IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

WPA 6505 of 2026

Lagan Engineering Company Limited

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Majumder, ld. Sr. Adv.

Ms. Amrita Pandey,

Mr. Ghanshyam Pandey,

Mr. S. Auddy.

For the State : Mr. Swapan Kr. Dutta,

Mr. Susanta Pal,

Ms. Ananya Neogi.

Judgment reserved on : 23.04.2026

Judgment delivered on : 27.04.2026

SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :

1. The writ application has been preferred on the ground that the

impugned Award dated 20.02.2025 passed by the Learned

Judge, 3rd Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, Kolkata in Case

No. 03/2021 has been passed in gross violation of the cardinal

principles of natural justice, specifically the audi alteram partem

rule, inasmuch as the Tribunal peremptorily closed the evidence

Page 2

of the parties before cross-examination of the petitioner's witness

OPW-1 could be completed.

2. The petitioner relies upon the judgments and the settled legal

framework laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.

of India (P) Ltd. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813 , and

reiterated in State of Uttarakhand v. Sureshwati, (2021) 3

SCC 108, which mandates that where no domestic enquiry

has been held prior to dismissal, the employer is entitled to

lead evidence before the Tribunal for the first time and the

Tribunal must determine justifiability of the dismissal on

the basis of such evidence.

3. The petitioner further states that the workman/respondent No.

2 herein examined himself as PW-1. His examination-in-chief

was recorded on 08.06.2022 and 22.06.2022 . Petitioner the

Company examined Manas Kuma r Banerjee, its Personnel

Manager, as OPW-1. The examination-in-chief of OPW-1 was

recorded on 11.09.2024 and 23.09.2024.

4. The cross-examination of OPW-1 had commenced but was not

completed. Despite the petitioner's bona fide requests for time to

produce OPW-1 for completion of his cross-examination and to

place all relevant documents on record, the Learned Tribunal,

vide its order dated 20.11.2024, peremptorily rejected the

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petitioner's prayer for adjournment and unilaterally closed the

evidence of both parties. The petitioner's further application for

adjournment was similarly rejected by a detailed order dated

20.12.2024. The Petitioner was thereby deprived of the

opportunity to complete the cross -examination of its own

witness OPW-1, and to produce additional evidence such as the

attendance register and other relevant documents, which had

been specifically called for by the Tribunal itself vide Order No.

27 dated 08.09.2023 and Order No. 32 dated 12.03.2024.

5. Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits

that as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India in Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P)

Ltd. v. Management of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India

(P) Ltd. and others , and State of Uttarakhand v.

Sureshwati, since no domestic enquiry had been held prior to

dismissal, the Petitioner was entitled to lead evidence before the

Tribunal to justify the dismissal, and duly availed of that

opportunity.

6. Mr. Majumder further states that in deciding Issue No. 1, the

learned Tribunal held, inter alia, that the overall evidence of the

petitioner was found to be weak and insufficient to prove the

charges against the respondent No. 2, and thus decided the said

issue in favour of the respondent No. 2 even though the said

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reply against the show cause far from being a defence, further

corroborates the charges against the respondent No. 2 and

demonstrates a continuation of his misconduct in an even more

audacious form. This conduct - threatening further coercive

action in response to a legitimate disciplinary notice is a most

serious aggravation of the original misconduct and bears directly

on the nature of the respondent No. 2's conduct, the

appropriateness of the penalty of dismissal, and the absence of

any basis for a finding of victimisation. The Tribunal's complete

failure to consider and evaluate this material aspect of the

record vitiates its finding on Issue No. 1.

7. Mr. Majumder further argues that:-

(a) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer, or if the

enquiry held is found to be defective, the Tribunal cannot,

without permitting evidence, straightway direct

reinstatement of the dismissed employee.

(b) The employer has the right to adduce evidence before the

Tribunal to justify the action taken; if such an opportunity

is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse.

(c) The giving of an opportunity to the employer to adduce

evidence for the fist time before the Tribunal is in the

interest of both the management and the employee and to

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enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged

misconduct and or termination.

(d) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry

conducted by the employer or by the evidence placed before

the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed

cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases

where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest

victimization.

