No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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LAXMIKANT PANDEY
v.
· UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
AUGUST 14, 1991
[RANGANATH MISRA, CJ, M.H. KANIA
AND KIJLDIP SINGH, .IJ.J
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 32-Writ by child welfare
agencies-Indian children-Adoption-Procedures laid down in ( 1984)
2 SCR 795-Modificatiol!.
The writ petitioners-some of the licensed welfare agencies con·
templated under the judgment of this Court in (1984) 2 SCR 795, and
petitioner No. 2, the Central Voluntary Adoption Resource Agency
prayed
that the Indian children adopted to be allowed to retain their
citizenship till they attain the age of majority; that birth certificates to
be issued based upon attested copies of Court's certificate (decree),
adoption deed
or affidavits of the officials of the licensed agencies; that
quota fixed for placement of children with Indian families
he quashed;
that show cause notice be is:sued before cancellation of registration/
licence to the registered agency; that setting up of Central Adoption
Resource Agency be stayed; that to enable the agencies to maintain high
standards of care for the children, expenses
by about 25% be revised
and annual escalation of
10% be made; and that transfer of children
from statutory homes to recognised agencies for placement
be allowed.
Partly allowing the writ petition, this Court,
F
HELD: I. If the Indian citizenship is allowed to continue until the
adopted child attains the
age of majority, it would run counter to the
need of quick assimilation and may often stand as a barrier to the
requirements of the early
cementing of the adopted child into the adop·
live family. [574G-H]
· G 2. The birth certificate of the adopted child be obtained on the
basis
of application of the society sponsoring adoption.
On the basis of
the application and suc.h other material which may be relevant to be
found in an affidavit to accompany the application made by a responsi
ble person belonging to the agency, the local magistrate should have the
authority
to make an order approving the particulars to be entered in
H the birth certificate and on the basis of
the magisterial order the requi-
568
>-.
. PANDEY v. U.0.1. 569
site ~ertificate should be granted. This process should be done only after
adoption is finalised and the particnlars of the adopting foreign parents
are available to
be inclnded. The Chief District Medical Officer (COMO) may be involved in the matter of ascertainment of the age and
the magistrate may ordinarily act on the certificate granted by the
COMO. [574H-57SD) .
3. Registered societies to entitle themselves for renewal of regist
ration of licence shonld exhibit their involvement in the process of adop·
tion and the anthority should have evidence to satisfy that the agency is
really involved in the activity. [57SG)
A
B
4. The licensing anthority should ordinarily ensure that the C
registered agency has proper child care facilities
so that an agency
which does not have snch facilities may over a period of
years go out of
the field.
[57SEJ
S. In the event of registration/licence being proposed to be cancel-D
led, an opportudity should
be granted to such agency. That would
answer the requirements of natural justice and would uphold a healthy
scheme of administration.
[57SH-576AI
6. The setting up of CARA is justified.
Such an institution would
be
an organisation of primacy and would work as a useful agency
In the
field. Although there should
he no keen competition for offering adop-E
lions, regulated competition may perhaps keep
up the system in a
healthy condition. Existence of CARA
in that field is, therefore,
welcome.
[576A·Bl
7. Keeping in view the general rise in cost of living an escalation F
by 30% is allowed. The matter may be reviewed once in three years
so
far as escalation of expenses is concerned. [576C-D
I
8.1. The children, who can be transferred for the purposes for
placement, would
be those, whose parents are not known, orphans and G
perhaps those
who are declared as abandoned children. The homes are
not set
up in several States and areas. Even Juvenile Boards have not
been properly functioning and the recognised agencies do not have the
facility
of child care. In these circumstances to order transfer of
children from statutory homes to recognised agencies can
Indeed not be
accepted as a rule. [5760-Fj
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570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 3 S.C.R.
8.2. As a11d when such a request is received from recognised
agencies, the Juvenile Court
or the Board set up under the Act may
consider the
feasibility of such transfer and keeping the interest of the
.child in view, the possibility of an adoption within a short period and
the facilities available in the recognised agency as also other relevant
features,
make appropriate Orders. A strait-jacket formula may very
often
be injurious to the interest of the child. [S76F-G
I
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Misc. Petition Nos.
5704 and 8842 of 1990.
