REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal Nos. 4578­4580 of 2022

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.31186­88 of 2016)

KRISHNA RAI (Dead)           APPELLANT(S)

THROUGH LRs & ORS.

VERSUS

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

THROUGH REGISTRAR & ORS.  RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Vikram Nath, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.I.A.D.No.133982 of 2021 is allowed.

1

3.In these three Civil Appeals, this Court has

been called upon to decide whether principle of

estoppel   and   acquiescence   will   prevail   over

statutory service rules prescribing the procedure

for promotion of Class­IV employees to Class­III

working   in   the   Banaras   Hindu   University

1

,

Varanasi,   a   Central   University.   The   learned

Single Judge was of the view that the statutory

rules would prevail and must be strictly adhered

to,   whereas,   the   Division   Bench,   although,

agreeing with the reasoning of the learned Single

Judge that the procedure prescribed under the

rules was violated, still proceeded to set aside

the   judgment   of   the   learned   Single   Judge

applying   the   principle   of   estoppel   and

acquiescence   over   and   above   the   eligibility

1 BHU

2

conditions having statutory force laid down by

the statutory rules.

4.The learned Single Judge had allowed the

writ petition filed by the appellants and after

setting aside the promotion of respondent Nos.3

to 16, had directed the BHU to carry out the

exercise for promotion afresh as per the law and

the observations made in the said judgment. The

Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the

judgment   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   and

dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the

same, the original writ petitioners are in appeal

before this Court.

5.Facts in brief are that for filling up 14 posts

of   Class­III   (Junior   Clerk   Grade)   by   way   of

promotion,   the   University   issued   a

3

Notification/Advertisement   dated   17.12.2005

inviting applications from permanent Class­IV

employees for promotion as Junior Clerk in the

Pay­Scale   of   Rs.3050­4590.   The   eligibility

prescribed in the aforesaid Notification reads as

under:

“Eligibility:

All Class­IV employees, who have  put in five

years   services   and   who   have   passed

matriculation examination or equivalent will be

eligible for appointment as Junior Clerk under

25% promotion quota.

Such eligible candidates will be tested in:

A typing test in English/Hindi for a minimum of

30 words per minutes; and after qualifying in

the test.

Note: If an employee does not passed the typing

test   and   is   otherwise   eligible   for   promotion

he/she be promoted subject to the condition that

he/she passes the typing test within two years

from the date of his/her promotion failing which

he/she will be reverted.

Provided further that for such employees, typing

test be held at least twice a year.

4

Two   papers   of   simple   English,   Hindi   and

Arithmetic of one hour duration.”

6.It would be worthwhile to mention here that

in   the   meantime,   it   was   resolved   to   hold   a

computer typing test on 20.04.2006. However,

upon   a   representation   being   made,   the   said

computer type test was deferred vide letter dated

19.04.2006 and, later vide communication dated

04.05.2006, it was informed that final merit list

would be based on the marks obtained in typing

test, written test and interview. The type test

could be taken on a computer or on a manual

type­writer.   The   typing   test   was   held   on

16.05.2006;   the   written   test   was   held   on

23.09.2006   and   interview   was   held   on

31.05.2007 and 01.06.2007. Thereafter, merit

list was prepared by the Board of Examiners

appointed for making the selection/promotion

5

and, accordingly, as per its recommendations,

14 selected candidates (respondent nos.3 to 16)

were issued appointment letters on 05.06.2007.

The appellants made a representation against

the decision to appoint respondent nos.3 to 16,

which was rejected by the competent authority

on 02.07.2007.

7.Aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition

No.37741   of   2007;   Sri   Krishna   Rai   and   33

others impleading the Banaras Hindu University

through its Registrar as respondent No.1, Vice­

Chancellor,   Banaras   Hindu   University   as

respondent No.2, and the 14 selected candidates

as respondent nos.3 to 16. The petition was filed

primarily   on   the   ground   that   the

Advertisement/Notification,   which   was   issued

6

laying   down   the   eligibility   conditions,   as   per

paragraph 6.4 of the Manual did not provide for

any interview, but later on, changing the rules of

the   game   and   in   violation   of   the   eligibility

conditions laid down in para 6.4, the Board of

Examiners which did not have any authority or

power to amend paragraph 6.4 laying down the

eligibility   conditions   introduced   an   interview.

