IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR

&

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

FRIDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2020 / 22ND JYAISHTA, 1942

WA.No.738 OF 2020

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 30010/2019(A) OF HIGH COURT OF

KERALA

APPELLANT/PETITIONER IN WPC :

K.G.PURUSHOTHAMAN,

S/O GOVINDAN, AGED 51 YEARS,

(GENERAL SECRETARY KERALA CONGRESS (JACOB)),

KONNAMPARABIL HOUSE, MEEPARA P.O.,

PUTHENCRUZ (VIA), ERNAKULAM DISTRICT - 682 038.

BY ADVS.

SRI.PAUL K.VARGHESE

SRI.K.P.S.JALALUDDEEN MOHMMED

RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS IN WPC :

1 STATE OF KERALA,

REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY,

LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION,

GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,

THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.

2 THE SECRETARY,

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT,

GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,

THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.

3 THE ASSISTANT ENGINEER,

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT (ROAD SECTION OFFICER),

THRIPUPNITHURA - 682 301.

4 THRIPUNITHURA MUNICIPALITY,

MUNICIPALITY BUILDING, THRIPUNITHURA,

REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY - 682 301.

W.A.No.738 of 2020

2

5 THE SECRETARY,

THRIPUNITHURA MUNICIPALITY, MUNICIPALITY

BUILDING, THRIPUNITHURA - 682 301.

6 THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER,

HEALTH DEPARTMENT,

THRIPUNITHURA MUNICIPALITY - 682 301.

7 THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER,

REVENUE DEPARTMENT,

THRIPUNITHURA MUNICIPALITY - 682 301.

SR GP SURIN GEORGE IPE FOR R1 TO R3,

SRI.C.V.MANUVILSAN, SC FOR R4 TO R7

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON

12.06.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE

FOLLOWING:

W.A.No.738 of 2020

3

“C.R.”

JUDGMENT

Dated this the 12

th

day of June, 2020

S.Manikumar, C.J.

Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 11.12.2019 in W.P.

(C)No.30010 of 2019, instant writ appeal is filed. Short facts leading to

the writ petition are as hereunder:

The petitioner/appellant is conducting a small textile shop by name

“Pavithra Garments” near to Tripunithura Sree Poornathrayeesha Temple

for the last few years. Tripunithura area is a thickly populated one and

one of the busiest city in Ernakulam District. The peculiar feature of

Tripunithura, especially town area, is that the public roads therein are

very narrow one, resulting in heavy crowd and has no capacity to

accommodate the vehicles and the people coming there. The town area

in Tripunithura is owned by the Public Works Department. The Public

Works Department has provided small footpath on either side of the road

for the use of the pedestrians. It is learnt by the petitioner that the

respondent Municipality is intending to give the public roads, footpaths,

etc. for rent for doing street vending business. If any of the public roads

and footpaths in the area are given on rent, the traffic block in that area

will be unpredictable and the pedestrian has no other means even to

W.A.No.738 of 2020

4

walk. If the public roads and footpaths are given on rent by the

Municipality, the shop owners and their respective customers have no

means to enter into the shop rooms from the public road. Hence, the

petitioner/appellant has filed the writ petition for the following relief:

“i. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or

any direction commanding the respondents not to give the

public roads and the footpaths under their limits for rent to

anybody for doing street vending business.”

2. The writ court, after considering the pleadings and the material

on record, closed the writ petition by observing thus:

“3. I have considered the afore submissions and am

certainly of the view that the declarations of this Court in

Vasanth Nagar Allottees' Association (supra) covers the field and

that the Municipality will have to abide by the directions therein.

That said, since it is asserted before me by the Municipality -

and which is not controverted by the petitioner - that even

during the festival time, the area in front of his business had not

been obstructed or occupied by any other person, I am certainly

of the view that this writ petition has now become purely

academic in nature, particularly because the said festival is now

over and the allegations made in this writ petition are no longer

relevant.

Resultantly, I close this writ petition, however, leaving full

liberty to the petitioner to approach this Court as and when any

violation is found by him to the declarations of this Court in

Vasanth Nagar Allottees' Association (supra); for which

purpose all contentions impelled by him in this writ petition are

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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left open.

