2023 INSC 939 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11104 of 2014

KESHAV BHAURAO

YEOLE (D) BY LRS. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

MURALIDHAR (D) & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Aravind Kumar, J.

1. The appellants are the legal heirs of original landlord, Keshav

Bhaurao Yeole (hereinafter referred to as “landlord” for ease of

reference). Survey No. 291 (admeasuring 26 acres 13 guntas) and

Survey No. 290/1 & 290/2 (admeasuring 8 acres 21 guntas) had been

given on lease to Respondent Nos. 2 & 5 (now deceased) namely

Murlidhar Damodar Modhave & Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave and

2

Respondent No.1 namely Kundalik Damodar Modhave (now deceased)

respectively, (hereinafter referred to as “tenants”) through two

separate lease deeds dated 30.08.1962, for a period of 13 years. The

lease in respect of Survey No. 291 was specifically executed for

cultivation of sugarcane crop, whereas the lease for Survey No.290/1

& 290/2 were for cultivation, generally.

2. On the expiration of the tenure of the lease, a notice (dated

05.09.1975) for termination of tenancy (hereinafter referred to as

‘notice’) had been issued to the tenants. The landlord sought to recover

possession for the purpose of personal cultivation. It was stated in the

notice that the tenanted land was the principal source of income for the

family and that their livelihood was dependent on the cultivation of

such lands. It is critical to note at the very outset that the notice

pertained to land bearing Survey No.291 only and no separate notice of

termination of tenancy was issued in respect of land bearing Survey

No. 290/1 & 290/2.

3. Since the tenant did not voluntarily relinquish his possession in

response to the notice, the landlord initiated proceedings

1

for

1

Tenancy Case No. 2/1977

3

resumption of tenanted lands before the Court of Tenancy Awal

Karkun, Rahuri (hereinafter referred to as ‘original authority’) under

Section 29 read with Section 43A(1)(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and

Agricultural Lands Act, 1948

2

. (for short ‘the Act’). Through these

proceedings, the landlord had sought to recover possession of lands

leased under both lease deeds, that is, Survey No. 291 and Survey No.

290/1 & 290/2.

4. In order to decide the lis, the original authority had framed

four issues for consideration. The issues framed and summary of

findings in respect of each issue are tabulated hereinbelow for ease of

reference:

Issues Findings

1. Whether the applicant is the

landlord of the suit land?

Yes, suit lands were owned by

applicant.

2. Whether the opponents are the

tenants of the suit land?

Only Opponents no. 1,2,5 are tenants

of the land in dispute; no evidence led

to prove that there was a partition in the

joint family of the tenants

3. Whether the notices for

termination of tenancy are served

upon the opponents and are valid

one?

Yes, notice for termination of tenancy

had been served on Opponents no.

1,2,3 on 24.10.75, 24.9.75 and 30.9.75

respectively and notice is a valid notice

4. Whether the landlord requires the

suit lands?

Yes, landlord has proved that he

requires land for bonafide personal

cultivation

2

The Act has since been renamed as the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands

Act, 1948 by Maharashtra Act 24 of 2012

4

5. Ultimately, the original authority allowed the application of the

landlord

3

and directed that 22 acres of the suit lands

4

(33 acres 21

guntas) was to be restored to him. The direction for restoration of 22

acres of the suit land was on the premise that the applicant (landlord)

was ‘entitled for possession of so much of land as would result in both

the landlord and tenants holding thereafter in the total and equal area

for personal cultivation’. The reasoning of the original authority in this

regard is extracted below:

“The lands held by the opponents individually are measuring

(23 ac. 29 gts. 9H. 83 R.) The land held by applicant is 13A

11 Gts. The applicant is entitled for possession of so much

of the land as would result in both the landlord and tenants

holding thereafter in the total and equal area for personal

cultivation. The area of the land in dispute is 33 A 21 gts. I,

therefore, order that 22 A 00 gts. Twenty two acres of the

land out of the land in dispute should be restored to the

landlord i.e., applicant. I further order that the possession of

the land may be given to the applicant, not earlier than sixty

days after the close of the year.”

6. Both the landlord and the tenant preferred appeals against the

order of the original authority. The appeals were filed in the Court of

Assistant Collector, Rahuri Division, Ahmednagar (hereinafter referred

to as, ‘the appellate authority’). The landlord preferred an appeal

5

on

3

Order dated 17.04.1978 in Tenancy Case No.2/77

4

Sum total of land bearing Survey No. 291 and Survey No. 290/1& 290/2

5

TNC A. No. 32/78

5

the ground that the possession had not been granted in respect of the

entire suit land. The tenant, on the other hand, had sought for

interference

6

on the ground that notice for termination of tenancy was

invalid and that the landlord did not require the lands for bonafide

personal cultivation as he was already in possession of a substantial

extent of revenue-bearing lands.

