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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 11310 OF 2026

Karuna Sumit Kamble

Age 38 Years,

Room No. 66, Building No. 64, BDD Chawl,

Near Jambori Maidan, Bhagoji Waghmare

Road,

Worli, Mumbai – 400 018.

...Petitioner

Versus

1) The Deputy Director of Education,

Mumbai Region, Mumbai.

Having its Office at:

Building of Mittal Foundation Trust

Ayurvedic Hospital, Eight Floor,

Netaji Subhash Road,

Near Charni Road Station, Marine Drive,

Mumbai – 400 002.

2) Balmohan Vidyamandir,

Through Is Principal,

Having its office at:

59/56, Dr Madhukar B Raut Marg,

Dadar West, Shivaji Park,

Mumbai – 400 028.

3) Education Officer (Primary)

Greater Mumbai, South Zone,

Having Office at:

E-Vita Empress Building, 3

rd

Floor,

G. D. Ambekar Road, Parel,

Mumbai – 400 012.

4) State of Maharashtra

Through its Secretary,

Department of School Education and

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Sports,

Having its Office at:

Mantralaya (Extension Building),

Hutatma Rajguru Chowk,

Madam Cama Road,

Mumbai – 400 032.

…Respondents

Mr. S. S. Bedekar, with Swapnil Shanbhag, for the Petitioner.

Smt. Savita Prabhune, AGP, for the Respondents-State.

Ms. Deepa Chavan, Senior Advocate, with R Nathani and

Siddhi Dawane, i/b Divekar and Co, for Respondent

No.2.

CORAM :N. J. JAMADAR, J.

RESERVED ON : 12

th

OCTOBER 2026

PRONOUNCED ON : 19

th

OCTOBER 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the

consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2. By this Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India, the Petitioner, who is the mother of

Krishika, a six year old girl child, has assailed an order dated

14

th

August 2026 passed by the Deputy Director of Education

(R1) whereby the admission of the Petitioner’s daughter granted

under the 25% quota for the weaker section and disadvantaged

group in the Balmohan Vidyamandir School (R2) has been

cancelled on the ground that the distance between the residence

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of the Petitioner and Respondent No.2-school exceeds the

prescribed limit.

3.The Petition arises in the backdrop of the following facts:

3.1In accordance with the provisions of the Right of Children

to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (“the RTE Act,

2009”), enacted to operationalize the fundamental right to free

and compulsory education of children between the age group of

6 to 14 years, and the rules framed thereunder, the Petitioner

had filed an application for the admission of the Petitioner’s

daughter in a private unaided school.

3.2The Petitioner’s daughter fulfilled the criteria of a child

belonging to a disadvantaged group as she is a member of the

Scheduled Caste. The Petitioner claimed to have furnished all

the necessary particulars and documents in support of the

claim for admission. Three preferences were given by the

Petitioner. Respondent No.2-school was the third in the order of

preferences.

3.3By a communication dated 10

th

April 2026, Respondent

No.3 allotted, Respondent No.2-school for the admission of the

Petitioner’s daughter, under the 25% quota. Respondent No.2,

the Petitioner asserts, blatantly and brazenly refused to admit

the Petitioner’s daughter. No reason was ascribed. In fact

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Respondent No.2 had declined to admit as many as 12 students

who were allotted admission in Respondent No.2-school. Many

complaints were lodged with the authorities.

3.4On 16

th

June 2026, the Education Officer (R3) called upon

Respondent No.2 to appear for a hearing as, by that time, four

students were not admitted by Respondent No.2. It appears

that, Respondent No.2, thereafter preferred an Appeal against

the order of allotment before the Deputy Director of Education

(R1), questioning the eligibility of the students to be admitted in

Respondent No.2-school on various grounds. Qua the

Petitioner’s daughter, it was contended that, the residence of the

child was not within the radius of 1 km from Respondent No.2-

school and incorrect information as to the location on the

Google Map was filled in the Application form with a view to

secure admission in Respondent No.2-school.

3.5By the impugned order, the Deputy Director of Education

(R1) was persuaded to direct Respondent No.2 to admit two

students whose residence was within the radius of 1 km to 3 km

from Respondent No.2-school. However, based on the report of

the Education Inspector that, the residence of the Petitioner was

at a distance of 4 km from Respondent No.2-school, Respondent

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No.1 proceeded to cancel the allotment of the seat in the

Respondent No.2-school to the Petitioner’s daughter.

3.6Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has invoked writ

jurisdiction.

3.7The substance of the challenge is that, there was no

deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the Petitioner. The

correct residential address was mentioned in the application

form. Even the copies of the documents annexed to the

application reveal that the Petitioner resides at the same

address that was mentioned in the form. More importantly, in

view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ashish

Chaman Fulzele and Ors. Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors,

1

whereby this Court has quashed and set aside the conditions in

the GR dated 12

th

February 2026 in regard to the distance

between the school and the residence of the child, and the

statement made on behalf of the State Government before the

Court that the State would not prescribe area restrictions for

the purpose of ascertainment of the “neighbourhood school”,

the impugned order passed on the sole ground that the distance

between Respondent No.2-school and the Petitioner’s residence

exceeds the prescribed limit, cannot be sustained. Furthermore,

1 Nagpur Bench Public Interest Litigation No. 17 of 2026, decided on 11

th

March 2026.

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since Respondent No.2 unjustifiably cancelled the admission of

the Petitioner’s daughter belatedly, she would lose a precious

academic year.

3.8The grounds of breach of principles of natural justice and

fundamental principles of judicial process in the decision

making process are also urged.