IN
Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 1171of1986.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Altai Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, A.S. Nambiar,
Laxmi
Kant
Pandey in-person, M~. A. Subhashini, Ms. Niranjana
D Singh, Ms. Shanta Vasudeva, P.K. Manohar, K.R. 1-iambiar, Jagdeep
Kishore,
T.V.S.N. Chari, Ms.
Suruchi Aggarwal, Ms. Manjula Gupta,
Bharati Reddy, Ms. Kusum Choudhary, Ms. Bina Gupta, Ms. Monika
Mohil, Ms. Vandana Saggar, Gopal Singh, A.S. Pundir, Manoj
Swamp, V. Krishnamurthy, Ms. H. Wahi, B.B. Singh, D.N. Mukher
jee, P.H. Parekh, Ms. Chandan Ramamurthi, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal,
E R.K. Mehta, Ms. Urmila Kapoor, M. Veerappa, Uma Nath Singh,
A:S. Bhasme, Kailash Vasdev, G. Prabhakar, S.K. Bhattacharya,
R.S. Suri, Ms. S. Dikshit, Prabir Choudhary, K. Swamy, Aruneshwar
Gupta, Ms. M. Karanjawala, H.K. Puri and Ms. Rani Chhabra for the
appearing parties.
F The following Order of the Court was delivered:
In Laxmikant Pandey v. Union of India, [1984) 2 SCR 795 this
Court laid down the procedure to be followed in adoption of children
by foreigners. The Court observed the fact tha1 children are a
supremely important national asset and the future well-being
of
the·
G nation depends upon how the children grow and develop. It quoted
with approval the report of the Study Team on Social Welfare where it
was said:
"The physical and mental health of the nation is deter
mined largely by the manner in which it is shapped in the
H early stages."
?~
.:ies 1
~ rr ~
PANDEY v. U.0.l. 571
~Court also quoted with approval from the National Policy for the A
~·e of Children where it was said:
,
,
"The nation's chilaren are a supremely important assets.
Their nurture and solicitude are our responsibility. Chil
dren's programme should find a prominent part
in our
national plans for the development of human resources, so
B
that our
childccn grow up to become robust citizens, physi
cally fit, mentally alert and morally healthy, endowed with
the skills and motivations needed
by society. Equal
opportunities for development to all children during the
period
of growth should be our aim, for this would serve
our larger purpose of reducing inequality and
ensuring C
social justice."
Thus saying, this Court laid down the procedure to be followed
and while doing so, the Court referred to recognised child welfare
agencies and provided for their licensing or registration
by the Central D
Government. Petitioners
in this application are some of the licensed
welfare agencies contemplated under the judgment of this court and
petition no. 2
is the Central Voluntary Adoption Resources Agency
which
is a coordinating unit based at Delhi.
In these applications
petitic;rners have made the following E
prayers:
(a)(i) All Government/juvenile homes, nursing,homes and
hospitals-Government or private, will apply for declara
tion
of a child as abandoned and free for placement and if
the parents of the child are not known, such children F
should be transferred to the recognised institution/place
ment agency as requested for
by them within a fixed time
frame;
(ii) all recognised placement agencies depending upon G
their capacity to accommodate and care for those children
after accounting for their age and qualification should be
allowed to seek transfer of those children from Govern
ment/juvenile courts and nursing homes/hospitals and such
institutions should be obliged to transfer the children
tu
such placement agencies; H
572
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.
(iii) Juvenile Welfare Boards/Courts should al;fow ·'1e
aforesaid transfers in favour of the recognised age or
rehabilitation through guardianship/adoption fro.m •I
CV ARAS or otherwise;
(iv) Juvenile Welfare Boards/Courts should not disturb
the custody
of children abandoned directly with the recog
nised placement agencies when approached for
declaring/
them as abandoned and free for placement and such orders.