7. The appellate authority, vide a common judgment dated

21.11.78, upheld the findings of the original authority but modified the

extent of land, which was to be restored to the landlord. It held that the

landlord was entitled to possession of 17 acres 17 guntas of the suit

land. The appellate authority notes that the original authority’s direction

for restoration of 22 acres of suit land proceeded on a misinterpretation

of Section 31B of the Act.

8. Against the decision of the appellate authority, the landlord and

the tenant filed revision applications

before Member of the

Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune (for short, the ‘revisional

authority’). It was contended on behalf of the tenant

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that the notice

was issued only in respect of Survey No. 291 and that there was no

6

TNC A. 24/78

7

Revision No.7/79

6

separate notice in respect of Survey No.290/1 & 290/2. It was further

argued that the original authority ought to have framed an issue as to

whether the subject in dispute was to be governed by notification dated

14.2.1958 or the notification as amended on 08.10.1969

(for short ‘amended notification’) – the extent of land which could be

ordered to be resumed was dependent on the relevant notification

which applied, and therefore, in the absence of any finding on this

question, both the authorities fell into grave error in their determination

of the final outcome. Accordingly, it was prayed that the case be

remanded back to the original authority for framing of an appropriate

issue on the relevant notification applicable. On behalf of the landlord

8

,

it was urged that there was no justification for remand since the

question sought to be decided was a question of law and the revisional

authority could, by itself, decide this issue.

9. Upon examination of the contentions urged by both the sides,

the revisional authority allowed the application filed on behalf of the

tenant, dismissed the application of the landlord and accordingly,

ordered that the case be remanded to the original authority ‘for framing

8

Revision No.3/79

7

issues under the provisions of Section 31A to 31D of the Tenancy Act,

1948 in respect of Survey No. 291 only’. The original authority was

directed to give its finding on the said issue.

10. The order of the revisional authority was based on the following

reasons. The revisional authority found that the notice was issued only

in respect of Survey No. 291 and therefore, the application of the

landlord for restoration of possession of lands bearing Survey No.

290/1 & 290/2 could not have been entertained by the original

authority. In the absence of a valid notice, the original authority lacked

jurisdiction to entertain the landlord’s application for resumption of

land. It found that the landlord’s holding is more than one unit of

economic holding and therefore, he is not entitled to application of

beneficial provisions as provided in the amended notification dated

08/10/969. It was also noticed that the outcome of the dispute was

directly linked to the question of the relevant notification applicable,

that is, whether the original notification or the amended notification

governed the facts in issue, and therefore, a clear finding on that

question was most expedient.

8

11. The landlord challenged the order passed by the revisional

authority in writ proceedings before the High Court of Judicature of

Bombay. During the pendency of writ proceedings, both, the original

landlord as well as original Respondent Nos.2 & 5 namely, Murlidhar

Damodar Modhave & Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave, expired. Their

legal heirs were brought on record through applications for

substitution. The High Court set aside all orders passed by the

authorities below and ordered for remand of the case before the original

authority. However, the reasons which persuaded the High Court to

order remand were completely different from that which motivated the

revisional authority to do. So it was directed that the original authority

shall consider the matter afresh and examine if the heirs of the landlord

had any bonafide requirement for personal cultivation in light of the

changed circumstances (death of landlord). In ordering so, the High

Court relied on Maruti Namdeo Gade v. Dattatraya Maval

9

and Hariba

Keshav Barbole v. Motibhai Deepchand.

10

It was held therein that if

landlord had died pending eviction proceedings, the bonafide

requirement of lands for personal cultivation had to be demonstrated

and proved afresh by the heirs of the landlord.

9

(1976) 78 Bom LR 602.

10

AIR 1975 Bom 137

9

12. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 29.07.2005,

the landlord filed a special leave petition before this Court. Leave to

appeal was granted by Order dated 9.12.2014.

13. We have heard Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel for

the appellant-landlord and Mr. Ravinder Keshavrao Adsure, learned

counsel for the respondents.

