HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

* * * *

WRIT PETITION No.13273 of 2026

Between:

Komma Siva Haritha

.....PETITIONER

AND

The State of Andhra Pradesh,

General Administration Department (GAD),

Rep. by its Principal Secretary, and 3 others

.....RESPONDENTS

DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED : 06.08.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : .09.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED : .09.2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair

copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

_______________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

_______________________________________

PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI , J

2

APHC010252562026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI

+ WRIT PETITION No.13273 of 2026

% .09.2026

Between:

Komma Siva Haritha

.....PETITIONER

AND

The State of Andhra Pradesh,

General Administration Department (GAD),

Rep. by its Principal Secretary, and 3 others

.....RESPONDENTS

! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri Dushyanth Reddy, representing

Sri K.V.Aditya Chowdary

Counsel for the Respondents : Sri Keerthi Teja Kondaveeti,

learned Government Pleader

< Gist :

> Head Note:

? Cases Referred:

1. (2023) 9 SCC 587

2. (2012) 2 SCC 72

3. (2025) 4 SCC 476

4. W.P.No.33545 of 2025 APHC decided on 22.06.2026

5. (1981) 2 SCC 456

6. (2024) 19 SCC 791

3

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

CHINTALAPUDI

WRIT PETITION NO: 13273 OF 2026

ORDER: (per Ravi Nath Tilhari, J)

Heard Sri Dushyanth Reddy, learned counsel representing Sri

K.V.Aditya Chowdary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Keerthi

Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader for the respondents.

2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition for writ of Habeas Corpus

under Article 226 of Constitution of India also challenging the order of

preventive detention of the detenu namely Yalapala Maruthi Prasad

Reddy @ Talamarla Maruthi Reddy @ Maruthi.

I. FACTS:

3. With respect to the detenu an order of preventive detention vide

proceedings D.Dis.No.MAGL/E-37252, dated 02.04.2026 was passed by

the Collector & District Magistrate, Sri Sathya Sai District under Section

3 of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of

Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic

Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act, 1986). The same was

confirmed vide G.O.Rt.No.994 General Administration (SC-I)

Department dated 18.05.2026.

4

4. The preventive detention order was passed on the following

criminal cases:

i) Cr.No.232/2020 under Sections 143, 147, 341, 447, 506 r/w. 149

IPC of Kothacheruvu Police Station.

ii) Cr.No.116/2025 under Sections 79, 118(1), 329(3), 351(2) r/w

3(5) BNS, 2023 of Kothacheruvu Police Station.

iii) Cr.No.14/2026 under Sections 79, 129(3), 329(3), 351(2) r/w 3(5)

BNS, 2023 of Kothacheruvu Urban Police Station.

iv) Cr.No.15/2026 under Sections 111, 132, 351(2) BNS of

Kothacheruvu Urban Police Station.

v) Cr.No.45/2022 under Sections 447, 353, 506 IPC r/w. 34 IPC and

Sec 3 & 4 of AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 of

Puttaparthy Urban Police Station.

vi) Cr.No.70/2025 under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 126(1) BNS of

Puttaparthy Urban Police Station.

vii) Cr.No.01/2026 under Sections 103(2), 238 r/w. 3(5) BNS of

Puttaparthy Urban Police Station.

viii) Cr.No.94/2022 under Sections 324, 354, 506 r/w. 34IPC of

Puttaparthy Rural Police Station.

ix) Cr.No.159/2019 under Sections 323, 506 r/w 34 IPC of Gorantla

Police Station.

II. Submissions of learned counsel for Parties:

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that out of 9 grounds

i.e., criminal cases in 2 grounds i.e., ground Nos.5 & 7 bail was granted.

