No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
KUSHESHWAR DUBEY
v.
A
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1988
(RANGANATH MISRA AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.) B
Disciplinary and criminal pr;;ceedings-Holding of-Simul
taneously-Whether legal bar-Not advisable to evolve a hard and fast
rule valid for all
cases.
The appelJant, an employee of Respondent No. 1; was subjected to
disciplinary proceedings as also a criminal prosecution simultaneously C
on the allegation that he physically assaulted a supervising officer. He
tiled a civil action in the trial court asking for injunction against the
disciplinary action pending criminal trial. The trial court stayed
further proceedings in the disciplinary action till disposal of the crimi-
nal case.
In appeal, the appellate court affirmed the aforesaid order. D
However, the High Court allowed the Revision Application of the
Respondent and set aside the impugned order on the ground that there
is no
bar for an employer to proceed with the departmental proceeding
with
regard to the same allegation
for which a criminal·case is pending.
Allowing the appeal
to this Court, E
HELD: 1. The order of the High Court is vacated and that of the
trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored. The criminal action and the
disciplinary proceedings were grounded upon the same set of facts. The
disciplinary proceedings
should have been stayed and the High Court
was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of injunction F
which had been affirmed in appeal. [826A-B)
2(i) While there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceed
ings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate
to defer disciplinary proceedings a.waiting disposal of the criminal case.
In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent-employee G
to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the couri. [825E-F)
J 2(ii) Whether, 'in the facts and circumstances of a particular case,
there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings
would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in
the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the discipli-H
821
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A nary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. [825F·G]
B
c
The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960] 3
SCR 227; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1964] 7 SCR 555
and Jung Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969] 1SCR134, relied
upon.
Rama
P. C. v. Superintendent of Police, Kolar & Anr., AIR 1967
54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. & Ors. v. Chairman T.A. & C. Udhampur,
[1981] 2 SLR 225; Moulindra Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner &
Ors., [1973] LIC 6 1564; Shaikh Kasim v. Superintendent of Post
Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965 Mad. 502; Khusi Ram v. Union of India,
[1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal Chand Wazir
Chand Chandna,
[1982] I SLR 654, referred to.
3.
It is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and
fast, straight-jacket· formula valid for all cases and
<1f general
application without regard to the particularities of the individual·
D situation.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3129
of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.7.1987 of the Patna High
E
Court in Civil Revision No. 128 of 1987 (R).
R.K. Jain, Rakesh K. Khanna and R.P.
Singh for the Appellant.
R.N. Sachthey and Anip Sachthey for the Respondents.
F The following Order of the Court was delivered:
ORDER
Special leave granted ..
G The appellant is an employee in the Balihari Colliery of the
Respondent No. 1 and in
1986 was working as an electrical helper.
On
the allegation that .he physically assaulted a supervising officer by [
name S.K. Manda!, he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings as
also a criminal prosecution. Since the disciplinary proceeding as also
the criminal trial were taken simultaneously, the appellant filed a
civil
H action in the court of Munsif at Dhanbad asking for injunction against
]
K. DUBEY v. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. 823
the disciplinary action pending criminal trial. On 6.12.1986, the
Munsif made an order staying further proceedings
in the disciplinary
action till disposal
of the criminal case. The appeal of the Respondent
No. 1 against the order of learned Munsif
was dismissed on 3 lst
March,
1987, by the appellate court. Thereupon the Respondent No. 1
moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, The High Court by
its
order dated 7. 7 .1987 held:
"First information report was lodged against the opposite
party (appellant) and the same
was pending before the
competent court. Meanwhile the petitioners (respondents)
started departmental proceeding against the opposite
party. The opposite party filed a suit before the trial court
for declaration that appointment of the Enquiry
Officer
was illegal and for restraining the petitioners permanently
from continuing with the departmental proceeding during
the pendency of the criminal case. That
was allowed by the
trial court and confirmed by the lower court. There
is
rio
bar for an employer to proceed with the departmental
proceeding with regard to the same allegation for which a
criminal case
is pending.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below
· were wrong in granting in junction in favour of the opposite
party. -
In the result, this application is allowed and the order
impugned
is set
aside."
