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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present :-

The Hon’ble Justice PARTHA SARATHI SEN

W.P.A. 13560 OF 2026

KALOMONI BASKI & ORS.

-Vs-

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

With

W.P.A. 13565 OF 2026

KALOMONI BASKI & ORS.

-Vs-

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

With

W.P.A. 13570 OF 2026

KALOMONI BASKI & ORS.

-Vs-

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

With

W.P.A. 13574 OF 2026

KALOMONI BASKI & ORS.

-Vs-

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

For the Petitioner: Mr. S.N. Mookherjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. T.M. Siddiqui, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Soumitra Chatterjee, Adv.

For the Respondent

Nos. 10 & 11:

Mr. Sanjay Saha, Adv.

Mr. Raju Mandal, Adv.

For the State: Mr. Nilanjan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Standing Counsel.

Ms. Jayita Dhar Chakraborty, Adv.

Mr. Nilanjan Pal, Adv.

Mr. Joy Ranjan Dhar, Adv.

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Hearing concluded on:

10.07.2026

Judgment on: 15.07.2026

PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. : –

1. At the time of hearing it is submitted at the Bar that WPA 13560 of 2026,

WPA 13565 of 2026, WPA 13570 of 2026 and WPA 13574 of 2026 are identical

in nature and in all the four writ petitions identical questions of facts and laws

are involved.

2. On consent of the parties, all the four writ petitions are taken up for

hearing analogously and these writ petitions are tagged together and

accordingly this Court proposes to dispose of the instant four writ petitions by

a common judgment.

3. The facts are taken from WPA 13560 of 2026.

4. The subject matter of the writ petition being WPA 13560 of 2026 is the

order dated 11.05.2026 as passed by the respondent no. 12 in Appeal Case No.

33 of 2025 (Kalomoni Baski vs. State of West Bengal) whereby and whereunder

the said respondent no. 12 affirmed the order dated 16.07.2025 as passed by

the respondent no. 5 authority in connection with Case No. M&M/01 of 2025

whereby and whereunder the said respondent no. 5 authority declined to

extend the period of mining lease as has been originally executed between the

predecessor-in-interest of the present writ petitioners and the respondent no. 4

authority for excavation of sand over the plot no. 01/2050 (B) covering an area

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of 6.50 acre on the river bed of Mayurakshi in Mouza Kenduli under P.S.-Suri,

Dist.- Birbhum (hereinafter referred to as the “plot in question”).

5. For effective adjudication of the instant lease some relevant facts are

required to be dealt with in a nutshell and those are discussed hereunder in

seriatim:-

(i) Pursuant to issuance of Letter of Intent (LOI) for grant of mining lease

for excavation of sand from the plot in question a registered deed of

lease dated 14.08.2018 was executed between the predecessor-in-

interest of the present writ petitioners as lessee and the Government

of West Bengal as lessor for a period of 5 years. After execution of the

said deed of lease the original lessee started mining activity over the

plot in question by way of extraction and dispatch of sand being

“minor mineral”.

(ii) During the subsistence of the said lease the original lessee died and in

his place the present writ petitioners being his legal heirs and

representatives stepped into the shoes of the said original lessee and

to that effect a registered deed of declaration dated 16.09.2020 was

executed between the Government of West Bengal and the present

writ petitioners whereby and whereunder the present writ petitioners

were permitted to carry on mining activity over the plot in question in

terms of the original deed of lease dated 14.06.2018.

(iii) Since on account of untimely death of the original lessee (who died on

10.03.2020), the mining activity could not be carried out for sometime

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the respondent nos. 4 and 5 authorities on an approach made by the

present writ petitioners have granted 197 days extension beyond the

stipulated period of 5 years in order to allow the present writ

petitioners to carry on the mining activity over the plot in question.

(iv) On 24.02.2023 the writ petitioner no. 1 under cover of a letter

requested the respondent no. 4 authority to grant further extension of

time due to “force majeure” since according to the writ petitioner no.1,

she could not carry on the mining activity over the property in

question on account of outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic.

(v) Subsequently, on 16.04.2024 the writ petitioner no. 1 again requested

the respondent no. 4 authority by writing a letter requesting him to

extend the period of lease due to “force majeure” on account of

outbreak of Covid- 19 pandemic as well as on account of stoppage of

mining work from December, 2021 till March, 2022, due to abnormal

water logging and flood like situation due to untimely release of water

by Tilpara Barrage.