·
may be passed ex parte and confirmed after notice to the
concerned parties;
(b )(i)
Quota fixed by the Central Government for place
ment of children with Indian families may be quashed'as
being contrary to the decision in Laxmikant Pandey's case;
(ii) in the alternative, if this Court upholds the validity
of
the circular fixing the quota, the percentage may be suit
ably reduced;
(iii) this court may direct that if the
quota is to be fixed,
children with
handii:aps, medical problems and other
drawbacks should be excluded from the total count as also
girls above one year and boys above two years
of age
should be exclude from counting;
(c)
The State Governments and the various Union Teri
tories should be directed
to issue birth certificates based
upon att{Osted copies of court's certificate (decree), adop
tion
deed or on the basis of affidavits of officials of the
licensed agencies;
(d) This Court may approve by way
of revision of expenses
by
about 25% with effect from the date of the application
and another
10% increase annually to enable the agencies
to maintain high standards of care for the children;
(
e) The Indian children adopted abroad or to be allowed to
retain their cit.izenship/nationality till they attain the age
of
majority wherever they should exercise their option one
way
or the other;
(f)(i)
The
Central Government should be directed to act
..
PANDEY v. U.O.I. 573
by itself or through the State/Union Territory Govern
ments to issue show cause notice before refusing to extend
recognition and grant personal hearing before taking offi
cial action and reasoned orders should be made
in support
of such action;
A
(ii) In the event of cancellation of recognition, a time B
frame should be fixed to clear all the
cases already in the
pipeline for being processed;
(ii) An appellate authority should be prescribed for chal
lenge of governmental action
as stated above;
(g)(i) The Court may direct stay of governmental action
in
the matter of setting up of Central Adoption Resource
Agency (CARA) and ultimately hold that there was
no
lqnger any need for such as agency in view of the fact that
many private agencies were not available to monitor the
programme.
c
D ~ Notice was ordered on these petitions on September 21, 1990,
>-.
and these several months that have followed have been taken by diffe
rent State Governments and Union Territories and others to place
their affidavits for consideration of this Court.
We have heard counsel for the appearing parties at length.
E
Before we deal with several prayers placed before the Court for con
sideration it
is perhaps necessary to refer to the provisions of the
Children's Act of
1960 and the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986. The
scheme
of these two Acts is not very different. The definitions of
'neglected child' and 'neglected juvenile'
is absolutely the same. The F
mechanism for administering the statutes is also more or less the same.
Under section 4(1) of the Children's Act, a Child Welfare Board is
intended to take charge of neglected children. Under s. 4(1) of the
Juvenile Justice Act, a Welfare Board for the neglected juveniles
is
similarly contemplated. Sub-sections
(3)·and (4) of either Act autho-
rise the Board to function as a Bench of Magistrates and confers on G
such Board certain powers under Criminal Procedure Code conferable
on a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First
Class. Section 9 of the Children's Act contemplates of Children's
Homes and detailed provisions have been made
in the matter of setting
up of such homes and management thereof. Section
11 contemplates
of Observation Homes. Chapter
Ill deals with neglected children. H
I
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[1991] 3 S.C.R. /
Under Chapter II of the Act of 1986 provision has been made for
1
,
setting up of Juvenile Homes (s. 9), Special Homes (s. 10) and Obser
vation Homes (s. 11). Both the Acts provide for After Care
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'•
organisation.
Though these two statutes
in recognition of the importance of
B children to society have made these beneficial provisions, 'nothing con
crete and substantial appears to have been done yet for implementing
either statute
in a serious way. The Children's Act has been operative
for more than
30 years while the Act of 1986 is in force for about five
years. Yet most of the provisions in the two statutes are still to be
worked
out in a real way.
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The Union of India has set up a Department of Women and
Child Development and most of the States and Union Territories have
corresponding departments, yet
full coordination has not been
achieved. The responsibility of administering the
two statutes is not
properly shared. Monitoring seems to
be very much wanting.
In course of hearing of this petition we asked learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the
Union Government to tell us as to
what happens to the
children-both boys and girls-who are lodged in
the Homes when they cease to be children under the statute. It may be
pointed
out that under the Children's Act boys upto 16 and a girl upto
E
18 years come within the definition of
"child". If 'children' within the
meaning
of the term are lodged in various types of homes indicated in
the two statutes
what exactly happens to them when they cease to be
children by passing of time has remained an·enigma in the absence of a
clear answer. Obviously no provision has been made
in these two Acts
to meet such a situation. Is it the intention of the stautes then that once
F a boy or girl ceases to be a child and does not come within the purview
of the stautes he/she would
have to be thrown out from the home on to
the street as no more cared for? What then would be the effect of such
a situation? Since that is not very relevant for disposing of this peti
tion,
we do not intend to proceed with that aspect any longer.