According to Mr. Jain for the appellant, the legal position settled
A
B
c
D
E
by this Court supported the stand that the disciplinary action had to be F
stayed till the criminal case
was over. He relied upon the decisions in
The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960] 3 SCR
227 and Tata
Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1964] 7 SCR 555. He
also referred
in the course of his submission to the decisions of diffe
rent High Courts in support of his propositions. Two cases out of the
several ones of the High Courts he relied upon are Khusi Ram
v. G
Union of India, [1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal
Chand Wazir Chand Chandna,
[1982] 1 SLR 654. Pathak CJ., as he
then
was', in the Himachal case indicated that· fair play required the
postponing of the criminal trial and Thakkar J.
as
our learned.brother
then was in the Gujarat case had also taken a similar view.
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
We would like to point out that there are also authorities in
support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceed
ings being
taken-one by way of the disciplinary proceeding and the
other in the criminal court. Reference may be made to decision of this
Court in Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969]
I SCR 134
and some decisions of High Courts such as Rama P. C. v. Superinten
dent
of Police, Kolar & Anr., AIR 1967 54 Mysore
220; Ali Mohd. &
Ors. v. Chairman I.A. & C. Udhampur, [1981] 2 SLR 225; Moulindra
Singh
v. The Deputy Commissioner &
Ors., [1973] LIC 6 1564 and
Shaikh Kasim
v. Superintendent of Police
Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965
Mad. 502.
Mr. Jain ~on tended that we should settle the law in a straight
jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be conflicting. We do
not propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship
and individual situations may not be available to be met and thereby
injustice
is likely to ensue.
In the Delhi Cloth & General Mills' case (supra), it was pointed
out by this Court:
"It is true that very often employers st&y enquiries pending
the decision
of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but
we cannot say that principles
of natural justice require that
an employer must wait for the decision at least
of the crimi
nal trial court before taking action against an employee. In
Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee
v. Mis. Newsman's Printing
Works,
[1956] LAC 188, this was the view taken by the
Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if
the case
is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or
law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the
employer to await the decision
of
lhe trial court, so that the
defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be
prejudiced
.....
".
In Tata Oil Mills' case (supra), Gajendragadkar, CJ, spoke for a
three Judge Bench thus:
"There is yet another point which remains to be consi
dered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the
view that since criminal proceedings had been started
against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been
stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal pro-
[
J
K. DUBEY v. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. 825
ceedings. As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and
General Mills Ltd.
v. Kushal Bhan, it is desirable that if the
incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman
in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the
employer, should stay the domestic enquiry pending the
final disposal of the criminal case
.....
".
ln _Jang Bahadur's case {supra) this Court said:
"The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the
employee
is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed to.
take action against him. The same issue may arise for deci
sion
in a civil or criminal proceeding pending in a court.
But the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar the
taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking such
action
is vested in the disciplinary authority. The civil or
criminal court has
no such power. The initiation and con
tinuation of disciplinary proceedings
in good faith is not
calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice
in the pending court proceeding. The employee is free to
move the court for an order restraining the continuance of
the disciplinary proceedings.
If he obtains a stay order, a
wilful violation of the order would of course amount to
contempt of court.
In
the absence of a stay order the disci
plinary authority
is free to exercise its lawful
powers."
A
B
c
D
E
The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to
support the position that while there could be
no legal bar for simul
taneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may
be cases where it
would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting dis
posal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open F
to the delinquent-employee to
seek such an order of stay or injunction
from the Court. Whether
in the facts and circumstances of a particular
case there should
or should not be such simultaneity of the proceed
ings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court
will
decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the
disciplinary
proceedin-gs should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. G
As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to
evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of
general application without regard to the particularities of the
individual-situation. For the disposal of the present case,
we do not
think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when
we do not
intend to lay down any general.guideline. H
A
B
c
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary pro
ceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view
that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the
High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of
injunction which had been affirmed
in appeal.