14. The submissions of Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel

for the appellant-landlord can be summarized in the following points:

• The High Court fell into error in relying on the decisions in

the case of Maruti Namdeo Gade(supra) and Hariba Keshav Barbole

(supra). The date for determining the bonafides of the requirement of

lands for personal cultivation ought to have been determined as on

date of filing the application and subsequent events thereon, like

death of the landlord, ought not to have any bearing on the decision

of the dispute.

• Both the original authority and the appellate authority had

recorded a finding that the landlord’s holding does not exceed one

economic holding. In that context, the revisional authority went beyond

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its jurisdictional boundaries in disturbing the said finding and holding

that the landlord’s holding exceeds one unit of economic holding.

• Even though the land leased in respect of Survey No. 290/1 &

290/2 are not for sugarcane cultivation, while determining the extent of

land to be resumed to the landlord as per Section 33B(5)(b), the original

authority is required to consider the total holding of both the landlord

and the tenant.

15. The learned counsel for the respondent-tenant has supported the

impugned order and has canvassed the following contentions:

• The notice for termination of tenancy dated 05.09.1975 having

been issued only in respect of land bearing Survey No. 291, the scope

of adjudication of this dispute must be limited to such land, as has been

rightly noticed by the revisional authority.

• The High Court and the revisional authority were justified in

remanding the case to the original authority since the facts necessary

to decide whether the landlord’s holding was in excess of one unit of

economic holding, was not forthcoming from the evidence on record.

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• The landlord held several other lands other than lands leased to

the tenant, and was earning income through non-agricultural sources,

which fact can be inquired into only on remand of the case. The

holding of the landlord was clearly in excess of one economic unit,

and therefore, Section 31A-31D has to be applied. Since the original

authority has not framed any issue in this regard, it was essential that

the case be remanded back for fresh determination.

16. Undisputedly, the notice for termination of tenancy has been

issued only in respect of Survey No. 291 and it did not relate to Survey

No.290/1 & 290/2. In fact, we have perused the original records and

the original notice dated 05.09.1975 and are satisfied that termination

notice has been issued only in respect of Survey No.291 and there is

not even a whisper with regard to Survey No.290/1 & 290/2 in the

notice dated 05.09.1975. This fact had been rightly noticed in the order

of the revisional authority. Therefore, we shall proceed to consider the

dispute only in so far as Survey No. 291 is concerned.

17. Having considered the rival submissions canvassed by both sides

and the material on record, the following issue falls for consideration:

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“Whether the holding of the landlord exceeds one

economic holding and whether the landlord earns

his livelihood principally by agriculture or by

agricultural labour?”

18. To adjudicate the above issues, it becomes necessary to examine

the relevant provisions and notifications issued under the provisions of

the Act. The relevant provisions of the Act include Section 2(2D),

Section 2(6A), Section 4B, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 29,

Section 31, Section 31A, Section 31B, Section 33B, Section 43A. It

would be of benefit to consider the notification issued by the State

Government in exercise of powers under Section 43A (3) on

14.02.1958 and the amendment brought out to this notification on

08.10.1969 which has been relied upon by the appellant and which has

a direct bearing on the issue. Hence, the relevant provisions as well as

the notification are extracted hereinbelow:

AMENDED NOTIFICATION DATED 08/10/1969

“Lease of land granted for cultivation of sugarcane or the

growing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of livestock

referred to in Sec. 43-A (1)(b) to which the provisions of

Sec. 43A (1) apply.

Sec. 43A (3) of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948.- No. T N

C.5157/173483- M. in exercise of the powers conferred by

sub-section (30 of sec. 43-A, of the Bombay Tenancy and

Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVII of 1948), the

Government of Bombay hereby directs that the leases

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referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said sec.

43A and to which the provisions of sub-section (1) of the

said sec. 43A and to which the provisions of sub-section (1)

of said sec. 43-A apply shall be subject to the following

conditions namely:-

Conditions as to the duration and termination of lease:-

“1. No such lease of land shall be liable to be

terminated on the ground that the period fixed by agreement

or usage for its duration has expired.

2. If a lessor bona fide requires an land so leased by

him for cultivating it personally or for any non-agricultural

use, such lease may, subject to the conditions mentioned in

Secs. 31-A, 31-B, 31-C and 31-D be terminated by the lessor

by giving the lessee [a month’s] notice in writing stating

therein the reasons for the termination of the lease:

[Provided that, if the holding of lessor does not exceed one

economic holding and such lessor earns his livelihood

principally by agriculture or by agricultural labour, the

conditions mentioned in sec. 31-A and 31-B shall not apply

but the lessor’s right to resume land shall be subject to the

conditions mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section

(5) of sec. 33-B, with this modification that clause (c) of the

said sub-section (5) shall be read as if for the words “the

commencement date” appearing therein the words, letters,

figures and brackets “the date Government Notification,

Revenue and Forests Department, No. TNC. 6769/9667-M,

Spl. Dated the 8

th

October, 1969” were substituted.]