(vi) Since the said two representations dated 24.02.2023 and 16.04.2024

remained unattended, the writ petitioners approached this Court by

filing WPA 25733 of 2024 which came to be disposed of by a

coordinate Bench of this Court on 13.11.2024 whereby and

whereunder the said coordinate Bench directed the respondent no. 5

therein to pass a reasoned order in connection with the

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representation dated 16.04.2024 in accordance with law after giving

an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners.

(vii) Pursuant to such order dated 13.11.2024 as passed by this High

Court the respondent no. 5 passed his reasoned order dated

16.07.2025 in Case no. M&M/01 of 2025 whereby and whereunder

the respondent no. 5 authority declined to pass a favourable order in

favour of the writ petitioners.

(viii) The writ petitioners felt aggrieved and thus preferred an appeal being

an Appeal Case No. 33 of 2025 (Kalomoni Baski vs. State of West

Bengal) before the respondent no. 12 authority which disposed of the

said appeal by its order dated 11.05.2026 affirming the order of the

respondent no. 5 authority which is impugned in this writ petition.

6. In course of hearing Mr. Mookherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing

on behalf of the writ petitioner draws attention of this Court to page nos. 43 to

88 of the instant writ petition being a copy of the said registered deed of lease

dated 14.06.2018. Drawing attention to the internal page nos. 3 and 16 of the

said registered deed of lease, it is submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that from the

said two pages of the copy of the lease deed it would reveal that the original

lease was for 5 years and in the said deed of lease it has been categorically

mentioned the minimum quantity of sand the lessee would have to extract from

the plot in question per annum. For better appreciation this Court proposes to

quote the relevant clause of the said deed of lease in verbatim and the same is

as under:

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“(b) The lessee shall extract and dispatch a minimum 35,820

cubic meters of SAND (name of mineral) from the

leasehold area per annum.”

7. It is argued by Mr. Mookherjee that the aforementioned clause of the said

deed of lease categorically indicates that the lessee under the terms and

conditions of the said lease is obliged to extract and dispatch a minimum

35,820 cubic meter of sand. It is submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that by no

stretch of imagination it can be said that the present writ petitioners being the

lessee are not entitled to extract and dispatch more than the said minimum

quantity. It is however submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that it is the specific case

of the writ petitioners that on account of stoppage of mining activity for no fault

of the present writ petitioners, the writ petitioners could not extract the said

base quantity on account of “force majeure” as well as on account of release of

stored water form Tilpara Barrage beyond the monsoon period.

8. Drawing further attention of this Court to internal page no. 33 of the said

deed of lease it is argued by Mr. Mookherjee that the said deed of lease

contained a clause “failure to fulfil the terms of lease” due to “force majeure” and

the relevant recital under the said clause is also quoted hereinbelow in

verbatim:

“Failure to fulfill the terms of lease due to “Force

Majeure”

Failure on the part of the Lessee/ Lessees to fulfill any of

the terms and conditions of this lease shall not give the

State Government any claim against the Lessee/ Lessees

or be deemed a breach of this lease, in so far as such

failure is considered by the said Government to arise from

force majeure, and if through force majeure the fulfillment

by the Lessee/ Lessees of any of the terms and conditions

of this lease be delayed, the period of such delay shall be

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added to the period fixed by this lease. In this clause the

expression “force Majeure” means act of God, war,

insurrection, riot, civil commotion, strike, earthquake, tide,

storm, tidal wave, flood, lightning, explosion, fire and other

happenings, which the Lessee/ Lessees could not

reasonably prevent or control.”

9. In course of his argument Mr. Mookherjee however did not dispute that on

account of untimely death of the original lessee and on account of passage of

time to complete the formality for substitution of the present writ petitioners as

his legal heirs and representatives in connection with the lessee in question the

mining activity over the property in question remained suspended for some

time and on being approach made by the writ petitioners, 197 days extension

has been granted in respect of the period of lease by the respondent nos. 4 and

5 authorities. It is however submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that that the

respondent no. 5 authority while considering the representation of the writ

petitioner no. 1 and while passing the reasoned order dated 16.07.2025 failed

to visualize the true purport and implication of the term “force majeure”. It is

further submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that the respondent no. 5 authority also

miserably failed to appreciate that the writ petitioner could not carry out

mining activity from the last week of December, 2021 to March, 2022 on

account of untimely heavy water logging in the river bed though the said period

is not a normal period of monsoon when mining activity remained suspended

on account of environmental reason. Placing reliance upon a compilation being

“Sustainable Sand Mining Management Guidelines, 2016” (“Guidelines” in

short) it is argued by Mr. Mookherjee that as per the said guidelines no river

bed mining would be permitted during rainy season and as per the self same

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guidelines the period of monsoon in West Bengal extends from 10

th

June of a

year to 15

th

October of the self same year.