8. It is stated that in State of Uttarkhand vs. Sureshwati

(2021) 3 SCC 108, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the

above principles and held that where an employer fails to hold

an enquiry before dismissal or discharge of a workman, he can

justify his action by leading evidence before the Labour Court,

and the Labour Court has the authority to decide the

justifiability of the order of discharge or dismissal.

9. The Hon’ble Court in the case before it further held that the High

Court had committed an error in allowing the writ petition

merely on the ground that the employer had not conducted a

disciplinary enquiry, without adverting to the evidence adduced

by the employer before the Labour Court. The parallel with the

present case is manifest and direct.

10. It is further stated that the impugned Award has been passed in

gross violation of the cardinal principles of natural justice,

Page 6

specifically the audi alteram partem rule. The learned Tribunal,

by its order dated 20.11.2024 and 20.12.2024, peremptorily

closed the evidence of the parties before the cross -

examination of the petitioner’s own witness OPW-1, Manas

Kumar Banerjee, could be completed.

11. The cross-examination of OPW-1 had commenced but remained

wholly incomplete. The petitioner’s bona fide and repeated

requests for sufficient time to produce OPW-1 for completion of

cross-examination were rejected without adequate or valid

reason. A party’s right to lead complete evidence, and the right

to have its witness’s cross-examination fully concluded, is a

fundamental ingredient of the right of hearing guaranteed by

the principles of natural justice. No litigant can be condemned

on the basis of incomplete evidence caused by the Tribunal’s

own premature closure order. The impugned Award passed on

such a truncated and incomplete record is vitiated at its root

and is liable to be set aside in its entirely.

12. The relevant observation/finding of the Tribunal in its

Award is as follows:-

“It is to mention here that after closing the evidence

of this case, date of argument was fixed but on the

date of argument, Ld. Advocate for the

OP/Company filed ad journment petition. This

Tribunal after passing a reasoned order rejected

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the said adjournment petition on 20.11.2024 and

fixed a date for Award. It is to mention here that on

20.12.2024 i.e. the fixed date for passing Award,

Ld. Advocate for the OP/Company filed a petition

with the prayer for adjournment seeking

opportunity to adduce evidence. On the same date,

Ld. Advocate for the applicant/workman filed a

petition seeking opportunity to submit written notes

of argument. This Tribunal passed a detailed order

on 20.12.2024 and rejected the adjournment

petition submitted by the OP/Company and at the

same time allowed both the parties to file written

notes of argument before the date of passing

Award. In fact, neither the OP/Company nor the

applicant/workman has filed written notes of

argument in this case. Be it mentioned here that

actually there is no provision for argument hearing

in a case u/s. 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 as well as there is no such provision in

the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958.”

13. It appears from the evidence of the OPW No.1 that (evidence of

cross examination) is incomplete and as the evidence has

been closed, there is also no scope for further

witnesses/evidence.

14. On 23.09.2024, the tribunal held:-

“……….. It is to mention here that after closing the

evidence of this case, date of argument was fixed but on

the date of argument, Ld. Advocate for the OP/Company

filed adjournment petition. This Tribunal after passing a

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reasoned order rejected the said adjournment petition on

20.11.2024 and fixed a date for Award. It is to mention

here that on 20.12.2024 i.e. the fixed date for passing

Award, Ld. Advocate for the OP/Company filed a petition

with the prayer for adjournment seeking opportunity to

adduce evidence. On the same date, Ld. Advocate for the

applicant/workman filed a petition seeking Opportunity to

submit written notes of argument. This Tribunal passed a

detailed order on 20.12..2024 and rejected the

adjournment petition submitted by the OP/Company and

at the same time allowed both the parties to file written

notes of argument before the date of passing Award. In

fact, neither the OP/Company nor the applicant/workman

has filed written notes of argument in this case. Be it

mentioned here that actually there is no provision for

argument hearing in a case u/s. 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 as well as there is no such provision in

the West Bengal Industrial Dispute Rules,

1958…………………”

15. In Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre vs. Management &

Ors. (Supra) the Supreme Court held as follows :-

“We have already expressed our view regarding the

interpretation of section 11A. We have held that the

previous law, according to the decisions of this Court, in

cases where a proper domestic enquiry had been

held, was that the Tribunal, had no jurisdiction to

interfere with the finding of misconduct except

under certain circumstances. The position further

was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to

interfere with the punishment imposed by an

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employer both in cases where the misconduct is

established in a proper domestic enquiry as also

in cases where the Tribunal finds such misconduct

proved on the basis of evidence adduced before it.

