 executed a GPA in favour of one

G.Govardhan in respect of the land situated in Sy.No.533/6 to

an extent of Ac.1.48 cents and both the petitioner and the GPA

holder in collusion formulated the plots and sold the same to

the third parties with a fraudulent intention, and the allegations

in the complaint are sufficient to constitute the offence under

Section 420 IPC. Therefore, the present criminal proceedings

were initiated against the petitioner/A.1 and he prays to dismiss

the petition.

6. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions made

by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned

Assistant Public Prosecution for the State, in my considered

opinion, the foremost issue, which requires determination in the

instant case is,

Whether the allegations made against the

petitioner/A.1 would attract the accusation made

against him and whether there are any merits in the

criminal petition to allow?

7

POINT:

7. In a decision reported in State of Haryana & Others Vs.

Ch.Bhajanlal and Others

1, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in

exercise of extraordinary power conferred under Article 226 of

Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C, the following categories of cases are given by way of

illustration, wherein, such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down

any precise clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and

inflexible guide, myriad kinds of cases wherein, such power

should be exercised. The relevant guidelines read as under:

―(1) where the allegations made in the First Information

Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the

accused;

(2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under

an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code;

(3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out

a case against the accused;

(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non -cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

1

AIR 1992 SC 604

8

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated

under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which

a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a

specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.‖

8. As can be seen from the decision supra, the 1

st guideline is

to the effect that even if the complaint allegations are accepted

to be true on their face value, if they do not constitute any

offence, then the criminal proceedings against the petitioner/A.1

can be quashed.

9. In the instant case, the petitioner/A.1 is the absolute

owner of the land in Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents

and admittedly, the Government intended to acquire the land to

an extent of Ac.14.54 cents comprised in different survey

numbers for establishment of Industrial Development Area at

Palamaner and the Land Acquisition Officer -cum-Revenue

Divisional Officer, Madanapalle issued Section 4(1) notification

on 21.01.1993 as mentioned in the Writ Petition No.22968 of

1995 filed by the petitioner/A.1. The Declaration under

9

Section 6 was published on 24.09.1993 preceded by Section 5-A

enquiry conducted and the petitioner/A.1 expressed his

willingness for acquisition of the land in Sy.No.533/1 to an

extent of Ac.1.05 cents and received compensation to the said

land and admittedly he declined willingness for the land in

Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents and no compensation

was received by the petitioner/A.1 for the said land. The Award

No.2/Genl./95-96, dated 18.09.1995 was passed and the said

Award reveals that the petitioner/A.1 who is the land owner in

Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents along with four others

have not consented to be part with their respective lands for the

acquisition. Except that, rest of the owners have consented and

expressed their willingness for acquisition of the lands

@ Rs.40/- per square foot. Accordingly, the Award was passed

on 18.09.1995 and the said Award was enclosed along with the

complaint and the above facts reveal the same.

10. However, as per Section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act,

1894, within two years from the date of notification, award has

to be passed, whereas, in the present case, award has been

passed beyond two years.

11. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Section 11-A of

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows:

10

―11A. Period shall be which an award within made . - The

Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period

of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration

and if no award is made within that period, the entire

proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been

published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition

(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made

within a period of two years from such commencement.‖

12. As per the above provision, the draft notification issued

under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was approved by

the Collector vide Proceedings in Roc.L7/17458/88, dated

02.12.1992 and the draft declaration issued under Section 6 of

the Land Acquisition Act was also approved by the Collector vide

Proceedings in Roc .D12/17458/88, dated 28.08.1993,

CTR/199. But, the Award was passed on 18.09.1995, which is

beyond two years from the date of the publication of the

Declaration.

13. The first and foremost contention of the petitioner/A.1 is

with regard to lapse of acquisition on account of non-passing of

the impugned award within a period of two years from the date

of issuance of the final notification as contemplated

under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is no longer res

integra.

14. As per Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the

Collector should make an Award under Section 11 within a

period of two years from the date of publication of

11

Section 6 declaration and if no Award is made within that

period, the entire proceedings of such acquisition of lands

should lapse. In the instant case, the date of publication

of Section 6 declaration was 28.08.1993. The 2

nd

respondent/Zonal Manager should have passed the Award on or

before 27.08.1995, whereas, the Award was passed on

18.09.1995. Since the Award had not been passed within the

mandatory period of two years from the date of the publication

of the Declaration, the entire acquisition proceedings lapsed.

The non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 11-

A of the Land Acquisition Act vitiated the entire proceedings.

