2025 INSC 1067

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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._______ OF 2025

(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 8169 OF 2025)

KIRAN …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN & ANR.

…RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

1.1 With the consent of learned counsels for the

parties and upon their joint request, the appeal was taken

up for final hearing today.

2. By way of present appeal, what is called in

question is judgment and order dated 29.04.2025 of the

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High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at

Aurangabad, in Criminal Appeal No.201 of 2025, whereby

the High Court allowed the pre-arrest bail to respondent

No.1 under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, which was refused by the Additional

Sessions Judge, Paranda.

3. FIR No.255/2024 came to be registered by the

appellant-complainant with the Paranda Police Station,

District Dharashiv on 26.11.2024 against accused-

respondent No.1 herein and others in respect of alleged

commission of offenses punishable under Sections 118

(1), 115(1), 189(2), 189(4), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 333, 324(4),

76, 351(3) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

and under Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention

of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

3.1 The relevant and material part of the contents of

the said FIR is extracted below.

“Today on 25.11.2024 at around 11:00 AM, while I and my

mother Mohini were at home, Bahubali Masalkar, a peon

from the Gram Panchayat Office, Kapilapuri, came in front

of my house and started abusing us, asking why we did

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not vote in yesterday's assembly elections as we had

asked. At that time, I tried to tell him that voting was my

only concern, but he abused me and then rushed at me.

At that time, we got into a fight. After that we got into a

fight. After that he left from there.

Then at 11:20 in the morning, my village’s known, namely

Rajkumar Jain, Jaykumar Jain, Bharatesh Awani, Jayghosh

Jain, Kishore Awani, Vaibhav Awani, Nabiraj Awani,

Bahubali Masalkar, Jitendra Wasgadekar, Anil

Wasgadekar, Ranjit Rajkumar Jain, Jagdish Jain, all

residents of Kapilapuri (all Jains), came in front of our

house. At that time, Rajkumar Jain said to me, "Mangtyano,

you have become much arrogant", you are staying in the

village and voting against me, so he hit me on the head

and back with an iron rod." At that time, I fell down. After

that, Kishore Jain and Vaibhav Awani entered my house,

pushed my mother Mohini and aunt Rekha, grabbed the

saree of mother Mohini and pulled it, threatened that

"Mangtyano, you have become arrogant, we will not let

you stay in the village, we will burn your houses," beat

them with an iron rod and even punched them giving

internal injuries. In it, a one-tola gold mangalsutra from

mother Mohini's fortune necklace fell somewhere in the

scuffle. The household utensils were damaged by the

rioters, causing total damage to our household items.

Seeing us being beaten up, my friend Yashwant Bodre

from the village came to the house to resolve the dispute.

Rajkurhar Jain also said to him that you Ramoshi have also

become arrogant, that you voted for someone else in

yesterday's assembly elections without listening to us; so

he beat Yashwant on the left hand and back with an iron

rod in his hand. At that time, some of them had petrol

bottle in their hands and were shouting and threatening

repeatedly that they would burn our houses and not let us

stay in the village. Due to the noise of this commotion,

three of our villagers, Avinash Masgude, Appa Masgude,

Omkar Mane, came to the house and rescued us from the

clutches of these men. After that, when approached to the

Paranda police station to file a complaint, the police

immediately gave us a letter for medical treatment and

sent us to the Paranda Sub-District Hospital for medical

treatment.

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On 25.11,2024 between 11:00 AM to 11.20 AM, the names

of Rajkumar Jain, Jaykumar Jain, Bharatesh Awani,

Jayghosh Jain, Kishore Awani, Vaibhav Awani, Nabiraj

Awani, Bahubali Masalkar, Jitendra Wasgadekar, Anil

Wasgadekar, Ranjeet Rajkumar Jain, Jagdish Jain, all

residents of Kapilapuri, angry that I voted against them in

yesterday's assembly elections, even though they knew

that I and my family belongs to the Matang community,

they abused us in caste terms, beat us with an iron rod and

injured us, and they also entered my house and beat my

mother and aunt abusing in filthy language, and they

pulled my mother's saree and molested her, so I have a

complaint against them.

I am giving my above statement with full of my

consciousness and after reading it, I found it completely

correct as per my narration.”