4. Respondent No.1 has resisted the Petition by filing an

Affidavit in Reply. The impugned action is justified on the

ground that the Petitioner had deliberately mentioned wrong

distance between Respondent No.2-school and the Petitioner’s

residence. The impugned action is thus in conformity with the

rules which govern the admission under the RTE quota. The

Petitioner furnished wrong and incorrect information and that

misled the authorities to allot Respondent No.2-school. Under

the rules, it was the responsibility of the parents to furnish

correct and truthful information. Even an undertaking was filed

by the Petitioner that, in the event, the information furnished in

the application was found to be untrue, the admission was

liable to be cancelled and the Petitioner was also liable for

action. It was denied that Respondent No.1 has not adhered to

the principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order.

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5.In the wake of the aforesaid pleadings and material on

record, I have heard Mr. Sudhanva Bedekar, the learned

Counsel for the Petitioner, Smt. Savita Prabhune, the learned

AGP, for the Respondent-State, and Ms. Deepa Chavan, the

learned Senior Advocate, for Respondent No.2-school, at some

length. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the

parties, I have perused the material on record.

6.Mr. Sudhanva Bedekar, the learned Counsel for the

Petitioner, submitted that the very foundation of the impugned

order is flawed. The only reason ascribed by Respondent No.1 for

cancelling the admission was the excess distance. Banking

heavily upon the orders passed by the Division Bench of this

Court in Ashish Chaman Fulzele (supra), Mr. Bedekar urged

that, as the State Government has withdrawn the distance

criteria, Respondent No.1 could not have cancelled the

admission on the ground that the distance between the

Petitioner’s residence and Respondent No.2-school, was in

excess of one km.

7.Mr. Bedekar urged that, in the aforesaid case, the Division

Bench has laid emphasis on the fundamental right of the

children to free and compulsory education. The restrictions

imposed by the State Government vide GR dated 12

th

February

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2026, might infringe the right of the child to have education in

the school contemplated under the provisions of the RTE Act,

2009, and will frustrate the very object and purpose of that Act.

8.Mr. Bedekar would urge that, when it was submitted on

behalf of the State Government that the distance to determine a

“neighbourhood school” would be extended to 3 km from 1 km,

the Division Bench, in terms, directed that the State

Government should modify the distance criteria with a rider

that such restriction should not be imposed for admission to a

private unaided school. The said Public Interest Litigation was

disposed of by noting the compliance that the State has taken

steps to remove the restriction of distance for school admission

in private unaided schools under the RTE Act, 2009.

9.In the face of the aforesaid directions and compliance

thereof by the State Government, it was not open to Respondent

No.1 to cancel the admission and that too after almost five

months, on the basis of the distance criteria.

10.As a second limb of this submission, Mr Bedekar would

urge that, the question that is required to be adjudicated is

whether the right of the child to free and compulsory education

is being violated and not whether there was some inadvertent or

technical error on the part of the parents. The cancellation of

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admission after almost five months, has caused grave prejudice

to the educational prospects of the child. Under a legitimate

expectation that, the child would be admitted in Respondent

No.2-school, the Petitioner did not make any efforts to secure

admission in any other school. To deny admission to the child,

at this juncture, would cause her grave prejudice as her entire

academic year would be lost.

11.Mr. Bedekar further submitted that, the adversarial

approach of Respondent No.2-school was completely uncalled

for. Respondent No.2-school preferred an appeal only after

grievances were made before the authorities regarding its

deliberate failure to admit the children belonging to weaker

sections and disadvantaged groups. The stand of Respondent

No.2, in the circumstances of the case, according to Mr.

Bedekar, is not in consonance with the role of a school expected

to perform under the RTE Act, 2009.

12. Lastly, invoking the beneficial object of the RTE Act, 2009

and the overriding objective of securing the fundamental right of

free and compulsory education, Mr. Bedekar would urge, in a

situation of this nature, the Court ought to adopt an

interpretation which advances the constitutional guarantee

sought to be enforced through the RTE Act, 2009.

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13.Smt. Savita Prabhune, the learned AGP for the

Respondent-State, stoutly supported the impugned order. It was

submitted that, the Petitioner was entitled to give as many as 10

preferences. Under the scheme of the RTE Act, the admission is

to be secured in “neighbourhood schools”. It was not the case of

the Petitioner that there were no schools in the neighbourhood

of her residence. The Petitioner deliberately chose the schools

which were far off and beyond the distance criteria prescribed

under the Rules. What exacerbates the situation, according to

Smt. Prabhune, was incorrect information in the online

application form regarding the aerial distance between the

Petitioner’s residence and Respondent No.2-school. In a case of

the present nature where a party deliberately furnishes

incorrect and misleading information, she cannot be granted

any discretionary relief, submitted Smt. Prabhune.

14. Ms. Deepa Chavan, the learned Senior Advocate, for

Respondent No.2, endeavoured her best to dispel the

impression sought to be created by the Petitioner that

Respondent No.2-school has adopted an adversarial approach.

Ms. Chavan urged that, Respondent No.2 reckons the instant

matter as a non contentious case. At the same time, Ms. Chavan

emphasized, it is the obligation of not only Respondent No.2-

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school but also the Petitioner to ensure that the admission

under the RTE quota is in accordance with the provisions of the

RTE Act and statutory Rules and Regulations. Once, the field is

governed by a statutory framework, Ms. Chavan would urge, it

is not open to press into service submissions premised on equity

and prejudice.

15.Taking the Court through the provisions of the RTE Act,

2009 and the Maharashtra Right of Children to Free and

Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 (“the Rules, 2011”) and the

Maharashtra Right of Children to Free and Compulsory

Education (Manner of admission of Minimum 25% children in

Class I or Pre-school at the Entry level for Children belonging to

Disadvantaged Group and Weaker Section) Rules, 2013 (“the

Rules, 2013”), Ms. Chavan would urge that, the entire emphasis

of the constitutional guarantee and the object of the RTE Act,

2009 is to secure the schooling of children belonging to weaker

sections and disadvantaged groups along with the other

children in the same area in neighbourhood schools. The

repeated use of the expression “neighbourhood school” under

the provisions of Section 3 and Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act,

2009 is with a definite purpose. No word in a statute, Ms

Chavan submitted, can be construed as superfluous or

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redundant. An interpretation, which renders the words in a

statute redundant cannot be adopted. To this end, Ms. Chavan

placed reliance on the decision in the case of Union of India And

Anr Vs Hansoli Devi and Ors.