10. It is further submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that the respondent no. 5

authority while passing the reasoned order for the reason best known to him

most wrongfully came to a finding that since the lessee could extract the

requisite quantity of sand in the entire lease period of 5 years as per the terms

of the said deed of lease there cannot be any occasion to extend the period of

lease.

11. In his next limb of submission Mr. Mookherjee took me to the

impugned order dated 11.05.2026 as passed by the respondent no. 12

authority in the said appeal case. It is submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that the

impugned order of appeal dated 11.05.2026 is a glaring example of non

application of mind since the said appellate authority while disposing the said

appeal most mechanically endorsed the view of the respondent no. 5 authority.

It is further argued by Mr. Mookherjee that the respondent no. 12 authority

also failed to visualize the actual impact of the pandemic Covid- 19 over the

mining activity as carried on by the present writ petitioners over the plot in

question. It is further submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that the respondent no. 12

authority ought to have held that Covid- 19 pandemic tantamounts to an act of

God as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the different High

Courts and therefore, the clause “force majeure” as mentioned in the said deed

of lease very much applies in connection to the said deed of lease. It is further

submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that the respondent no. 12 authority ought to

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have added the period of suspension of mining activity with the actual period of

lease by applying “force majeure” clause and in not doing so, the decision

making process of the respondent no. 12 has been vitiated for non-

consideration of relevant materials as well as of law and thus, judicial

intervention is very much warranted.

12. In support of his contention Mr. Mookherjee places his reliance

upon the following reported decisions:

(i) Mehra Jewel Palace Pvt. Ltd. vs. Miniso Life Style Pvt. Ltd. &

Anr. [2022 SCC OnLine Del 1557]

(ii) Manoj Paliwal & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan, though its

Principal Secretary & Ors. [2024 SCC OnLine Raj 914]

(iii) Mamatha Theatre vs. State of Telengana & Ors. [2021 SCC

OnLine TS 3113]

(iv) Lebeaupin vs. Richard Crispin & Co. [1920 Kings Division

714]

(v) Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. vs. Hede & Co. [(2007) 5 SCC 614]

13. Drawing further attention of this Court to the ground no. XIV of the

memo appeal as preferred before the respondent no. 12 authority, it is further

submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that the factual finding of the respondent no. 5

authority that the writ petitioners had excavated requisite quantity of sand

from the property in question was assailed before the said appellate authority

however, the said appellate authority did not make any venture to address the

said issue which resulted miscarriage of justice in the decision making process

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as well as for non-consideration of relevant materials available on record and

thus, the order impugned is required to be inferred with in judicial review by

granting reliefs to the writ petitioner in terms of the prayers as made in the

instant writ petition.

14. Per contra, Mr. Saha, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the

respondent no. 10 Corporation and its instrumentalities at the very outset took

me to page nos. 104 to 108 of the instant writ petition being a copy of the

environmental clearance report dated 04.06.2018 as has been issued by

District Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority, Birbhum

(“Environmental Authority” in short). It is argued by Mr. Saha that on perusal

of the said environmental clearance report dated 04.06.2018 it would reveal

that the said Environmental Authority while considering the mining plan as

has been submitted by the predecessor-in-interest of the present writ

petitioners considered the aspect of feasibility of mining depending upon the

mineral reserve in the river bed and the environmental impact in case of

mining and excavation of sand and thus, set up a parameter and/or ceiling

regarding production capacity to the extent of 35,820 cubic meter per annum.

It is thus submitted by Mr. Saha that in view of fixing of such ceiling limit the

writ petitioners are not entitled to carry on sand mining and excavation beyond

the production capacity as has been fixed by the said Environmental Authority.

15. In his next limb of submission Mr. Saha submits further that the lease

deed dated 14.06.2018 and/or its various clauses may not be viewed

independently overlooking the aforementioned environment clearance report as

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otherwise there may be every possibility of occurrence of environmental

hazards due to excess excavation and sand mining. It is further submitted by

Mr. Saha that for the sake of argument even if it is accepted that the writ

petitioners’ mining and excavation activity stood stalled for some days for some

reason or other, however, the writ petitioners have not suffered any pecuniary

loss since they could excavate requisite quantity of sand from the leased out

area and thus, the writ petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for.