This writ petition is thus closed. ”

Being aggrieved, the instant writ appeal is filed.

3. Though Mr.Paul K.Varghese, learned counsel for the appellant

made submissions on the grounds raised, going through the impugned

judgment, it is amply clear that the Municipality, by filing Ext.R4(B)

photographs, has substantiated the stand before the writ court that the

appellant's shop has not been obstructed in any manner, nor its ingress

and egress impeded on account of the ongoing temple festival. Writ

court has also observed that public road and pavement were not allotted

to the street vendors permanently, but they were allowed to do small

business during temple festival and that the same was also over. That

apart, on consideration of the material on record, writ court has also

found that even during the temple festival time, the area in front of the

appellant's shop was not obstructed or occupied by any other person.

4. Though the learned counsel for the appellant made submissions

relying on the decision of this court in Vasanth Nagar Allottees'

Association v. District Collector (2000 (1) KLT 148), we are not

inclined to interfere with the decision made in the writ petition for the

reason that on facts, the petitioner has projected the case as if he was

an aggrieved person, in allowing street vending to be done, in front of his

W.A.No.738 of 2020

6

shop. On the aspect as to a person can be said to be aggrieved, we

deem it fit to consider few decisions:

“(i) In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar and

Others reported in (1975) 2 SCC 702, while considering Sections 37

and 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

observed thus:

"28. Where a right of appeal to Courts against an

administrative or judicial decision is created by statute the

right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a

person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the

words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the

context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a

person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that

decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is

required to establish that one has been denied or deprived

of something to which one is legally entitled in order to

make one "a person aggrieved." Again a person is

aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The

meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes

given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which

provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights.

The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of

legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the

back ground of statutes which do not deal with property

rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The

role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is

comparable to the role of a guardian in professional

ethics. The words "persons aggrieved" in Sections 37 and

38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be

subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The

test is whether the words "person aggrieved" include "a

person who has a genuine grievance because an order has

been made which pre judicially affects his interests." It

has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council

has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting

the professional conduct and etiquette.

38. The term "lis" is not confined to litigation by

means of a suit in a Court of law. In Butler v. Mountgarret

(1859) 7 HLC 633 at p. 641, it was held that a "suit is not

necessary to constitute lis". It was pointed out there that

"a family controversy capable of being litigated is a lis

mota". In B. Johnson & Company (Builders) v. Minister of

Health (1947) 2 All ER 395 at p. 399 Lord Greene, M.R.

Said:

"Lis implies the conception of an issue joined

between two parties. The decision of a lis...is the decision

of that issue".

57. In the well-known case of Attorney-General of

the Gambia v. Pierr Sarr N. Jie, 1961 AC 617, Lord

Denning observed about the Attorney-General's standing

thus:

"...The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import

and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation.

They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is

interfering in things which do not concern him; but they

do include a person who has a genuine grievance because

an order has been made which prejudicially affects his

interests. Has the Attorney-General a sufficient interest for

this purpose? Their Lordships think that he has. The

Attorney General in a colony represents the Crown as the

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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guardian of the public interest. It is his duty to bring

before the judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor

which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action."

(ii) In Jasbhai Motibhai Deasi v. Roshibi Kumar, Haji

Bashir Ahmed and Others reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671, the

question posed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was as follows:

"Whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding

a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films is entitled to

invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a

"No Objection Certificate', granted under R.6 of the

Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short, the Rules) by the

District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought

up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a

defect of jurisdiction, is the principal question that falls to

be determined in this appeal by special leave."

While considering the expressions "aggrieved person"

and a "stranger" to the list, taking note of a catena of foreign

and Indian decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

12. According to most English decisions, in order to

have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the

petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and in a case

of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled

to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does

not fulfil that character, and is a "stranger", the Court will,

in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save

in very special circumstances. This takes us to the further

question : Who is an "aggrieved person"? And what are

the qualifications requisite for such a status? The

expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to

W.A.No.738 of 2020

9

an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within

the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition.