G
We are inclined to keep the handicapped children out of the
purview of the judgment of this Court.
We do not, however, agree that
.>
Indian citizenship should continue until the adopted child attains the
age
of majority and is legally competent to opt.
Such a step would run
counter to the
need of quick assimilation and may often stand as a
barrier to the«equirements of the early cementing of the adopted child
H il)to the adoptive family.
In regard to the issue of the birth certificate
.....
PANDEY v. U.O.I. 575
of the adopted child we are of the view that such certificate should be
obtained on the basis
of application of the society sponsoring adop-A
tion. In most of these cases the registration
of birth may not be avail
able because that would not have been done. We are
of the view that
on the basis
of the application and such other material which may be
relevant to be found in an affidavit to accompany the application made
by a responsible person belonging to the agency the local magistrate B
should have the auihority to make an order approving the particulars
to be entered in the birth certificate and on the basis of the Magisterial
order the requisite certificate should be granted. This process should
be done only after adoption
is finalised and the particulars of the
adopting foreign parents are available to be inclined. There
is no point
in having
tw.o birth certificates, one before the child is placed for
adoption and another when adoption
is completed. If the procedure C
for taking
out a birth certificate is deferred until adoption is finalised
the certificate can
lie obtained once for all. We are of the view that the
Chief District Medical Officer (COMO) may be involved in the matter
of ascertainment of the age and the magistrate may ordinarily act on
the certificate granted
by the
COMO. 'D
We gather that many of these agencies have indeed no child care
facilities. In the event of such facilities not being available maintaining
children in hygienic condition and
in an environment which would be
healthy for the
childreil's growth .and mental development would
indeed be difficult. The licensing authority should ordinarily ensure E
that the registered agency has proper child care facilities so that an
agency which does not have such facilities may over a period of years
go
out of the field.
The affidavit of the
Union Government indicates that it never
intended to fix any quota for the purpose of allowing renewal of regist-F
ration
or licence. In view of the clear statement in the
affidavit we
must hold that it is not the policy of the Government of India to
require the agency to satisfy the condition of any quota.
In fact the
Government
of India's circular letter is intended to emphasise on the
feature that registered societies to entitle themselves for renewal of
registration
or licence should exhibit their involvement in the process G
of adoption and
the authority should have evidence to satisfy that the
agency
is really involved in the activity.
We would accept the stand taken by the petitioner that
in the
event
of registration/licence being proposed to be cancelled, an
opportunity should be granted to such agency. That would answer the H
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576 SUPREME'COURT REPORTS [19911 3 S.C.R.
requirements of natural justice and would uphold a healthy scheme of
administration. We have not been able to see any positive justification
for opposition to the setting up of
CARA. Such an institution would be
an organisation of primacy and would work as a useful agency in the
field. While we agree that there should be no keen competition for
offering adoptions, regulated competition may perhaps keep up
the
system in a healthy condition. Existence of CARA in that field is,
therefore, welcome. We do not agree with the stand of the petitioner
that the scheme envisaged by the main judgment should be altered in
this regard.
The judgment laid down a scale of expenses to be recovered by
the agency offering placement for maintaining the child from the adop
tive parents.
There was some modification in 1986. Keeping in view
the general rise in cost of living we are prepared
to allow escalation of
30%. We do not, however, agree to an escalation of 10% every year.
The matter may be reviewed once in three years so far as escalation of
expenses
in concerned.
Only
one aspect is left for consideration and that is the petitio
ner's prayer for fransfer of children from statutory homes to recognised
agencies for placement. The children who can be transferred for such
purposes would be those whose parents are not known, orphans and
perhaps those who are declared as abandoned children. We have
E
pointed out already that the homes are not set up in several States and
areas.
Even Juvenile Boards have not been properly functioning and
the recognised agencies do not have the facility of child care. In these
circumstances to
order transfer of children from statutory homes to
recognised agencies can indeed not be accepted as a rule. We are
prepared to observe that as and when such a request is received from
F recognised agencies, the Juvenile Court or the Board set up under the
Act may consider the feasibility of such transfer and keeping the·
interest of the child in view, the possibility of an adoption within a
short period and the facilities available in the recognised agency as also
other relevant features, make appropriate orders. A strait-jacket
formula may very often bi> injurious to the interest of the child.
G
This order disposes of the petitions.