Placing reliance upon an unreported judgment dated 16.06.2026 as passed by

a coordinate Bench of this Court in WPA 3349 of 2026 (Ambey Niwas Pvt.

Ltd. vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) and judgment dated 27.11.2025

as passed by a Division Bench of this Court in MAT 1304 of 2025 (Dilip

Mondal vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) it is submitted by Mr. Saha

that the said coordinate Bench as well as the Division Bench while interpreting

“force majeure” clause as available in the deed of lease consistently held that in

the event the petitioner claims to have suffered loss for not being allowed to

carry on the mining activities for a substantial period of the tenure of the lease,

the remedy of the petitioner is to sue for damages before a competent Civil

Court having jurisdiction. It is thus submitted by Mr. Saha that the respondent

nos. 5 and 12 authorities are very much justified in passing their respective

orders which may not be interfered with by issuance of appropriate writ/writs

as prayed for.

16. Mr. Pal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent State

while adopting the argument of Mr. Saha draws attention of this Court to the

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copy of the order dated 16.07.2025 as passed by the respondent no. 5

authority. It is argued by Mr. Pal that the respondent no. 5 while considering

the representation of the writ petitioners categorically dealt with the various

grievance of the writ petitioners under different heads and in doing so he had

assigned logical reasoning for not entertaining the writ petitioners’ grievance as

has been ventilated before him by way of a representation dated 16.04.2024.

17. It is further argued by Mr. Pal that after substitution of the present writ

petitioners in place and state of the original lessee the present writ petitioners

made no venture to agitate their grievance regarding alleged stoppage of work

of mining on account of “force majeure” and/or political unrest. It is further

argued by Mr. Pal that by no stretch of imagination a political unrest comes

under the periphery of the clause “force majeure”.

18. In course of his reply Mr. Mookherjee placed his reliance upon the

judgment as passed in the case of Confederation of Real Estate Developers

of India (CREDAI) vs. Vanashakti & Anr. reported in (2026) 5 SCC 201. It is

argued by Mr. Mookherjee that in the case of Vanashakti (Supra) the Hon’ble

Supreme Court while entertaining a review petition took a realistic approach by

holding that in a changed circumstances the environmental clearance and the

relevant notification may be modified in the event it is found that the

restrictions as imposed by the Environmental Authority had a deterrent effect

and in such a case the activity may be permitted to operate as otherwise it

would create more pollution rather than protecting environment.

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19. This Court has meticulously gone through the entire materials as placed

before this court including the reported/ unreported decisions as cited from the

Bar. This court has also given due consideration over the submissions of the

learned Advocates for the contending parties.

20. Since in the instant writ petition, the findings of the appellate authority

being the respondent no. 12 under Rule 51 of the West Bengal Minor Minerals

Concession Rules, 2016 (“Rules of 2016” in short) is impugned in a judicial

review under Article 226/ 227 of the constitution of India with a prayer for

issuance of writ of certiorari commanding the respondents to produce all the

records before this court in order to do substantial justice to the writ petitioner,

this Court at the very outset proposes to look to the law of land relating to the

cardinal principles of the law governing in the field of exercise of extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where an administrative

decision arising out of a contract concerning public authorities is impugned. In

this regard, this Court proposes to place its reliance upon the judgment as

passed in the case of Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Chief Executive

Officer reported in (2024) 15 SCC 461 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court

expressed thus:

“57. Thereafter, this Court in its decision in M.P. Power

Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India

(P) Ltd. [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power

Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703]

exhaustively delineated the scope of judicial review of the

courts in contractual disputes concerning public authorities.

The aforesaid decision is in the following parts:

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Scope of judicial review in matters pertaining to

contractual disputes

57.1. This Court in M.P. Power Management case [M.P.

Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar

India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] held that the earlier

position of law that all rights against any action of the State

in a non-statutory contract would be governed by the

contract alone and thus not amenable to the writ jurisdiction

of the Courts is no longer a good law in view of the

subsequent rulings. Although writ jurisdiction is a public

law remedy, yet a relief would still lie under it if it is sought

against an arbitrary action or inaction of the State, even if

they arise from a non-statutory contract. The relevant

observations read as under: (M.P. Power Management

case [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power

Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] , SCC p.