15. Further, the 2

nd respondent stated in the complaint that

the above lands were handed over to APIIC by the Revenue

Department on 25.02.2002 and ever since, the APIIC has been

in possession of the said lands and lodged a complaint on

15.05.2014. The said fact is seriously disputed by the

petitioner/A.1.

16. The question as to whether the possession was in

symbolic or actual, fell for consideration, could all depend upon

the facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the

possession of the subject land was taken by APIIC from the

Revenue Authorities on 25.02.2002 as alleged in the complaint.

But, whether the said possession was taken under the

12

Panchanama or not, is not indicated in the complaint by the 2

nd

respondent. It is necessary to note that when a panchanama for

delivery of possession of the lands was conducted and the

panchanama was signed by one of the officers of the Revenue

Department, it is not open to the 2

nd respondent to dispute

about the taking possession of the lands and it is a

common sense that the lands cannot be physically put in

possession of anybody, and it is only a paper delivery by duly

conducting panchanama on the spot wherein , handing over of

the possession is recorded. In the complaint it does not indicate

that under the panchanama the possession of the property was

delivered to APIIC by the Revenue Authorities. This assertion

would undoubtedly go to show that the possession of the land

was not taken by APIIC. If the possession of the land was

handed over to the APIIC by the Revenue Authorities, they

would have intimated to the Registering Authorities about the

acquisition of the properties in respective survey numbers not to

entertain any registrations thereon, but, they did not do so.

17. Admittedly, the possession of the lands has been under

the control of the petitioner/A.1 and the Revenue records reflect

the name of the petitioner as an owner of the said land. If the

Revenue Authorities handed over the subject property to an

extent of Ac.1.48 cents in Sy.No.533/6 to the APIIC, the Pahanis

13

would have shown that APIIC is the owner of the said land. On a

perusal of the Pahanis, dated 29.05.2014, filed along with this

petition, the name of the pattadar was shown as Venkatachalam

Chetty i.e., the petitioner/A.1 for the above land in Sy.No.533/6.

Apart from Pahanis, Adangal copy was also filed along with the

petition, wherein, the name of the pattadar was shown as

Venkatachalam Chetty i.e., the petitioner/A.1 for the above said

land. Further, the statement of Encumbrance on Property, dated

26.05.2014 issued by the Sub-Registrar, Palamaner, would also

show that as per the records of S.R.O., from 24 years i.e., from

01.01.1990 to 25.05.2014 the land to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents

in Sy.No.533/6 was in the name of the petitioner/A.1 and

G.Govardhan. In the light of the above documents, it clearly

indicates that the subject property has been in possession of the

petitioner/A.1. Therefore, there is no merit in the contentions

raised by the respondents and there is no explanation as to why

the Revenue Department did not change the entries in the

Revenue records. In the instant case, the 2

nd respondent lodged

the present complaint to cover up laches converting the civil

dispute by giving criminal colour alleging that the petitioner/A.1

sold the property to third parties. But, there was no

documentary proof to prove the same. On other hand, the Award

itself discloses that the petitioner/A.1 and four others have not

14

consented to part with the land for acquisition in respective

survey numbers.

18. Even otherwise, as per Section 24(2) of New Land

Acquisition Act, 2013 i.e., Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013, in any acquisition proceedings if award

is passed five years prior to the commencement of the Act and

possession was not taken, the land acquisition proceedings shall

be deemed to have lapsed and remedy left to the Government to

initiate acquisition proceedings afresh.

19. In the instant case, the Award was passed on 18.09.1995

i.e., 18 years prior to the commencement of the Act and the

possession was not taken as stated supra, which is evident from

the Revenue records i.e., Pahanis and Adangal and

Encumbrance Certificate, as referred to above to show that the

petitioner/A.1 is the owner of the subject land. Therefore, the

acquisition proceedings said to have been initiated in the year

1993 got lapsed by the operation of Law.

20. Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 reads as follows:

―24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894

shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.–

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section

(1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the

15

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under

the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to

the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the

land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid

the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the

appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the

proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with

the provisions of this Act.‖

21. In the light of the above provision, the land acquisition

proceedings initiated by the Land Acquisition Officer deemed to

have been lapsed.

22. In the present case, possession of the subject land has not

been taken as alleged in the complaint and the compensation for

the subject land was not deposited and apart from that the

Award reveals that the petitioner/A.1 who is the land owner in

Sy.No.533/6 to an extent of Ac.1.48 cents along with four others

have not consented to be part with their respective lands for the

acquisition. The 2

nd respondent initiated the present criminal

proceedings by giving criminal colour to the civil dispute instead

of taking appropriate steps by following the provisions under the

Land Acquisition Act.

