CRM-M-46103-2025            1 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-46103-2025

Reserved on : 11.09.2025

Pronounced on: 30.09.2025

Kulwinder Singh and others ......Petitioners

Vs.

State of Punjab and others ......Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA

Present: Ms. Rashika Bansal, Advocate

for the petitioners.

Mr. Iqbalpreet Singh, AAG, Punjab.

Mr. Bhim Singh, Advocate

for respondent No.2.

***

ANOOP CHITKARA J.

FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections

86 29.07.2025 Purana Shalla, District

Gurdaspur

140(3), 127(2), 351(2), 191(3),

115(2), 332(c) of BNS 2023

The petitioners, arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, have come up

before this Court under Section 528 BNSS for quashing of the FIR and all consequential

proceedings based on a compromise with the aggrieved person.

2. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved

person have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as

Annexure P-2.

3. After that, the petitioner came up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the

quashing petition, the aggrieved person has been impleaded as respondent.

4. This court had asked the parties to appear before the concerned court and had

asked the said court to give its report as per the format. The report reads as follows:

Name of the reporting

Court

Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class Gurdaspur

CRM-M-46103-2025            2 

FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections

86 29.07.2025 Purana Shalla, District Gurdaspur 140(3), 127(2), 351(2),

191(3), 115(2), 332(c) of

BNS 2023

Criminal Case no.

before trial Court

Shri Chandan Hans, JMIC, Gurdaspur

1. Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/

aggrieved persons(s)

Satnam Singh

2. Dates on which the statement(s) of the

complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved

persons(s) were recorded

02.09.2025

3. Has the identity of the complainant/

victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been

verified?

Yes

4. Whether all the victims/ all the

aggrieved persons have compromised

the matter?

Yes

5. Is there pressure, threat, or coercion

upon the victim(s)/aggrieved

person(s)/complainant?

No

6. Names of the accused person(s) 1. Kulwinder Singh

2. Palwinder Singh

3. Lakhwinder Singh

4. Arshdeep Singh

5. Gurnam Singh

6. Kamaljit Singh

7. Dates on which the statement(s) of the

accused persons(s) recorded

02.09.2025

8. Whether all the accused have

compromised the matter? If no, then

the names of the accused who have

compromised.

Yes, all the accused have compromised

the matter

9. Whether proclamation proceedings are

pending against any accused?

No

10. Has the police report been filed or

not?

No

11. Notice of accusation /Charges have

been framed or not?

No

12. Sections of statutes invoked in the

matter

140(3), 127(2), 351(2), 191(3), 115(2),

332 (c) of BNS, P.S. Purana Shalla

Gurdaspur

13. Whether the court is satisfied with the

genuineness of the compromise?

Yes

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

5. The State’s counsel has severely opposed this compromise and seeks dismissal of

the petition because of the heinous nature of the offence.

6. In the present case, the offences under sections 140(3) & 191(3) of BNS 2023 is

CRM-M-46103-2025            3 

not compoundable under Section 359 BNSS 2023. However, in the facts and circumstances

peculiar to this case, the prosecution qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed

by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.

7. The injured and all the accused had appeared before the Court of JMIC, Gurdaspur

and had stated that they had entered into a compromise. The parties belong to the same

village and must be living there for generations and might continue to live, who knows for

how long. In the closely-knit village community, when the parties have buried their

hatchets, the continuation of criminal proceedings will not advance the reformative

purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence.

8. The following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: -

a) The accused and the private respondent(s) have amicably settled the matter

between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded

before the concerned Court;

b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been secured

through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious means;

c) The victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings;

d) There is no objection from the private respondents in case present FIR and

consequent proceedings are quashed;

e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity,

moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters

concerning public policy;

f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial

affects career and happiness;

g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an

unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;

h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to

bring peace to family, community, and society;

i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing the conviction, sentence and

all previous proceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.

9. In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds,

The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri

Ram, who was the person injured as a result of firing, have

appeared before us and stated that they wish to compound the

offence. The offence for which both the appellants have been

convicted is one under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, but having regard to the nature of the injury

sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the proper offence for which

the appellants should have been convicted was under Section 324

CRM-M-46103-2025            4 

read with Section 34. Shri Ram received only one injury on the

shoulder and that was also in the nature of simple hurt. We

would, therefore, convert the conviction of the appellants to one

under Section 324 read with Section 34. Since the parties belong

to the same village and desire to compound the offence, we think,

in the larger interest of peace and harmony between the parties

and having regard to the nature of the injury, that it would be

proper to allow the parties to compound the offence.

10. In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds

as under:

[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they were

convicted by the High Court for the offence under section 307

Indian Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under law.

