2025 INSC 1242 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO(S). 27984-27988 OF 2023)

LEELAVATHI N. AND ORS.

ETC.

APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

AND ORS. ETC.

RESPONDENT(

S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.496 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.497 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO(S).28331-28335 OF 2023)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO(S).7298-7303 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.16867 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.16575 OF 2024)

Page 1 of 35

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.16562 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.7297 OF 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.11728 OF 2024)

J U D G M E N T

VIJAY BISHNOI, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.These appeals have been preferred by the Appellants challenging

the Judgment dated 12.10.2023 (hereinafter referred to as

“impugned judgment ”) passed in W.A. No.305/2023 (GM-CC) ;

W.A. No.300/2023 (GM-CC); W.A. No.337/2023 (GM-CC); W.A.

No.591/2023 (GM-CC); W.A. No.886/2023 (GM-CC) (hereinafter

referred to as “the writ appeals”) by the High Court of Karnataka

at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred as “the High Court”). The

Division Bench of the High Court, thereby set aside the

Judgment passed by the Single Judge Bench of the High Court in

W.P. No. 23752 of 2022 (GM-CC) dated 30.01.2023, thus

relegating the matter to the Karnataka State Administrative

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Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “KSAT”) to be considered in a

properly constituted application.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3.A notification dated 21.03.2022 was issued by the Department of

Public Education, Government of Karnataka inviting applications

for a total number of 15,000 posts of Graduate Primary Teachers

for Classes 6-8 for 35 Educational Districts (hereinafter referred

to as “recruitment notification”).

4.Pursuant to the said recruitment notification, examinations were

held on 21.05.2022 and 22.05.2022. The Appellants and the

private Respondents herein applied and participated in the said

examinations. On 17.08.2022, the results of the said

examinations were declared and accordingly, a provisional select

list was published on 18.11.2022.

5.The provisional select list dated 18.11.2022 did not include the

names of certain married individuals/candidates, who had

applied in the OBC category, as they had not produced the caste

cum income certificate (hereinafter referred to as “certificate”) of

their husband but rather submitted the one issued in the name

of their father. As a result of non-consideration of the certificate

produced by them, the said individuals were found to be

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ineligible for reservation provided for the OBC category and

hence, their names got reflected in the general merit list.

6.Aggrieved by the same, some of the private respondents herein

approached the High Court by filing the Writ Petition No. 23752

of 2022 (GM-CC), praying to quash the provisional select list

dated 18.12.2022 and seeking consideration of their names in

the said provisional select list.

7.A similarly aggrieved candidate (private respondent herein) filed a

Writ Petition bearing No. 200032 of 2023 before the High Court

of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, which came to be dismissed

vide order dated 12.01.2023 as not maintainable. However, the

Court granted liberty to the said writ petitioner to approach the

Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) in

view of the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of

India and Ors, reported in (1977) 3 SCC 261. Pursuant to the

same, some similarly situated persons have approached the

KSAT.

8.Despite the Order dated 12.01.2023 being passed by the Kalaburagi

Bench of the High Court, the Single Judge of the High Court

(Principal Bench) entertained the W.P. No. 23752 of 2025,

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presumably because the Order dated 12.01.2023 was not

brought to its notice.

9.The Single Judge of the High Court in the W.P. No. 23752 of 2022

(GM-CC) on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed the

following issues:

“(i) Whether the writ petitions challenging the action of

interpretation of caste and income certificates by the Selecting

Authority - DDPI would be maintainable?

(ii) Whether the caste and income of the husband of the female

applicant should be taken into consideration or the caste and

income of the parents?

(iii) Whether the Selecting Authority – DDPI would get jurisdiction

to interpret caste and income certificates issued by competent

authorities?”

10.The Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated

30.01.2023 allowed the said writ petitions filed by some of the

private respondents herein, thereby quashing the provisional

select list dated 18.11.2022 insofar as it related to the private

respondents being brought under the General Merit category and

directed the Respondent-State to treat such candidates as

belonging to the OBC category to which they applied for, qua the

certificates appended to the applications. Further, the

Respondent-State was granted liberty to regulate its procedure by

continuing recruitment and taking it to its logical conclusion.

