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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 2354 of 1999

PETITIONER:

KAILASH CHANDRA AND ANR

RESPONDENT:

MUKUNDI LAL AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/01/2002

BENCH:

R.C. LAHOTI & BRIJESH KUMAR

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

2002 (1) SCR 605

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BRIJESH KUMAR, J. This appeal has been preferred by the tenant of the

premises in question against the Judgement and Order passed by Allahabad

High Court dismissing appellant's Writ Petition, filed against the order

for his eviction passed in revision, on the ground of default in payment of

rent.

The Landlords, who are respondent Nos. 1-3 in the present appeal, filed a

suit for eviction of the appellant in the court of Judge, Small Causes,

Jaunpur. The ground for eviction on account of sub-letting by the

appellant/ tenant, was not accepted by the Trial Court, However, it was

found that the appellant-tenant was in arrears of rent, but decree of

eviction was not passed, since the appellant paid the amount due on the

first date of hearing in accordance with Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban

Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (to be

referred as Act). The Revisional Court, however, upset the order passed by

the Trial Court and passed decree of eviction on account of arrears of rent

as well as on the ground of sub-letting. The said order was upheld in the

Writ Petition in so far it related to default in payment of rent. The High

Court, however, held that the Revisional Court was wrong in substituting

its own finding of fact regarding subletting, in exercise of its revisional

powers. Therefore, finding of the Trial Court on the point of sub-letting

stood restored.

The learned counsel for the parties have confined their submissions before

us relating to the question as to whether the defendant-appellant had

cleared the arrears of rent or not. In this connection, it may be indicated

that according to the respondent-plaintiff, the rent of the accommodation

in question was Rs. 18 per month. The tenant stopped payment of rent w.e.f.

1.6.1971, but an amount of Rs. 443.50 paise was claimed on account of

arrears of rent w.e.f. 15.12.1973 to 4.1.1975 and an amount of Rs. 240.50

paise on account of mesne profit w.e.f. 5.1.1975 till 15.12.1976. It is

further averred in the plaint that rent for the period w.e.f. 1.6.1971 to

15.12.1973 was not being claimed having become barred by time. According to

the appellant-defendant, he had deposited all the amount due in the Court

on the first date of hearing complying with Section 20(4) of the Act and

prior to that he had deposited the rent under Section 30(2) of the Act. The

property in question was on lease with the landlord, granted by Municipal

Board. On expiry of the period of lease in the year 1971, the Municipal

Board issued notice demanding rent from the defendant. Therefore, the

defendant-appellant resorted to the provisions of Section 30(2) of the Act

and started depositing the rent in the Court. Thus taking into account all

the amounts deposited, nothing remained due to be paid to the plaintiff,

therefore, decree of eviction could not be passed.

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The High Court came to the conclusions that benefit of deposit under

Section 30(2) of the Act could not be given to the tenant under Section

20(4) of the act and the tenant has to clear off all dues as standing

against him including the amount of arrears which may, though have become

barred by time. So far latter proposition is concerned, the High Court's

view cannot be faulted with. In regard to the amount deposited under

Section 30(2) of the Act, the High Court has held as follows:-

"In view of the fact that the amount of rent which was deposited by the

tenant under Section 30(2) of the Act, on a plain reading of Section 20(4)

could not be deducted or adjusted while making compliance of the

requirements contemplated under sub-section (4) as the provision makes

reference only to adjustment of rent deposited under Section 30(1) and not

to deposits made under Section 30(2) of the Act, the finding of the trial

court extending benefit to the tenant of Section 20(4) of taking into

account the rent deposited by the tenant under Section 30(2) suffered from

an apparent error of law which error has been corrected by the Revisional

Court by excluding from consideration the said deposit for the purposes of

judging the compliance of the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 20

of the Act.

The view taken by the High Court, as indicated above, requires examination

though apparently on the face of it, it may seem to be correct.

Sub-section 4 of Section 20 reads as under-

(4) In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-

section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally

pays or (tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court) the entire amount of

rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such

damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent)

together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and

the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting

therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1)

of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on

that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for

eviction on that ground:"

Section 30 of the Act reads as follows:-

30. Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances:-

(1) If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount

as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged

landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount

in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges

to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the

landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his

willingness to accept it.

(2) Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who

is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may

like-wise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such

deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute

has been settled by the decision of any competent court or by settlement

between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently

become due in respect of such building.

(3) The deposit referred to in sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) shall

be made in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction.