2

16.Ms. Chavan further submitted that, under the Right of

Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2010 (“the

Rules, 2010”) framed by the Central Government, the areas or

limits of the neighbourhood have been specified. Under the

Rules, 2011 also, “neighbourhood school” in respect of a

children in Classes I to V, has been defined to mean a school to

be established, as far as possible, within a distance of one km of

the neighbourhood. The Rules 2013, prescribe an elaborate

procedure for admission of the children under the 25% quota.

Therefore, the submission on behalf of the Petitioner that, in

view of the decision in the case of Ashish Chaman Fulzele

(supra), area restrictions cannot be insisted upon cannot be

countenanced as the Rules have a binding force. To buttress

this submission, reliance placed by Ms. Chavan on the

judgment in the case of PTC India Limited Vs Central Electricity

Regulatory Commission.

3

2 (2002) 7 SCC 273.

3 (2010) 4 SCC 603.

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17.Ms.Chavan further submitted that, in a series of decisions

this Court has upheld the area restriction criteria for admission

under the RTE quota as the children are to be admitted in the

neighbourhood schools. Reliance was placed on the judgments

in the cases of Amol Vasantrao Patil and Ors Vs Bhartiya Vidya

Bhavan’s Lloyds Viday Niketan, Bhugaon and Ors

4

and Murugan

Arunanchalam Nadar Vs Balmohan Vidya Mandir English

Medium School Through Headmaster and Ors.

5

18.Ms. Chavan made a strenuous effort to distinguish the

orders passed in Ashish Chaman Fulzele (Supra), on the

premise that those orders were passed in the matter of securing

admission in private unaided schools, where no other private

unaided school was available within the prescribed limit. It was

submitted that, those orders do not displace the statutory

framework, nor can the decision in the case of Amol Vasantrao

Patil and Ors (supra) be said to have been deviated from by the

Division Bench in the case of Ashish Chaman Fulzele (supra).

19.Lastly Ms. Chavan would urge that, since the Petitioner

has deliberately submitted incorrect information, the Petition

deserves to be dismissed. However, in order to ensure that the

4 2018 (1) Mh LJ 54.

5 Appellate Side Writ Petition No. 6828 of 2019, decided on 19

th

June

2019.

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academic year of the child is not lost, as ordered in the case of

Amol Vasantrao Patil and Ors (supra) and Murugan

Arunanchalam Nadar (supra), Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 should

be directed to assist the Petitioner in securing the admission of

the child in a neighbourhood school.

20.I have given anxious consideration to the submissions

canvassed across the bar.

21.To start with, it may be apposite to note that on facts,

there is not much controversy that in the application form filled

in by the Petitioner, the correct residential address of the

Petitioner was mentioned. The documents annexed to the

application form, namely, Aadhaar Card and the Electricity

Consumption Bill do reveal the same address of the Petitioner.

In fact in the allotment letter, Respondent No.3 records the same

address of the Petitioner. The controversy between the parties

revolves around the distance between the Petitioner’s residence

and Respondent No.2 school. In the admission form, it was

mentioned that the aerial distance was 0.417 km.

22.Incontrovertibly, the distance between the Petitioner’s

residence and Respondent No.2-school is about 4 km. The only

reason ascribed by Respondent No.1 to cancel the admission

was that, the said distance was in excess of the prescribed limit.

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It is also imperative to note that the allotment of the school was

made vide letter dated 10

th

April 2026 and the admission came

to be cancelled by the impugned order dated 14

th

August 2026.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the pivotal question that

crops up for consideration is, whether the impugned action of

cancellation of the admission, on the ground that the child did

not fulfill the distance criteria to seek admission in a private

school, is sustainable?

RIGHT TO EDUCATION - The Evolution

23.The 86

th

Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2002, heralded a

paradigm shift in the constitutional goal of securing children's

elementary educational rights. A new Article 21A, guaranteeing

the Right to Education, came to be inserted in Part III of the

Constitution. Simultaneously, Article 45, which declared the

governing policy of the State to provide early childhood care and

education for all children between the age of 6 to 14 years, came

to be substituted to provide that, the State shall endeavor to

provide early childhood care and education until they complete

the age of six years. A fundamental duty was also cast on the

parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his

or her child or ward between the age of 6 and 14 years, by

introducing clause (k) in Article 51A.

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24.Article 21A reads as under:

“The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all

children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as

the State may, by law, determine.”

25.The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education

Act, 2009 came to be enacted to operationalize and enforce the

right to free and compulsory education guaranteed under Article

21A.

Legislative Framework :

26.A brief reference to the provisions of the RTE Act, 2009,

would be advantageous. Section 3(1) of the RTE Act, 2009

declares that, every child of the age of six to fourteen years,

including a child belonging to a weaker section or disadvantaged

group, shall have the right to free and compulsory education in

a neighbourhood school till the completion of his or her

elementary education. Section 6 imposes a duty on the

Government and local authorities to carry out the provisions of

the RTE Act. Section 6, in terms, declares that, for carrying out

the provisions of that Act, the appropriate Government and local

authority shall establish, within such areas or limits of

neighbourhood as may be prescribed, a school, where it is not

so established, within a period of three years from the

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commencement of that Act. In addition to the duties imposed on

the Government and the local authority, a responsibility is also

cast to provide free and compulsory education on the schools,

defined under Section 2(n) of the said Act.