Page 5 of 35

11.The findings recorded by the Single Judge can be better

understood in the following three parts:

A.First, on the issue of maintainability of the writ petitions, the

Single Judge, while relying on the judgment of this Court in

T.K. Rangarajan vs. Government of T.N. and Others ,

reported in (2003) 6 SCC 581, held that in cases wherein

thousands of employees are directed to approach the Tribunal,

it would not be in a position to render justice to the cause and,

therefore, in such exceptional circumstances, the High Court

has to entertain the writ petitions and ought not to dismiss

them merely on the ground that an alternative remedy exists

under the statute. The Single Judge deemed this situation

whereby hundreds of applicants, who fell under the category

2A, 2B, 3A and 3B of the OBC Category, were held to be

general merit candidates, as a peculiar situation warranting

immediate and necessary interference. As a result, the writ

petitions were held as maintainable.

B.Secondly, the Single Judge, on the issue of whether the caste

and income of the husband of the applicant should be

considered or that of her parents, held that the creamy layer

status of a candidate is determined on the basis of the status

Page 6 of 35

of his/her parents and not on the basis of his/her own status

or income, or the status or income of his/her spouse on the

ground that caste is determined by birth and it cannot be

changed by marriage with a person belonging to another caste.

Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of this

Court in Surinder Singh vs. Punjab State Electricity

Board, Patiala and Others, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 767.

C.Finally, on the question of the jurisdiction of the Selecting

Authority i.e. the Deputy Director of Public Instruction (for

short, “the DPPI”) to interpret the certificates, it was held that,

in view of a similar judgment by a Coordinate Bench of the

High Court, the Selecting Authority being the DPPI had no

jurisdiction to interpret the certificates issued by the

competent authorities. The Single Judge noted that the action

of the Selecting Authority, in light of the Government Order

dated 12.12.1986, was unsustainable as the said Government

Order was in and of itself, unsustainable.

12.The Government issued a fresh provisional select list dated

27.02.2023, in lieu of the directions issued by the Single Judge

vide Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2023, after considering

the candidature of the married individuals in terms of their

Page 7 of 35

husbands, or their parents’ certificate. The names of 451

candidates (including the Appellants), whose names were

included in the provisional select list dated 18.11.2022, were

excluded owing to the fact that their merit position moved lower

on inclusion of candidates who were excluded in the provisional

select list dated 18.11.2022.

13.Several candidates (private respondents herein) aggrieved by the

provisional select list dated 27.02.2023 having not found their

names in the said list, approached the High Court by way of Writ

Petitions led by W.P. No.5009 of 2023, whereby the High Court

disposed of the writ petitions vide order dated 26.05.2023 as not

maintainable while granting liberty to the writ petitioners to

approach the KSAT for redressal of their grievances in light of the

law laid down in Rajeev Kumar and Another vs. Hemraj Singh

Chauhan and Others , reported in (2010) 4 SCC 554 and L.

Chandra Kumar (supra).

14.Subsequently, the Appellants filed their objections before the

Government which were rejected and the Government published

the final select list on 08.03.2023.

15.The Appellants, being aggrieved by the exclusion of their names

in the final select list dated 08.03.2023, published pursuant to

Page 8 of 35

the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2023, preferred the writ

appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court challenging

the Order dated 30.01.2023 passed by the Single Judge of the

High Court and seeking a direction to the Respondent-State to

proceed with the provisional list dated 18.11.2022 in accordance

with law.

16.The Division Bench vide Order dated 12.10.2023 partly allowed

the writ appeal and set aside the Judgment and Order dated

30.01.2023 passed by the Single Judge. The Division Bench

directed that all the contentions regarding the issues raised

before the Single Judge were left open to be raised before the

KSAT. The Division Bench framed the following issue after

hearing the writ appeal:

“a) Whether writ petition as filed seeking the relief thereunder is

entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?”

17.The Division Bench, while relying upon the judgement passed in

L. Chandra Kumar (supra), held that in the matters of

recruitment process, the Tribunal would be the Court of first

instance and the role of Division Bench of the High Court is only

limited to the exercise of judicial review under Article 226/227 of

the Constitution of India.

Page 9 of 35

18.The Division Bench further held that the Single Judge erred in

placing reliance on the judgment passed in the case of T.K.

Rangarajan (supra) since, in the present case, the moot question

revolved around the rejection of certificates of some of the

candidates during the recruitment process. There was no vested

right created in favour of such candidates except expectation of

being selected, and this could not be deemed as “ an

unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel” as laid

out by this Court in T.K. Rangarajan (supra).

19.However, the Division Bench, taking note of the peculiar fact

situation that had arisen in this case, whereby the appointment

of teachers of Class 6-8 had come to a grinding halt on account

of the rejection of some of the candidates, as a measure of

interim relief, directed the State to proceed with the appointment

of teachers from the selected candidates as per the final select list

dated 08.03.2023, provided that the candidates have submitted

the certificate in the prescribed form.