These limitations on the powers of the Tribunals were

recognised by this Court mainly on the basis that the

power to take disciplinary action and impose

punishment was part of the managerial functions. That

means that the law, as laid down by this Court over a

period of years,' had recognised certain managerial

rights in an employer. We have pointed out that this

position has now been changed by section 11 A.

The section has the effect of altering the law by

abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as

it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to

differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at

by an employer as well as the punishment

imposed by him.”

16. In State of Uttarakhand & Ors. vs. Sureshwati (2021)

SCC 108 para 18, 19, 20 and 21 , the Court held:-.

“18. This Court has in a catena of decisions held that

where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before

dismissal or discharge of a workman, it is open for him

to justify the action before the Labour Court by leading

evidence before it. The entire matter would be open

before the tribunal, which would have the jurisdiction to

satisfy itself on the evidence adduced by the parties

whether the dismissal or discharge was justified.”

19. A four Judge Bench of this Court in Workmen v.

Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd. held that :

Page 10

“ 11. It is now well settled by a number of decisions of

this Court that where an employer has failed to

make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging

a workman it is open to him to justify the action

before the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence

before it. In such a case the employer would not have

the benefit which he had in cases where domestic

enquiries have been held. The entire matter would be

open before the tribunal which will have

jurisdiction not only to go into the limited

questions open to a tribunal where domestic

enquiry has been property held (see Indian Iron &

Steel Co. v. Workmen) but also to satisfy itself on

the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the

dismissal or discharge was justified. We may in this

connection refer to Sana Musa Sugar Works (P) Limited

v. Shobrati Khan, Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, and

Punjab National Bank Limited v. Workmen. These three

cases were further considered by this Court in Bharat

Sugar Mills Limited v. Jai Singh, and reference was also

made to the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in

Ram Swarath Sinha v. Belsund Sugar. It was pointed

out that “the important effect of omission to hold an

enquiry was merely this: that the tribunal would not

have to consider only whether there was a prima facie

case but would decide for itself on the evidence adduced

whether the charges have really been made out”. It is

true that three of these cases, except Phulbari Tea

Estate case, were on applications under Section 33 of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But in principle we

see no difference whether the matter comes before the

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tribunal for approval under Section 33 or on a reference

under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In

either case if the enquiry is defective or if no enquiry has

been held as required by Standing Orders, the entire

case would be open before the tribunal and the

employer would have to justify on facts as well that its

order of dismissal or discharge was proper. Phulbari

Tea Estate case was on a reference under Section 10,

and the same principle was applied there also, the only

difference being that in that case there was an inquiry

though it was defective. A defective enquiry in our

opinion stands on the same footing as no enquiry and in

either case the tribunal would have jurisdiction to go

into the facts and the employer would have to satisfy

the tribunal that on facts the order of dismissal or

discharge was proper.”

20. Subsequently in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v.

Ludh Budh Singh this Court held that :

“60….(1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by

the management, or if the management makes it

clear that it does not rely upon any domestic

enquiry that may have been held by it, it is

entitled to straightway adduce evidence before the

Tribunal justifying its action. The Tribunal is

bound to consider that evidence so adduced before

it, on merits, and give a decision thereon. In such

a case, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to

consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as

the employer himself does not rely on it.

* * * *

Page 12

(3) When the management relies on the enquiry

conducted by it, and also simultaneously adduces

evidence before the Tribunal, without prejudice to its

plea that the enquiry proceedings are proper, it is the

duty of the Tribunal, in the first instance, to consider

whether the enquiry proceedings conducted by the

management, are valid and proper. If the Tribunal is

satisfied that the enquiry proceedings have been held

properly and are valid, the question of considering the

evidence adduced before it on merits, no longer

survives. It is only when the Tribunal holds that the

enquiry proceedings have not been properly held, that it

derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute

and in such a case it has to consider the evidence

adduced before it by the management and decide the

matter on the basis of such evidence.”