The appeal
is allowed and the order of the High Court is vacated
and that
of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored. The appel
lant shall be entitled to costs. Hearing fee
is assessed at
Rs.2,000.
We would like to point out that for the first time in this Court, the
enquiry report in the disciplinary proceedings
was produced. We
express no view about it.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
(
The Supreme Court of India's landmark judgment in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. provides critical guidance on the contentious issue of conducting simultaneous disciplinary and criminal proceedings against an employee for the same misconduct. This authoritative ruling, now easily accessible on CaseOn, clarifies that while there is no absolute legal bar, the decision to grant a stay of disciplinary proceedings is a matter of judicial discretion, dependent on the unique facts of each case. It moves away from a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach towards a more nuanced standard of fairness and justice.
The case involved Mr. Kusheshwar Dubey, an employee of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., who was accused of physically assaulting a supervising officer. Consequently, the company initiated two separate actions against him: an internal disciplinary proceeding and a criminal prosecution. Both actions were based on the very same incident.
Believing that facing both inquiries simultaneously would prejudice his defense, Mr. Dubey filed a civil suit seeking an injunction to halt the disciplinary action until the criminal trial concluded. The Trial Court agreed with him and granted a stay. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Appellate Court. However, the company took the matter to the High Court, which overturned the lower courts' decisions. The High Court reasoned that there is no legal prohibition preventing an employer from proceeding with a departmental inquiry, even if a criminal case on the identical matter is ongoing. This led Mr. Dubey to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether disciplinary proceedings must be stayed by default when a criminal case based on the same set of facts is pending. More specifically, the Court had to decide if there should be a hard and fast rule applicable to all such cases or if the decision should be left to the discretion of the courts based on individual circumstances.
The Supreme Court, after reviewing several precedents, established a balanced legal principle. It held that:
The Court drew upon its earlier decisions in The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, which suggested that staying an inquiry is “desirable” and “fair,” especially in cases involving grave charges or complex questions of fact, to avoid prejudicing the employee's defense.
The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s rigid interpretation that the absence of a legal bar automatically permits simultaneous proceedings. Instead, it focused on the principle of fairness. The Court observed that in Mr. Dubey's case, the “criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings were grounded upon the same set of facts.”
Forcing Mr. Dubey to reveal his defense strategy and evidence during the disciplinary inquiry could have severely compromised his ability to defend himself effectively in the criminal court. This potential for prejudice was the cornerstone of the Court's analysis. The Supreme Court concluded that the Trial Court’s initial decision to grant the stay was a proper exercise of judicial discretion, aimed at ensuring a fair process. The High Court, therefore, was wrong to interfere with a well-reasoned order that was affirmed on appeal.
For legal professionals pressed for time, understanding the nuances of judicial discretion in such rulings is crucial. CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distill complex judgments like this one, providing quick, actionable insights for effective case analysis.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the original injunction granted by the Trial Court. The final verdict confirmed that the disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Dubey must remain stayed until the criminal case is disposed of. The key takeaway is that the question of simultaneous proceedings is not a matter of absolute law but one of judicial discretion, guided by the principles of fairness and the specific facts of each case.
In the case of Kusheshwar Dubey, an employee of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., both disciplinary and criminal proceedings were initiated against him for allegedly assaulting a supervisor. The employee successfully obtained an injunction from the trial court to stay the disciplinary action pending the criminal trial, a decision affirmed by the appellate court. The High Court, however, reversed this, stating there was no legal bar to such parallel proceedings. The Supreme Court, in its final judgment, overturned the High Court's order. It held that while no absolute legal bar exists, courts must decide on a case-by-case basis. Given that both proceedings were based on the exact same facts, the Supreme Court ruled that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed to prevent prejudice to the employee's defense in the criminal trial, thereby restoring the trial court's original injunction.
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