763, paras 81-82)

“81. … when the offending party is the State. In other

words, the contention is that the law in this field has

witnessed an evolution and, what is more, a revolution of

sorts and a transformatory change with a growing

realisation of the true ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution

of India. The State, he points out, cannot play the Dr Jekyll

and Hyde game anymore. Its nature is cast in stone. Its

character is inflexible. This is irrespective of the activity it

indulges in. It will continue to be haunted by the mandate of

Article 14 to act fairly. There has been a stunning expansion

of the frontiers of the Court's jurisdiction to strike at State

action in matters arising out of contract, based,

undoubtedly, on the facts of each case. It remains open to

the Court to refuse to reject a case, involving State action, on

the basis that the action is, per se, arbitrary.

***

82.1. It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is

a public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely within a

private realm of affairs of public body, may not lend itself

for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the Court.

82.2. The principle laid down in Bareilly Development

Authority [Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal

Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116] that in the case of a non-statutory

contract the rights are governed only by the terms of the

contract and the decisions, which are purported to be

followed, including Radhakrishna Agarwal [Radhakrishna

Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457] , may not

continue to hold good, in the light of what has been laid

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down in ABL [ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit

Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 : (2004)

118 Comp Cas 213] and as followed in the recent judgment

in Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar

Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706] .

82.3. The mere fact that relief is sought under a contract

which is not statutory, will not entitle the respondent State

in a case by itself to ward-off scrutiny of its action or

inaction under the contract, if the complaining party is able

to establish that the action/inaction is, per se, arbitrary.”

(emphasis supplied)

Exercise of writ jurisdiction in disputes at the stage

prior to the award of contract

57.2. An action under a writ will lie even at the stage

prior to the award of a contract by the State wherever such

award of contract is imbued with procedural impropriety,

arbitrariness, favouritism or without any application of

mind. In doing so, the courts may set aside the decision

which is found to be vitiated for the reasons stated above

but cannot substitute the same with its own decision. The

relevant observations read as under: (M.P. Power

Management case [M.P. Power Management Co.

Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2

SCC 703] , SCC p. 764, para 82.4)

“82.4. An action will lie, undoubtedly, when the State

purports to award any largesse and, undoubtedly, this

relates to the stage prior to the contract being entered into

(see Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3

SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628] ). This scrutiny, no doubt,

would be undertaken within the nature of the judicial

review, which has been declared in the decision inTata

Cellular v. Union of India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India,

(1994) 6 SCC 651] .”

(emphasis supplied)

Exercise of writ jurisdiction after the contract comes

into existence

57.3. This Court in M.P. Power Management case [M.P.

Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar

India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] held that even after the

contract comes into existence an action may lie by way of a

writ to either: (I) obviate an arbitrary or unreasonable action

on the part of the State, or (II) to call upon it to honour its

obligations unless there is a serious or genuine dispute as

Page 16 of 25

regards the liability of the State from honouring such

obligation. Existence of an alternative remedy or a disputed

question of fact may be a ground to not entertain the parties

in a writ as long as it is not being used as smokescreen to

defeat genuine claims of public law remedy. The relevant

observations read as under: (M.P. Power Management

case [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power

Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] , SCC pp.

764-65, para 82)

“82. … 82.5. After the contract is entered into, there can

be a variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of

action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek relief

by filing a writ petition.

82.6. Without intending to be exhaustive, it may include

the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the

aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be

called upon to honour its obligations of making payment,

unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute

raised relating to the liability of the State to make the

payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the

contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its

obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by

the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence.

82.7. The existence of an alternative remedy, is,

undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief

in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question

as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates,

would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief

sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to

be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are

disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary,

as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief

sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the

writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact,

particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of

documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the

remedy by way of a civil suit.

82.8. The existence of a provision for arbitration, which

is a forum intended to quicken the pace of dispute

resolution, is viewed as a near bar to the entertainment of a

writ petition [see in this regard, the view of this Court even

in ABL [ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee

Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 : (2004) 118 Comp

Cas 213] explaining how it distinguished the decision of this

Court in State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India)

Page 17 of 25

Ltd. [State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (1996)

6 SCC 22 : (1997) 104 STC 78] , by its observations in SCC

para 14 in ABL [ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit

Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 : (2004)

118 Comp Cas 213] ].

82.9. The need to deal with disputed questions of fact,

cannot be made a smokescreen to guillotine a genuine claim

raised in a writ petition, when actually the resolution of a

disputed question of fact is unnecessary to grant relief to a

writ applicant.