27.Section 2(n), reads as under:

“2(n) “School" means any recognised school imparting

elementary education and includes-

(i)a school established, owned or controlled by the

appropriate Government or a local authority;

(ii) an aided school receiving aid or grants to meet whole or

part of its expenses from the appropriate Government or the

local authority;

(iii) a school belonging to specified category; and(iv)an

unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet

its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local

authority;in turn, defines a school to mean any recognised

school imparting elementary education and includes an

unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet

its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local

authority.”

28.Section 12(1)(c) reads as under:

“12. Extent of school's responsibility for free and compulsory

education. -

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a school,-

……….

(c) specified in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause (n) of

section 2 shall admit in class I, to the extent of at least

twenty-five per cent. of the strength of that class, children

belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group in the

neighbourhood and provide free and compulsory elementary

education till its completion.”

29.A cumulative reading of the aforesaid provisions would

indicate that, apart from the schools established, owned or

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controlled by the appropriate Government or a local authority,

or an aided school, a school belonging to a specified category

and even an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or

grant to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or

the local authority are enjoined to admit children in Class I to

the extent of at least 25% of the strength of that class, the

children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups

in the neighbourhood, and provide free and compulsory

elementary education to those children.

Legislative object :

30.The salience of the aforesaid provisions and the laudable

object was expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of

Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others

6

,

on which a very strong reliance was placed by Ms. Chavan in

the opening paragraph of the judgment as under:

“1.The obligation of a “neighbourhood school” to admit

children belonging to weaker and disadvantaged sections of

our society, to the extent of twenty- five percent of the class

strength, under Section 12 of the Right of Children to Free

and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to

as “the Act”) has the extraordinary capacity to transform the

social structure of our society. Earnest implementation can

truly be transformative. It is not only a step towards

educating young India, but also a substantive measure in

securing the preambular objective of ‘equality of status’.”

(emphasis supplied)

6 (2026) 7 Supreme Court Cases 267.

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31.The legislative object in promoting the education of the

children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups

through the neighbourhood schools was emphasised by the

Supreme Court in the said judgment in the following words:

“9.The legislative choice to implement the right to free

and compulsory education through neighbourhood schools is

not merely administrative; it is a deliberate constitutional

strategy to operationalise equality of status, dignity, and

social integration among children in their formative years. In

sustaining Section 12, the Supreme Court has recognised

that the rights of children carry corresponding obligations on

the State to “respect, protect and fulfill” those rights and to

regulate private educational institutions so that children’s

rights are not violated even in non-State spheres.

…...

12.The emphasis on “neighbourhood schools” is rooted in

the National System of Education, as elaborated in the

Kothari Commission Report, which recommended a Common

School System whereby all children, irrespective of social or

economic background, would attend the same

neighbourhood schools and learn together in an integrated,

non-segregated environment. This model envisages the

school as a common civic space that breaks down barriers of

caste, class and gender, and thereby advances substantive

equality and social justice. The neighbourhood common

school system under the RTE Act envisages that each child

must have access to a neighbourhood school and such a

system is central to the project of democratising schooling

and reducing entrenched social inequalities.”

(emphasis supplied)

Neighbourhood School :

32.What is the connotation of the term 'Neighbourhood

School'? In the case at hand, Respondent No. 2, as is evident,

resisted the admission of the petitioner's daughter on the

ground that, though it is not averse to the admission of the

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children under the statutory mandate contained in Section 12(1)

(c), it is not a neighbourhood school, vis-a-vis the child in

question and the petitioner must thus enforce her remedies

against the schools in her neighbourhood. The thrust of the

submission on behalf of the State and respondent No. 2 was

that the obligation is that of neighbourhood schools and not of

any school as per the choice of the parents of the child. As

support is sought to be drawn from the Rules, reference to the

relevant Rules may be apposite.

33.In the Central Right of Children to Free and Compulsory

Education Rules, 2010, Rule 6(1) provides for the area or limits

of the neighbourhood within which a school has to be

established.

34.Under the Maharashtra Rules, 2011, framed in exercise of

the powers under Section 38 of the RTE Act, 2009

“Neighbourhood School” is defined as under:

“(m)“Neighbourhood school” means a school in respect of children

in classes I – V a school shall be established as far as possible within

a distance of one km of the neighbourhood and has a minimum of 20

children in the age group of 6 to 11 years available and willing for

enrollment in that school and in classes VI – VII, a school shall be

established as far as possible within a distance of 3 kms of the

neighbourhood and which has not less than 20 children in class 5

th

of the feeding primary schools, taken together, available and willing

for enrollment in that school.”

35.Rule 4 prescribes the areas or the limits for the purposes

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of Section 6 as under:

“4(1)The State Government or the Local Authority, as the

case may be, shall establish neighbourhood schools within

the areas or limits to meet the following criteria, namely:--

(a)In respect of children in classes I-V, a school shall be

established as far as possible within a distance of one

kilometer of the neighbourhood and has a minimum of 20

children in the age group of 6 to 11 years available and willing

for enrollment in that school; and

(b)In respect of children in classes VI-VIII, a school shall

be established as far as possible within a distance of three

kilometers of the neighbourhood and which has not less than

20 children in class 5th of. the feeding primary schools, taken

together, available and willing for enrollment in that school.”

36.Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 empowers the State Government to

suitably alter the minimum distance specified in sub-rule (1) in

cases of hilly areas or areas that are not easily accessible and

make available the schools run by the Government or local

authority for children having no facility of further elementary

education in their schools in such areas. Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 4

casts an obligation on the local authority to designate a

neighbourhood school for every settlement or area and make

that information known to the public.