5

The said bail orders were not placed before the detaining authority. So,

the order of preventive detention, and its confirmation, suffers from non-

consideration of the relevant material. The satisfaction of the detaining

authority therefore is vitiated and the order cannot be sustained.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in ground

No.7 the bail was cancelled on 09.04.2026 i.e., after passing of

detention order, for which bail cancellation application was filed on

03.03.2026 by the prosecution but it was not placed by the sponsoring

authority before the detaining authority.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in five criminal

cases/grounds Section 41A Cr.P.C. notices were served and in

remaining two grounds/criminal cases, the detenu was not arrested.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the offences

complained against the detenu are of such a nature which can be dealt

with under the ordinary law of the land without taking recourse to the

Preventive Detention Act. There was no threat to the public order and

the object of the preventive detention is not to punish. He placed

reliance in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana

1

.

9. The learned Government Pleader could not dispute that the bail

orders in ground Nos.5 & 7 were not considered by the detaining

1

(2023) 9 SCC 587

6

authority. He however submits that the activities of the detenu were

prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and so recording the

satisfaction as a preventive measure the order of preventive detention

was passed.

10. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the

material on record.

III. Analysis:

A. Non-Consideration of the bail orders:

11. The law is well settled with respect of the consideration of the bail

orders that those are relevant material and must be considered to arrive

at subjective satisfaction.

12. In Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite v. State of Maharashtra

2

the

Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the order of detention passed without

considering the bail orders i.e., consideration ignoring the

material/relevant material could not be sustained. Para Nos.8 to 12 in

Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite (supra) read as under:

“8. It would be, thus, seen that the order releasing the detenu on bail in the

crime registered on 14-8-2010 and the order relaxing the bail condition were

passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dharangaon much before the

issuance of the detention order dated 10-1-2011. However, the detention

order or the grounds supplied to the detenu do not show that the detaining

2

(2012) 2 SCC 72

7

authority was aware of the bail order granted in favour of the detenu on 15-

8-2010.

9. In a case where the detenu is released on bail and is enjoying his

freedom under the order of the court at the time of passing the order

of detention, then such order of bail, in our opinion, must be placed

before the detaining authority to enable him to reach at the proper

satisfaction.

10. In the present case, since the order of bail dated 15-8-2010 was neither

placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the order of

detention nor the detaining authority was aware of the order of bail, in our

view, the detention order is rendered invalid. We cannot attempt to

assess in what manner and to what extent consideration of the order

granting bail to the detenu would have effected the satisfaction of the

detaining authority but suffice it to say that non-placing and non-

consideration of the material as vital as the bail order has vitiated the

subjective decision of the detaining authority.

11. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rekha v. State of T.N. [(2011) 5

SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] decided recently held as under: (SCC p.

254, para 25)

“25. In this connection, it may be noted that there is nothing on the record to

indicate whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the bail

application of the accused was pending on the date when the detention order

was passed on 8-4-2010. On the other hand, in Para 4 of the grounds of

detention it is mentioned that „Thiru. Ramakrishnan is in remand in Crime No.

132 of 2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far‟. Thus, the

detaining authority was not even aware whether a bail application of the

accused was pending when he passed the detention order, rather the detaining

authority passed the detention order under the impression that no bail

application of the accused was pending but in similar cases bail had been

granted by the courts. We have already stated above that no details of the

alleged similar cases has been given. Hence, the detention order in question

cannot be sustained.”

8

12. In Rekha [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] , the detention

order was held to be bad as the detaining authority was not aware of

the fact that the bail application of the detenu was pending on the date

when the detention order was passed. In the present case, the detenu

was already released on bail but the detaining authority was not aware

of the fact of grant of bail to the detenu.”

13. In Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India

3

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court

held that the bail was granted by the jurisdictional court, that too on

conditions, the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they

were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities;

which is the very basis of the preventive detention order. In the said

case the detention order was silent on that aspect. The Hon‟ble Apex

court interfered with the detention order only on the ground that the

detaining authority did not look into the conditions imposed by the

Magistrate while granting bail for the very same offence to enter a

satisfaction as to whether those conditions were sufficient or not to

restrain the detenu from indulging in further like activities of smuggling.

Para Nos.32 to 35 in Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra) are reproduced as

under:

“32. Likewise, in the present case, we are not concerned as to whether the

conditions imposed by the Magistrate would have taken care of the

apprehension expressed by the detaining authority; of the detenu indulging in

further smuggling activities. We are more concerned with the aspect that

the detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the conditions

3

(2025) 4 SCC 476

9

and enter any satisfaction, however subjective it is, as to the conditions

not being sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in such

activities.