20.Aggrieved by the said impugned judgment passed by the Division

Bench, the Appellants have preferred the present batch of

appeals, which are classified as follows:

Page 10 of 35

A.The appellants in the appeals, arising out of SLP (C) Nos.

27984-27988/2023, SLP (C) Nos.28331-28335/2023, SLP (C)

Nos.7298-7303/2024 and SLP (C) No.11728/2024, were the

candidates whose names were included in the provisional

select list dated 18.11.2022 and they are aggrieved by the

order passed by the Division Bench, whereby, the Division

Bench as a measure of interim relief, directed the State to

proceed with appointment process as per the final selection

list dated 08.03.2023.

B.The appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.

496/2024, SLP (C) No.497/2024, SLP (C) No.16867/2024, SLP

(C) No. 16575/2024, SLP (C) No.16562/2024 and SLP (C) No.

7297/2024, are the ones whose names were included in the

final select list dated 08.03.2023 as per the directions given by

the Single Judge vide Order dated 30.01.2023. These

appellants are aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench,

whereby, the Division Bench relegated the matter to the

Tribunal.

21.During the pendency of these appeals, certain orders have been

passed by this Court which are as follows:

Page 11 of 35

A.Vide Order dated 03.01.2024, this Court directed that the

directions issued in paragraph 45-47 of the impugned

judgment dated 12.10.2023 shall be stayed and that any

appointment letters issued by the State in terms of final

selection list dated 08.03.2023 shall be kept in abeyance. The

Order is reproduced herein below:

“ O R D E R

1.Permission to file Petition for Special Leave to Appeal is

granted.

2. Applications seeking exemption from filing certified copy of

the impugned judgment and exemption from filing official

translation are allowed.

3. Delay condoned.

4. Issue notice. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted.

5. Mr. D.L. Chidananda, learned Advocate on Record accepts

notice on behalf of the caveator/respondent.

6. Counter affidavit, if any, be filed within four weeks.

Rejoinder affidavit, if any, be filed within two weeks,

thereafter.

7. Till further orders, the directions issued in paragraphs 45 to

47 of the impugned judgment shall not be given effect to.

Any

appointment letters as stated to have been issued in favour

of the candidates selected in terms of the final selection list

dated 08th March, 2023 shall be kept in abeyance.

8. List after pleadings are complete.

9. Additional documents, if any, be filed, in the meantime.”

B.Vide Order dated 22.01.2024, the Court clarified that the

joining of 11,494 candidates who were already issued

appointment letters and working, would be subject to the

outcome of the present appeals. The Order is reproduced

herein below:

“ O R D E R

Page 12 of 35

IA No.6067/2024 in SLP (C) Nos.27984-27988/2023, IA

No.6858/2024 in SLP (C) No.496/2024, IA No.6817/2024

in SLP (C) No.497/2024, IA No.6617/2024 in SLP (C)

Nos.28331-28335/2023:

1. On 3rd January, 2024, while issuing notice on this petition, it

was directed that till further orders, the directions issued in

paragraphs 45 to 47 of the impugned judgment shall not be

given effect to. It was further directed that any appointment

letters as stated to have been issued in favour of the candidates

selected in terms of the final selection list dated 08th March,

2023, shall be kept in abeyance.

2. Now an additional affidavit has been filed by the respondent

no.1-State of Karnataka wherein category wise distribution of

13,352 candidates has been reflected in paragraph 3.2. As per

the said tabulated statement, out of a total of 13,352

candidates, who had applied for the subject posts being 15000

in number for 35 Educational Districts, have been included in

the list published on 08th March, 2023, 6649 candidates fall

under the category of general merit, 1953 candidates fall under

the Scheduled Caste category, 428 candidates fall under the

Scheduled Tribe category and 3841 fall under the OBC

candidates. This is besides those who fall under the category of

Married Women who seek to be considered in OBC category

based on their parents’ income and caste certificate. It is stated

that the number of candidates who fall under the category of

Married Women referred to hereinabove, is 481.

3. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on

behalf of the respondents states that it has been clarified that

the authorities have kept aside 481 notified posts to be filled up

subject to the final outcome of the present litigation. In other

words, if married women candidates who claim reservation on

the basis of the income of their parents’ ultimately succeed in

the present petition, they shall be entitled to appointment

against the said posts, subject to their fulfilling all other

eligibility criteria.