3.2 What is narrated in the FIR disclosed certain

manifest aspects. On 25.11.2024 in the morning, the

respondent-accused along with others went to the house

of the appellant and standing outside and in front of

appellant’s house stated to the appellant “Mangtyano, you

have become much arrogant, you are staying in the village

and voting against me”. The appellant was attacked with

an iron rod. The mother and aunt of the appellant were

addressed with the same set of words as above and that

they all were beaten with the iron rod and were punched

inflicting internal injuries, the Mangalsutra of the mother

fell somewhere in the scuffle. The accused had in their

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hands petrol bottles and were repeatedly shouting and

threatening that they would burn the house of the

appellant. The injured appellant lodged the FIR from the

hospital.

3.3 The evident reason for this incident was

animosity generated in the mind of the accused in respect

of appellant’s act of not voting in favour of particular

candidate in the assembly elections which had concluded

on the previous day. The exhibition of enmity by the

accused, their utterances as above and the conduct of

beating the appellant and hurling castiest abuses and

threats were in public view, outside the house of the

appellant. The appellant belonged to the Scheduled

Caste community whose caste was “Mang” or “Matang”;

whereas the respondent accused was not the member of

the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. He

hailed from ‘Jain’ community.

3.4 While rejecting the prayer of respondent-

accused for anticipatory bail, the Additional Sessions

Judge, Paranda recorded findings in paragraph 8 of his

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order inter alia that there was a specific allegation against

the accused and that the accused had abused the

complainant by referring to his caste, that the caste

certificate confirmed that the complainant-informant

belonged to the Scheduled Caste community and further

that the incident was witnessed by independent

witnesses. On the basis of statements in the FIR and the

material available, the court concluded that the

ingredients of the offences punishable under Section 3 of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention

of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the

SC/ST Act”) as alleged were made out.

3.5 When the order rejecting the anticipatory bail

was challenged before the High Court by the accused, the

High Court took the view to record that there were

inconsistencies in the prosecution story as could be

gathered from the account of eye-witnesses. According to

the High Court, the entire prosecution case appeared to

be exaggerated and false. What weighed with the High

Court was also the aspect that the incident took place

immediately after the declaration of results of the

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assembly elections, therefore, it had political overtures.

Resting on such considerations, the High Court concluded

that the appellant was falsely implicated. Further

referring to the nature of the injuries and allegations, the

High Court granted anticipatory bail.

4. Mr. Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, learned

counsel appearing for the appellant-herein assailed the

judgment and order of the High Court to submit that the

High Court not only misdirected itself in exercise of the

discretion to grant bail to respondent No.1, but it plainly

overlooked the provisions of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act.

Highlighting the contents of and the allegations in the FIR,

it was submitted that the accused used abusive language

referring to caste and the appellant who was the member

of the Scheduled Caste community was thereby subjected

to derogation and insult. The appellant was intimidated

and his mother and aunt were also abused with castiest

slur and were threatened. Learned counsel for the

appellant further submitted that the castiest slur and the

castiest abuse employed against the appellant clearly

made out the offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act as

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alleged and since the offence was prima facie committed,

the pre-arrest bail could not have been granted by the

High Court in view of the provision of Section 18 of the Act.

4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the

decision of Vilas Pandurang Pawar vs . State of

Maharashtra

1 to submit that at the stage of the

consideration of grant of bail or otherwise, the High Court

was not expected to conduct a mini trial. It was submitted

that the reasoning of the High Court was not acceptable.

Regarding bar created by virtue of Section 18 of the SC/ST

Act, learned counsel pressed into service the decision of

this Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs. Union of India

2

.

4.2 On the other hand, learned counsel for

respondent No.1 seeking to defend the order of the High

Court, submitted that Section 18 of the SC/ST Act did not

create an absolute bar to grant anticipatory bail. He

proceeded to submit that in subsequent decision of this

Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr.

3,

1

(2012) 8 SCC 795

2

(2020) 4 SCC 727

3

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249

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it was observed that the court needed to undertake an

exercise to find out whether there was a prima facie

substance in the allegations. According to learned

counsel for respondent No.1, the allegations in the FIR

were made for the sake of making and were out of anger

regarding casting of vote in the assembly elections. He

tried to submit that it was wrong to give a castiest colour

to the allegations to conclude that any offence under the

SC/ST Act was committed by the accused.