1. Submitted for the words “one year” by G.N. No. TNC

6796/9667 (Spl.) of 8.10.69.

2. Added by G.N. of 1.10.1969.”

Relevant provisions of Tenancy Act, 1948

“Section 2(2D) - “ceiling area” means in relation to land

held by a person whether as an owner or tenant or partly as

owner and partly as tenant the area of land fixed as ceiling

area under section 5 or 7;

Section 2(6A) - “economic holding” means in relation to

land held by a person, whether as an owner or tenant, or

partly as owner and partly as tenant, the area of land fixed as

an economic holding in section 6 or 7;

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Section 5 - Ceiling area

(1) For the purposes of this Act, the ceiling area of lands

shall be,––

(a) 48 acres of jirayat land, or

(b) 24 acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice

land, or

(c) 12 acres of perennially irrigated land.

(1) Where the land held by a person consists of two or more

kinds of land specified in sub-section (1), the ceiling area of

such holding shall be determined on the basis of one acre of

perennially irrigated land being equal to two acres of

seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice land, or four acres

of jirayat land.

Explanation.–– In calculating the ceiling area, warkas land

shall be excluded.

Section 6 - Economic holding

(1) For the purposes of this Act, an economic holding shall

be,––

(a) 16 acres of jirayat land, or

(b) 8 acres of seasonally irrigated land, or paddy or rice

land, or

(c) 4 acres of perennially irrigated land.

(1) Where the land held by a person consists of two or more

kinds of land specified in sub-section (1), an economic

holding shall be determined on the basis applicable to the

ceiling area under sub-section (2) of section 5.

Explanation.–– In calculating an economic holding, warkas

land shall be excluded.

Section 31 - Landlord’s right to terminate tenancy for

personal cultivation and non- agricultural purpose

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 and

30 but subject to sections 31A to 31D (both inclusive), a

landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter

III-AA) may, after giving notice and making an application

for possession as provided in sub-section (2), terminate the

tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the

landlord bona-fide requires the land for any of the following

purposes :––

(a) for cultivating personally, or

(b) for any non-agricultural purpose.

(1) The notice required to be given under sub-section (1)

shall be in writing, shall state the purpose for which the

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landlord requires the land and shall be served on the tenant

on or before the 31st day of December 1956. A copy of such

notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the Mamlatdar. An

application for possession under section 29 shall be made to

the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957.

(2) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person

subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may

be given and an application for possession under section 29

may be made,––

(i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he

attains majority;

(ii) by the succesor-in-title of a widow within one year from

the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;

(iii) within one year from the date on which mental or

physical disability ceases to exist; and

Provided that where a person of such category is a member

of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not

apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the

categories mentioned in the sub-section unless before the

31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint

family has been separated by metes and bounds and the

Mamlatdar on inquiry, is satisfied that the share of such

person in the land is separated having regard to the area,

assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same

proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint

family property, and not in a large proportion.

Section 31A - Conditions of termination of tenancy

The right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy for cultivating

the land personally under section 31 shall be subject to the

following conditions :––

(a) If the landlord at the date on which the notice is given

and on the date on which it expires has no other land of his

own or has not been cultivating personally any other land, he

shall be entitled to take possession of the land leased to the

extent of a ceiling area.

(b) If the land cultivated by him personally is less than a

ceiling area, the landlord shall be entitled to take possession

of so much area of the land leased as will be sufficient to

make up the area in his possession to the extent of a ceiling

area.

(c) The income by the cultivation of the land of which he is

entitled to take possession is the principal source of income

for his maintenance.

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(d) The land leased stands in the record of rights or in any

public record or similar revenue record on the 1st day of

January 1952 and thereafter during the period between the

said date and the appointed day in the name of the landlord

himself, or of any of his ancestors 2[but not of any person

from whom title is derived, whether by assignment or Court

sale or otherwise], or if the landlord is a member of a joint

family, in the name of a member of such family.

(e) If more tenancies than one are held under the same

landlord, then the landlord shall be competent to terminate

only the tenancy or tenancies which are the shortest in point

of duration.