37.Rule 7(3) provides that the areas or limits of

neighbourhood schools specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 shall

apply to admissions made in pursuance of clause (c) of sub-

section (1) of Section 12. The proviso thereto, however, enables

a school, if necessary for the purposes of filling up the requisite

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percentage of seats, to extend those limits with the prior

approval of the State Government.

38.The Maharashtra Rules, 2013, contain fasciculus of

provisions to regulate the admissions under the RTE quota,

including the procedure to be followed by the schools,

institutionalising the online admission process, and the

certificates to be accompanied to an application seeking

admission thereunder.

39.To begin with, it is necessary to note that the Parliament,

did not define what constitutes, “a neighbourhood school”, while

mandating that every child of the age of 6 to 14 years shall have

a right to free and compulsory education therein. The obligation

on the State and the local authority to establish the

neighbourhood schools was also not defined in a straitjacket.

Under Section 38(1) and (2) of the RTE Act, the appropriate

Government was conferred the power to make Rules to provide

the areas or limits for the establishment of a neighbourhood

school under Section 6 of the RTE Act. The necessity of

conferring the power to define the limits by framing the Rules

arose on account of the varying factors which bear upon the

determination of the area or limits, in view of the vast and

varied differences in the geographical conditions, density of

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population, level of literacy, and requirement of the schools.

Different Governments have prescribed different areas and

limits to cater to their specific requirements. There is, thus, an

element of flexibility in the concept of neighbourhood. The term

“neighbourhood” cannot be defined in rigid terms, with clinical

precision or mathematical exactitude. Ordinarily, the term

'neighbourhood' signifies a contiguous area or locality.

40.It is in the aforesaid context that, both the Central Rules,

2010, as well as the Maharashtra Rules, 2011, qualify the

prescribed limits of area with the expression "as far as possible".

The area prescribed in the Maharashtra Rules, 2011, though

cannot be said to be wholly insignificant or irrelevant for the

purpose of the obligation of the State under Section 6 or the

school under Section 12(1)(c), yet, is required to be appreciated

keeping in view of the aforesaid element and necessity of

flexibility and the object of admission in a neighbourhood

school.

41.A very rigid view of the limits of area to the point that

deviation therefrom is impermissible would, in a given case,

impinge upon the constitutional right of free and compulsory

education. Undoubtedly, the constitutional guarantee is to be

enforced in accordance with the law made by the State.

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However, the prescription as to the area and limits to ascertain

what constitutes a neighbourhood school ought to be construed

as a mean for achieving the object of securing the right to free

and compulsory education to the child and not an end in itself.

42.In the light of the aforesaid legislative regime, that holds

the field, reference to the decisions of this Court may be

necessary. In the case of Amol Vasantrao Patil (supra), the

petitioners therein claimed admission in a school under the RTE

quota which was situated at a distance of more than 11 kms. In

that context, after referring to a previous decision, the Division

Bench observed as under:

“25.The perusal of 2009 Act shows that Section 3 thereof provides

and protects right of a child to a free and compulsory education in a

"neighbourhood school". This right of an elementary WP.2303.17

education, therefore, can be enforced against the neighbourhood

school. The provisions in Section 2(n) define "School" and 2009 Act,

therefore, applies to schools run by Government or local authority or

also to private schools receiving grant-in-aid or other assistance from

Government or local authority. It also applies to unaided school not

receiving any kind of aid or grants. Section 8 casts a duty on

appropriate Government to provide free and compulsory elementary

education to every child and to ensure availability of a neighbourhood

school as specified in Section 6. The Maharashtra Right of Children

to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 in Rule 2(m) defines

"Neighbourhood school". In respect of children in classes I-V, school

within distance of one km. and in classes VI to VIII, a school within

distance of 3 km. from residence has been envisaged as

neighbourhood school if minimum 20 children in age groups specified

therein are available and willing for enrollment in that school. The

fact that such schools are available in present matter is not in

dispute. Object of Parliament behind mandating the State to

establish or provide such a school in neighbourhood cannot be lost

sight of.

….

33.Petitioners before us have not urged and demonstrated that

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parents of such a student can restrict their choice to few schools and

indirectly attempt to secure admission in a coveted school. They have

not demonstrated that when a school is available in neighbourhood

or extended neighbourhood, petitioners can ignore those schools and

vie for a distant school. They have also not urged and demonstrated

that admission process cannot include all such schools, whether

aided or unaided. Contention of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that all

schools ought to have been registered and subjected to on-line

exercise, has remained unrebutted. We find that respondent nos. 3 &

4 cannot force petitioners on respondent nos. 1 & 2.”

43.In the case of Murugan Nadar (supra), another Division

Bench of this Court, declined to accede to the prayer of the

petitioner therein to admit his daughter in respondent No. 2

school, as the distance criterion was not met. In the case of

Akhil Bharatiya Samajwadi Adhyapak Sabha and others vs.

State of Maharashtra and others

7

, the challenge was to the 2024

Amendment to the Maharashtra Rules, 2011, whereby a proviso

had been added to Rule 4(5) to the effect that the local authority

shall not identify the private unaided schools where Government

schools and aided schools were situated within a radius of one

km of that school, for the purpose of providing 25% quota

admission to the children belonging to disadvantaged groups

and weaker sections under the Rules, 2013.

44.A Division Bench of this Court, struck down the said

proviso introduced by the said amendment as the operation of

Section 12(1)(c) qua the unaided schools had been made

7 2024 SCC Online Bom 2263.

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conditional, in the sense that, the said provision would become

applicable only in case an unaided school was situated outside

a radius of one km from the Government/aided school. This

Court found that such a condition was conspicuous by its

absence in the text of Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act, 2009, and,

accordingly, any rule of subordinate legislation which introduces

a distance condition of a private unaided schools vis-a-vis the

Government/aided school clearly ran contrary to what Section

12(1)(c) provided for. Neither can delegated legislation override

the provisions of the Parent Act under which it was made, nor

can it supply something which was clearly absent from that Act.