33.Ameena Begum [Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587

: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] , noticed with approval Vijay Narain Singh v. State of

Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri)

361] and extracted para 32 from the same (Vijay Narain Singh [Vijay Narain

Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] ) : (SCC pp.

35-36)

“32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law

and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that

the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely

within … not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is

involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of

keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may

not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material

available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions

authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a

competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in

scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is

based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal

court.”

(emphasis supplied)

34. The criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered

are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities, through a

network set-up, revealed on successive raids carried on at various locations,

on specific information received, leading to recovery of huge cache of

contraband. When bail was granted by the jurisdictional court, that too on

conditions, the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they

were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical

activities; which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered.

10

35. The detention order being silent on that aspect, we interfere with the

detention order only on the ground of the detaining authority having not

looked into the conditions imposed by the Magistrate while granting bail

for the very same offence; the allegations in which also have led to the

preventive detention, assailed herein, to enter a satisfaction as to

whether those conditions are sufficient or not to restrain the detenu from

indulging in further like activities of smuggling.

14. In Buddiga Dhana Lakshmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh

4

, on

consideration of various pronouncements this Court held that the bail

order and the conditions of the bail are relevant material to be

considered to arrive at the subjective satisfaction if the order of detention

is yet to be passed. There was no consideration of the bail orders in the

order of detention. The impugned order of detention was set aside on

that ground. Para Nos.14 to 16 in Buddiga Dhana Lakshmi (supra)

read as under:

“14. In Ponnada Geetha (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court has

held that when the detenu was already released on bail in a crime and when

it was made basis for passing the order of preventive detention and when

such order of bail was not placed before the detention authority, it vitiates

the order of preventive detention. Paragraph Nos.(9) to (12) of Ponnada

Geetha (supra) read as under:

“9. However, as per the settled law, the very fact that the order of bail

granted to the detenu in Crime No.219 of 2024 of Gopalapatnam Police

Station for the offence under NDPS Act, was not placed before the

detaining authority, while passing the impugned order of detention, by

4

W.P.No.33545 of 2025 APHC decided on 22.06.2026

11

itself, is sufficient to hold that it vitiates the impugned order of

detention. The legal position in this regard is fairly well settled.

10. The Division Bench of the common High Court for the State of

Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh had an occasion to

elaborately deal with the said legal position in the case of Vasanthu

Sumalatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh(2016) 1 ALT 738 (DB). At

paragraph 44 of the said judgment, it is held as follows:

“44. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court,

great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order

of preventive detention, which is based on the very same charge which

is to be tried by the criminal court. (Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar

[(1984) 3 SCC 14]; Jotha Viswanadh v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of A.P.

[Judgment in W.P.No.10018 of 2012, dated 29.06.2012 (APHC) (DB)].

Where the detenu is released on bail, and is enjoying his freedom

under the order of the court, the order of bail must be placed before the

detaining authority, when the order of detention is passed, to enable

him to reach a proper satisfaction. (Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite v. State of

Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 72]. If the detaining authority was

unaware of the order of bail, the detention order is rendered invalid as

the Court cannot attempt to assess in what manner, and to what

extent, consideration of the order granting bail to the detenu would

have effected the satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the

order of preventive detention (Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite (42 supra);

Rekha (5 supra); Jotha Viswanadh (44 supra).”

11. At paragraph 42 of the said judgment, it is also held by the Division

Bench of the common High Court that it is incumbent that all vital

materials are placed before the detaining authority to enable him to

arrive at the subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing an

order of detention, as decided in M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India

((1990) 2 SCC 1 and State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini(1988 (1)

SCC 287). Therefore, it is held that the bail order is a vital material

12

for consideration and if it is not considered, the satisfaction of the

detaining authority would be impaired.