Section 31B - No termination of tenancy in contravention

of Bom. LXII of 1947 or if tenant is member of co-

orperative farming society

In no case a tenancy shall be terminated under section 31––

(1) in such manner as will result in leaving with a tenant,

after termination, less than half the area of the land leased to

him, or

(2) in such a manner as will result in a contravention of the

provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and

Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, or in making any part

of the land leased a fragment within the meaning of that Act,

or co-operative farming society.

(3) if the tenant has become a member of a co-operative

farming society and so long as he continues to be such

member.

Section 31C - Landlord not entitled to terminate tenancy

for personal cultivation of land left with tenant

The tenancy of any land left with the tenant after the

termination of the tenancy under section 31 shall not at any

time afterwards be liable to termination again on the ground

that the landlord bona fide requires that land for personal

cultivation.

Section 31D - Apportionment of rent after termination of

tenancy for land left with tenant

If, in consequence of the termination of the tenancy under

section 31, any part of the land leased is left with the tenant,

the rent shall be apportioned in the prescribed manner in

proportion to the area of the land left with the tenant.

Section 33B - Special rights of certificated landlord to

terminate tenancy for personal cultivation

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(1) xxx

(2) xxx

(3) xxx

(4) xxx

(5) The right of a certificated landlord to terminate a tenancy

under this section shall be subject to the following

conditions, that is to say,––

(a) If any land is left over from a tenancy in respect of

which other land has already been resumed by the landlord

or his predecessor-in-title, on the ground that other land was

required for cultivating it personally under section 31 (or

under any earlier law relating to tenancies then in force), the

tenancy in respect of any land so left over shall not be liable

to be terminated under sub-section (1).

(b) The landlord shall be entitled to terminate a tenancy and

take possession of the land leased but to the extent only of

so much thereof as would result in both the landlord and the

tenant holding thereafter in the total an equal area for

personal cultivation––the area resumed or the area left with

the tenant being a fragment, notwithstanding, and

notwithstanding anything contained in section 31 of the

Bombay Preventation of Fragmentation and Consolidation

of Holdings Act, 1947.

(c) The land leased stands in the Record of Rights (or in any

public record or similar revenue record) on the 1st day of

January 1952 and thereafter until the commencement date in

the name of the landlord himself, of any of his ancestors (but

not of any person from whom title is derived by assignment

or Court sale or otherwise), or if the landlord is a member of

a joint family, in the name of a member of such family.

(6) xxx

(7) xxx

Section 43A - Some of the provisions not to apply to

leases of land obtained by industrial or commercial

undertakings, certain co-operative societies or for

cultivations of sugar- cane or fruits or flowers

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(1) The provisions of sections 4B, 8, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C, 10,

10A, 14, 16, 17, 17A, 17B, 18, 27, 31 to 31D (both

inclusive), 32 to 32R, (both inclusive) [33A, 33B, 33C] 43,

63, 63A, 64 and 65, shall not apply to––

(a) land leased to or held by any industrial or commercial

undertaking (other than a Co-operative Society) which in the

opinion of the State Government bona fide carried on any

industrial or commercial operations and which is approved

by the State Government;

(b) leases of land granted to any bodies or persons other

than those mentioned in clause (a) for the cultivation of

sugarcane or the growing of fruits or flowers or for the

breeding of livestock;

(c) to lands held or leased by such co-operative societies as

are approved in the prescribed manner by the State

Government which have for their objects the improvement

of the economic and social conditions of peasants or

ensuring the full and efficient use of land for agriculture and

allied pursuits.

(2) xxx

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1)

and (2), it shall be lawful for the State Government to direct,

by notification in the Official Gazette that the leases or lands,

as the case may be, to which the provisions of sub-sections

(1) and (2) apply, shall be subject to such conditions as may

be specified in the notification, in respect of––

(a) the duration of the lease;

(b) the improvements to be made on the land and the

formation of co-operative farming societies for that purpose

and financial assistance to such societies;

(c) the payment of land revenue, irrigation cess, local-fund

cess and any other charges payable to the State Government

or any local authority; or

(d) any other matter referred to in sections mentioned in

sub-section (1).”

19. Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 43A would indicate that

lease of land granted for the cultivation of sugarcane would result in the

exemption of the provisions indicated in sub-Section (1) of Section

43A. In other words, the provisions indicated in sub-Section (1) of 43A

19

is not attracted in respect of the leases of land granted for the cultivation

of sugarcane or the leases of land as specified in Chapter IIIA. The

legislature in its wisdom, has thought it fit to make an exception to the

exemption clause as incorporated in sub-Section (3) of Section 43A(3).

