IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

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AT JABALPUR

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BEFORE

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HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN

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ON THE 20

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th

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OF JANUARY, 2026

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CIVIL REVISION No. 747 of 2025

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KANHAIYA LAL ASWANI

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Versus

DEEPAK MANOHAR LAL CHAWALA AND OTHERS

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Appearance:

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Shri Avinash Zargar - Advocate for the Petitioner.

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Shri Kapil Rohra - Advocate for the Respondent No.1.

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ORDER

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Reserved on 01.12.2025

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Pronounced on 20.01.2026

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The present Revision has been filed challenging the Order dated

17.06.2025 at the instance of the Tenant who is aggrieved by rejection of his

application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC whereby the Trial Court has

rejected the objection of the Petitioner raised by the said application that the

suit before the regular Civil Court is not maintainable and the same should be

filed or transferred to the Commercial Court.

2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently argued before

this Court that the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent has been

filed by the Plaintiff/Landlord on the assertion that the defendants are tenant

and sub-tenant respectively of Shop No.5 and the suit property being a shop,

therefore, it is a commercial property and used exclusively for commercial

purpose. Therefore, as per Section 2(c)(vii) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015,

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the dispute comes within the definition of commercial dispute as per the Act

of 2015 and therefore, it is exclusively triable by the Commercial Court. It is

argued that the Trial Court has wrongly rejected the application of the

Petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC by overlooking the position that

the suit was not maintainable before the Trial Court and it was maintainable

only before the Commercial Court.

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/tenant has relied on judgment of

High Court of Calcutta in C.S.No.3/2019

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whereby the Calcutta High Court

has returned the Plaint to the Plaintiff in a similar matter of eviction of

Tenant from commercial property holding the suit to be maintainable only

before the Commercial Court. It is therefore, argued that in view of

definition of commercial dispute as per Section 2 (c)(vii) of the Act of 2017,

the suit was not maintainable before the regular Civil Court and it could only

have been filed before the Commercial Court.

4. Further reliance is made on a judgment of the Delhi High Court in

Kartar Singh Kochhar v. ICICI Bank Ltd. Reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Del

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6987

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wherein the Delhi High Court has held in similar terms.

5. Per contra, it is contended by learned counsel for the

Respondent/Landlord that the suit is not filed for enforcement or breach of

any agreement relating to any immovable property used exclusively in trade

or commerce, but it is filed to seek eviction of the Tenant by exercising the

rights given to the Landlord and the grounds made available to the landlord

under Section 12 (1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Therefore, it is

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simplicitor an Eviction suit under M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961

and it cannot be stated to be a commercial dispute by any stretch of

imagination because the Respondent/Landlord is only exercising the rights to

get the Tenant evicted on grounds under the Accommodation Control Act

and nothing else. It is not a dispute relating to any agreement in respect of

immovable property used in Trade and Commerce. Therefore, it is argued

that the suit is maintainable and the Trial Court has rightly held the suit to be

maintainable and rightly rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of

the C.P.C. filed by the Petitioner/Tenants.

6. Upon hearing learned counsel for the rival parties and on perusal of

the record, it is seen that as per Section 2(c)(vii) of the Act of 2015,

following has been provided as one of the commercial disputes defined

under the Act of 2015:-

“(vii ) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively

in trade or commerce;”

7. In the present case, there are no allegations of breach of any

agreement or enforcement of terms of any agreement executed between the

parties. Neither any written agreement nor any oral agreement has been

pleaded by either of the parties which has been alleged to be violated by the

defendant or sought to be enforced by the Landlord. The entire plaint does

not relate to any clause of the oral or written agreement alleged to be

breached, either at the instance of the Plaintiff or at the instance of the

defendants who also have not made any pleading of breach of any oral or

written agreement between the parties.

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8. The same dispute was raised before the Calcutta High Court in the

case of Deepak Polymers (P) Ltd. v. Anchor Investments (P) Ltd. reported in

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2021 SCC OnLine Cal 4323

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and the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid

case has decided the matter in great detail and held that once the suit arises

out of statutory right conferred by Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act

having no direct nexus with the lease agreement, therefore, once the

precondition of dispute emanating out of lease agreement being not satisfied,

the matter would not fall within the purview of Commercial Courts Act,

2015.

9. The Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case held as under:-

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30.

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However, the cardinal question which has not been addressed but is pivotal to the

present adjudication is the expression “dispute” which precedes the expression “arising out

of” as appearing in Section 2(1)(c) of the 2015 Act. Reading sub-clause (vii) in conjunction

with the starting words of Clause (c), it is seen that the expression “agreements relating to

immovable property….” qualifies the term “dispute” arising out of such agreements.