12. Thus, it is obvious from the analogy and the legal position decided

in the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of the common High

Court, which is binding on this Court, that when the detenu was already

released on bail in a crime and when it was made basis for passing the

order of preventive detention and when the said order of bail was not

placed before the detaining authority, it vitiates the impugned order of

preventive detention. Therefore, in view of the law enunciated in the

above judgment, as the order of bail is admittedly not placed before the

2

nd

respondent when he has passed the impugned order of preventive

detention, the impugned order of preventive detention is vitiated and,

therefore, cannot be sustained.”

15. The aforesaid is the settled position in law. The bail order and the

conditions of bail are relevant material to be considered to arrive at the

satisfaction if the order of detention is yet to be passed.

16. Admittedly, there is no consideration of all the bail orders in the order of

detention though in five cases the bail was granted prior to passing of the order

of detention and even in the order of approval and confirmation by the State

there is no consideration whereas by that time in all seven cases bail (s) had

been granted.”

15. In the present case the detaining authority was not even aware of

the fact the detenu was released on bail in two criminal cases under

ground Nos.5 & 7. The bail orders were not placed before the detaining

Authority which do not find consideration. The satisfaction of the

detaining authority would be impaired and the order of preventive

detention would be vitiated.

13

B. Public order & Law and order

16. On the aspect of the distinction between public order and law and

order in Ameena Begum (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as under:

“34. The issues with the detention order which we need to address are

these: first, whether the alleged acts of commission for which the

detenu has been kept under detention are prejudicial to “public order”

and secondly, whether all relevant circumstances were considered or

whether extraneous factors weighed in the mind of the detaining authority

leading to the conclusion that the detenu is a habitual offender and for

prevention of further crimes by him, he ought to be detained. Incidentally, the

issue of whether application of mind is manifest in first ordering detention and

then confirming it by continuing such order for a period of 12 (twelve) months

upon rejection of the representation filed on behalf of the detenu by the

appellant could also be answered. Needless to observe, we need not

examine the second and the incidental issues if the appeal succeeds on the

first issue.

35. Addressing the first issue first, it has to be understood as a

fundamental imperative as to how this Court has distinguished between

disturbances relatable to “law and order” and disturbances caused to “public

order”.

36. It is trite that breach of law in all cases does not lead to public

disorder. In a catena of judgments, this Court has in clear terms noted

the difference between “law and order” and “public order”.

37. We may refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in

Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar,

1965 SCC OnLine SC 9 : (1966) 1 SCR 709] , where the difference between

“law and order” and “public order” was lucidly expressed by Hon'ble M.

Hidayatullah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in the following words : (SCR

pp. 745-46, paras 54-55)

“54. … Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every

breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two

drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder.

They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but

cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public

order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one

of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of

law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other

examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects

order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the

community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and

order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for

action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert

the public order are. …

14

55. It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of this

Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity

than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order” also

comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting “public

order”. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order

represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing

public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is

then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public

order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the

State.”

(emphasis supplied)

38. For an act to qualify as a disturbance to public order, the specific

activity must have an impact on the broader community or the general

public, evoking feelings of fear, panic, or insecurity. Not every case of a

general disturbance to public tranquillity affects the public order and

the question to be asked, as articulated by Hon'ble M. Hidayatullah, C.J. in

Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98

: 1970 SCC (Cri) 67] , is this : (SCC p. 100, para 3)

“3. … Does it [the offending act] lead to disturbance of the current of life

of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or

does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society

undisturbed?”

39. In Arun Ghosh case [Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98 :

1970 SCC (Cri) 67] , the petitioning detenu was detained by an order of a

District Magistrate since he had been indulging in teasing, harassing and

molesting young girls and assaults on individuals of a locality. While holding

that the conduct of the petitioning detenu could be reprehensible, it was

further held that it (read : the offending act) “does not add up to the situation

where it may be said that the community at large was being disturbed or in

other words there was a breach of public order or likelihood of a breach of

public order. (Arun Ghosh case [Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC

98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67] , SCC p. 101, para 5)”

40. In the process of quashing the impugned order, the Hidayatullah, C.J.

while referring to the decision in Ram Manohar Lohia [Ram Manohar Lohia v.