At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative

manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse,

variable factors such as the content and intent of the

statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific

circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the

petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the

prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have

sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide

construction on the expression "aggrieved person".

However, some general tests have been, devised to

ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category

so as to have the necessary locus standi or 'standing' to

invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

13. We will first take up that line of cases in which an

"aggrieved person" has been held to be one who has a

more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that

of the general public, in seeing that the law is properly

administered. The leading case in this line is 1870 (5) QB

466 Queen v. Justices of Surrey decided as far back as

1870. There, on the application by the highway board the

Justice made certificates that certain portions of three

roads were unnecessary. As a result, it was ordered that

the roads should ceases to be repaired by the parishes.

30. Ex Parte Stott, 1916 (1) KB 7 is another illustration of

a person who had no legal grievance, nor had he sufficient

interest in the matter. A licensing authority under the

Cinematograph Act, 1901, granted to a theatre proprietor

a licence for the exhibition of cinematograph films at his

theatre. The license was subject to the condition that the

W.A.No.738 of 2020

10

licensee should not exhibit any film if he had notice that

the licensing authority objected to it. A firm who had

acquired the sole right of exhibition of a certain film in the

district in which the theatre was situated entered into an

agreement with the licensee. for the exhibition of the film

at his theatre. The licensing authority having given notice

to the licensee that it is objected to the exhibition of the

film, the firm applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up the

notice to be quashed on the ground that the condition

attached to the licence was unreasonable and void, and

that they were aggrieved by the notice as being

destructive of their property. It was held that whether the

condition was unreasonable or not, the applicants were

not persons who were aggrieved by the notice and had no

locus standi to maintain the application.

34. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a

cast iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases

where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an

act or omission of an authority, even though he has no

proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject

matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or

a person who was not a party to the proceedings before

the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in

the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by

this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases

noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.

36. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to

apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily

fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii)

'stranger'; (iii) busybody of meddlesome interloper.

Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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those coming under the first two categories. Such persons

interfere in things which do not concern them. They

masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act

in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no

interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They

indulge in the past time of meddling with the judicial

process either by force of habit or from improper motives.

Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or

cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some

applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking

the wheels of administration. The High Court should do

well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the

threshold.

37. The distinction between the first and second

categories of applicants, though real, is not always well

demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two

concentric zones: a solid central zone of certainty, and a

grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding

centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of

uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are

those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such

applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons

aggrieved". In the grey outer circle the bounds which

separate the first category from the second, intermix,

interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal

direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be

"persons aggrieved".

38. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among

them, some broad tests may be deduced from the

conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and

ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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circumstances of the case, including the statutory context

in which the matter falls to be considered. These are:

Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has

been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in

the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been

prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of

the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has

suffered as legal grievance, a person "against whom a

decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully

deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him

something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?

Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own

beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him

in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to

object and be heard by the authority before it took the

impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in

the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of

jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in

the context of which the scope of the words "person

aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure

designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of

conduct for the community? Or is it a statute, dealing with

private rights of particular individuals?

39. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The

Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not

designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for

the community at large or even a section thereof. They

only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual

to carry on a particular business on his property. In this

context, the expression "person aggrieved" must receive a

strict construction.

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48. It is true that in the ultimate analysis the jurisdiction

under Art.226 is general, and certiorari in particular is

discretionary. But in a country like India where writ

petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand,

many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the

outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this

extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The

broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other well

established self devised rules of practice, such as the

availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the

petitioner etc. can go a long way to help the courts in

weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial

stage with consequent saving of public time and money.

49. While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a

rule, the Court should not interfere at the instance of a

'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances

involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse

impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is

a 'stranger', and not a busybody, then also there are no

exceptional circumstances in the present case which would

justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On

the contrary, the result of the exercise of these

discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be

against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition

in this business which is so essential to raise commercial

morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's

monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all,

it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of

respondents 1 and 2, which they have under Art.19(1)(g)

of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject

to 'reasonable restrictions imposed by law'."