4.3. The respondent-State of Maharashtra filed the

counter affidavit and opposed the grant of pre-arrest bail

to respondent No.1 accused by emphasising the

operational ambit of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act. It was

highlighted that when prima facie material existed in the

form of allegations in the FIR and other attendant factual

aspects, the respondent No.1 could not have been

granted the anticipatory bail by the High Court.

5. Amongst the offences alleged in the FIR,

included those under Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and

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3(1)(w)(i) of the SC/ST Act. The relevant extract of Section

3 of the SC/ST Act is as under.

“3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— (1)

Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste

or a Scheduled Tribe,

(b) to (n) … … …

(o) commits any offence under this Act against a

member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe

for having voted or not having voted for a particular

candidate or for having voted in a manner provided

by law;

(p) … … …

(q) … … …

(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to

humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within

public view;

(t) … … …

(u) … … …

(v) … … …

(w) (i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that

she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled

Tribe, when such act of touching is of a sexual nature

and is without the recipient’s consent; (ii) uses

words, acts or gestures of a sexual nature towards a

woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

5.1. Section 18 of the SC/ST Act is reproduced:

“18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons

committing an offence under the Act.— Nothing in

section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any

case involving the arrest of any person on an

accusation of having committed an offence under this

Act.”

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5.1.1 Section 18A in its sub section (1) of the Act

provides that for the registration of an FIR against any

person, preliminary enquiry shall not be required. It is

further stated that the investigating officer shall not be

required to take approval for the arrest, if necessary, of

any person against whom an accusation about the

commission of an offence under this SC/ST Act has been

made. Sub section (2) of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act

mentions that the provisions of Section 438 of the Cr.PC

shall not apply to a case under this Act notwithstanding

any judgment or order or direction of any Court.

5.2 It is evident from the above provision of Section

18 that it expressly excludes the applicability of Section

438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“hereinafter

referred to as “the Cr.PC”). In another words, in relation

to any case involving arrest of a person who is facing the

accusation about committing offence under this Act,

protection of Section 438, Cr.P.C. would not be available.

The Legislature has taken away the benefit of anticipatory

bail in respect of the arrest for the offences alleged under

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the SC/ST Act. The bar in Section 18 of the SC/ST Act

would operate.

5.3. While upholding the Constitutional validity of

Section 18 of the Act, this Court in State of M.P. & Anr.

vs. Ram Krishna Balothia & Anr.

4 observed as under,

“… The offences enumerated under the said Act fall

into a separate and special class. Article 17 of the

Constitution expressly deals with abolition of

‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any form.

It also provides that enforcement of any disability

arising out of ‘untouchability’ shall be an offence

punishable in accordance with law. The offences,

therefore, which are enumerated under Section 3(1)

arise out of the practice of ‘untouchability’.”

(Para 6)

5.3.1 The court proceeded to observe,

“The exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection

with offences under the Act has to be viewed in

the contest of the prevailing social conditions

which give rise to such offences, and the

apprehension that perpetrators of such atrocities

are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims

and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution

of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to

avail of anticipatory bail as pointed out in the

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. In

these circumstances, if anticipatory bail is not

made available to persons who commit such

offences, such a denial cannot be considered as

unreasonable or violative of Article 14, as these

offences form a distinct class by themselves and

cannot be compared with other offences”

(para 6)

4

(1995) 3 SCC 221

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5.4 The aforesaid bar is held to be not violative of

Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh vs. State of

Punjab

5 it was stated that taking away the right of pre-

arrest bail under Section 438 of the Cr.PC, under Section

18 of the SC/ST Act would not infringe the right to

personal liberty.