4. This would mean that if the married women candidates do

not qualify for appointment on the strength of their parents’

income and caste certificate, they would be considered in the

General Merit Category on the basis of their overall merit. As it

has been submitted that 11494 candidates who were selected

and issued appointment letters were already working prior to

passing of the order on 03rd January, 2024 and their

Page 13 of 35

appointment orders have been kept in abeyance in compliance

of the aforesaid order, it is clarified that joining of the aforesaid

11494 candidates working on the subject posts is subject to the

outcome of the present petitions. This order shall be duly

intimated to all the said appointees for their information.

5. The applications are allowed and disposed of on the above

terms.

6. List these matters on 12th March, 2024 at 2.00 p.m.”

C.Vide Order dated 04.10.2024, the Court allowed the State to

proceed with the appointment to the vacant seats, however, by

reserving 500 seats as vacant. The Order is reproduced herein

below:

“ O R D E R

1) Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that unserved

respondents are represented in other cases through Advocates

or their service is complete, therefore, they may be deemed to

be served for which Interlocutory Applications have been filed.

Considering the statement made at Bar, we accept the

statement. Interlocutory Applications for dispensing with the

service of notice are allowed.

2) During hearing it is informed that 1,377 candidates

remained to be appointed though they are not affected by the

issue involved in the present cases regarding claim of married

women under creamy layer in Other Backward Classes

category.

3) Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, appearing for

the State submitted that to safeguard rights of the candidates

involved in the litigation the State Government shall keep 500

posts reserved.

4) In view of the aforesaid stand of the State, it is at liberty to

fill up the vacant advertised posts by reserving 500 posts.

5) At present, we are not passing any order regarding seniority

of the persons appointed or who may be appointed on the

posts reserved.

6) List the matters on 12th November, 2024 (Non Miscellaneous

Day).

7) Parties shall complete and exchange the pleadings within

four weeks from today.”

Page 14 of 35

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

22.The learned Counsel for the Appellants in the first set of appeals

(A) submitted that the direction issued by the Division Bench to

continue with the appointments in terms of the final select list

dated 08.03.2023 and not granting the consequential relief of

proceeding as per the provisional select list dated 18.11.2022

after setting aside the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2023, is

unsustainable and without jurisdiction. It was further contended

that pursuant to the final select list dated 08.03.2023, only

13,352 candidates have been appointed against 15,000 notified

vacancies. Accordingly, it was urged by the learned Counsel that

the Appellants, who had been selected in the provisional select

list dated 18.11.2022 but were ousted by virtue of the Order of

the Single Judge dated 30.01.2023, can be accommodated

against the remaining vacancies.

23.The learned Counsel for the Appellants in the second set of

appeals (B) submitted that the Division Bench erred in setting

aside the well-reasoned Judgment of the Single Judge without

properly appreciating the law laid down in T.K. Rangarajan

(supra). It was further contended that the Division Bench was

Page 15 of 35

not justified in directing the State to defer the appointments of

candidates who had not furnished certificates in the form

prescribed under the notification and in conformity with the

Government Order dated 12.12.1986, and who had been

included in the list only by virtue of the order of the Single

Judge, until disposal of the challenge before the KSAT.

24.The learned Counsel for the Respondent-State has argued that

the contention of the Appellants that since the appointment of

the 481 candidates, who sought to be considered on the basis of

their parents’ income certificate, were directed to be deferred by

the Division Bench, it cannot be unanimously accepted that the

Appellants who had been displaced from the list dated

08.03.2023 on inclusion of 481 candidates, ought to have been

appointed. Further, it was vehemently contended that the present

lis primarily related to the inter-se eligibility of candidates, and

the Respondent-State is merely a formal party and would give

effect to the Orders as passed by this Court.

ANALYSIS

25.We have heard the parties and perused the materials on record.

Page 16 of 35

26.The Single Judge of the High Court had not ruled that the issue

raised before it by the appellants of the second set of appeals (B)

is outside the jurisdiction of the KSAT while exercising power

under Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1985”). It is not even the

case of the appellants of the second set of appeals (B) that the

KSAT has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue raised by them

in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. In such

circumstances, it is an admitted position that the KSAT has the

jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue raised by the appellants of the

second set of appeals (B).