State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 9 : (1966) 1 SCR 709] also ruled :

(Arun Ghosh case [Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970

SCC (Cri) 67] , SCC pp. 99-100, para 3)

“3. … Public order was said to embrace more of the community than

law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the

community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality.

Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed

against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of

causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of

disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality

which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of

law and order. … It is always a question of degree of the harm and its

effect upon the community. … This question has to be faced in every

15

case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be

distinguished from another.”

41. In Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar [Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar, (1974) 1 SCC

185 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 84] , Hon'ble Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as the Chief

Justice then was) speaking for the Bench held that : (SCC pp. 186-87, paras

4 & 6)

“4. … The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well-

established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assault are

not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow

of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to

disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public

disorder. …

***

6. … The power to detain a person without the safeguard of a court trial

is too drastic to permit a lenient construction and therefore Courts must

be astute to ensure that the detaining authority does not transgress the

limitations subject to which alone the power can be exercised.”

(emphasis supplied)

42. Turning our attention to Section 3(1) of the Act, the Government has to

arrive at a subjective satisfaction that a goonda (as in the present case) has

to be detained, in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to

the maintenance of public order. Therefore, we first direct ourselves to the

examination of what constitutes “public order”. Even within the provisions of

the Act, the term “public order” has, stricto sensu, been defined in narrow and

restricted terms. An order of detention under Section 3(1) of the Act can only

be issued against a detenu to prevent him “from acting in any manner

prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. “Public order” is defined in the

Explanation to Section 2(a) of the Act as encompassing situations that cause

“harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or

any section thereof or a grave wide-spread danger to life or public health”.

43.Ram Manohar Lohia [Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC

OnLine SC 9 : (1966) 1 SCR 709] is an authority to rely upon for the

proposition that if liberty of an individual can be invaded under statutory

rules by the simple process of making of a certain order, he can be so

deprived only if the order is in consonance with the said rule. Strict

compliance with the letter of the rule, in such a case, has to be the essence

of the matter since the statute has the potentiality to interfere with the

personal liberty of an individual and a Court is precluded from going behind

its face. Though circumstances may make it necessary for ordering a

detention without trial, but it would be perfectly legitimate to require strict

observance of the rules in such cases. If there is any doubt whether the rules

have been strictly observed, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the

detenu.

44.Rekha [Rekha v. State of T.N., (2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri)

596] too provides a useful guide. It is said in para 30 that : (SCC p. 255)

16

“30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged,

one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is : was

the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the

answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the

present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired

drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the

Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal

with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the

detention order in question was illegal.” [Ed. : As observed in para 26 of

this judgment hereinabove, this observation in para 30 of Rekha, (2011)

5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596, that preventive detention is not

permissible when the ordinary law of the land can deal with the

situation, is per incuriam paras 19 and 32 to 34 of the Constitution

Bench in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974

SCC (Cri) 816. See also paras 24 to 26, of the present judgment

above.Paras 19 and 32 to 34 of Haradhan Saha have been set out in

the Headnote at SCC pp. 589-90.]

45. At this stage, it would be useful to consider certain events anterior to the

detention order but referred to therein. The earlier order of detention dated 4-

3-2021 was challenged by the detenu's father before the High Court. Such

order of detention was passed considering 4 (four) FIRs under Sections 420

and 406IPC, wherein the detenu was arraigned as an accused. In its

reasoned judgment dated 16-8-2021 [Hakeem Khan v. State of Telangana,

2021 SCC OnLine TS 3663] , the High Court noted this Court having opined

in a catena of decisions that there is a vast difference between “law and

order” and “public order”; when offences are committed against a particular

individual it falls within the ambit of “law and order” whereas when the public

at large is adversely affected by the criminal activities of a person, then such

conduct of the person is said to disturb “public order”. Holding that the true

distinction between the areas of “law and order” and “public order” lies not

merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the proper degree and extent

of its impact on the society, it was ruled that the cases do not fall within the

ambit of the words “public order” or “disturbance of public order”, instead,

they fall within the scope of the words “law and order”, and that there was no

need for the detaining authority to pass the impugned order. Based thereon,

the impugned order was quashed and the detenu set at liberty.