45.At this juncture, the orders passed by this Court in the

case of Ashish Chaman Fulzele (supra) deserve to be noted. The

challenge in the said case was to clauses 3(5)(2) and 3(5)(3) of

the Government Resolution dated 12

th

February 2026, which

inter alia provided that, on the online portal only those schools

should be displayed which were situated within the radius of 1

km from the residence of the parent of the child. The Division

Bench, by an interim order dated 11

th

March 2026, directed the

State Government to take corrective steps to delete the

restrictive clauses in the Government Resolution dated 12

th

February 2026. The Division Bench, inter alia, observed as

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under:

“10.Thus, in terms of Section 12(1)(c), it is the

responsibility of the schools, including the schools belonging

to specific category and/or an unaided school not receiving

any kind of aids or grants from the State Government to

admit in Class:I at least 25% of the strength of that class,

children belonging to weaker sections and compulsory

elementary education. Thus, in a case where the private

unaided school is not located within the limit of 1 Km. from

the registered residence of a child and though the State has

established neighborhood school in terms of Section 6, the

child belonging to disadvantaged group or weaker section

cannot be deprived or his right to take education in terms of

provisions of RTE Act. It is, in this context, we had opined in

our order dated 09.03.2026 that the restrictions imposed

through impugned Government Resolution are contrary to

the judgment in the case of Akhil Bharatiya Samgjwadi

Adhyapak Sabha & Ors. supra as also are violative of

provisions of RTE Act read with Articles 14, 21 and 21A

amongst other.

11.At this stage, Ms Jayna Kothari, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has invited our attention

to Annexure-G to point out that a child named, Shivans

Sachin Pote made an attempt to submit form for admission to

I standard under the provisions of the RTE Act but could not

succeed because no school is available within 1 Km. The

residence of the child is located at Khapri Subhedar locality,

Borkhedi Nagpur (Gramin). Another such student named,

Prathyusha Paras Gajbhiye, r/o Kukdey Layout, Kausallya

Nagar, Nagpur. In her case also, no school is available within

limit of 1 Km. Learned Senior Counsel submits that there can

be many such cases where no school is available within area

of 1 Km. and there can be many cases where no private

unaided school is available within 1 Km. though other

schools may be available.

12,Put all together, the restrictions as imposed, appear to

us to be contrary to the judgment in the case of Akhil

Bharatiya Samajwadi Adhyapak Sabha & Ors supra as also

violative of provisions of the RTE Act read with provisions of

the Constitution of India.

………...

16.We may note here that to prioritize the selection of

schools at the nearest possible location from the residence of

a child is one thing and his right to have education in the

school including private unaided school is another There may

be or may not be private unaided schools within 1 Km. from

the residence of child though aided schools or schools

established by the Government under Section 6 are available

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within such distance. In such an eventuality,the child has

option to travel beyond 1 Km. to get admission in private

unaided school. The restriction imposed by the impugned

Government Resolution may infringe their right to have

education in the school contemplated under the provisions of

the RTE Act and will thus frustrate the very object and

purpose of the Act. Further, the petitioner has pointed out

certain examples where there are no schools at all within the

distance of 1 Km. from the residence of the child.”

(emphasis supplied)

46.It is imperative to note that, the attention of the Division

Bench was drawn to the decision of another Division Bench of

this Court in the case of Amol Patil (supra). The Division Bench

in Ashish Chaman Fulzele (supra), found the aforesaid decision

was of no assistance to the State in supporting the area

restrictions. The observations in paragraphs 13 to 15 read as

under:

“13.Learned A.G.P., however, has placed reliance upon

judgment in the case of Amol Vasantrao Patil and ors. Vs.

Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan’s Lloyds Vidya Niketan and ors; [Writ

Petition No,2303/2017 decided on 13.07.20171 、 to contend

that the restriction of 1 Km. or 3 Km., as the case may be, is

well recognized.14.

14.We have gone through the said judgment to find that

the factis are altogether different. The petitioners therein were

guardians of the children who were seeking admission of their

wards in pre-primary school of respondent No.1 - School,

which was unaided school. The school refused admission on

the count that the children did not reside in the

neighborhood of the school. Emphasis of petitioner was on

Rule 9A of the Rules, which allows allocation beyond 3 Km, if

needed. The Division Bench, while interpreting provision of

the RTE Act and particularly Sections 3 and 12(1)(c)read with

Rule 9A of the Rules, emphasized the concept of

neighbourhood school and held that the process must

prioritize the schools within defined proximity and parental

preferences cannot override this statutory mandate as it

would frustrate the Act's object of providing accessible

education near home. Accordingly, the Court held that the

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allocations ignoring nearer available options were invalid and

the schools are not obliged to admit children from beyond the

neighbourhood schools. The Court held that the priority

should be given to nearer schools and the extent,

limit/distance can only be invoked after verifying exhaustion

of nearer seats.

15.We are of the view that the above finding will be of no

help to the respondents inasmuch as the Division Bench was

examining the scope of Government Resolution dated

10.01.2017 that enables the school to admit children whose

residences were beyond the permissible distance, if the

parents were to bear travel expenses, The Court had no

occasion to examine the right of children have education in

private unaided school in terms of Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE

Act.” (emphasis supplied)

47.In the subsequent order dated 12

th

March 2026, the

Division Bench even did not approve of the stand of the State

Government that it had taken a decision to extend the criteria of

one km to three km. The observations in paragraph read as

under:

“In response, learned Additional Government Pleader

submits that respondent - State has taken decision to the

extend the criteria of 1 Km. to 3 Kms. The date for fling

application is extended up to 18-3-2026.