It enables the State Government to issue a notification providing for

conditions, subject to which, the leases referred to in Chapter IIIA

would be governed by. Therefore, it is crucial for us to examine the

notification dated 14.02.1958 as amended on 08.10.1969, which came

to be issued by the State Government under the enabling source of

power provided in Section 43A(3). In this regard, we must examine the

applicability of the proviso to condition No.2 stipulated thereunder

which came to be introduced through the amendment in the year 1969.

20. According to the aforesaid proviso, if the holding of the landlord

does not exceed one economic holding and the landlord’s principal

source of income is dependent on agriculture or agricultural labor, then,

it follows, as per the amended notification, that the conditions

mentioned in Section 31A & 31B shall not govern the present dispute

and the lessor’s right to resume land shall be subject to conditions set

out in Section 33B(5)(b) and (c). If the holding of the landlord exceeds

one economic holding or his principal source of income is not

20

dependent on agriculture, then, Section 31A-31D will govern the

present dispute.

21. The fact finding authorities have concluded that the landlord

holds 13 acres of jirayat land, apart from the land leased out to the

tenant under the two lease deeds. The definition of ‘economic holding’

in Section 2(6A) requires us to account for the total land held by a

person, whether as an owner or tenant. There is no definition in the Act

for the expression ‘land held’. However, we find the expression ‘to

hold land’ defined in the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for

short ‘the Code’). It reads as under:

“to hold land” or “to be a land-holder or holder of land”

means to be lawfully in possession of land, whether such

possession is actual or not.”

22. In Bhavani Housing Cooperative Society v. Bangalore

Development Authority, ILR 2006 KAR 1352, the Karnataka High

Court while considering the question as to whether the definition of a

particular phrase can be imported into a particular enactment from a

different enactment, has held that if the Acts are pari materia to each

other, then the definition of one Act can be imported to the other Act.

The preamble in the Code suggests that the object of the enactment was

‘to unify and amend the law relating to land and land revenue in the

21

State of Maharashtra.’ The Act, on the other hand, was brought in with

the object of amending ‘the law relating to tenancies of agricultural

lands and to make certain other provisions in regard to those lands’.

Under several provisions of the Act, reference is required to be made to

the Code. In that sense, the provisions contained in the Act and the Code

operate in an overlapping sphere and fertilize each other. The words

used in the Code and the expressions appearing under the Act, when

read harmoniously, it would indicate that the expressions in both the

enactments are complementary and supplementory to each other.

Therefore, it would not be incorrect to say that the Act and Code are in

pari materia to each other, and therefore, we proceed to import the

definition of ‘to hold land’ from the Code and import it for the purpose

of interpreting the phrase, ‘economic holding’ in the Act.

22A. When Section 2(6A) of the Act and Section 2 (12) of the Code

are read together, the economic holding of a person would be computed

by taking account of the lands possessed (whether actual or not) by

such person, whether as owner or tenant. In the facts of this case, the

landlord has claimed that, as an owner, he held 13 acres of jirayat land.

22

23. The tenant has not led any evidence to show that the landlord

holds any land as a tenant. Further, no evidence has been led to

contradict the fact that the landlord holds land as an owner, in excess

of 13 acres of jirayat land. Therefore, we ought to proceed on the

premise that the holding of the landlord is 13 acres of jirayat land. The

revisional authority has misinterpreted the word ‘holding’. In

determining the holding of the landlord, it has taken into account the

land leased to the tenant and has, on that basis, concluded that the

holding of the landlord is in excess of one unit of economic holding.

As we have explained above, only such land which a person holds (is

in possession) as an owner or tenant, must be taken into account. The

land leased to the tenants cannot be said to be held by the landlord either

as an owner, or as a tenant.

24. Section 6 of the Act provides that one unit of economic holding

in the context of jirayat land is equivalent to a holding of 16 acres. It is

thus clear that the holding of the landlord cannot be said to be in excess

of one unit of economic holding. The original authority has recorded a

finding that the landlord’s principal source of income is from

agriculture. This finding has not been disturbed or challenged by the

appellate authority or the revisional authority. Since the twin conditions

23

provided in the proviso as found in the amended notification stand

satisfied, the outcome of the dispute will have to be decided in

accordance with Section 33(B)(5)(b) and not according to Section 31A

and 31B.