46. In fine, what we find is that the order of detention impugned in that writ

petition failed to differentiate between offences which create a “law and

order” situation and which prejudicially affect or tend to prejudicially affect

“public order”. The present detention order fares no better. Even if the

offences referred to in the detention order, alleged to have been committed

by the detenu have led to the satisfaction being formed, still the same are

separate and stray acts affecting private individuals and the repetition of

similar such acts would not tend to affect the even flow of public life. The

offence in respect of the minor girl did exercise our consideration for some

time but we have noted that the detenu was not arrested because of an order

passed by the High Court on an application under Section 438 of the Criminal

Procedure Code (“CrPC” hereafter). The investigating agency not having

elected to have such order quashed by a higher forum, the facts have their

17

own tale to tell. Even otherwise, the gravity of the offences alleged in Arun

Ghosh [Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67]

was higher in degree, yet, the same were not considered as affecting “public

order”. The only other offence that could attract the enumerated category of

“acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” and an

order of preventive detention, if at all, is the stray incident where the detenu

has been charged under Section 353IPC and where the police has not even

contemplated an arrest under Section 41CrPC.

47. On an overall consideration of the circumstances, it does appear to us

that the existing legal framework for maintaining law and order is sufficient to

address like offences under consideration, which the Commissioner

anticipates could be repeated by the detenu if not detained. We are also

constrained to observe that preventive detention laws—an exceptional

measure reserved for tackling emergent situations—ought not to have

been invoked in this case as a tool for enforcement of “law and order”.

This, for the reason that, the Commissioner despite being aware of the earlier

judgment and order of the High Court dated 16-8-2021 [Hakeem Khan v.

State of Telangana, 2021 SCC OnLine TS 3663] passed the detention order

ostensibly to maintain “public order” without once more appreciating the

difference between maintenance of “law and order” and maintenance of

“public order”. The order of detention is, thus, indefensible.”

17. In Ameena Begum (supra) it was held that the breach of law in all

cases does not amount to public disorder. There is difference between

law and order and public order. Every breach of the peace does not lead

to public disorder. Law and order represents the largest circle within

which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle

represents security of State. The act may affect law and order but not

the public order. For an act to qualify as a disturbance to public order,

the specific activity must have an impact on the broader community or

the general public, evoking feelings of fear, panic, or insecurity. Not

every case of a general disturbance to public tranquillity affects the

public order.

18

18. With respect to the submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioners, that it is a case of the breach of law and order situation not

affecting the public order, we are of the view that since we are satisfied

that the bail orders were not taken into consideration by the detaining

authority, so the order of preventive detention cannot be sustained, even

if it be a case of threat to public order, though we do not conclusively

observe it to be a case of public order or law and order situation only.

19. In Shiv Parsad Bhatnagar vs. State of M.P and another

5

, the

Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that “the single vicious ground is sufficient

to vitiate an order of preventive detention.”

20. In Pramod Singla v. Union of India

6

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held

that in cases of preventive detention, every procedural irregularity,

keeping in mind the principles of Article 21 and Article 22(5) of the

Constitution of India, must be accrued in favour of the detenue.

Result:

21. The writ petition is allowed. The order of preventive detention

dated 02.04.2026 and the order of confirmation dated 18.05.2026 are

set aside.

22. The detenu shall be set at liberty immediately, if he is not in

detention in any other pending case.

5

(1981) 2 SCC 456

6

(2024) 19 SCC 791

19

23. The detaining authority shall however be at liberty to pass fresh

order in accordance with law.

24. In case any order of detention is passed afresh, the period of

detention shall not exceed in total the statutory period, including the

period already served under the impugned detention order.

No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall

also stand closed.

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI,J

____________________________________

PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI,J

Dated: .09.2026

Note:

L.R. copy to be marked

B/o

AG

20

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

CHINTALAPUDI

WRIT PETITION NO: 13273 OF 2026

Dated: .09.2026

Note:

L.R. copy to be marked

B/o

AG