In our view, if purpose of provision under Section 12(1)

(e) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory

Education Act, 2009 (for short ‘RTE Act) is to be achieved,

the respondents should ensure that the distance of the

school from the residence of the' child should be such, as to

accommodate at least one private unaided school and if the

number of applications for admission in private unaided

school is more than 25% of the strength of that Class in a

particular school, the distance should be suitably extended

to accommodate another private unaided school.

Since this arrangement is practically impossible, the

respondents should not put a limit. of distance for admission

in private unaided school. The respondents shall accordingly

modify this criteria to enable the children to seek admission

in terms of Section 12(1)(c), amongst. other provisions of the

RTE Act. The respondents shall also examine and submit

before us the data about establishment of schools in terms of

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Section 6of the RTE Act, which the State Government was

under obligation to establish within three years of coming

into force the RTE Act.

As we have noted in our order dated 11-3-2026 that at

some places, there is no school available within the distance

of 1 Km., which in a way, suggest failure of respondent –

State to establish school in terms of Section 6 of the RTE Act

and, therefore, the criteria of 1 Km. ought not to have been

imposed. Similar could be situation for 3 Kms. The State

Government shall accordingly examine the situation and

suitably modify the distance criteria with a rider that such

restrictions should not be imposed for admission to private

unaided school. Necessary steps shall be taken within two

days from today and compliance report shall be filed on 16-3-

2026.”

48.Finally on 17

th

March 2026 the said PIL came to be

disposed with the following order:

“Learned Additional Government Pleader submits that

in response to previous order dated 16.03.2026 and other

such orders, the respondents have taken necessary steps to

remove the restriction of distance for seeking admission in

private unaided schools in terms of the provisions of the

Right of Children To Free and Compulsory Education Act,

2009. The time to submit applications is extended up to

25.03.2026. A communication made to that effect by Director

of Education (Primary), Maharashtra State, Pune, is tendered

across the bar. Taken on record and marked ‘Y" for

identification.

2. The petitioners are satisfied with the development.

Thus, the purpose of filing petition is served.

3. The Public Interest Litigation is disposed of

accordingly.”

49.The aforesaid orders constituted the linchpin of the

submission on behalf of the petitioner. It was urged by Mr.

Bedekar with a degree of vehemence that in the face of the

aforesaid orders, and the categorical stand of the State

Government that it had taken steps to remove the restriction of

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distance for seeking admission in private unaided schools in

terms of the provisions of the RTE Act, 2009, it was

impermissible for the authorities of the State to turn around

and reject the admission of the petitioner's daughter on the very

count of distance.

50.As noted above, Ms. Chavan made a strenuous effort to

submit that the aforesaid orders are required to be read in the

backdrop of the facts of the case and, at best, the area

restriction would not apply in terms of the aforesaid judgments,

if there is no private unaided school within the prescribed limit

from the residence of the child. Lest the entire scheme of the

RTE Act, 2009, and the Rules framed thereunder of providing

admission to the children belonging to the weaker sections and

disadvantaged groups in the neighbourhood schools, would be

rendered nugatory.

51.In a matter of the present nature, in the considered view of

this Court, the Court cannot adopt a technical and doctrinaire

approach as to the precedential value of the aforesaid decisions

and the purported conflict therein. Rather the Court would be

guided by the constitutional guarantee of securing the right to

free and compulsory education as an overarching objective.

Indeed, the Rules do provide area restrictions in the matter of

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the determination of the neighbourhood school. Yet, as noted

above, those area restrictions cannot be construed as rigid,

sacrosanct and impregnable. The Rules themselves use the

qualifying expression "as far as possible". In the light of the

great diversity, with which our nation is endowed, and diverse

situations in different areas of the same State, nay, varying

conditions of different localities in a metropolis like Mumbai, the

criterion to determine a neighbourhood school, by the sheer

force of attendant circumstances, needs to be applied with

requisite flexibility.

52.An interpretation which completely discounts the distance

requirement might not be in consonance with the principles of

statutory interpretation and the object sought to be achieved by

the RTE Act. As noted above, Section 3(1) of the RTE Act,

recognizes the Right to Free and Compulsory Education in a

neighbourhood school till completion of the elementary

education. It would be contextually relevant to note that, the

duty of the Government and Local Authorities to establish

schools for carrying out the provisions of the RTE Act, is not

completely open ended. The obligation is cast on the appropriate

Government and Local Authorities to establish school, “within

such area or limits of neighbourhood”, as may be prescribed.

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The responsibility cast on the schools under Section 12(1)(c) of

the RTE Act, to admit in Class I children belonging to weaker

and disadvantaged groups is again, qualified by the expression,

“in the neighbourhood”.

53.What constitutes a “neighbourhood” may be debatable. Yet

the interpretative process must take into account the legislative

object behind the use of the expressions “neighbourhood school”

in Section 3; “within such area or limits of neighbourhood” in

Section 6 and “in the neighbourhood”, in Section 12(1)(c). The

RTE Act, 2009, thus, envisages “neighbourhood” as an

area circumscribed by some limits, in contradistinction to an

infinite area. It is well recognized that, the legislature does not

use words as surplusage. Every word in the edict of the

legislature is used with a definite object. An interpretation

which renders the words in a section redundant is required to

be avoided.

54.There is another formidable reason for conferring rights on

the children to have free and compulsory education in a

“neighbourhood school” and corresponding duties on the

Government and Local Authority to establish the schools in the

neighbourhood and responsibility on the schools to admit at

least 25% students from the weaker sections and disadvantaged

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groups in the “neighbourhood”. The object is to inculcate the

virtue of equality and fraternity among the children in the

formative days.