The Board of Examiners further laid down the

criteria for preparing the merit list out of total of

100   marks,   with   the   following   break­up:   20

marks for the type test, 60 marks for the written

test of Hindi, English and Arithmetic and 20

marks for the interview.

8.In the counter­affidavit filed by the BHU as

also by the respondent nos.3 to 16, the eligibility

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conditions   as   laid   down   in   para   6.4   of   the

Manual  and  duly   approved   by   the  Executive

Council, which is the supreme Authority, was

not disputed. Even during the course of the

arguments, learned counsel for the BHU agreed

to the submission of the appellants that the

Board of Examiners had no authority to alter the

eligibility conditions or the procedure prescribed

under   para   6.4   of  the   Manual.   It   is   further

undisputed that Board of Examiners was not

vested with any authority to alter the procedure

for promotion or in other words, it could not

amend para 6.4 of the Manual. It is also an

admitted position that it is only the Executive

Council, which could have amended or modified

the procedure/eligibility prescribed under para

6.4 of the Manual.

8

9.The learned Single Judge after considering

the entire material on record and also the catena

of decisions relied upon by the respondent­BHU

and the private respondents was of the view that

the Board of Examiners committed grave error in

making selections by awarding marks on the

type test, written test and interview and then

preparing the merit list.

10.The learned Single Judge allowed the writ

petition. It quashed the orders impugned dated

05.06.2007   and   02.07.2007   as   also   the

appointments   of   respondent   Nos.3   to   16   on

Class­III post and further directed BHU to hold

fresh selections for promotion to the post of

Class­III, complete the same expeditiously within

three months, strictly in accordance with the

9

Rules and in the light of observations made

above.   It   also   awarded   costs   quantified   at

Rs.50,000/. The operative part of the judgment

of   learned   Single   Judge   is   reproduced

hereunder:

“56. In the result, the writ petition is allowed.

Impugned orders dated 5.6.2007 and 2.7.2007

and   appointments   of   respondents   3   to   16   on

Class IV posts are hereby quashed.

57.   The   University   is   directed   to   hold   fresh

selection for promotion to  the post of  Class III

against   the   vacancies   for   which   selection   was

held   by   notification   dated   17.12.2005   and

complete the same expeditiously and in any case,

within three months from the date of production

of   certified   copy   of   this   order   strictly   in

accordance   with   Rules   and   in   the   light   of

observations made above.

58.   Petitioners   are   entitled   to   costs   which   I

quantify to Rs. 50,000/­“.

11.The finding recorded by the learned Single

Judge as contained in paragraph Nos.53, 54 and

55 are also reproduced hereunder:

10

“53.   In   the   present   case,   I   am   constrained   to

observe   that   the   notification   published   by

University   categorically   reiterated   what   was

contained in Clause 6.4 of the Manual. The rules of

game were made known to everybody but Board of

Examiners, which was constituted to hold selection

strictly   in   accordance   with   aforesaid   decided

norms, changed the rules in between the game and

held selection in a manner unknown to the extant

Rules  applicable   for promotion  from  Class   IV  to

Class   III   in   BHU.   This   was   wholly   illegal   and

without jurisdiction. It is well settled that rules of

games cannot be allowed to be changed during the

game.

54. This Court has no manner of doubt in the light

of   above   discussion   that   petitioners   have   been

discriminated   and   have   been   considered   in   a

manner   which   was   never   contemplated   by   the

University for considering promotion from Class IV

to Class III.

55.   One   more   aspect   also   not   be   ignored.   In

making such promotions persons totally unequal to

each   other   in   various   respects   have   to   be

considered.   A   Class   IV   employee   who   was

appointed in 1977 has much longer experience of a

Class IV post but in the context of personality and

other aspects, he may not compare with his much

junior   entered   in   service   as   Class   IV   employee

after   10,   20   or   25   years.   The   subsequent

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educational advancement also cannot be ignored.