5.5 In Vilas Pandurang Pawar vs . State of

Maharashtra

6, this Court explained the bar under

Section 18 of the SC/ST Act against grant of anticipatory

bail in the following words,

“Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for

invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is

cast on the court to verify the averments in the

complaint and to find out whether an offence under

Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie

made out. In other words, if there is a specific

averment in the complaint, namely, insult or

intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with

caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to

anticipatory bail.” (Para 9)

5.5.1 It was further stated in Vilas Pandurang Pawar

(supra),

“Moreover, while considering the application for

bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and

5

(1994) 3 SCC 569

6

(2012) 8 SCC 795

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other material on record is limited. The court is

not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the

evidence on record. When a provision has been

enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons

who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the

Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in

granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the

provision in the Special Act cannot be easily

brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the

evidence.” Para 10)

5.6 A three judge bench of this Court in Prathvi Raj

Chauhan (supra) expressed itself thus,

“… exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection

with offences under the Act has to be viewed in

the context of the prevailing social conditions

which give rise to such offences, and the

apprehension that perpetrators of such atrocities

are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims

and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution

of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to

avail of anticipatory bail as pointed out in the

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act.”

(Para 6)

5.6.1 This Court emphasised in Prithvi Raj Chauhan

(supra) that anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a

matter of right. It was stated that bail is essentially a

statutory right and cannot be said to be an essential

ingredient of Article 21of the Constitution. It was further

observed that if anticipatory bail is not made available to

persons who commit such offences, such a denial cannot

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be considered as unreasonable or violative of Article 14,

as these offences form a distinct class by themselves and

cannot be compared with other offences.

5.7 The aforesaid provision of Section 18 and the bar

created thereunder has to be seen in the context of the

object and purpose with which the Parliament enacted the

SC/SC Act, 1989. This legislation was brought into force

with an avowed object of implementing the measures to

improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who have remained a

vulnerable class in the society. The underlying idea is to

ensure that the persons belonging to these classes are not

denied their civil rights, are not subjected to indignities

and are insulated from humiliation and harassment.

5.7.1 The provisions of Section 18 in its ultimate

analysis, furthers the very object of the enactment.

Seemingly a stricter provision, it underscores the

Constitutional idea of availing social justice and to ensure

the same pedestal for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled

Tribe community people with other classes in the society.

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5.8 The decision of this Court in Shajan Skaria

(supra) sought to be pressed into service on behalf of

respondent No.1 take no different view. In that case, the

Bench of two Judges of this Court elaborated the law in

respect of grant of anticipatory bail, then highlighted and

recognised the bar created under Section 18 of the SC/ST

Act to observe that only in the cases where the offence

could not be said to have been made out on a very prima

facie consideration, the court may exercise the discretion

to grant pre-arrest bail to the accused.

5.8.1 In Shajan Skaria (supra) case the appellant-

accused who was an Editor of an Online news channel

who had published a video on YouTube levelling certain

allegations against the complainant who belonged to

“Pulaya” community and who was a Member of Kerala

State Legislative Assembly representing the constituency

which seat was reserved for the member of Scheduled

Caste and Scheduled Tribe community. An attentive

reading of the broadcast made on YouTube which was a

subject matter in that case, would go to indicate that there

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was no reference therein to the caste name, which aspect

becomes clear from the very translation itself, narrated in

the judgment by the Court. The caste word “Pulaya” was

not even referred to in the complaint also, what was only

stated by complainant the subject matter was on

Scheduled Caste community. In the totality of the

circumstances thereby this Court in Shajan Skaria

(supra) took the view that the contents of the YouTube

video displayed by the accused were not intended to

denigrate the complainant as a member of the Scheduled

Caste and that it could not be said to be with castiest slur.

5.9 In Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand &

Anr.

7

as well as in Ramesh Chandra Vaish vs. State of

U.P.

8

this Court stated that intimidation or insult amounts

to an offence under Section 3(1) of the Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

should have been targeted intentionally to the member of

the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community and

also because he is member of the Scheduled Caste or

7

(2020) 10 SCC 710

8

2023 SCC OnLine SC 668

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Scheduled Tribe community. In Swarn Singh (supra), it

was stated that for making out the offence under Section

3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, 1989, it requires that the insult or

intimidation should be at a place within public view.

6. In light of the parameters in relation to the

applicability of Section 18 of the Act emanating from

afore-discussed various decisions of this Court, the

proposition could be summarised that as the provision of

Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes,

Act, 1989 with express language excludes the

applicability of Section 438, Cr.PC, it creates a bar against

grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in relations to

the arrest of a person who faces specific accusations of

having committed the offence under the Scheduled Caste

and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of anticipatory bail

for such an accused is taken off.