21. Reliance is again placed on the judgment of this

Court in Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.

of India (P) Ltd. wherein the broad principle regarding

holding of the enquiry were spelt out as:

“32. From those decisions, the following principles

broadly emerge:

“(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to

decide upon the quantum of punishment are

mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is

referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see

if action of the employer is justified.

(2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is

expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with

the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and

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principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be

an empty formality.

(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an

employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible

conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the

said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in

judgment over the decision of the employer as an

appellate body. The interference with the decision of the

employer will be justified only when the findings arrived

at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is

guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala

fide.

(4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if

the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the

Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and

validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the

employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It

is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first

time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee

to adduce evidence contra.

(5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is

that the Tribunal would not have to consider only

whether there was a prima facie case. On the other

hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order

of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal

and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to

decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is

proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of

managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of

defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no

enquiry.

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(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the

evidence placed before it for the first time in justification

of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or

after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to

be defective.

(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should

straightaway, without anything more, direct

reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee,

once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or

the said enquiry is found to be defective.

(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the

opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before

the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the

appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for,

the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an

opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the

first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the

management and the employee and to enable the

Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged

misconduct.

(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry

conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed

before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment

imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal

except in cases where the punishment is so harsh

as to suggest victimisation.

(10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of

dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or

paid compensation is, as held by this Court in Panitole

Tea Estate v. Workmen within the judicial decision of a

Labour Court or Tribunal.

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* * * *

40. Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect

of cases where a domestic enquiry has b een held

as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the

matter on the evidence adduced before it for the

first time, the satisfaction under Section 11 -A,

about the guilt or otherwise of the workman

concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to

consider the evidence and come to a conclusion

one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry

has been held by an employer and a finding of

misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ

from that finding in a proper case and hold that

no misconduct is proved.

41. We are not inclined to accept the contentions

advanced on behalf of the employers that the stage for

interference under Section 11-A by the Tribunal is

reached only when it has to consider the punishment

after having accepted the finding of guilt recorded by an

employer. It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may

hold that the punishment is not justified because the

misconduct alleged and found proved is such that it

does not warrant dismissal or discharge The Tribunal

may also hold that the order of discharge or dismissal is

not justified because the alleged misconduct itself is not

established by the evidence. To come to a

conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to re-

appraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately it may

hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the

misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment of

dismissal or discharge. That is why, according to us,

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Section 11-A now gives full power to the Tribunal to go

into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these

points. Now the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to

reappraise the evidence and come to its conclusion

enures to it when it has to adjudicate upon the dispute

referred to it in which an employer relies on the findings

recorded by him in a domestic enquiry. Such a power

to appreciate the evidence and come to its own

conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was

always recognised in a Tribunal when it was

deciding a dispute on the basis of evidence

adduced before it for the first time. Both categories

are now put on a par by Section 11-A.”

17. In the present case, the tribunal’s has categorically noted that

no further opportunity would be granted to the petitioner for

adducing further evidence as prayed for, even though evidence

was necessary. As such the order is clearly against the principles

of natural justice and a clear abuse of the process of law.

18. Not providing an opportunity to adduce evidence in spite of

sufficient cause being shown for the delay, has caused severe

prejudice to the petitioner herein.

19. Thus the impugned award dated Award dated 20.02.2025,

passed by the Learned Judge, 3rd Industrial Tribunal, West

Bengal, Kolkata in Case No. 03/2021, is hereby set aside.

20. The proceeding in Case No. 03/2021 under Section 10 (1B)(d) of

the I.D. Act is restored to the file of the learned Third Industrial

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Tribunal, Kolkata, for fresh adjudication by permitting the

petitioner herein to adduce fresh and/or further evidence in

accordance with law, without any delay and proceed to dispose

of the case expeditiously preferably within a period of 3 months

from the date of communication of this order, by passing a fresh

award without being influenced by the earlier award which

has been set aside.

21. It is also made clear that this Court has not gone into the merit

of the case.

22. WPA 6505 of 2026 is disposed of.

23. Connected application, if any, stands disposed of.

24. Urgent photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for,

be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite

formalities.

[Shampa Dutt (Paul). J]