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PETITIONER:

LACHHMAN DASS

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

SANTOKH SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1995

BENCH:

FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

BENCH:

FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

ANAND, A.S. (J)

CITATION:

1995 SCC (4) 201 JT 1995 (7) 437

1995 SCALE (3)704

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

THE 12TH DAY OF MAY,1995

Present:

Hon'ble Dr.Justice A.S.Anand

Hon'ble Mr.Justice Faizan Uddin

Mr.Sarwa Mitter, (Mr.Sujit Bhattacharya,) Adv. for M/s.

Mitter & Mitter Co., for the appellant

Mr.K.G.Bhagat, Mr.Kamal Baid, Ms.Kusum Choudhary, Advs. for

the Respondent

J U D G M E N T

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5752 OF 1995

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.20025 of 1991)

Lachhman Dass .....Appellant

versus

Santokh Singh .....Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Faizan Uddin, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India has been directed against the judgment dated 19th

February, 1991, passed by a learned Single Judge of the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision

No.1076 of 1987 reversing the judgment and order of eviction

passed against the tenant-respondent herein by the Rent

Controlling Authority, Karnal in Rent Case Nos.41/2 of 1984

(21/2 of 1982) and affirmed by the Appellate Authority,

Karnal in Rent Appeal No.1 of 1986 decided on 11th March,

1987.

3. The present appellant brought the suit seeking

the eviction of his tenant, the respondent herein, from the

House No.372, situated in Ward No.7, Sadar Bazar, Karnal

consisting of two rooms, one varandah and kitchen and an

open courtyard on the grounds set out hereunder :-

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I THAT the respondent was a defaulter in respect of

payment of arrears of rent from 1-8-1979 to 31-7-1982

at the rate of Rs.20/- per month amounting to Rs.720/-

and House Tax to Rs.90/-:

II THAT the respondent had started tethering cattle

and putting dung cakes on walls of demised premises

diminishing its value and utility;

III THAT the respondent had ceased to occupy the

tenanted premises for more than a year without

reasonable cause and;

IV THAT the respondent-tenant has shifted his

residence to his own residential House No.351/7, Sadar

Bazar, Karnal having purchased in the name of his wife

which is reasonably sufficient for himself and his

family members.

It may be pointed out here that the afore-mentioned grounds

of eviction fall under Sections 13(2) (1), 13(2) (iii),

13(2)(v) and 13(3)(a) (iv) respectively of the Haryana Urban

(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 [hereinafter

referred to as the `Act'].

4. The respondent-tenant contested the said eviction

proceedings by controverting the material averments made by

the appellant-landlord. The respondent, inter-alia, pleaded

that the appellant was not the only owner and landlord of

the suit premises and, therefore, he was not competent to

file the suit for his eviction. He pleaded that the arrears

of rent were duly tendered by him. He also pleaded that the

house purchased by his wife consists of two small rooms and

that since he has strained relations with his wife, she was

living separate from him. He further pleaded that he and his

married son and his children and the wife of his son are

living in the house in dispute and on these pleadings he

made a prayer for the dismissal of the eviction suit.

5. The Rent Controller after framing the necessary

issues and recording the parties evidence came to the

conclusion that the appellant alone was competent to

initiate eviction proceedings and since the tenant-

respondent had paid the arrears of rent, house tax and

interest on 18-1-1983, therefore, the ground is eviction

under Section 13(2)(1) of the Act became non-existent. As

regards the second ground, the Rent Controller found that

there was no cogent and reliable evidence to prove that the

respondent had committed any act diminishing the value or

the utility of the suit premises. As regard the third and

fourth grounds mentioned above, the Rent Controller on a

minute and detailed discussion of the parties evidence on

record, took the view that the respondent-tenant had ceased

to occupy the demised premises for a continuous period of

more than four months without any reasonable cause and had

in fact shifted his residence with his wife and children in

September, 1981 in House No.351, Ward No.7, Sadar Bazar,

Karnal which he had purchased in the name of his wife and

the same is reasonably sufficient for his requirements. The

Rent Controller, therefore, passed an order of eviction of

the respondent from the suit premises on the ground

contained in Section 13(2)(v) and 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act.