The parties, however. want to treat it a special case, in view of the

peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and indeed not

disputed that one of the accused is a lawyer practising in the

lower court. There was a counter case arising out of the same

transaction. It is said that this case has already been

compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh Babu v. State

of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT 361, has been also referred to in

support of the plea for permission to compound the offence.

11. In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court holds,

[5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh

v. State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 :

2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526

(SC) we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal

proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law

because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing

extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are

offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring

about peace and amity between the two sides. In the

circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006

registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of

the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and

all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the

final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges

framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.

12. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014:INSC:217 [Para 24-25, 31], 2014 (6) SCC

466, a two-member bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[24]. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has

approved the quashing of proceedings under section 307, IPC

whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of

serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in

each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be

justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an

explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in

various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of

judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and

the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the

Constitution of India. Stare Decisis is the fundamental principle of

CRM-M-46103-2025            5 

judicial decision making which requires `certainty' too in law so

that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall

take is discernable and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the

very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related

objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the

personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it

achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different

persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical

treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the

human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law

is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by "that curious,

almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to

be treated alike in like circumstances".

[25]. As there is a close relation between the equality and justice,

it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions

under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are

given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we

are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason

we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and

clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to

take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the

settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and

under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We

make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in

this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of

offences under Section 307 IPC.

[31]. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down

the following principles by which the High Court would be guided

in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the

parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code

while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or

refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with

the criminal proceedings :

(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is

to be distinguished from the power which lies in the

Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of

the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code,

the High Court has inherent power to quash the

criminal proceedings even in those cases which are

not compoundable, where the parties have settled

the matter between themselves. However, this

power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

(II) When the parties have reached the settlement

and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal

proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases

would be to secure :

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form

an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those

prosecutions which involve heinous and serious

offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,

rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in

nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,

for offences alleged to have been committed under

CRM-M-46103-2025            6 

special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act

or the offences committed by Public Servants while

working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely

on the basis of compromise between the victim and

the offender.

(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having

overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship

or family disputes should be quashed when the

parties have resolved their entire disputes among

themselves.

(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to

examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is

remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases

would put the accused to great oppression and

prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to

him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the

category of heinous and serious offences and

therefore is to be generally treated as crime against

the society and not against the individual alone.

However, the High Court would not rest its decision

merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC

in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.

It would be open to the High Court to examine as to

whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for

the sake of it or the prosecution has collected

sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to

proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this

purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by

the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is

inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body,

nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect

of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the

guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie

analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether

there is a strong possibility of conviction or the

chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the

former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and

quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later

case it would be permissible for the High Court to

accept the plea compounding the offence based on

complete settlement between the parties. At this

stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that

the settlement between the parties is going to result

in harmony between them which may improve their

future relationship.

(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power

under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of

settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the

settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged

commission of offence and the matter is still under

investigation, the High Court may be liberal in

accepting the settlement to quash the criminal

proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason

CRM-M-46103-2025            7 

that at this stage the investigation is still on and even

the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those

cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is

yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the

High Court can show benevolence in exercising its

powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment

of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On

the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is

almost complete or after the conclusion of the

evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,

normally the High Court should refrain from

exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as

in such cases the trial court would be in a position to

decide the case finally on merits and to come a

conclusion as to whether the offence under Section

307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases

where the conviction is already recorded by the trial

court and the matter is at the appellate stage before

the High Court, mere compromise between the

parties would not be a ground to accept the same

resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already

been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is

proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is

already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore,

there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty

of such a crime.

13. In State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149, Hon’ble Supreme Court

holds,

[14] We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note of

by the Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10 years

rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section

307 IPC, but not by the High Court. The High Court has completely

overlooked the various principles laid down by this Court in Gian

Singh , and has committed a mistake in taking the view that, the

injuries were caused on the body of Abdul Rashid in a fight

occurred at the spur and the heat of the moment. It has been

categorically held by this Court in Gian Singh that the Court, while

exercising the power under Section 482, must have "due regard

to the nature and gravity of the crime" and "the societal impact".

Both these aspects were completely overlooked by the High

Court. The High Court in a cursory manner, without application of

mind, blindly accepted the statement of the parties that they had

settled their disputes and differences and took the view that it

was a crime against "an individual", rather than against "the

society at large".

[15] We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have

been committed by the accused persons was a crime against an

individual, on the other hand it was a crime against the society at

large. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving social

control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities

within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be non-

compoundable, because the Code has identified which conduct

should be brought within the ambit of non-compoundable

CRM-M-46103-2025            8 

offences.