27.Now, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether

the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly held that the

Single Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain

the writ petitions filed on behalf of the appellants of the second

set of appeals (B) in view of the availability of an effective

alternate remedy of filing an appropriate application before the

KSAT. The Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra

Kumar (supra), has categorically held that in a service dispute

covered by Section 15 of the Act of 1985, it will not be open for

litigants to directly approach the High Courts, even in cases

Page 17 of 35

where they question the vires of the statutory legislations except

the cases wherein the legislation under which the particular

Tribunal is created is under challenge.

28.Although the Single Judge took note of a specific objection raised

by the State regarding the maintainability of the petitions, the

Single Judge had relied upon the judgment of this Court

rendered in T.K. Rangarajan (supra) to hold that the writ

petitions filed on behalf of the appellants of the second set of

appeals (B) would be maintainable. It is to be noted that this

Court in T.K. Rangarajan (supra), has not made any departure

from the binding precedent laid down by the Constitution Bench

in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and only observed that the High

Court therein was faced with an extraordinary circumstance

which called for its interference because the State Government

had dismissed about two lakhs employees for going on strike. It

was held that the High Court was justified in allowing the writ

petitions, having regard to the exceptional circumstances which

rendered the Tribunal incapable of doing justice to the cause,

and thus, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court to

not entertain the petitions in view of the alternate remedy

provided under the statute. At best, the said judgment can be

Page 18 of 35

termed as an order passed under Article 142 of the Constitution

of India and as such, it is not binding.

29.In the instant case, the Division Bench of the High Court has

taken the view that the “unprecedented extraordinary situation

having no parallel”, as existed in T. K. Rangarajan (supra), was

not present in this case. The dispute in the case before us only

concerns the rejection of the certificates of certain candidates

who took part in the recruitment process. It is apposite to note

here that recruitment to any civil post and allied service matters

fall within the domain of the State’s administrative policy.

Further, it is not uncommon for discrepancies to arise in the

recruitment process, including those relating to the eligibility of

candidates on the basis of their certificates, during the

recruitment process. However, the rejection of candidates on the

basis of invalid certificates does not render them remediless so as

to directly approach the High Court. The Tribunals have been

well empowered to deal with such disputes as the court of first

instance. Such situations under no circumstance can be deemed

as an exceptional one to warrant the intervention of the High

Court under its writ jurisdiction.

Page 19 of 35

30.In view of the aforesaid observations, the present case does not

fall under the category of an exceptional circumstance as the

issue is restricted merely to 481 candidates whose inclusion in

the select list is allegedly illegal.

31.Significantly, it is pertinent to note that the High Court of

Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, by its order dated 12.01.2023,

had dismissed W.P. No. 200032 of 2023, which was filed on an

identical set of facts by a similarly situated candidate, as not

maintainable, while granting liberty to the petitioner therein to

approach the Tribunal. In a similar vein, the High Court

(Principal Bench), by its order dated 26.05.2023, disposed of a

set of writ petitions led by W.P. No. 5009 of 2023, filed by certain

private respondents herein, who were aggrieved by the

provisional select list dated 27.02.2023, as not maintainable,

once again granting liberty to the petitioners to seek redress

before the KSAT. These orders, echoing the same reasoning, lend

further support to the impugned judgment passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, we do not find any

illegality in the impugned judgment.

32.Otherwise also, the law of alternate remedy is well settled and

has been dealt with by this Court in various judgments. In

Page 20 of 35

Rajeev Kumar (supra), this Court while relying on the

Constitution Bench rendered in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) has

held as under:

“9. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC

261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] held that the power of the High Court

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court

under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure

of our Constitution (see paras 78 and 79, pp. 301 and 302 of the

Report). The Constitution Bench also held that various tribunals

created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution, will

function as court of first instance and are subject to the power of

judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of

the Constitution. The Constitution Bench also held that these

tribunals are empowered even to deal with constitutional

questions and can also examine the vires of statutory legislation,

except the vires of the legislation which creates the particular

tribunal.

10. In para 93, at p. 309 of the Report, the Constitution Bench

specifically held: (L. Chandra Kumar case [(1997) 3 SCC 261 :

1997 SCC (L&S) 577] )

“93. … We may add that the Tribunals will, however,

continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of

the areas of law for which they have been constituted.”

(emphasis added)

The Constitution Bench explained the said statement of law

by reiterating in the next sentence: (L. Chandra Kumar case

[(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] , SCC p. 309, para

93)

“93. … By this, we mean that it will not be open for

litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases

where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except,

as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the

particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.”

11. On a proper reading of the abovequoted two sentences, it is

clear:

(a) The tribunals will function as the only court of first instance

in respect of the areas of law for which they have been

constituted.