25. According to Section 33(B)(5)(b), the landlord’s entitlement to

terminate tenancy and recover possession of land leased is only to the

extent ‘of so much thereof as would result in both the landlord and the

tenant holding thereafter in the total an equal area for personal

cultivation’. The original authority and appellate authority have

disagreed on the extent of land to be resumed to the landlord. In

deciding the extent of land to be restored, the original authority has

applied the provision contained in Section 33(B)(5)(b), whereas the

appellate authority has applied the provision contained in Section 31B.

According to us, the original authority was correct in applying the

provision contained in Section 33B(5)(b) but has fallen into error in its

interpretation and application of the said provision. The appellate

authority could not have applied Section 31B since the application of

31B stands excluded by Section 43A and the amended notification, as

we have discussed above. Now, the question still remains as to how

much land must be restored to the landlord. This question will turn on

24

the interpretation to be laid on the language contained in Section

33(B)(5)(b) and the construction of expression : ‘in the total an equal

area for personal cultivation’?

26. The tenant may hold land for personal cultivation from three

sources: (a) land which he himself owns; (b) land which is let out to

him by his landlord or (c) land which is let out to him by another

landlord or another certificated landlord. Similarly, the landlord can

hold land from two sources. He may hold land which he himself owns

and land which is let out to him by another landlord (land held as a

tenant). While computing the lands held by the landlord and tenant, are

we to take into account the lands held by them from all possible

sources? The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to

interpret the provision contained in Section 33B(5)(b) of the Act in

great detail, in the case of Devidas Narayan More v. Chunnilal Bhailal

Wani.

11

It came to be held as under:

“32. Next it was urged that upon the interpretation which

we are putting and which was placed upon cl. (b) of sub-s.

(5) by the Division Bench in Rambhau's case it would be

impossible to apply the principle in the case of joint tenants

or joint landlords, as for instance where A the landlord has

leased out jointly to tenants B, C and D six acres of his land;

the landlord has no land under personal cultivation, but

tenant B has 4 acres of his own, tenant C has 4 acres of his

own but tenant D has no other land except the land leased.

11

AIR 1973 Bom 195

25

In such a case how was equality going to be achieved

between the landlord and the joint tenants? We must confess

that the law did not contemplate such a case at all but its

injunction nonetheless is quite clear that the tenancies must

be terminated, the landlord and “the tenant holding thereafter

in the total an equal area for personal cultivation”. The only

way in which equality can be achieved in such cases is to

notionally divide the land leased between the three joint

tenants and assume that 2 acres have been leased to each

tenant by the landlord and then work out the equities

between the landlord and each tenant. Thus it will have to be

held that notionally tenants B, C and D each has 2 acres of

the leased land. Thus tenant B will have 2 acres of leased

land plus 4 acres of his own; tenant C the same and tenant D

only two acres of the leased land. From B and C the landlord

cannot take back anything more than the land leased so they

must each give up two acres of the leased land. Tenant C has

no other land except the leased land. Therefore he must give

half his share of the land leased i.e. half of two acres viz. one

acre only and retain the remaining one acre. Thus tenants B

and C who have each 4 acres of their own will each have to

give up 2 acres of the land leased and tenant D half of his

two acres i.e. one acre. Thus, the landlord will be entitled to

get back 5 acres out of the land leased while tenants B and C

will have left 4 acres each and tenant D only one acre. Any

other computation will bring about greater inequity. In the

example given the tenancies of B and C would in the sequel

be wholly terminated. If the total land leased as a whole and

the total land in the possession of the joint tenants is taken

into account without the notional division which we have

suggested then the total land in the possession of the joint

tenants would be 6 acres of leased land plus 8 acres of their

own and if the landlord is held to be entitled to resume on

the basis of the total land thus held he would resume the

whole six acres leased by him but in that event the tenant D

would be left entirely without any land. This would work

greater hardship on the poorer tenant.”

27. From the evidence on record, we know that the landlord has 13

acres of jirayat land, which he holds as owner. The tenants in Survey

No. 291 were Mr. Murlidhar Damodhar Modhe and Mr. Bhausaheb

26

Damodar Modhe. The tenant in Survey No.290/1 & 290/2 was one, Mr.

Kundalik Damodar Modhe.

28. Having regard to the aforesaid analysis of law, we are of the

considered view that this litigation is pending for nearly 50 years and

as such relegating the parties to the authorities would only add salt to

the wound or acrimony between the parties would continue to haunt the

future generations and as such we have undertaken the exercise of

applying the formula prescribed under Section 33B(5)(b) as illustrated

in Chunnilal Bhailal Wani case (supra) of the Act to allocate the

respective shares of the parties on the basis of not only admission found

from the depositions recorded at the earliest point of time but also on

the revenue records which has been relied upon by the authorities for

undertaking such exercise and as such we have arrived at the following

entitlement of property by tabulating the same and the description of

entitlement has also been narrated in the foot-note to the table.