23. In Mitesh Kumar J.Sha Vs. State of Ka rnataka and

others

2, wherein, at Para Nos.29, 43, 45, 46 and 47 the Hon’ble

Apex Court held as follows:

―29. Coming to the facts of the case at hands, the contested

contention between the parties is that the builder company had

sold four excess flats beyond its share, in terms of the JDA and

2

2021 SCC Online SC 976

16

supplementary agreement entered into between the parties.

Respondent No. 2 contends that builder company which was

entitled to sell only 9 flats in its favour, has instead executed

sale deed for 13 flats in total. Thus, the company simply could

not have sold the flats beyond 9 flats for which it was

authorized and resultantly cannot evade criminal liability on a

mere premise that a civil dispute is already pending between

the parties.

43. On an earlier occasion, in case of G. Sagar Suri v. State of

UP

8, this Court has also observed:—

―8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to

be exercised with a great care. In exercise of its

jurisdiction High Court is not to examine the matter

superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which is

essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of

criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short

cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing

process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of

caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This

Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which

High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section

482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to

be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.‖

45. Applying this dictum to the instant factual matrix, it can be

safely concluded that the present case clearly falls within the

ambit of first, third and fifth category of the seven categories

enlisted in the above said judgment. The case therefore

warrants intervention by this Court, and the High Court has

erred in dismissing the petition filed by the Appellants under

section 482 CrPC. We find that there has been attempt to stretch

the contours of a civil dispute and thereby essentially impart a

criminal color to it.

46. Recently, this Court in case of Randheer Singh v. The State

of U.P.

10, has again reiterated the long standing principle that

criminal proceedings must not be used as instruments of

harassment. The court observed as under:—

―33. ….There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for

the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether

a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on

the nature of the allegation and whether the essential

ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has

to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt

that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also

have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however,

to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been

given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the

High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal

17

proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet

Batra (supra) extracted above.‖

47. Moreover, this Court has at innumerable instances

expressed its disapproval for imparting criminal color to a civil

dispute, made merely to take advantage of a relatively quick

relief granted in a criminal case in contrast to a civil dispute.

Such an exercise is nothing but an abuse of the process of law

which must be discouraged in its entirety.‖

24. In another decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in

Prof.R.K.Vijayasarathy and another Vs. Su dha Seetharam

and another

3 it was held as follows:

18. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus:

―420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of

property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces

the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to

make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable

security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is

capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to

fine.‖

19. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420

are as follows:

19.1. A person must commit the offence of cheating under

Section 415; and

19.2. The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to

(a) deliver property to any person; or

(b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed

or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security.

20. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute

an offence under Section 420.

25. In the light of the judgments referred to above, the remedy

available for the 2

nd respondent is to approach the Civil Court

seeking an appropriate remedy by way of cancellation of the

registered sale deed if executed by the petitioner/A.1 in favour of

the third parties and to initiate land acquisition proceedings

3

(2019) 16 SCC 739

18

afresh as stated above. Admittedly, the Land Acquisition Officer

has not communicated the acquisition of the subject property in

Sy.No.533/6 to the Sub -Registrar, Palamaner and did not

inform not to entertain any registrations from the date of

handing over the possession of the property to

APIIC/Government i.e., on 25.02.2002.

26. In the light above discussion, whether the possession was

taken or not, as alleged in the complaint, has to be established

in a proper Forum i.e., in a Civil Court. Essentially, these

disputed questions of fact constitute a civil case, which has to

be adjudicated in a Civil Court by adducing evidence. Instead,

the 2

nd respondent initiated the present proceedings by giving a

colour of a criminal offence. It does not meet the strict standard

of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.

27. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that

the 2

nd respondent made an attempt to abuse the authority so

as to do injustice. It would be an abuse of process of the Court

to allow any action, which would result injustice and prevent the

promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be

justified to quash any proceedings, if it finds that the initiation

or continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of the Court or

quashing of these proceedings would otherwise, serve the ends

of justice. In fact, no offence is committed by the petitioner/A.1.

19

Therefore, this Court finds that it is a fit case to exercise the

inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C to

quash the proceedings in Crime No.123 of 2014 of Palamaner

Police Station, Chittoor District, registered for the offence under

Section 420 IPC against the petitioner/A.1.

28. Resultantly, the criminal petition is allowed and the

proceedings against the petitioner/A.1 in Crime No.123 of 2014

of Palamaner Police Station, Chittoor District, are hereby

quashed.

As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any,

shall stand disposed of.

JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

06.09.2023

DNS/ Mjl/*

L.R.Copy to be marked

20

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

CRIMINAL PETITION No. 7020 OF 2014

06.09.2023

DNS

Mjl/*

L.R.Copy to be marked

21