(b) Even where any challenge is made to the vires of

legislation, excepting the legislation under which tribunal has

Page 21 of 35

been set up, in such cases also, litigants will not be able to

directly approach the High Court “overlooking the jurisdiction

of the tribunal”.

12. The aforesaid propositions have been repeated again by the

Constitution Bench (in L. Chandra Kumar case [(1997) 3 SCC 261

: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] ) in the penultimate para 99 at p. 311 of

the Report in the following words:

“99. … The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like

courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which

they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for

litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases

where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except

where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is

challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

concerned.”

13. In view of such repeated and authoritative pronouncement by

the Constitution Bench of this Court, the approach made to the

High Court for the first time by these appellants in respect of their

service disputes over which CAT has jurisdiction, is not legally

sustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court, with great

respect, fell into an error by allowing the appellants to treat the

High Court as a court of first instance in respect of their service

disputes for adjudication of which CAT has been constituted.

- xxx -

15. As the appellants cannot approach the High Court by treating

it as a court of first instance, their special leave petition before

this Court is also incompetent and not maintainable.

16. The principles laid down in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC

261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] virtually embody a rule of law and in

view of Article 141 of the Constitution the same is binding on the

High Court. The High Court fell into an error by allowing the

appellants to approach it in clear violation of the Constitution

Bench judgment of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC

261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] .”

(Emphasis

Supplied)

33.In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of

India and Others, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court

has held as under:

Page 22 of 35

“11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions.

There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to

issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of

habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and

prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature

of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary

legislation—L. Chandra Kumar v.Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC

261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577]. However, it is one thing to say that in

exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the

Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against

any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its

agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed

by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether

different thing to say that each and every petition filed under

Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High

Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved

person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled

law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of

grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the

statutory dispensation.

12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes [AIR 1964 SC 1419]

this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the

writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is

available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423,

para 7)

“7.… The High Court does not therefore act as a court of

appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct

errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under

Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by

statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved

petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another

jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by

a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by

entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed,

and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the

machinery so set up.”

13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2

SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] this Court observed: (SCC pp.

440-41, para 11)

“11.… It is now well recognised that where a right or

liability is created by a statute which gives a special

remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute

only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great

clarity by Willes, J. In Wolverhampton New Waterworks

Co.v. Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336 : 141 ER 486] in the

following passage: (ER p. 495)

Page 23 of 35

‘… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may

be established founded upon a statute. … But there is a

third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law

is created by a statute which at the same time gives a

special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The

remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is

not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable

to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute

must be adopted and adhered to.’

The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the

House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers

Ltd. [1919 AC 368 : (1918-19) All ER Rep 61 (HL)] and has

been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of

Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd. [1935

AC 532 (PC)] and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. [(1939-40)

67 IA 222 : AIR 1940 PC 105] It has also been held to be

equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been

followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was

therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.”

14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1997) 5 SCC

536] B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger

Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77)

“77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under

Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court

under Article 32—is concerned, it is obvious that the

provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies.

It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the

power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would

certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the

provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction

consistent with the provisions of the enactment.”

15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which,

by and large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam

Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [AIR

1969 SC 556], it has been held that an alternative remedy is not

a bar to the entertaining of writ petition filed for the enforcement

of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a

violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order

under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the

statute is under challenge.

16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some

exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the

proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes

[AIR 1964 SC 1419] and other similar judgments that the High

Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the

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Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the

aggrieved person or the statute under which the action

complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for

redressal of grievance still holds the field.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

34.In Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

and Others, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771, this Court has held

as under:

“25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to

dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition.

In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool

Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] , a two-Judge

Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point,

noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15)

“14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226

of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited

by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can

be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in

the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo

warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the

Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the

Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.

15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court,

having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to

entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High

Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of

which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is

available, the High Court would not normally exercise its

jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been

consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at

least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition

has been filed for the enforcement of any of the

Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of

the principle of natural justice or where the order or

proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of

an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this

point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we

would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of

the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool [Whirlpool

Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1],

in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal

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Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] , this Court

noted that : (Harbanslal Sahnia case [Harbanslal

Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] , SCC p. 110,

para 7)

“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the

remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was

available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition

filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is

concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of

writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is

a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an

appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative

remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ

jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the

writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental

rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural

justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly

without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.