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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(iii) In Thammanna v. K.Veera Reddy and Others

reported in (1980) 4 SCC 62, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as

follows:

"Although the meaning of the expression "person

aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the

statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless, normally

"a 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a

legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been

pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of

something or wrongfully refused him something or

wrongfully affected his title to something." (As Per James

L.J. in Re Sidebothem (1880) 14 Ch.D.458 referred to by

this Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar

[1975] 2 S.C.C. 703 and J.N. Desai v. Roshan Kumar

A.I.R.1976 S.C. 576"

(iv) In P.S.R.Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and

Another [(1980) 3 SCC 141], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as

follows:

14. Having said this, we must emphasise that we are living

in times when many societal pollutants create new

problems of unredressed grievance when the State

becomes the sole repository for initiation of criminal action.

Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic

officials, at other times politicisation of higher functionaries

may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under

Art.136 even though the justice of the lis may well justify

it. While "the criminal law should not be used as a weapon

in person vendettas between private individuals", as Lord

Shawcross (The Times, 26 May 1977, 20) once wrote, in

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the absence of an independent to every citizen, a wider

connotation of the expression 'standing' is necessary for

Art.136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in

which private individuals - not the State alone - may

institute criminal proceedings. The law Reforms

Commission (Australia) in its Discussion Paper No. 4 on

"Access to Courts - I Standing: Public Interest Suits"

wrote :

The general rule, at the present time, is that anyone may

commence proceedings and prosecute in the Magistrate's

court. The argument for retention of that right arises at

either end of the spectrum - the great cases and the

frequent petty cases. The great cases are those touching

government itself - a Watergate or a Poulson. However

independent they may legally be any public official, police

or prosecuting authority, must be subject to some

government supervision and be dependent on government

funds; its officers will inevitably have personal links with

government. They will be part of the "establishment".

There may be cases where a decision not to prosecute a

case having political ramifications will be seen, rightly or

wrongly, as politically motivated. Accepting the possibility

of occasional abuse the Commission sees merit in retaining

some right of a citizen to ventilate such a matter in the

Courts.

Even the English System, as pointed by the Discussion

Paper, permits a private citizen to file an indictment. In our

view, the narrow limits set in Vintage English Law, into the

concept of 'person aggrieved' and 'standing' needs

liberalisation in our democratic situation. In Dabholkar's

case 1975 (2) SCC 702 this Court imparted such a wider

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meaning. The American Supreme Court relaxed the

restrictive attitude towards 'standing' in the famous case of

Baker v. Carr, 1962 (369) US 186. Lord Denning, in the

notable case of the Attorney General of the Gambia v.

Pierra Sarr N'jie, 1961 AC 617 spoke thus:

................ the words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import

and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation.

They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is

interfering in things which do not concern him;"

(v) In Babua Ram and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

reported in (1995) 2 SCC 689, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered

the expression "person aggrieved" and held hereunder:

"In Collins English Dictionary, the word "aggrieved"

has been defined to mean "to ensure unjustly especially by

infringing a person's legal rights". In Webster

Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition at page 28,

aggrieved person is defined to mean "subjected to ill-

treatment, feeling an injury or injustice. Injured, as by legal

decision adversely infringing upon one's rights". In Strouds

Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Ed., Vol. 1, pages 83-84, person

aggrieved means "person injured or damaged in a legal

sense". In Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. at page 65,

aggrieved has been defined to mean "having suffered loss

or injury; damnified; injured", aggrieved person has been

defined to mean:

"One whose legal right is invaded by an act

complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and

adversely affected by a decree or judgment. One whose

right of property may be established or divested. The

word "aggrieved" refers to a substantial grievance, a

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denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or

the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation."

(vi) In Dr. Duryodhan and Others v. Jitendra Kumar

Mishra and Others reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273, the Hon'ble Apex

Court held thus:

18. The constitution of Administrative Tribunals was

necessitated because of large pendency of cases relating to

service matters in various courts in the country. It was

expected that the setting up of Administrative Tribunals to

deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in

not only reducing the burden of the Courts but also provide

to the persons covered by the Tribunals speedy relief in

respect of their grievances. The basic idea as evident from

the various provisions of the Act is that the Tribunal should

quickly redress the grievances in relation to service

matters. The definition of 'service matters' found in S.3(q)

shows that in relation to a person the expression means all

service matters relating to the conditions of his service.