It is evident that persons who were appointed in

1977   to   1997,   i.e.   petitioners,   got   occasion   for

consideration for promotion to Class III post after

decades   of   service.   For   such   persons,   making

interview as a part of selection when it was not

contemplated in the relevant procedure prescribed

by   the   University   obviously   made   it   difficult   for

them to qualify since they may not compete with

young and youngest new employees having better

qualifications. But one must also have considered

that they at the fag end of service to their credit,

have long experience. Better honour and respect

needed so that they may retire from a higher post

after getting at least one promotion at the fag end

of their service. The University must have all these

facts and other relevant aspects in mind when laid

down   the   procedure   in   the   Manual,   but

unfortunately   the   Board   of   Examiners   acted

unmindful   of   wider   aspects.   The   acted   wholly

illegally by ignoring the established procedure laid

down in the Rules and on the contrary settled their

own   selection   procedure   by   exceeding   their

authority and jurisdiction.”

12. BHU as also the private respondent nos. 3 to

16 preferred intra­court Appeals registered as

12

Special Appeal No.24 of 2012 (Banaras Hindu

University and another Vs. Sri Krishna Rai and

others), Special Appeal No.9 of 2012 (Shri Sarvjit

Singh and others Vs. Sri Krishna Rai and others)

and Special Appeal No.25 of 2012 (Ram Kishore

Pandey   and   others   Vs.   Banaras   Hindu

University and others). The Division Bench vide

judgment dated 29.07.2016 was of the view, as

already stated above, that the appellants having

appeared in the examination process as also the

interview   without   any   protest,   upon   being

unsuccessful   could   not   have   challenged   the

selection   process.   The   Division   Bench   relied

upon a number of decisions, which we shall

shortly   discuss,   in   support   of   its   view   and

accordingly   allowed   the   Special   Appeals,   set

13

aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge

and dismissed the writ petition.

13.Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the

parties   and   having   perused   the   material   on

record as also the case laws relied upon by the

learned counsel for the parties, we now proceed

to deal with the issue at hand. 

14.As   per   para   6.4   of   the   Manual   duly

approved by the Executive Council’s Resolution

No.223 dated 2/3

rd

 of November, 1980, all Class­

IV employees, who have put in five years’ service

and who have passed matriculation examination

or equivalent, would be eligible for promotion to

the post of Junior Clerk Grade. Such eligible

candidates would be tested in a typing test in

English/Hindi for a minimum speed of 30 words

per minute. The note appended to such Clause

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of typing test mentions that if an employee does

not pass the typing test and is otherwise eligible

for promotion, he be promoted subject to the

condition that he passes the typing test within

two years from the date of his promotion failing

which, he would be reverted. The note further

provided that for such employees the typing test

would   be   held   twice   a   year.   Para   6.4(ii)(b)

provided   that   two   papers   of   simple   English,

Hindi   and   Arithmetic   of   one   hour   duration

would be held.

15.The Executive Council vide its Resolution

No.131   dated   29/30.03.1996   had   raised   the

vacancies from 20% to 25% for promotion of

Group­D   in­service   employees   and   it   further

provided   that   the   seniority   list   would   be

prepared   after   passing   the   departmental   test

15

and it further provided that no relaxation in

prescribed qualification shall be given for in­

service employees.

16.The net effect of the above eligibility and

procedure prescribed for promotion of Group­D

Class­IV employees to the cadre of Junior Clerk

would be that­ (1) a type test would be held with

a minimum speed of 30 words per minute in

Hindi/English.   This   type   test   was   not

mandatorily required to be qualified and even

those eligible candidates, who could not qualify

the type test, but were otherwise eligible having

passed   in   the   departmental   test,   would   be

allowed two years’ time after joining to qualify

the typing test and for such candidates, typing

test would be held twice a year.