27

(In Acres)

A B C E

Name Land leased

under registered

lease deed

Dated

30/08/1962

(total extent 26

Acres 13

Guntas)

Notional Share

as per Chunnilal

Bhailal Wani

case

Land owned

by Tenant

(As per

revenue

records

available at

page

No.241(A)

and 261(A) )

Land owned

by Landlord

(Keshav

Bhaurao

Yeole)

Land to be

allowed to

Landlord

out of the

Leased

out

portion

Muralidhar

Damodar

Modhave

13.06 11.21 13.11 5.28

Bhausaheb

Damodar

Modhave

13.06 6.17 13.11 3.06

Total Leased out land which is to be restored to landlord 8.34

Method of calculation as per the Full Bench Judgment in Chunnilal

Bhailal Wani Case (supra):

A+B+C = X/2 = Y-C = E

• Murlidhar Damodar Modhave: 13.06+11.21+13.11 = 37.38\2 = 18.39

– 13.11 = 5.28

28

• Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave: 13.06+6.17+13.11 = 32.34\2 = 16.17

– 13.11 = 3.06

As we have already discussed above, the determination has to be

confined only to Survey No.291, in as much as the notice has been held

by revisional authority and High Court to be confined only to Survey

No.291 and the lessees in reference to the said lease, being Shri.

Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave and Murlidhar Damodar Modhave, the

extent of their individual holdings alone would have to be taken into

consideration though, some of the records would reflect the said two

persons holding certain lands jointly with others. Hence, for the

purposes of computation we have confined only to the two revenue

records available in the original file, namely, the account extract of

Form No.8A relating to the year August 1977 since the deposition of

the landlord came to be recorded on 09.06.1977, 20.06.1978 and that

of the respondent on 22.08.1977. When such an exercise is undertaken,

the irresistible conclusion which is to be drawn would be that the

appellant would be entitled to 13 Acres 30 Guntas as computed above

which is in tune with principles enunciated in the full Bench Judgement

of Bombay High Court in Devidas Narayan More (supra).

29

29. We do not think that the High Court was correct in remanding

the case, in its entirety to the original authority on the ground that the

landlord having died pending eviction proceedings, his heirs had to

demonstrate afresh, the bonafide requirement of leased lands for

personal cultivation. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava

12

, this

Court, while considering an eviction petition filed by the landlord

against his tenant, laid down the principle that the crucial date for

deciding the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of

his application for eviction. Events occurring subsequent to this date

have no bearing on the issue as to whether the eviction was a bona fide

requirement. It was reasoned therein that if every subsequent

development was to be accounted for in the post-petition period, there

would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in the

litigative slow-process system subsists. Therefore, the High Court fell

into grave error in ordering remand of the case by considering, events

which occurred subsequent to the date of filing of the petition.

30. We may also record here that it was unnecessary for the

revisional authority to remand the case for framing an issue on the

12

2001 2 SCC 604; See also Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, 2004 5 SCC 772,

Para 10

30

applicability of Section 31A-31D. The applicability of those provisions

was dependent on the question of whether the landlord’s holding

exceeded one unit of economic holding. That question was merely one

of law, the fact of the landlord’s holding having already come on record

before the original authority. The revisional authority could have taken

upon itself the task of deciding the question and disposing off the

dispute before itself. Be that as it may.

31. In light of the discussion and analysis made above, we allow

this appeal by setting aside the impugned order dated 29.07.2005

passed in Writ Petition No.2193 of 1981 (Bombay) by the High

court of Judicature of Bombay and the application filed by the

original landlord under Section 43A of the Bombay Tenancy and

Agricultural Lands Act, 1956 is allowed in part and hold that

appellants (legal heirs of original landlord) are entitled to 8.34 Acres in

Survey No.291 and the jurisdictional tehsildar shall take steps to

handover physical possession of the said land to the appellants as

indicated herein expeditiously and at any rate within an outer limit

of three months from the date of receipt of this Order. All

pending IAs stand disposed of. The appellants would be entitled

to proceed against the respondents in respect of Survey No.290/1 and

31

290/2 in accordance with law and contentions of both parties are kept

open. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs.

……………………….J.

(S. Ravindra Bhat)

……………………….J.

(Aravind Kumar)

New Delhi,

October 19, 2023