6.1 The absolute nature of bar, however, could be

read and has to be applied with a rider. In a given case

where on the face of it the offence under Section 3 of the

Act is found to have not been made out and that the

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accusations relating to the commission of such offence are

devoid of prima facie merits, the Court has a room to

exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the

accused under Section 438 of the Code.

6.2 Non-making of prima facie case about the

commission of offence is perceived to be such a situation

where the Court can arrive at such a conclusion in the first

blush itself or by way of the first impression upon very

reading of the averments in the FIR. The contents and the

allegations in the FIR would be decisive in this regard.

Furthermore, in reaching a conclusion as to whether a

prima facie offence is made out or not, it would not be

permissible for the Court to travel into the evidentiary

realm or to consider other materials, nor the Court could

advert to conduct a mini trial.

7. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the

respondent-accused was not a member of Scheduled

Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. The appellant

belonged to scheduled caste community known as

“Mang” or “Matang”. The allegations made in the FIR

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lodged by the complainant was that he was addressed by

the accused with abusive casteist utterance “Mangatyano,

you are became very arrogant, you are staying in the village

and voting against”. The appellant was addressed as

above by the accused outside the house of the appellant

where others were present

7.1 The accused persons beat the complainant with

iron rod and threatened to burn the house. The mother

and aunt of the appellant-complainant were also meted

out similar treatment with intimidation and were

addressed with same casteist slur. The use of the word

“Mangatyano” was with a clear intention to humiliate the

complainant because he belonged to the said Scheduled

Caste community. In the said abusive utterances and

conduct by the accused, the caste nexus was established.

The complainant was humiliated with casteist and abusive

approach for the reason that he did not vote in favour of

particular candidate one Bahubali-accused No.8 in the

Assembly Election as desired by the respondent-

accused.

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7.2 The incident as above took place outside the

house of the complainant, it was a place within public

view. The term “any place within public view” was

considered by this Court in Swarn Singh (supra) and

Hitesh Verma (supra) was also subsequently referred to

in the decision of this Court in Karuppudayar vs. State

Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalguid

Trichy & Ors.

9

wherein the Court drew distinction

between “public place” and “any place within public

view”. It was held that if the offence is committed outside

the building, for example in the lawn outside the house,

and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or

lawn outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would

certainly be a place within the public view.

8. In the present case, as noted above, the incident

took place outside the house of the appellant which could

be viewed by anybody. It was indeed a place within

public view. There is no gainsaying that in the facts of the

case all ingredients necessary to prima facie constitute

9

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2015

Page 22 of 23

offences under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and

Scheduled Tribe Act, 1989 as alleged in the FIR stood

satisfied. Furthermore, the occurrence of incident was

fortified by recovery of clothes and weapons.

9. In the above view, there is no escape from the

conclusion that offence under the Scheduled Caste and

Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is

made out from the bare reading of the FIR. The High Court

in proceeding to evaluate the testimony of witnesses and

to opine on that basis that there were certain

discrepancies, no offence was made out, committed a

manifest error. The anticipatory bail granted by

overlooking of and disregarding the bar of Section 18 of

the Act was a clear illegality and jurisdictional error

committed by the High Court. The order of the High Court

could not be sustained in the eye of law.

10. In the result, the judgement and order dated

29.04.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.201 of 2025 passed by

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at

Aurangabad is hereby set aside. The Appeal is allowed.

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The anticipatory bail granted to respondent No. 1 stands

cancelled.

10.1 It is clarified at this stage that the observations

and findings recorded in this judgment are of prima facie

nature, limited for the purpose of deciding the question of

grant of anticipatory bail. The trial shall proceed

independently on its own merits, uninfluenced by any

observations herein.

In view of the disposal of the main appeal, all the

interlocutory applications as may be pending stands

disposed of.

………………………………..,CJI.

[ B.R. GAVAI]

………………………………….., J.

[ K. VINOD CHANDRAN ]

………………………………….., J.

[ N.V. ANJARIA ]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 1, 2025.

(VK)