16

17.The only test required for eligible candidates

was to pass in the departmental test i.e. the test

of simple English, Hindi and Arithmetic. Thus, if

an eligible candidate passes in the written test of

simple English, Hindi and Arithmetic and also

passes in the type test, would be entitled to be

placed   in   the   seniority   list   for   promotion.   It

further   mandated   that   even   where   eligible

candidates   had   passed   in   the   departmental

written   test   of   simple   English,   Hindi   and

Arithmetic, but could not pass in the typing test,

would   still   be   eligible   for   promotion   and   be

placed in the seniority list with a rider that

he/she would have to qualify the typing test

within two years and such typing test for these

promoted candidates would be held twice a year,

that is to say that they would have at least four

17

chances  of appearing  in   the typing  test and

qualifying it subsequent to their promotion.

18.In the present case, the Board of Examiners

comprising of large number of Members changed

the   entire   procedure   and   they   established   a

completely   new   procedure.   They   awarded   20

marks   for   the   type   test   treating   it   to   be

compulsory,   60   marks   for   the   written

departmental test of simple English, Hindi and

Arithmetic with 20 marks for each subject and

further introduced an interview of 20 marks.

Thus, the merit list was to be prepared on the

total 100 marks as distributed above.

19.There is neither any provision nor any other

indication in the Manual duly approved by the

Executive Council for preparing such a merit list

based upon the marks awarded under different

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heads. The promotion was to be made on the

basis   of   seniority   subject   to   passing   the

departmental written test, once the candidate

was   eligible   having   five   years’   experience   in

Class­IV   and   matriculation   certificate   or

equivalent. The intention and object as culled

out from the aforesaid eligibility procedure was

that, seniority subject to qualifying the written

test would be the criteria for promotion.

20.The   Board   of   Examiners   on   their   own

changed the criteria and made it purely merit

based   by   introducing   an   interview   and   also

preparing the merit list on the basis of marks

awarded   in   the   type   test,   written   test   and

interview. As per the provisions of Clause 6.4 of

the   Manual,   type   test   was   not   mandatory.

Anybody who would fail in the type test, could

19

also be promoted subject to the rider that they

would have to qualify the type test within two

years from his joining.

21.What we notice is that, the Division Bench

approved the reasoning of the learned Single

Judge. The relevant extract of the judgment of

the Division Bench is reproduced below:

“Learned Single Judge as already noted above has

rightly proceeded to observe that interview was not

at all subscribed by the provisions holding the field.

We   are   also   of   the   same   view   that   procedure

prescribed ought to have  been adhered to by the

Board of Examiners. Board of Examiners on their

own could not have changed the procedure already

holding   the   field   as   laid   down   by   the   Executive

Council.”

22.However, the Division Bench fell in error in

applying   the   principle   of   estoppel   that   the

appellants having appeared in the interview and

being unsuccessful proceeded to challenge the

same and on that ground alone, allowed the

20

appeals, set­aside the judgment of the learned

Single   Judge.   The   Division   Bench   having

approved the reasoning of the learned Single

Judge,   ought   not   to   have   interfered   in   the

judgment   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   on   a

technical plea. The Division Bench ought to have

considered   that   the   appellants   were   Class­IV

employees   working   from   1977   onwards   and

expecting   from   them   to   have   raised   serious

objection or protest at the stage of interview and

understanding the principles of changing the

Rules   of   the   game,   was   too   far­fetched,

unreasonable and unwarranted.

23.The case laws relied upon by the Division

Bench would have no application in the facts of

the present case as none of the judgments relied

upon   by   the   Division   Bench   laid   down   that

21

principle of estoppel would be above law. It is

settled   principle   that   principle   of   estoppel

cannot   override   the   law.   The   manual   duly

approved by the Executive Council will prevail

over   any   such   principle   of   estoppel   or

acquiescence.

24.The   Division   Bench   relied   upon   the

following judgments:

(1)Union   of   India   and   another  Vs.  N.

Chandrashekharan and others

2

.

(2)Utkal University and others Vs. Dr. N.C.

Sarangi and others

3

.

(3)Chandra Prakash Tiwari Vs. Shakuntala

4

 .

(4)K.A. Nagmani Vs. Indian Airlines

5

.

(5)Madan   Lal   and   others  Vs.  State   of

Jammu and Kashmir and others

6

.