The respondent-tenant challenged the said finding in appeal

under Section 15(2) of the Act before the Appellate

Authority. The Appellate Authority re-examined the entire

evidence and the material on record and after such

reassessment of evidence affirmed the conclusions recorded

by the Rent Controller and, therefore, dismissed the appeal

filed by the respondent, maintaining the order of eviction.

The respondent-tenant then prefarred Civil Revision under

sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act before the High

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Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned Single Judge by

the impugned judgment set aside the concurrent findings of

the two courts below by holding that it was not established

that the respondent-tenant has acquired or is in possession

of reasonably sufficient accommodation which renders him

liable to be evicted from the demised premises.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord-

appellant strenuously urged that the learned Single Judge of

the High Court committed a grave and serious error in

interferring with the well reasoned judgment and findings of

fact recorded by the two courts below after proper

appreciation of evidence on record and took contrary view on

extraneous facts and circumstances by ignoring the relevant

evidence and material on record which has resulted into

miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that there is cogent and convincing

evidence indicating that the respondent had shifted to new

residential house which he had acquired in the name of his

wife and had absolutely ceased to occupy the tenanted

premises in question. It was urged that the learned Single

Judge totally ignored the fact that respondent-tenant had

come forward with a false defence that he had strained

relations with his wife and, therefore, he was living

separate in the demised premises with his son and his family

while his wife was living separate from him in House No.351,

which defence has been found to be entirely false by the two

courts below on a thorough marshalling of evidence on

record. It was also urged that the learned Single Judge made

out a case for respondent-tenant that his family consisted

of about 14 persons and, therefore, the house acquired by

him was not reasonably sufficient for the whole family which

is against the evidence on record. After hearing the learned

counsel for the parties and on perusal of the judgment of

the High Court as well as the judgments of the two

subordinate courts and other material on record we find that

there is much substance in the store-mentioned submissions

made by the learned counsel for the appellant.

7. The first question that arises for our

consideration is whether the learned Single Judge of the

High Court was justified in re-assessing the value of the

evidence and substitute his own conclusions in respect of

the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts

below, in exercise of his revisional powers vested in the

High Court under Section 15(6) of the Act. In the present

case as discussed earlier the Rent Controller passed the

order of eviction against the respondent on the ground

mentioned under Section 13 of the Act against which the

respondent preferred an appeal under sub-section (2) of

Section 15 of the Act and the Appellate Authority affirmed

the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. Here it

may be noted that the Act does not provide a second appeal

against the order passed in appeal by the Appellate

Authority under sub-section (2) of Section 15. The Act,

however, under sub-section (6) of Section 15 makes a

provision for revision to the High Court against any order

passed or proceedings taken under the Act. Thus, the

Legislature has provided for a single appeal against the

order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority and no

further appeal has been provided under the Act. The

Legislature has, however, made a provision for discretionary

remedy of revision which is indicative of the fact that the

Legislature has created two jurisdictions different from

each other in scope and content in the form of an appeal and

revision. That being so the two jurisdictions - one under an

appeal and the other under revision cannot be said to be one

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and the same but distinct and different in the ambit and

scope. Precisely stated, an appeal is a continuation of a

suit or proceedings wherein the entire proceedings are again

left open for consideration by the appellate authorities

which has the power to review the entire evidence subject,

of course, to the prescribed statutory limitations. But in

the case of revision whatever powers the revisional

authority may have, it has no power to reassess and

reaporeciate the evidence unless the statute expressly

confers on it that power. That limitation is implicit in the

concept of revision. In this view of the matter we are

supported by a decision of this Court in State of Kerala vs.

K.M. Charia Abdullah and Co. [1965 (1) SCR 601 at 604 ].