31.

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A “dispute” can only be determined by the cause of action of the suit and not the

preceding backdrop. Even if Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with

termination of the jural relationship of lessor and lessee, pre-supposing a prior lease

agreement, the bundle of facts comprising the cause of action of the suit is the sole

determinant of the “dispute” involved in the suit.

32.

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In the event the suits, in the present case, had been filed for recovery of possession

in respect of immovable property on the ground of forfeiture for contravention of any of the

terms and conditions of the respective agreements-in-question, it might have been argued

that the suits pertains to disputes “arising out of” such agreements.

33.

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However, the dispute itself, in the present case, arises out of refusal by the

defendants to comply with the notices issued by the lessor under Section 106 of

the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is based on a statutory right independent and

irrespective of any clause of the lease agreements.

34.

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Hence, the suits squarely arise out of a statutory right conferred by Section 106 of

the Transfer of Property Act, having no direct nexus with the lease agreements in respect of

the immovable properties concerned. Thus, the pre-condition of the applicability of Section

2(1)(c)(vii), that is, the emanation of the dispute out of the lease agreement, is not satisfied

in the present suits. Thus, the secondary question as to whether the immovable properties

are used exclusively in trade or commerce, pales into insignificance.”

10. Similar is the present case in hand wherein the Landlord has filed

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eviction suit exercising the rights given to the Landlord and the grounds of

eviction given to the Landlord as per M.P. Accommodation Control Act,

1961 and has exercised the rights laid down in grounds under Section 12 (1)

(a) (b) (h) (o) of the said Act seeking eviction of tenant.

11. This issue has been decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court in

Mohit Sadana Vs. Vijay Kumar Goyal reported in 2025 (3) JLJ 147

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,

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wherein

an exactly similar dispute has been decided and it has been held that a suit

for eviction would not be maintainable before a Commercial Court only

because the suit shop is being used for carrying out business or trade. The

judgment of Division Bench of Gujarat High Court has been considered by

the Coordinate Bench and it has been held as under:-

“9. In order to find out as to whether a dispute is a commercial dispute or

not, one has to conjointly read Sections 2(1)(c)(vii), Section 2(1)(i) and Section 12

of the Act. From a plain reading of aforesaid provisions, it is clear that only suits,

appeals or applications relating to a commercial dispute of a specified value are to

be tried by the Commercial Court. Merely because the suit shop is being used for

carrying out business or trade, the suit for eviction from the suit shop would not fall

within the definition of commercial dispute of specified value.

10. The Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Ujwala Raje

Gaekwar (Supra) has held that merely because the movable property in question is

going to be used or is being used exclusively in trade or commerce, the dispute does

not become a commercial dispute as defined under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act. If the

object and purpose of establishment of Commercial Courts, Commercial Divisions

and Commercial Appellate Divisions of the High Court are considered, then it is

clear that the establishment of Commercial Courts had become necessary on

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account of inordinate delays and to ensure fast disposal of high value commercial

disputes to provide assurance to domestic and foreign investors.

11. ……………………… It has also been held that a perusal of the

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act Act, 2015 and the

various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and insertion of new rules to

that Code applicable to suits of commercial disputes show that the said Act has been

enacted for the purpose of providing an early disposal of high value commercial

disputes. A purposive interpretation of the Statement of Objects and Reasons and

various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code leaves no room for doubt that the

provisions of the Act require to be strictly construed. If the provisions are given a

liberal interpretation, the object behind constitution of Commercial Division of

Courts viz. putting the matter on fast track and speedy resolution of commercial

disputes, will be defeated. If one takes a closer look at the Statement of Objects and

Reasons, words such as "early" and "speedy" have been incorporated and reiterated.

The object shall be fulfilled only if the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a

narrow sense and not hampered by the usual procedural delays plaguing our

traditional legal system. Thus, a dispute relating to immovable property per se may

not be a commercial dispute. But it becomes a commercial dispute, if it falls under

sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act viz. "the

agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce".

The conclusion arrived at herein, that in order to fall within Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of

the Commercial Courts Act, the immovable property must be "used exclusively" or

"being used exclusively" in trade or commerce, is agreed to. The words "used

exclusively in trade or commerce" are to be interpreted purposefully. The word

"used" denotes "actually used" and it cannot be either "ready for use" or "likely to

be used" or "to be used". It should be "actually used". Such a wide interpretation

would defeat the objects of the Act and the fast tracking procedure for deciding the

commercial disputes. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that at

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the time when the agreement to sell came to be executed in 2012, the property was

being exclusively used in trade and commerce so as to bring the dispute within the

ambit of sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. Merely

because the property is likely to be used in relation to trade and commerce, the same

cannot be the ground to attract the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court.

12. Therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that merely because suit

shop is being used for running business, the question of eviction from said suit shop

would not become commercial dispute.”

12. The coordinate bench has relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP and

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Another, (2020) 15 SCC 585

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wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as

under:-

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13.

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The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant would however, contend that a

strict interpretation as in the case of taxing statutes would not be appropriate in the

instant case where the issue relates to jurisdiction. In that regard, the learned Senior

Advocate has referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons with which the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is enacted so as to provide speedy disposal of high value

commercial disputes so as to create the positive image to the investors world about the

independent and responsive Indian legal system. Hence, he contends that a purposive

interpretation be made. It is contended that a wider purport and meaning is to be

assigned while entertaining the suit and considering the dispute to be a commercial

dispute. Having taken note of the submission we feel that the very purpose for which

the CC Act of 2015 has been enacted would be defeated if every other suit merely

because it is filed before the Commercial Court is entertained. This is for the reason

that the suits which are not actually relating to commercial dispute but being filed

merely because of the high value and with the intention of seeking early disposal would

only clog the system and block the way for the genuine commercial disputes which

may have to be entertained by the Commercial Courts as intended by the lawmakers. In

commercial disputes as defined a special procedure is provided for a class of litigation

and a strict procedure will have to be followed to entertain only that class of litigation in

that jurisdiction. If the same is strictly interpreted it is not as if those excluded will be

non-suited without any remedy. The excluded class of litigation will in any event be

entertained in the ordinary civil courts wherein the remedy has always existed.

14.

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In that view it is also necessary to carefully examine and entertain only disputes

which actually answers the definition “commercial disputes” as provided under the Act.

In the instant case, as already taken note neither the agreement between the parties

refers to the nature of the immovable property being exclusively used for trade or

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commerce as on the date of the agreement nor is there any pleading to that effect in the

plaint. Further the very relief sought in the suit is for execution of the mortgage deed

which is in the nature of specific performance of the terms of Memorandum of

Understanding without reference to nature of the use of the immovable property in trade

or commerce as on the date of the suit. Therefore, if all these aspects are kept in view,

we are of the opinion that in the present facts the High Court was justified in its

conclusion arrived through the order dated 1-3-2019 [K.S. Infraspace LLP v. Ambalal

Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Guj 1926] impugned herein. The

Commercial Court shall therefore return the plaint indicating a date for its presentation

before the Court having jurisdiction.

36.

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A perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts

Act, 2015 and the various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code and insertion of

new rules to the Code applicable to suits of commercial disputes show that it has been

enacted for the purpose of providing an early disposal of high value commercial

disputes. A purposive interpretation of the Statement of Objects and Reasons and

various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code leaves no room for doubt that the

provisions of the Act require to be strictly construed. If the provisions are given a

liberal interpretation, the object behind constitution of Commercial Division of Courts

viz. putting the matter on fast track and speedy resolution of commercial disputes, will

be defeated. If we take a closer look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons, words

such as “early” and “speedy” have been incorporated and reiterated. The object shall be

fulfilled only if the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a narrow sense and not

hampered by the usual procedural delays plaguing our traditional legal system.”

13. Another coordinate bench of this Court in Bhopal Fracture

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Hospital Vs. Savitri Devi Vijaywargiya (2024 (4) MPLJ 223)

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has also held

the same by referring to the statement of objection reasons of Commercial

Courts Act, the plain language of Section 2 as well as Section 12 of the said

Act, that relates to determination of specified value.

14. In view of the aforesaid, following the views taken by the

coordinate benches of this Court so also by the earlier view of Calcutta High

Court in the case of Deepak Polymers (supra)

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which has not been considered

in its later case of Maharshi Commerce (supra)

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cited by the learned counsel

for the Petitioner, so also the view taken by the Gujarat High Court, this

Court is of the considered opinion that in such matters of eviction where the

Landlord is exercising his right given to him to seek eviction on specified

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(VIVEK JAIN)

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JUDGE

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grounds under M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the suit would not

fall within the definition of Commercial dispute in terms of Section 2(c) of

Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

15. Consequently, finding no ground to interfere in the present

Revision, the same is dismissed

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and the eviction suit is held maintainable

before the Civil Court.

veni

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