2 JT 1998(1) SC 295

3 JT 1999 (1) SC 101.

4 2002 (6) SCC 127

5 2009 (5) SCC 515

6 1995(3) SCC 486

22

25.In the case of Chandrashekharan (supra),

the plea taken by the unsuccessful candidates

was that the marks prescribed for interview and

confidential reports were disproportionately high

and the authorities could not fix a minimum to

be   secured   either   in   interview   or   in   the

assessment of annual confidential reports. In

the above case, there was no violation of any

statutory rules or the eligibility determined by

the rule making authority.

26.In the case of Utkal University (supra), the

objection taken by the unsuccessful candidates

was   with   regard   to   the   composition   of   the

Selection Committee. This again would not have

any application to the facts of the present case.

27.In  the  case   of  Chandra  Prakash  Tiwari

(supra), the unsuccessful candidate did not find

23

the result of the interview palatable and the

objection taken was that the process of interview

was unfair. This also has no application to the

facts of the present case.

28.In the case of  K.A. Nagmani (supra),  the

unsuccessful   candidates   were   given   equal

opportunity and no violation of any statutory

rule was alleged, as such, this judgment would

also have no application.

29.In the case of Madan Lal (supra), again the

objection taken by the unsuccessful candidate

was regarding the process of interview being

unfair.   This   case   also   does   not   have   any

application to the facts of the present case.

30.On the contrary, what we find is that, in the

case of Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu and others

24

Vs.  State of Orissa and others

7

, it has been

held that the suitability criteria is to be laid

down by the rule making authority and that the

selection criteria cannot be laid down by the

Selection   Board/Selection   Committee   unless

specifically   authorized.   In   the   present   case,

firstly, there was no authorization to the Board

of Examiners to lay down the selection criteria

and   further   there   was   clear   violation   of   the

suitability criteria laid down by the rule making

authority. Paragraph nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and

36   of   the   said   judgment   are   reproduced

hereunder:

“31.   Now,   power   to   make   rules   regulating   the

conditions   of   service   of   persons   appointed   on

Govt. Posts is available to the Governor of the

State under the Proviso to Article 309 and it was

in exercise of this power that the present rules

were   made.   If   the   statutory   Rules,   in   a   given

7 1995 (6) SCC 1

25

case,   have   not   been   made,   either   by   the

Parliament or the State Legislature, or, for that

matter, by the Governor of the State, it would be

open to the appropriate Government (the Central

Government   under  Article   73  and   the   State

Government under Article 162) to issue executive

instructions.   However,   if   the   Rules   have   been

made but they are silent on any subject or point

in issue, the omission can be supplied and the

rules   can   be   supplemented   by   executive

instructions. (See: Sant Ram Sharma V. State of

Rajasthan).

32.   In   the   instant   case,   the   Government   did

neither issue any administrative instruction nor

did   it   supply   the   omission   with   regard   to   the

criteria on the basis of which suitability of the

candidates was to be determined. The members

of the Selection Board, of their own, decided to

adopt   the   confidential   character   rolls   of   the

candidates   who   were   already   employed   as

Homoeopathic Medical Officers, as the basis for

determining their suitability.

33. The members of the Selection Board or for

that matter, any other Selection Committee, do

not have the jurisdiction to lay down the criteria

for   selection   unless   they   are   authorised

specifically   in   that   regard   by   the   rules   made

under  Article 309.  It is basically the function of

the Rule making authority to provide the basis for

26

selection. this Court in  State of Andhra Pradesh

and Anr. v. V. Sadanandam and Ors observed as

under: (SCC pp. 583­84, para 17):

“We are now only left with the reasoning of the

Tribunal   that   there   is   no   justification   for   the

continuance   of   the   old   rule   and   for   personnel

belonging   to   either   zone   being   transferred   on

promotion to offices in other zones. In drawing

such   conclusion,   the   Tribunal   has   travelled

beyond the limits of its jurisdiction. We need only

point out that the mode of recruitment and the

category from which the recruitment to a service

should   be   made   are   all   matters   which   are

exclusively within the domain of the executive. It

is not for judicial bodies to sit in judgment over

the wisdom of the executive in choosing the mode

of recruitment of the categories from which the

recruitment should be made as they are matters

of  policy decision  falling exclusively within the

purview of the executive.” (Emphasis supplied).