(4) On any deposit being made under sub-section (1), the Court shall

cause a notice of the deposit to be served on the alleged landlord, and the

amount of deposit may be withdrawn by that person on application made by

him to the Court in that behalf.

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(5) On a deposit being made under sub-section (2), the Court shall cause

notice of the deposit to be served on the person or persons concerned and

hold the amount of the deposit for the benefit of the person who may be

found entitled to it by any competent Court or by a settlement between the

parties, and the same shall be payable to such person.

(6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that

the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the

person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in sub-

section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in sub-section (2).

A perusal of sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, no doubt indicates

that the deduction of an amount from the total amount due is permissible

only to the extent of deposit made under sub-section (1) of Section 30. It

does not mention about the deposits made under sub-section (2) of Section

30 of the Act.

A tenant is required to make deposit, under sub-section (1) of Section 30

on refusal of the landlord to accept the rent. The deposit under sub-

section(2) of Section 30 is required to be made where any doubt or dispute

arises as to the person who may be entitled to receive rent in which event,

the tenant may deposit the amount in the Court till such doubt has been

removed or dispute has been settled. The effect of the deposits made under

sub-section (1) and (2) is to be found under sub-section (6) of Section 30

according to which it shall be deemed that the person depositing the amount

has paid it on the date of deposit, to the person in whose favour deposit

is made under sub-section (1) and to the landlord in case deposit is made

under sub-section (2). It is thus clear that the effect of deposit under

two different circumstances as provided under sub-sections (1) and (2) of

Section 30, is the same. The deposit is deemed to be payment made by the

person depositing to the landlord. That being the position, it is not open

to say that a deposit made under sub-section (2) of Section 30 would not be

deemed to be payment or rent to the landlord and the same is not liable to

be accounted for while considering the amount due. Omission of sub-section

(2) of Section 30 in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, cannot lead

to an inference, which would negate or nullify the express and statutory

effect provided under sub-section (6) of Section 30 regarding deposits made

under Section 30 (2) of the Act.

As a matter of fact, it would not at all be necessary to incorporate the

effect of sub-section (6) of Section 30 in sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of

the Act. The effect of sub-section (6) of Section 30 flows from the

provision itself. Therefore, sub-section (4) of Section 20 will have to be

read with sub-section (6) of Section 30 where it relates to deposit for

rent made under sub-section (2) of Section 30, which it would not be

necessary in case of deposits under sub-section (1) of Section 30. The

interpretation as accepted by the High Court is unnatural and against the

spirit and specific provision under sub-section (6) of Section 30. There

may or may not be a mention of sub-section (2) of Section 30 in Section

20(4) the plain and natural consequences statutorily provided should be

allowed to flow irrespective of mention of sub-section (1) alone in sub-

section (4) of Section 20. There cannot be converse inference in the teeth

of sub-section (6) of Section 30. Had sub-section (6) of Section 30 been

not there, it could perhaps provide some scope for such an inference.

A provision in the statute is not to be read in isolation. It has to be

read with other related provisions in the Act itself, more particularly,

when the subject matter dealt with in different Sections or parts of the

same statute is the same or similar in a nature. As in the case in hand, we

find that the matter relates to liability of the tenant to pay rent to the

landlord and the consequences on failure to do so as provided under Section

20(2)(a) of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 deals with payment of

arrears of rent etc, at the first hearing of the suit which in that event

provides protection from eviction. Section 30 deals with the two

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circumstances in which, for one reason or the other, the rent is deposited

in the Court instead of payment to the landlord. As noted earlier the

effect of deposit of rent is provided under sub-section (6) of Section 30.

Therefore, all the related provisions have to be read together for the

purposes of proper and harmonious construction. It is not only permissible

but much desirable for proper understanding of the contents and meaning of

the provisions under consideration. In R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka

and Anr., AIR (1992) SC 81 it has been observed-"No part of a Statutes and

no word of a Statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be

constructed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place".

In M Pentiah and Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors. reported in, AIR

(1961) SC 1107, a reference was made to observations made by Lord Davey, in

Canada Sugar Refining Company v. R. (1898) AC P. 375 it reads as follows :-

"Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the

context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a

consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to

the subject matter".

See also: Gammon India Limited etc. etc. v. Union of India, AIR (1974) SC

960; Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mira Khasivali Ven, (1977)

SC 747; Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj

Traders, AIR (1980) SC 485 and Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, AIR (1997)

SC 1006.