(See Whirlpool Corpn.v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool

Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The

present case attracts applicability of the first two

contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants'

dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be

terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In

such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should

have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of

driving them to the need of initiating arbitration

proceedings.”

(emphasis supplied)

27. The principles of law which emerge are that:

27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue

writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of

fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.

27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ

petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High

Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the

aggrieved person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a)

the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a

fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b)

there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c)

the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the

vires of a legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High

Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an

appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be

entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by

law.

Page 26 of 35

27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes

the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort

must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking

the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.

This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,

convenience and discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the

High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition.

However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the

nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ

jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.

28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court

in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad,

(2003) 5 SCC 399] , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal

Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas

Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of

India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among

other decisions.”

(Emphasis

Supplied)

35.Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in PHR Invent

Educational Society vs. UCO Bank and Others , reported in

(2024) 6 SCC 579, has held as under:

“37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out

certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an

alternative remedy. Some of them are thus:

(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance

with the provisions of the enactment in question;

(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of

judicial procedure;

(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed;

and

(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the

principles of natural justice.

38. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not

entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an

effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person

or the statute under which the action complained of has been

taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance.”

Page 27 of 35

(Emphasis Supplied)

36.A careful perusal of the aforesaid judgments leads us to the

conclusion that where an efficacious alternate remedy is

available, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters falling

squarely within the domain of the Tribunals.

37.Nevertheless, a writ petition under Article 226 may still be

maintainable notwithstanding the existence of such an

alternative remedy in exceptional circumstances, including the

enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of

the Constitution; instances of ultra vires or illegal exercise of

power by a statutory authority; violation of the principles of

natural justice; or where the vires of the parent legislation itself is

under challenge. While these exceptions have been carved out

and reiterated by this Court in a catena of decisions, the facts of

the present case do not fall within any of these exceptions so as

to warrant the maintainability of the writ petitions before the

High Court.

38.The Act of 1985 empowers the Tribunals to deal exclusively with

service matters with the intention to reduce the burden on

Courts, who were otherwise dealing with service matters along

with the other cases. The idea behind establishing the Tribunals

Page 28 of 35

was to provide speedy reliefs to the aggrieved persons in respect

of their grievances in relation to service matters.

39.The Act of 1985 came into force in the State of Karnataka w.e.f.

01.01.1985 vide G.S.R. 956(E), dated 31.12.1985. In the Act of

1985, a complete mechanism is provided for disposal of any

service matter expeditiously and, therefore, it cannot be said that

the statutory remedy before the Tribunal is not an effective

remedy.

40.Section 15 of the Act of 1985 which outlines the exclusive

jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal and Section 22

bestows upon the Tribunals the power to regulate its own

provisions. The said provisions read as under:

“15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State

Administrative Tribunals.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly

provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall

exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction,

powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by

all courts (except the Supreme Court [***]) in relation to—

(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any

civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State;

(b) all service matters concerning a person [not being a person

referred to in clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person

or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section

14] appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post

under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in

connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other

authority under the control of the State Government or of any

corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the State

Government;

(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with

the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any

service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose

services have been placed by any such local or other authority

or corporation [or society] or other body as is controlled or

Page 29 of 35

owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State

Government for such appointment.

(2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect

from such date as may be specified in the notification the

provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and

corporations [or societies] controlled or owned by the State

Government:

Provided that if the State Government considers it expedient

so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as

envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under

this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different

categories under any class of, local or other authorities or

corporations [or societies].

(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the

Administrative Tribunal for a State shall also exercise, on and

from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-

section apply to any local or other authority or corporation [or

society], all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable

immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme

Court [***]) in relation to—

(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any

service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or

other authority or corporation [or society]; and

(b) all service matters concerning a person [other than a person

referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section or a

member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-

section (1) of section 14] appointed to any service or post in

connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or

corporation [or society] and pertaining to the service of such

person in connection with such affairs.

(4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the

jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Administrative Tribunal

for a State shall not extend to, or be exercisable in relation to, any

matter in relation to which the jurisdiction, powers and authority

of the Central Administrative Tribunal extends or is exercisable.

- xxx -

22. Procedure and powers of Tribunals. —(1) A Tribunal shall

not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles

of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act

and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal

shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the

fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to

sit in public or in private.

(2) A Tribunal shall decide every application made to it as

expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every application shall

be decided on a perusal of documents and written

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representations and [after hearing such oral arguments as may

be advanced].