The significance of the word 'his' cannot be ignored. S.3(b)

defines the word 'application' as an application made under

S.19. The latter Section refers to 'person aggrieved'. In

order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application

has to be made and the same can be made only by a

person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter

within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already

seen that the word 'order' has been defined in the

explanation to sub-s.(1) of S.19 so that all matters referred

to in S.3(q) as service matters could be brought before the

Tribunal. If in that context, S.14 and 15 are read, there is

no doubt that a total stranger to the concerned service

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cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public

interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed

to be entertained by the Tribunal the very object of speedy

disposal of service matters would get defeated.

19. Our attention has been drawn to a judgment of the

Orissa Administrative Tribunal in Smt. Amitarani Khuntia v.

State of Orissa 1996 (1) OLR (CSR) - 2. The Tribunal after

considering the provisions of the Act held that a private

citizen or a stranger having no existing right to any post

and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is

not entitled to approach the Tribunal. The following

passage in the judgment is relevant:

"... A reading of the aforesaid provisions would mean that

an application for redressal of grievances could be filed

only by a 'person aggrieved' within the meaning of the Act.

Tribunals are constituted under Art.323A of the Constitution

of India. The above Article empowers the Parliament to

enact law providing for adjudication or trial by

Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with

respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons

appointed to public services and posts in connection with

the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other

authority within the territory of India or under the control

of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned or

controlled by the Government and such law shall specify

the jurisdiction, powers and authority which may be

exercised by each of the said Tribunals. Thus, it follows

that Administrative Tribunals are constituted for

adjudication or trial of the disputes and complaints with

respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons

appointed to public services and posts. Its jurisdiction and

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powers have been well defined in the Act. It does not enjoy

any plenary power."

We agree with the above reasoning.

21. In the result, we answer the first question in the

negative and hold that the Administrative Tribunal

constituted under the Act cannot entertain a public interest

litigation at the instance of a total stranger."

(vii) In Shobha Suresh Jumani v. Appellate Tribunal,

Forfeited Property and Another [(2001) 5 SCC 755], the Hon'ble

Supreme Court took note of a decision in Sidebotham, Re, ex p

Sidebotham (Ch D at p.465) held as follows:

"4. At the time of hearing of this matter, learned

counsel Mr. H.L. Tiku appearing on behalf of the appellant

submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is illegal

and erroneous because "any person aggrieved by an order

of the competent authority" is entitled to file an appeal

under Section 12(4) of the SAFEMA and appellant being

wife of the detenue is an aggrieved person. He also

submitted that the appellant apart from being wife is also

entitled to have charge for maintenance from the

properties which are forfeited and, therefore, she is

'person aggrieved' by the order of the competent

authority.

5. First we would reiterate that the words 'any

aggrieved person' are found in several statues. However,

the meaning of the expression "aggrieved" may vary

according to the context of the enactment in which it

appears and all the circumstances. In Sidebotham, Re, ex

p Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458., it was observed by

James, L.J.:

W.A.No.738 of 2020

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"But the words "person aggrieved" do not really

mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he

might have received if some other order had been made.

A "person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a

legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been

pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of

something or wrongfully refused him something, or

wrongfully affected his title to something".

(viii) In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. The State of

Maharashtra and Others [(2013) 4 SCC 465], the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held as follows:

"9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger

cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless

he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the

category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has

suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the

act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either

for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or

when there is a complaint by the Appellant that there has

been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the

Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially

enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis

of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of

course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a

public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a

person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that

he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The

existence of such right is a condition precedent for

invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in

W.A.No.738 of 2020

21

the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the

relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right.

Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the

exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal

right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of

the Appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such

right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the

same. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (AIR

1952 SC 12); Saghir Ahmad and Anr. v. State of U.P. (AIR

1954 SC 728); Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State

of West Bengal and Ors. (AIR 1962 SC 1044); Rajendra

Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1996 SC 2736);

and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare

Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar and Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 784)

10. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out

of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or

a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The

expression, "person aggrieved" does not include a person

who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a

person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one,

whose right or interest has been adversely affected or

jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home

Insurance Co. of New York AIR 1974 SC 1719; and State

of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1977

SC 1361).

11. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of

Mumbai (AIR 2008 SC 1289), a similar view was taken by

this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not

eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a

person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of

other persons.

W.A.No.738 of 2020

22

12. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P. (AIR 2011

SC 3031), this Court held:

"The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an

elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined

within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive

definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse,

variable factors such as the content and intent of the

statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific

circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of

complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of

the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant."

13. This Court, even as regards the filing of a

habeas corpus petition, has explained that the expression,

'next friend' means a person who is not a total stranger.

Such a petition cannot be filed by one who is a complete

stranger to the person who is in alleged illegal custody.

(Vide: Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and

Ors. AIR (1951 SC 41); Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi

Administration (AIR 1980 SC 1579); Mrs. Neelima

Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 SC 2021);

Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC

280); Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC

284); and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. and Ors. [JT

(2012) 10 SC 393]

14. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts

against entertaining public interest litigation filed by

unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to

abuse the process of the court. The right of effective

access to justice, which has emerged with the new social

rights regime, must be used to serve basic human rights,

which purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a

W.A.No.738 of 2020

23

workable remedy within the framework of the judicial

system must be provided. Whenever any public interest is

invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that

there is in fact, genuine public interest involved. The court

must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no

abuse of the process of court and that, "ordinarily

meddlesome bystanders are not granted a Visa". Many

societal pollutants create new problems of non-redressed

grievances, and the court should make an earnest

endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective

purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. (Vide: P.S.R.

Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Anr. (AIR 1980 SC

856); Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. [(2010) 2 SCC

114]; State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and

Ors. [(2010) 3 SCC 402]; and Amar Singh v. Union of

India and Ors. [(2011) 7 SCC 69])

15. Even as regards the filing of a Public Interest

Litigation, this Court has consistently held that such a

course of action is not permissible so far as service

matters are concerned. (Vide: Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and

Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC

114); Dattaraj Natthuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra

AIR 2005 SC 540; and Neetu v. State of Punjab and Ors.

[AIR 2007 SC 758])

16. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors.

[(2002) 1 SCC 33], this Court considered a similar issue

and observed as under:-

"There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition

that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except

in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus

W.A.No.738 of 2020

24

or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is

the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence

of the legal right of the Petitioner which is alleged to have

been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction

of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The

orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi

of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea

change with the development of constitutional law in our

country and the constitutional Courts have been adopting

a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging

the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds.

----In other words, if the person is found to be not merely

a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or

property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his

not having the locus standi.

(Emphasis added)

17. In view of the above, the law on the said point

can be summarised to the effect that a person who raises

a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury.

Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any

post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the

affairs of others."

.................

23. Thus, from the above it is evident that under

ordinary circumstances, a third person, having no concern

with the case at hand, cannot claim to have any locus -

standi to raise any grievance whatsoever. However, in the

exceptional circumstances as referred to above, if the

actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy,

inarticulation or poverty, are unable to approach the

Court, and a person, who has no personal agenda, or

W.A.No.738 of 2020

25

object, in relation to which, he can grind his own axe,

approaches the Court, then the Court may examine the

issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if his bona

fides are doubted, but the issue raised by him, in the

opinion of the Court, requires consideration, the Court

may proceed suo-motu, in such respect."

5. In view of the uncontroverted specific stand of the Municipality

and giving due consideration to the judgments, we are of the view that

the appellant cannot be said to be an aggrieved person to invoke the

jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for

the reliefs sought for in the writ petition. Accordingly, writ appeal is

dismissed.

Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand closed.

Sd/-

S.Manikumar,

Chief Justice

Sd/-

Shaji P.Chaly

Judge

vpv

/true copy/

P.A. To Judge