Such provisions are not meant, just to protect the individual, but

the society as a whole. High Court was not right in thinking that it

was only an injury to the person and since the accused persons

had received the monetary compensation and settled the matter,

the crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal justice system

has a larger objective to achieve, that is safety and protection of

the people at large and it would be a lesson not only to the

offender, but to the individuals at large so that such crimes would

not be committed by any one and money would not be a

substitute for the crime committed against the society. Taking a

lenient view on a serious offence like the present, will leave a

wrong impression about the criminal justice system and will

encourage further criminal acts, which will endanger the peaceful

co-existence and welfare of the society at large.

[16] We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside

the judgment of the High Court. The High Court was carried away

by the settlement and has not examined the matter on merits,

hence, we are inclined to direct the High Court to take back the

appeal to its file and decide the appeal on merits.

14. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 2014:INSC:496 [Para 4], 21.7.2014,

Supreme Court holds,

[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can

compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC

which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences

which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the

court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from

Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly

followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal)

543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC

303). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a

criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under section 482 of

the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably

settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even

though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the

High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings

will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences

which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder

etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that

will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be

said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such

offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society.

However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are

entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public

peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such

proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace

and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash

them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame

prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of

time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and

obstruct restoration of peace.

15. In Kailash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 2018(4) R.C.R (Criminal) 292, Hon’ble

CRM-M-46103-2025            9 

Supreme Court holds,

[7]. Upon perusal of the record, it appears that the incident has

occurred almost 30 years ago. Since the complainant/s and the

appellant-accused belong to the same family and are living in the

same house, they have buried their animosity and settled their

disputes amicably in writing under an agreement letter dated

28.07.2017, copy of which is already placed on the file. The

injured victims are brother and sister-in-law of the appellant. It is

also stated in the aforesaid application for

compromise/compounding of offence that there is no untoward

incident has ever taken place after the date of incident.

[8]. Though the offences under sections 307 and 326 of the IPC

are non-compoundable, having regard to the fact that the

incident in the present case did not have an impact on the society

in general, and having regard to the fact that the dispute between

the parties has been settled amicably and there is no likelihood of

the repetition of such incident, we allow the application for

compromise/compounding of offence and set aside the orders of

conviction and sentence passed by the courts below against the

appellant by exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India. The appellant is ordered to be acquitted of

the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is confined

in jail, he is ordered to be released from custody forthwith if not

required in any other case.

16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar, 2019:INSC:254 [Para 16.1], (2019) 5

SCC 570, the FIR was registered under S 307, 294 and 34 IPC based on the allegations that

Dhruv Gurjar (accused) armed with a 12-bore gun, and his gang, visited the house of the

complainant with a view to take revenge with his nephew. When the complainant told

them that his nephew was not present at home, on this Dhruv Gurjar fired, and the pellets

struck on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear. Disagreeing with the order of High Court

quashing the FIR, Hon’ble Supreme Court held,

[16.1] However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact

that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as

per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and

orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the

relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly

the seriousness of the offences and its social impact. From the

impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, it

appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the

respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between

a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social

impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State of

Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, 2014 15 SCC 29, the

Court's principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section

482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan

the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the

crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the

Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be

used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous

CRM-M-46103-2025            10 

prudence.

17. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not

compoundable under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no

reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under

Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our

opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of

recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise

of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle

distinction between compounding of offences by the parties

before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise

of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under

Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a Court

trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may

not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on

a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the

offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High

Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the

offences with which the accused stand charged are non-

compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under

Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose

controlled by Section 320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so,

we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under

Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory

for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and

caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands

that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court

is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance

of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process

of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the

situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may

be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power

must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where

refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the

process of law. The High court may be justified in declining

interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it

cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a

petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the

facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a

fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.

18. In State of M.P. v. Rajveer Singh, 2016:INSC:337 [Para 7], 2016(3) R.C.R.(Criminal)

176, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[7]. Considering allegations and counter-allegations, it was not

such a case which could have been compromised by the

complainant and the accused and FIR could not have been

quashed in such a serious case as that would be against public

policy and administration of criminal justice system. The FIR

discloses commission of cognisable offence under Section 307/34

IPC. Considering the nature of allegation, it is necessary to

investigate further in the facts and circumstances of the instant

case.

CRM-M-46103-2025            11 

19. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003 [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641,

a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for

quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: -

[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on

the subject, may be summarized in the following propositions:

16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court

to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the

ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only

recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash

a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground

that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and

the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the

purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an

offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of

section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power

to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-

compoundable.