(3) A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of [discharging its

functions under this Act], the same powers as are vested in a civil

court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while

trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person

and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence of affidavits;

(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning any

public record or document or copy of such record or document

from any office;

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witness or

documents;

(f) reviewing its decisions;

(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex

parte;

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation

for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and

(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central

Government.”

41.Moreover, Section 24 of the Act of 1985 enables the Tribunals to

pass interim orders subject to fulfillment of certain conditions,

however, in circumstances where an urgent relief is necessitated,

the Tribunal can pass such an interim order bypassing the

conditions specified so as to prevent any travesty of justice.

Section 24 reads as follows:

“24. Conditions as to making of interim orders. —

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of

this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no interim

order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other

manner) shall be made on, or in any proceedings relating to, an

application unless—

(a) copies of such application and of all documents in support

of the plea for such interim order are furnished to the party

against whom such application is made or proposed to be

made; and

(b) opportunity is given to such party to be heard in the matter:

Page 31 of 35

Provided that a Tribunal may dispense with the requirements of

clauses (a) and (b) and make an interim order as an exceptional

measure if it is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing,

that it is necessary so to do for preventing any loss being caused

to the applicant which cannot be adequately compensated in

money but any such interim order shall, if it is not sooner

vacated, cease to have effect on the expiry of a period of fourteen

days from the date on which it is made unless the said

requirements have been complied with before the expiry of that

period and the Tribunal has continued the operation of the

interim order.”

42.Section 27 of the Act of 1985 also provides the mechanism for

execution of orders passed by the Tribunal. Furthermore, Section

35 and 36 also empowers the appropriate government to make

rules for efficient functioning of the Tribunals.

43.In exercise of the powers under Sections 35 and 36 of the Act of

1985, the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,

1986 have been framed and Rule 15 of the said rules provides a

timeline of 6 months to the KSAT for deciding the applications.

Additionally, Rule 17 envisages the ex-parte hearing of an

application.

44.Further, Section 17 of the Act of 1985, gives the power to the

Tribunals to the Tribunal to punish for contempt. In exercise of

the same, the KSAT has framed the Karnataka Administrative

Tribunal (Contempt of Tribunal Proceedings) Rules, 1987 to deal

with contempt.

Page 32 of 35

45.In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 22 of the Act of

1985, the KSAT framed the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal

(Review Applications) Regulation, 1994 which provides for the

powers and procedure of the KSAT to deal with applications for

the review of any order passed by the Tribunal.

46.What emerges from the foregoing exposition of law is that the

KSAT is equipped with all the powers to effectively and

holistically deal with a matter presented before it and do

complete justice to the same.

47.Thus, we are of the considered view that the Division Bench of

the High Court has rightly set aside the judgment passed by the

Single Judge and had not committed any illegality in partly

allowing the appeals by the first set of appellants (A) and

relegating the matter to the KSAT for adjudication. The Division

Bench of the High Court had rightly held that their writ petitions

before the High Court are not maintainable.

48.So far as the contention of the appellants of the first set of

appeals (A), that the Division Bench has erred in not reviving the

provisional select list dated 18.11.2022, we are of the view that

the same has no merit since, the appellants of the first set of the

appeals (A) were figured in only the provisional select list issued

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on 18.11.2022 and, therefore, no right has been accrued to them.

Any direction issued by the High Court to act on, the provisional

select list dated 18.11.2022 would result in confusion and a

complex situation and, therefore, we do not find any error in the

impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court,

wherein it has not revived the provisional select list dated

18.11.2022.

49.As a result, this batch of appeals is dismissed. The interim

directions passed by this Court on 03.01.2024, 22.01.2024 and

04.10.2024 are made absolute with a clarification that the 500

posts which were kept reserved pursuant to the Order dated

04.10.2024 shall be filled as per the final judgment passed by the

KSAT.

50.In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is expected that the

KSAT shall make every endeavour to decide any application

preferred on behalf of the appellants of the second set of appeals

(B) pursuant to liberty granted by the Division Bench of the High

Court of Karnataka vide impugned judgment, expeditiously,

preferably within six months from the date of filing of such

application/applications. Further, it is made clear herein that we

have only dealt with the maintainability of the writ petitions

Page 34 of 35

before the High Court and not gone into the merits of the instant

case.

51.With these observations, the present appeals and all

pending/interim applications stand disposed of.

………………………. J.

(J.K. MAHESHWARI)

………………………. J.

(VIJAY BISHNOI)

NEW DELHI,

Dated: 16

th

October, 2025

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