8. This Court in the case of Hari Shankar vs. Rao

Girdhari Lal Chowdhury [ 1962 Suppl (1) SCR 933 = AIR 1963

SC 698 ] had an occasion to consider the question of

distinction between an appeal and a revision and

Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was ) speaking for the Court

observed at page 939 of the report as follows :-

"The distinction between an appeal and revision is

a real one. A right to appeal carries with it right of

re-hearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute

conferring the right to appeal limits the re-hearing in

some way as we find has been done in second appeal

arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to

hear a revision is generally given to a superior court

so that it may satisfy, itself that a particular case

has been decided according to law."

9. In the case of State of Kerala vs. K.M. Charia

Abdulla & Co. [1965 (1) SCR 601] this Court expressed the

view that when the Legislature confers a right to appeal in

one case and a discretionary remedy of revision in another,

it may be deemed to have created two jurisdictions different

in scope and content. Again in the case of Neta Ram and

others vs. Jivan Lal and another [ AIR 1963 SC 499 ]

Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court

observed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court

do not include the power to reverse concurrent findings,

without showing how those findings are erroneous.

10. In the present case sub-section (6) of Section 15

of the Act confers revisional power on the High Court for

the purpose of satisfying itself with regard to the legality

or propriety of an order or proceeding taken under the Act

and empowers the High Court to pass such order in relation

thereto as it may deem fit. The High Court will be justified

in interfering with the order in revision if it finds that

the order of the appellate authority suffers from a material

impropriety or illegality. From the use of the expression

"Legality or propriety of such order or proceedings"

occurring in sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, it

appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court

under the Act is wider than the power under Section 115 of

the Code of Civil Procedure which is confined to

jurisdiction, but it is also not so wide as to embrace

within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an

appeal and disturb a concurrent finding of fact properly

arrived at without recording a finding that such conclusions

are perverse or based on no evidence or based on a

superficial and perfunctory approach. If the High Court

proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact

ignoring the aforementioned well recognised principles, it

would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High

Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine

distinction between an appeal and a revision. That being so

unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the

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concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below are

wholly perverse and erroneous which manifestly appear to be

unjust there should be no interference. In the present case

the two courts below have thoroughly examined and

appreciated the parties evidence and have recorded a

definite finding, entirely based on the evidence on record

that the respondent-tenant has ceased to occupy the demised

premises since after September 1981 and had, in fact,

alongwith his wife and family started living in the House

No.351, Ward No.7, Karnal, having been acquired by him in

the name of his wife.

11. It may be noticed that the learned Single Judge

has himself stated in the impugned judgment that it is not a

matter of dispute that both the accommodations i.e. the

demised premises and the house acquired by the tenant-

respondent, in the name of his wife, both have almost the

same capacity, yet the learned Single Judge took the view

that the house acquired by the respondent was not reasonably

sufficient for his requirements. If both the houses are

almost of the same capacity it is difficult to accept the

finding that the house acquired by the respondent is a

reasonably not sufficient for his requirements. The

observation of the learned Single Judge that the

respondent's family consists of about 14 persons is neither

here nor there, as admittedly, all those 14 persons are not

living at Karnal with the respondent and, particularly, in

the demised premises or in the house acquired by the

respondent. The learned Single Judge has himself further

observed in the impugned judgment that "though it is also in

evidence that some of the sons are either posted or working

outside Karnal yet it is patent that they keep on visiting

the petitioner." Thus, the learned Single Judge included the

occasional visitors of the respondent also to be the members

of the family which by no stretch of imagination could be

accepted to be a sound reasoning, to set aside the

concurrent findings of fact. It is also not the case of

respondent-tenant that 14 persons of his family are living

with him in the house. On the contrary from the evidence it

is clear that at the most the respondent's family consist of

six members including his wife who have been living in the

demised premises and all of them have shifted in the house

acquired by the respondent in the name of his wife. This

fact is sufficiently established from the oral and

documentary evidence on record. But surprisingly enough the

learned Single Judge ignored this part of the evidence and

disturbed concurrent findings for no good reasons, resulting

into miscarriage of justice.

12. In the facts and circumstances discussed above we

are satisfied that there were no reasons muchless cogent

reasons for the learned Single Judge to interfere with the

findings of fact recorded by the two courts below.

Consequently we set aside the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court and restore the orders of the two courts

below with costs of Rs.1000/-.