82.10. The reach of Article 14 enables a writ court to

deal with arbitrary State action even after a contract is

entered into by the State. A wide variety of circumstances

can generate causes of action for invoking Article 14. The

Court's approach in dealing with the same, would be guided

by, undoubtedly, the overwhelming need to obviate

arbitrary State action, in cases where the writ remedy

provides an effective and fair means of preventing

miscarriage of justice arising from palpably unreasonable

action by the State.”

(emphasis supplied)

Exercise of writ jurisdiction after termination or

breach of the contract

57.4. A relief by way of a writ under Article 226 of the

Constitution will also lie against a termination or a breach of

a contract, wherever such action is found to either be

palpably unauthorised or arbitrary. Before turning away the

parties to the remedy of civil suit, the courts must be

mindful to see whether such termination or breach was

within the contractual domain or whether the State was

merely purporting to exercise powers under the contract for

any ulterior motive. Any action of the State to cancel or

terminate a contract which is beyond the terms agreed

thereunder will be amenable to the writ jurisdiction to

ascertain if such decision is imbued with arbitrariness or

influenced by any extraneous considerations. The relevant

observations read as under: (M.P. Power Management

case [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power

Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] , SCC pp.

765-66, para 82)

“82. … 82.11. Termination of contract can again arise

in a wide variety of situations. If for instance, a contract is

terminated, by a person, who is demonstrated, without any

need for any argument, to be the person, who is completely

unauthorised to cancel the contract, there may not be any

Page 18 of 25

necessity to drive the party to the unnecessary ordeal of a

prolix and avoidable round of litigation. The intervention by

the High Court, in such a case, where there is no dispute to

be resolved, would also be conducive in public interest,

apart from ensuring the Fundamental Right of the petitioner

under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When it comes

to a challenge to the termination of a contract by the State,

which is a non-statutory body, which is acting in purported

exercise of the powers/rights under such a contract, it

would be over simplifying a complex issue to lay down any

inflexible Rule in favour of the Court turning away the

petitioner to alternate Fora. Ordinarily, the cases of

termination of contract by the State, acting within its

contractual domain, may not lend itself for appropriate

redress by the writ court. This is, undoubtedly, so if the

Court is duty-bound to arrive at findings, which involve

untying knots, which are presented by disputed questions

of facts. Undoubtedly, in view of ABL [ABL International

Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004)

3 SCC 553 : (2004) 118 Comp Cas 213] , if resolving the

dispute, in a case of repudiation of a contract, involves only

appreciating the true scope of documentary material in the

light of pleadings, the Court may still grant relief to an

applicant. We must enter a caveat. The Courts are today

reeling under the weight of a docket explosion, which is

truly alarming. If a case involves a large body of documents

and the Court is called upon to enter upon findings of facts

and involves merely the construction of the document, it

may not be an unsound discretion to relegate the party to

the alternative remedy. This is not to deprive the Court of its

constitutional power as laid down in ABL [ABL

International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of

India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 : (2004) 118 Comp Cas 213] .

It all depends upon the facts of each case as to whether,

having regard to the scope of the dispute to be resolved,

whether the Court will still entertain the petition.

82.12. In a case the State is a party to the contract and

a breach of a contract is alleged against the State, a civil

action in the appropriate Forum is, undoubtedly,

maintainable. But this is not the end of the matter. Having

regard to the position of the State and its duty to act fairly

and to eschew arbitrariness in all its actions, resort to the

constitutional remedy on the cause of action, that the action

is arbitrary, is permissible (see in this regard Shrilekha

Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. [Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of

Page 19 of 25

U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 742] ). However, it

must be made clear that every case involving breach of

contract by the State, cannot be dressed up and disguised

as a case of arbitrary State action. While the concept of an

arbitrary action or inaction cannot be cribbed or confined to

any immutable mantra, and must be laid bare, with

reference to the facts of each case, it cannot be a mere

allegation of breach of contract that would suffice. What

must be involved in the case must be action/inaction, which

must be palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and

bereft of any principle. An action, which is completely mala

fide, can hardly be described as a fair action and may,

depending on the facts, amount to arbitrary action. The

question must be posed and answered by the Court and all

we intend to lay down is that there is a discretion available

to the Court to grant relief in appropriate cases.”