34. The Selection Committee does not even have

the inherent jurisdiction to lay down the norms

for selection nor can such power be assumed by

necessary implication. In P.K. Ramachandra lyer

and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (SCC pp. 180­

81 para 44) , it was observed :

“By   necessary   inference,   there   was   no   such

power   in   the   ASRB   to   add   to   the   required

qualifications. If such power is claimed, it has to

27

be   explicit   and   cannot   be   read   by   necessary

implication   for   the   obvious   reasons   that   such

deviation   from   the   rules   is   likely   to   cause

irreparable and irreversible harm”.

35. Similarly, in Umesh Chandra Shukla Etc. v.

Union of India and Ors. it was observed that the

Selection   Committee   does   not   possess   any

inherent power to lay down its own standards in

addition to what is prescribed under the Rules.

Both   these   decisions   were   followed   in

Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa and  Ors

and   the   limitation   of   the   Selection   Committee

were  pointed  out  that it  had  no  jurisdiction to

prescribe the minimum marks which a candidate

had to secure at the viva­voce test.

36.     It   may   be   pointed   out   that   rule   making

function under  Article 309  is legislative and not

executive as was laid down by this Court in B.S.

Yadav and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. For

this reason also, the Selection Committee or the

Selection   Board   cannot   be   held   to   have

jurisdiction to lay down any standard or basis for

selection as it would amount to legislating a rule

of selection.”

31.Further in the case of Tata Chemicals Ltd.

Vs.  Commissioner  of Customs (preventive),

28

Jamnagar

8

, it has been laid down that there can

be no estoppel against law. If the law requires

something to be done in a particular manner,

then it must be done in that manner, and if it is

not done in that manner, then it would have no

existence in the eye of the law. Paragraph 18 of

the said judgment is reproduced below:

“18. The Tribunal’s judgment has proceeded on the basis

that even though the samples were drawn contrary to law,

the   appellants   would   be   estopped   because   their

representative was present when the samples were drawn

and they did not object immediately. This is a completely

perverse finding both on fact and law. On fact, it has been

more   than   amply   proved   that   no   representative   of   the

appellant   was,   in   fact,   present   at   the   time   the   Customs

Inspector   took   the   samples.   Shri   K.M.   Jani   who   was

allegedly present not only stated that he did not represent

the  Clearing Agent  of the  appellants in  that he  was not

their   employee   but   also   stated   that   he   was   not   present

when the samples were taken. In fact, therefore, there was

no representative of the appellants when the samples were

taken. In law equally the Tribunal ought to have realized

that   there   can   be   no   estoppel   against   law.   If   the   law

requires that something be done in a particular manner, it

must   be   done   in   that   manner,   and   if   not   done   in   that

manner   has   no   existence   in   the   eye   of   law   at   all.   The

Customs   Authorities   are   not   absolved   from   following   the

8 2015 (11) SCC 628

29

law   depending   upon   the   acts   of   a   particular   assessee.

Something   that   is   illegal   cannot   convert   itself   into

something legal by the act of a third person.”

32.For   all   the   reasons   recorded   above,   the

appeals   deserve   to   be   allowed.   They   are,

accordingly, allowed.

33.The   impugned   judgment   of   the   Division

Bench dated 29.07.2016 is set aside and the

judgment   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   dated

26.08.2011 is restored.

34.We have been informed that some of the

appellants have retired and a couple of them

have also died, post retirement. Rest of them are

still   working.   Since   the   examinations   have

already been held in the year 2006­07, all the

appellants   who   are   found   to   be   eligible   for

promotion   as   per   the   existing   rules   and   as

directed by the learned Single Judge, would be

30

extended all consequential benefits.   Further,

where   the   appellants   have   died,   the   benefit

would be extended to their legal heirs entitled

under law for the same.

35.Pending   application(s),   if   any,   is/are

disposed of. 

…………..........................J.

[DINESH MAHESHWARI]

………….........................J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

NEW DELHI

JUNE 16, 2022. 

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