V.P.R. Petition Partly allowed.
The seminal ruling in Laxmikant Pandey v. Union of India, a cornerstone of India's jurisprudence on inter-country adoption procedures, is a critical follow-up to its 1984 predecessor. This 1991 judgment of the Supreme Court, available on CaseOn, addressed the practical challenges faced by child welfare agencies in implementing the court-mandated guidelines, thereby refining the legal framework to better serve the welfare of children. The court meticulously balanced the operational needs of these agencies with the paramount principle of the child's best interest, leading to significant modifications that continue to influence adoption law today.
Following the Supreme Court's comprehensive 1984 judgment in the same case, which established a detailed procedure for the adoption of Indian children by foreign parents, several licensed child welfare agencies approached the court again. They filed a writ petition seeking modifications to these procedures, arguing that certain stipulations were creating practical hurdles, increasing costs, and at times, acting against the very interest of the children they were meant to protect. This 1991 decision is the court's response to that plea.
The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the procedures for inter-country adoption, laid down in its 1984 judgment, required modification. The petitioners, including various welfare agencies, raised several specific points for the court's consideration:
The Court's decision was guided by several key legal and constitutional principles:
The Supreme Court analyzed each prayer individually, delivering a nuanced judgment that partly allowed and partly dismissed the petitioners' requests.
The Court rejected the plea to allow adopted children to retain Indian citizenship until majority. It reasoned that such a provision would “run counter to the need of quick assimilation” and act as a barrier to the “early cementing of the adopted child into the adoptive family.” The focus was on ensuring the child fully integrates into their new family and country without ambiguity.
Acknowledging the practical difficulties, the Court approved a simplified process. It held that a birth certificate could be obtained based on an application from the sponsoring agency, supported by an affidavit. A local magistrate was empowered to approve the particulars, and the certificate would be granted only after the adoption was finalized, allowing for the inclusion of the foreign adoptive parents' names. This eliminated the need for two separate certificates.
For legal professionals grappling with the nuances of adoption law, understanding the evolution of these guidelines is crucial. The detailed reasoning behind each modification in this case can be complex, which is why resources like CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs are invaluable. They provide a quick, accessible summary, helping lawyers and students efficiently analyze these specific rulings and their long-term implications.
The Court clarified that the Government of India never intended to fix a rigid quota for placing children with Indian families as a condition for renewing an agency's license. The intent was to ensure that registered societies demonstrated genuine involvement in the process of adoption, not merely meet a numerical target.
Upholding the principles of natural justice, the Court agreed that an agency must be granted an opportunity to be heard before its registration or license is cancelled. This ensures fairness and administrative accountability.
The Court rejected the stay on CARA's formation. It endorsed the agency as a “useful agency” and an “organisation of primacy” that would help create a healthy, regulated system and prevent unhealthy competition among adoption agencies.
Recognizing the general rise in the cost of living, the Court allowed a 30% escalation in the scale of expenses that agencies could recover. However, it rejected the request for a 10% annual escalation, suggesting instead that the matter be reviewed every three years.
The Court refused to establish a blanket rule for transferring children from statutory homes to recognized agencies. It noted that many state-run homes and Juvenile Boards were not functioning properly, and some agencies lacked adequate child-care facilities. However, it permitted a case-by-case approach. A recognized agency could request a transfer, and the Juvenile Court or Board could approve it after considering the child's best interests, the possibility of a quick adoption, and the facilities available at the agency.
The Supreme Court partly allowed the writ petition, demonstrating judicial responsiveness to the practical realities of implementing its own guidelines. By making targeted modifications to procedures concerning birth certificates, agency regulation, and expenses, while upholding the core principles of child welfare and assimilation, the Court refined the framework for inter-country adoption, making it more robust and effective.
In essence, the 1991 judgment in Laxmikant Pandey v. Union of India served as a crucial course correction. It streamlined administrative processes for adoption agencies, reinforced the principles of natural justice in their regulation, and provided for their financial sustainability. At the same time, it firmly prioritized the child’s seamless integration into the adoptive family over dual citizenship and endorsed the creation of a central regulatory body (CARA) to oversee the entire process, ensuring a more organized and child-centric adoption ecosystem in India.
This ruling is essential reading for several reasons:
Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on any legal issue, you should consult with a qualified legal professional.
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