(emphasis supplied)

Other relevant considerations for exercise of writ

jurisdiction

57.5. Lastly, this Court in M.P. Power Management

case [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power

Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] held that

the courts may entertain a contractual dispute under its writ

jurisdiction where: (I) there is any violation of natural

justice, or (II) where doing so would serve the public

interest, or (III) where though the facts are convoluted or

disputed, but the courts have already undertaken an in-

depth scrutiny of the same provided that it was pursuant to

a sound exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The relevant

observations read as under: (M.P. Power Management

case [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power

Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703] , SCC p.

766, para 82)

“82. … 82.13. A lodestar, which may illumine the path

of the Court, would be the dimension of public interest

subserved by the Court interfering in the matter, rather than

relegating the matter to the alternate Forum.

82.14. Another relevant criteria is, if the Court has

entertained the matter, then, while it is not tabooed that the

Court should not relegate the party at a later stage,

ordinarily, it would be a germane consideration, which may

persuade the Court to complete what it had started,

provided it is otherwise a sound exercise of jurisdiction to

decide the matter on merits in the writ petition itself.

Page 20 of 25

82.15. Violation of natural justice has been recognised

as a ground signifying the presence of a public law element

and can found a cause of action premised on breach of

Article 14. (See Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of

U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706] ).”

(emphasis supplied)

***********************************************************

“60. Thus, the demarcation between a private law

element and public law element in the context of contractual

disputes if any, may be assessed by ascertaining whether

the dispute or the controversy pertains to the consensual

aspect of the contract or tender in question or not. Judicial

review is permissible to prevent arbitrariness of public

authorities and to ensure that they do not exceed or abuse

their powers in contractual transactions and requires

overseeing the administrative power of public authorities to

award or cancel contracts or any of its stipulations.

61. Therefore, what can be culled out from the above is

that although disputes arising purely out of contracts are

not amenable to writ jurisdiction yet keeping in mind the

obligation of the State to act fairly and not arbitrarily or

capriciously, it is now well settled that when contractual

power is being used for public purpose, it is certainly

amenable to judicial review.”

**************************************************************

“70. The dictum as laid in Tata Cellular v. Union of

India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] is

that the judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any

unbridled executive functioning. It was observed that the

restraint has two contemporary manifestations viz. one is

the ambit of judicial intervention and the other covers the

scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative

decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks

of judicial control over administrative action. It was held

that the principle of judicial review is concerned with

reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which

the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-

making process itself. It was held that the principle of

judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual

powers by the government bodies in order to prevent

arbitrariness or favouritism. It was held that the duty of the

court is to confine itself to the question of legality and its

concern should be whether a decision-making authority

exceeded its powers; whether it committed an error of law

or committed a breach of the rules of natural justice or

Page 21 of 25

reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would

have reached or, abused its powers. The grounds upon

which an administrative action can be subjected to judicial

review are classified as illegality, irrationality and

procedural impropriety. In that very decision, while

deducing the principles from various cases referred, it was

held that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in

administrative action; that the Court does not sit as a court

of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the

decision was made; that the court does not have the

expertise to correct the administrative decision and if a

review of the administrative decision is permitted, it will be

substituting its own decision, without the necessary

expertise which itself may be fallible; that the terms of the

invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny

because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract;

and, that the Government must have freedom of contract i.e.

a free-play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an

administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere

or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must

not only be tested by the application

of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses

Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principle

of reasonableness, but must be free from arbitrariness not

affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. Moreover,

quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative

burden on the administration and lead to increased and

unbudgeted expenditure.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

21. Keeping in mind the scope of judicial review as enunciated by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the above quoted judgment viz., Subodh Kumar Singh

Rathour (Supra) if I look to the factual aspects of this Court, it appears that

after issuance of Letter of Intent (LOI) the writ petitioner approached

Environmental Authority for granting environmental clearance for the proposed

sand mining in the relevant plot of land over the river bed of Mayurakshi. It

appears from the report dated 04.06.2018 that the said Environmental

Authority prior to issuing environmental clearance to the original lessee

Page 22 of 25

considered the quantum of mineral reserve in the relevant plot over the river

bed of Mayurakshi and after considering the environmental impact on account

of proposed mining granted environmental clearance to the original lessee for

production capacity of 35,820 cubic meter per annum. No material is

forthcoming that prior to the execution of the registered deed of lease the

original lessee has challenged such environmental clearance. On the other

hand, it has been noticed by this Court that on submission of the said

environmental clearance with the respondent no. 4 authority the said mining

lease dated 14.06.2018 was executed.