55.In the case of Dinesh Ashtikar (supra), the Supreme Court

has emphasized the spirit of fraternity which the provision

contained in Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act, has the potential to

promote. The Supreme Court has, in terms, observed that, the

25% inclusion under Section 12 in unaided neighbourhood

schools, is not an isolated welfare measure but a vehicle

through which the constitutional commitment to fraternity and

the “development of the child” as recognized in Articles 21A and

39(f) of the Constitution, is sought to be realized. The

neighbourhood common school system under the RTE Act

envisages that each child must have access to neighbourhood

school and such a system is central to the project of

democratizing the schooling and reducing entrenched social

inequalities.

56.At the same time, very rigid restrictions in the matter of

prescribing the limits or areas which constitute a

neighbourhood may not be sustainable. As noted above, an

element of flexibility must be present in understanding what

constitutes a neighbourhood school. Distance is a relative

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concept. In an era of time-space compression, the distance

ceases to be an absolute inhibiting factor. Time is said to be the

greatest distance between two places. In a metropolis like

Mumbai, the concept of distance becomes even more relative. A

number of variables come into play. The means of transport and

easy accessibility become critical.

57.Keeping the aforesaid legal and social construct in view,

reverting to the facts of the case, it is imperative to note that,

the petitioner had not furnished an incorrect address, nor did

the petitioner suppress any certificate or document which was

required to be submitted alongwith the application. The

petitioner had, however, incorrectly mentioned the aerial

distance between her place of residence and the Respondent

No.2 – school. It could be urged that, lesser distance was

deliberately furnished. However, the Court cannot lose sight of

the fact that, the petitioner had not made any false or incorrect

statement as to her actual residence. The error in furnishing

lesser aerial distance could be inadvertent and bona fide as well.

58.The fact that the petitioner had not given preference to

other schools in the vicinity of her residence, in the considered

view of this Court, cannot be arrayed against her. The petitioner

had selected schools in the order of preference in exercise of

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options given to a parent. In hindsight, it could be urged that,

had the petitioner selected the schools in the vicinity of her

residence she would have got admission for her daughter in any

of those schools, but that cannot be the basis for the

determination of the controversy.

59.The hard facts which emerge are that, the Authorities had

allotted the Respondent No.2 – school for the petitioner’s

daughter in the month of April, 2026. Despite persuasion the

Respondent No.2 did not admit the petitioner’s daughter.

Grievances were made before the Education Officer. An

explanation was called from Respondent No.2 in the month of

July, 2026. Thereupon, the Respondent No. 2 preferred an

appeal before the Education Officer. Admission of two other

students were also withheld by the Respondent No. 2 – school,

on the ground of the distance criteria. By the impugned order,

the Respondent No.1 directed that, those two children be

admitted as the distance between their residence and the school

was within the range of 1 km to 3 kms. The claim of the

petitioner’s daughter was negatived on the ground that, the

distance appeared to be 4 kms. By the time the impugned order

was passed, a period of more than 4 months had elapsed.

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Resultantly, the prospect of securing admission for the

petitioner’s daughter in other schools became bleak.

60.It must be noted that, during the course of hearing of this

petition, the learned AGP was requested to take instructions as

to whether the petitioner’s daughter could be accommodated in

any other private school. Upon instructions, the learned AGP

made a statement that, it was not practicable to accommodate

the petitioner’s daughter in any other private unaided school.

The situation which thus obtains is that, two other children

whose residences were within the range of 3 kms from the

Respondent No. 2 – school, were directed to be admitted in the

said school. The petitioner’s daughter was denied the same

dispensation as the distance appeared to be 4 kms.

61.At this juncture, the consideration emphasized above that,

while construing a “neighbourhood school” with reference to an

area or geographical limit, it cannot be construed in rigid and

pedantic manner, becomes relevant. It would be taking too rigid

and unrealistic view of the matter to hold that, a distance of 100

meters more or less denudes the contagious area the

characteristics of a “neighbourhood”. In the totality of the

circumstances, especially having regard to the situation in a

metropolis like Mumbai, the Respondent No.1 could not have

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applied the barometer of distance i.e. within the range of 3 kms

and beyond 3 kms with exactitude, particularly when, by the

time the decision was taken, the prospect of the petitioner’s

daughter securing admission in any other private unaided

school considerably diminished. The last consideration of the

petitioner’s daughter losing an academic year, in the peculiar

facts of the case, is of critical salience.

62.In these circumstances, this Court is persuaded to

prioritize the rights of the daughter of the petitioner to have free

and compulsory education guaranteed under Article 21A of the

Constitution of India over the considerations of inadvertence on

the part of the authorities of the state in initially allotting the

Respondent No. 2 – school for the petitioner’s daughter, or for

that matter, the error on the part of the petitioner in furnishing

an incorrect aerial distance between the petitioner’s residence

and Respondent No.2 – school.

63.This Court appreciates the submission of Ms. Chavan

that, the Respondent No. 2 insisted for the compliance of the

statutory requirements in declining to admit the petitioner’s

daughter. However, the fact remains that, the immediacy of

purpose was lost by the Respondent No. 2 not reporting to the

authorities its objections immediately and filing the appeal in

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the month of July, 2026. In any event, this Court does not find

that, the admission of petitioner’s daughter in the Respondent

No.2 – school would impede the salutary object of Section 12(1)

(c) of the RTE Act, 2009. Therefore, this Court is inclined to

exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner’s daughter as

that would advance the object of the RTE Act, 2009.

64.Hence, the following order :-

: : O R D E R : :

i) The Writ Petition stands allowed.

ii)The impugned order stands quashed and set aside.

iii)The respondents, including the respondent No. 2 –

School, are directed to take requisite steps to admit the

petitioner’s daughter in the 1

st

standard in Respondent

No. 2 – School, within a period of one week from today.

iv)Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

v) No costs.

[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

ARS/SAINATH 39/39