16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or

complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of

justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide

ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends

of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information

Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and

victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts

and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of

principles can be formulated;

16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while

dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High

Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the

offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity

or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot

appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the

victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking,

not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The

decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the

overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for

serious offences;

16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be

criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant

element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so

far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from

commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar

transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate

situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal

proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,

the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a

criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

CRM-M-46103-2025            12 

16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in

propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the

financial and economic well-being of the state have implications

which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private

disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash

where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or

economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act

complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh

in the balance.

20. In The state of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalyan Singh, 2019:INSC:8 [Para 3.1], 2019 (4)

SCC 268, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[3.1] It is required to be noted that the original Accused was facing

the criminal proceedings under Sections 307, 294 read with

Section 34 of the IPC. It is not in dispute that as per Section 20 of

the Cr.PC offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34

of the IPC are non-compoundable. It is also required to be noted

that the allegations in the complaint for the offences under

Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC are, as such,

very serious. It is alleged that the accused fired twice on the

complainant by a country-made pistol. From the material on

record, it appears that one of the accused persons was reported

to be a hardcore criminal having criminal antecedents. Be that as

it may, the fact remains that the accused was facing the criminal

proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with

Section 34 of the IPC and that the offences under these sections

are not non-compoundable offences and, looking to the serious

allegations against the accused, we are of the opinion that the

High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal

proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with

Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that the original

Complainant and the accused have settled the dispute. At this

stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Gulab Das and Ors.

V. State of M. P., 2011 12 Scale 625 is required to be referred to.

In the said decision, this Court has specifically observed and held

that, despite any settlement between the Complainant on the

one hand and the accused on the other, the criminal proceedings

for the offences under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be quashed,

as the offence under Section 307 is a non-compoundable offence.

Under the circumstance, the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings

against the original Accused for the offences under Sections 307,

294 read with Section 34 of the IPC cannot be sustained and the

same deserves to be quashed and set aside.

[4] In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the

present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 6075

of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside.

21. In The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & others, 2019:INSC:307 [Para

13], 2019 (5) SCC 688, a two-member bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[13] Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of

CRM-M-46103-2025            13 

this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed

and held as under:

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to

quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable

offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having

overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or

arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and

when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst

themselves;

ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which

involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or

offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not

private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences

under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the

offences committed by public servants while working in that

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of

compromise between the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would

fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore

are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the

individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the

offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which

have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in

exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground

that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst

themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision

merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or

the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the

High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307

IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected

sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the

charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open

to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether

such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body,

nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the

High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is

collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge

is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible

when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the

ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of

this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read

harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances

stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to

quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable

offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious

impart on society, on the ground that there is a

settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the

High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;

the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed

with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

[14] Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has

quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections

CRM-M-46103-2025            14 

307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was

under progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a

compromise with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR

on the basis of a settlement. The allegations are serious in nature.

He used the fire arm also in commission of the offence. Therefore,

the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused is not at

all considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a

settlement between the accused and the complainant, the High

Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power

under Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable in the

eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents

of the accused.

22. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on

29.09.2021, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[11]. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’

cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise

of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the

court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of

Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature.

There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section

320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider interpretation and include

such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which

have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable.

Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence

within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo

against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the

peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable

reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of

the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the

offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their

dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification

of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise

of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the

offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably

evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the

body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach,

to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker

with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal

justice system.

[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-

heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a

private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial

has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against

conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of

delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is

always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that

the cases where compromise is struck postconviction, the High

Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in

view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in

which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard

to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct

of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for

CRM-M-46103-2025            15 

exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and

fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial

justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in

the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to

grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous

offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit

ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court

in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC

466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15].

[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which

involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and

moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public

policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups

only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at

large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process

would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may

also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or

professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through

duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It

is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.”

23. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when parties,

who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

24. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of

compromise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of

the compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.

25. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh,

2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds

“[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is

concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the

order of cognizance only because of the reason that matter was

already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave

Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their

petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to

these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In

any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of

cognizance would automatically stands vitiated.”

26. Considering the entire facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-mentioned

judicial precedents, I believe that continuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful

purpose whatsoever.

27. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent

jurisdiction under section 528 BNSS and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings

qua the petitioner(s). The bail bonds of the petitioner are accordingly discharged.

CRM-M-46103-2025            16 

Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above. All pending application(s), if any, stand

closed.

(ANOOP CHITKARA)

JUDGE

30.09.2025

anju rani

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes

Whether reportable: No.