22. Admittedly, the relevant clause of the said deed of lease says that the

lessee would extract and dispatch a minimum 35,820 cubic meters of sand

from the leasehold area per annum and placing reliance on such clause Mr.

Mookherjee contended that the present writ petitioners are entitled to extract

more. In considered view of this Court such argument of Mr. Mookherjee

appears to be attractive at the first blush however, on perusal of environmental

clearance report dated 04.06.2018 it appears that the Environmental Authority

restricted the lessee and/or his legal representatives to extract sand upto

35,820 cubic meter per annum and such finding was never challenged either

by the original lessee or by the present writ petitioners at any point of time.

Rather it appears from ground no. XIV that the present writ petitioners while

preferring an appeal before the respondent no. 12 authority specifically

contended that as per the said deed of lease they could extract 63,24,860 cubic

feet equivalent to 1,79,100 cubic meter in 5 years that is 35,820 cubic meter

Page 23 of 25

per annum though they have actually extracted 55,00,000 cubic feet of sand

from the said sand block.

23. In view of such, this Court is constraint to hold that the contention of

Mr. Mookherjee that the writ petitioners could extract more quantity of sand as

have been mentioned in the environmental clearance report dated 04.06.2018

and/or the said registered deed of lease dated 14.06.2018 has no leg to stand

upon.

24. At this juncture, if I look to the order dated 16.07.2025 as passed by the

respondent no. 5 authority while disposing the representation of the writ

petitioners as submitted on 16.04.2024 it reveals that the said respondent no.

5 authority on careful consideration of the materials as available in the

relevant file came to a factual finding that the present writ petitioners had

already extracted total quantum of sand from the leased out area. In appeal the

said appellate authority being respondent no. 12 came to a concurrent finding

regarding extraction of the stipulated annual quantity of sand by the writ

petitioners though some misprint occurred regarding numerical figures, may be

on account of typographical error/ omission.

25. In course of his argument, Mr. Mookherjee though contended that the

said appellate authority failed to appreciate the fact that the writ petitioners on

account of suspension of mining work could extract lesser quantity of sand

however, this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction is not supposed to act as an

appellate Court and, therefore, is not entitled to re-appreciate the evidence

based on factual findings as arrived by the two authorities being respondent

Page 24 of 25

nos. 5 and 12 since review or reweigh the evidence is not permissible in

judicial review unless sufficient materials have been placed that such

concurrent findings are palpably erroneous.

26. For the sake of argument even if it is accepted that the mining activity of

the writ petitioners over the leased out plot was stalled on account of various

reasons beyond the control of the writ petitioners may be on account of “act of

God” however, keeping in mind that the remedies under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India is founded on legal injury if I again look to the factual

aspects as involved in the instant writ petition, it appears to this Court that the

writ petitioners before the respondent nos. 5 and 12 authorities have miserably

failed to prove that they had suffered legal injury on account of suspension of

mining activity in view of the fact that both the aforementioned authorities on

careful perusal of the entire materials on record came to hold that the writ

petitioners had already extract requisite quantity of sand in terms of the deed

of lease as well as in terms of the environmental clearance as given by the

Environmental Authority.

27. The argument of Mr. Mookherjee that the environmental clearance is not

sacrosanct and thus, parameters for environmental management plan may be

changed on account of change of circumstances in view of the reported

decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vanashakti (Supra)

appears to be not convincing in view of the fact that no case has been made out

on behalf of the writ petitioners that in the event the ceiling of extraction as

has been fixed by the Environmental Authority is maintained, it would have an

Page 25 of 25

adverse impact on the environment on account of some changed

circumstances.

28. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court thus considers

that applicability and/or non-applicability of “force majeure” clause as available

in the said registered deed of lease become insignificant and thus this Court

finds no reason to deal with the reported judgments as cited on behalf of the

writ petitioners to substantiate that suspension of mining activity at the

relevant sand block occurred on account of “act of God” and thus, the writ

petitioners are entitled to get the benefit of the clause “force majeure”.

29. In view of the discussion made hereinabove this Court finds no reason to

interfere with the order impugned. WPA 13560 of 2026 is thus dismissed.

30. With the dismissal of WPA 13560 of 2026 the other writ petitions being

WPA 13565 of 2026, WPA 13570 of 2026 and WPA 13574 of 2026 are also

dismissed.

31. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given

to the parties on completion of usual formalities.

(PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J.)