In O.P. Singhla and Anr v. Union of India and Ors., [1984] 4 SCC 450 at 461

it has been observed:-

"One must have regard to the scheme of fasiculus of the relevant rules or

Sections in order to determine the two meanings of any one or more of them

and isolated consideration of a provision leads to the risk of some other

inter related provisions becoming OTIOSE or devoid of meaning" (emphasis

supplied).

In the background of what has been held by this Court in the cases referred

to in the preceding paragraph, it would only be proper rather necessary to

read sub-section (4) of Section 20 along with sub-section (6) of Section 30

of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 provides for payment of entire

rent by the tenant at the first hearing of the Suit. It further permits,

deduction of any amount therefrom which has already been deposited by the

tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30. Sub-section (2) of Section 30

is omitted. The effect of payment under sub-section (2) of Section 30 is

that of payment by the depositor to the landlord. If it is so, how the said

amount can be treated to be due from the tenant for payment to the

landlord? If the amount deposited under sub-sec. (2) is not deductible

under sub-section (4) of Section 20 like the deposit made under sub-section

(1) of Section 30 and despite the deposit the tenant is liable to be

evicted on the ground of arrears of rent, it would render sub-section (2)

of Section 30 devoid of meaning and sub-section (6) of Section 30 otiose.

Double payment or deposit for the same period is not envisaged, nor it can

be, therefore, for construing the meaning of entire amount due as occurring

in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, sub-section (6) of Section 30

will have to be read along with it and not in isolation. It would also save

sub-section (6) of Section 30 from becoming OTIOSE. The anomalies and

differentiation in the deposits made under sub-sections (1) and (2) of

Section 30, though the effect is the same, would also be saved. It would

only harmonize the construction of the two provisions, namely, sub-section

(4) of Section 20 and sub-sections (2) and (6) of Section 30 of the Act.

Provisions of one Section of a statute can not be used to defeat those of

another unless it is impossible to effect re-conciliation between them.

(See Raj Krushna v. Vinod Kanungo, AIR (1954) SC 202 and Sultana Begum

(Supra) as also Mohd Sher Khan v. Raja Seth, AIR (1922) P.C. Page 17.

We also find that there are certain observations made in the judgement of

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the High Court for which there seems to be no basis. It is observed that

amount of arrears of rent w.e.f. 1971 to 1973 have not been deposited,

namely, the amount which was left out to be claimed by the plaintiff being

barred by time it does not appear to be correct on the face of it. It has

been the case of petitioner that he had deposited the amount under sub-

section 2 of Section 30 only when the Municipal Board demanded rent from

the defendant in 1971 on expiry of lease period of the plaintiff. It is

nobody's case that amount deposited under sub-section 2 of Section 30 was

any amount other than for the period w.e.f 1971. It is also not

understandable as to how it has been observed by the High Court that even

after the deposit made under section 30 (2) is taken into account the time

barred amount has not been paid. It is not necessary for us nor it would be

appropriate to go into the details of the payments made but we find that

the Trial Court observed that the defendant deposited Rs. 700 more than

what was claimed in the plaint. A total sum of Rs. 648 was demanded in the

plaint, whereas the amount deposited was 1510; Rs. 443.50 p. was demanded

on account of arrears of rent for the period from 15.12.1973 to 11.1.1975,

thereafter, up to 15.12.1976 a sum of Rs. 204.50 as mesne profit for use

and occupation. Rent for the period 21.5.1971 to 15.12.1973 had become time

barred. There was admittedly a deposit made under Section 30(2) of the Act.

We again find that at one place the High Court has observed that the

Revisional Court made some observations that deposit under Section 30(2)

was not a bonafide deposit, hence it was not liable to be taken into

account. No such question about the deposit under Section 30(2) being

bonafide or not, appears to have been raised before the Trial Court. No

such issue was framed, nor finding recorded either way and rightly. It is

not understandable how the observation came to be made by the Revisional

Court for the first time. There is no denial of the fact that the Municipal

Board had also served notice upon the defendant to make payment of the rent

to it. It also does not appear that the plaintiff placed any document on

the record to show that the Court where the deposit was being made under

Section 30(2) may have rejected the petition for deposit holding it to be

not bonafide. Such an observation by the Revisional Court at the first

instance is but only to be ignored.

In view of the discussions held above, we allow the appeal and set aside

the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the Revisional Court,

and the order passed by the Trial Court is restored.

There would, however, be no order as to costs.