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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 888    OF 2013

    (ARISING OUT OF SLP(Crl.)NO .4513 OF 2012)

LOKESH KUMAR JAIN        … APPELLANT

VERUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN             … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

Leave granted. This appeal has been preferred by the  

appellant against the order dated 2

nd

 March, 2012 passed by  

the   Rajasthan   High   Court,   Jaipur   Bench   in   S.B.   Criminal 

Miscellaneous Petition No.605 of 2006 titled Lokesh Kumar  

Jain v. State of Rajasthan. By the impugned order, the High  

Court refused to quash the FIR No.10/2000 lodged against  

the   appellant   under   Section   409   IPC   at   Police   Station, 

Dausa.   The petition under Section 482 Cr.PC was disposed  

of by the High Court with the following observation:

“This criminal misc. petition has been filed  

under   section   482   Cr.PC   for   quashing   of   FIR

No.10/2000 registered at Police Station, Dausa.

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This   Court   has   asked   the   learned   counsel   for 

the petitioner   whether   challan   has   been   filed   or 

not.     He   replied   that   still   challan   has   not   been 

filed and the matter is under investigation.

If   it   is   to,   the   petitioner   is   permitted   to 

file   representation/documents   on   the   basis   of   the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court or any other 

Court, the I.O. Should investigate the matter on the 

basis   of   the   judgment/documents/representation   so  

filed by the  petitioner and thereafter shall file  

progress before the court concerned.

Accordingly, the petition is disposed of.”

2.In order to appreciate the rival stands of the parties,  

it would be necessary to notice the background facts in a  

greater detail.  

3.The   appellant   was   posted   as   Lower   Division   Clerk   (for 

short,   'LDC')   during   the   period   November,   1996   to  

November,1997 in the Office of District Literacy Education  

Officer, Dausa. On 4

th

 January, 2000, the District Literacy  

Education   Officer,   Dausa   registered   a   First   Information  

Report (for short, 'FIR') in Police Station, Dausa alleging  

therein   that   when   the   appellant   was   posted   as   LDC­cum­

Cashier, a financial irregularity was committed by him.  As  

per   the   report   of   Auditor   General,   an   embezzlement   of 

Rs.4,39,617/­ has been discovered.  The original copies of  

the bills and documents were available in the office of the  

Auditor General and in the office of Directorate for the  

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State   Literacy   Programme.     Therefore,   on   the   basis   of 

report given by the Auditor General, the FIR was filed.

4.On the basis of report submitted by the complainant, the  

Police   lodged   FIR   No.10/2000   of   the   incident   alleged   to 

have   taken   place   in   the   year   1996­1997,   implicating 

appellant as an accused.   After making investigation, the  

Police   submitted   a   final   report   in   the   matter   on   2

nd 

June,2000   before   the   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate,   Dausa  

(hereinafter referred to as the, “CJM, Dausa”) 

5.During the pendency of the matter before the CJM, Dausa,  

the complainant filed an application on 18

th

 November, 2000 

before the CJM, Dausa requesting therein to send back the  

matter to the Police for further investigation.   The CJM,  

Dausa vide order dated 18

th

  November, 2000, sent back the  

matter to the Police under Section 156(3) of Cr.PC. Since  

then   the   matter   remained   pending   with   the   police.  

According to the appellant, he met as well as represented  

on   a  number   of   times   to   the   Police   Authorities   and   the 

Departmental Authorities but still no action has been taken  

by the Authorities. Neither final report is submitted nor  

the challan is being filed and the matter is pending since  

then.  Earlier in the final report, it was stated that the  

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Police informed that the original copies of the bills and  

another   documents   are   not   available,   therefore,   no  

investigation could be made. 

6.Having   waited   for   more   than   six   years,   the   appellant 

preferred   a   petition   under   Section   482   Cr.PC   before   the 

Rajasthan High Court being Criminal Miscellaneous Petition  

No.605/2006 to set aside the FIR No.10/2000 registered at  

Police Station, Dausa.

7.In   the   meantime,   a   Departmental   Inquiry   was   initiated 

against the appellant for the same charges in which the  

Inquiry Officer after inquiry submitted his report on 15

th 

December,2008 exonerating the appellant from the charges.

8.The High Court by impugned order dated 2

nd

  March, 2012 

chose   not   to   interfere   with   the   FIR   and   again   left   the 

matter in the hands of the authorities. Hence, the special  

leave   petition   was   filed   by   the   appellant   before   this 

Court.

9.Learned counsel for the appellant challenged the decision  

of the High Court on the following grounds:

(a)Since the date of order passed by the CJM, Dausa  

the   appellant   has   been   suffering   the   harassment   of 

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investigation   for   more   than   13   years   which   is   not 

completed   till   date   because   of   lack   of   supply   of 

documents.

(b)After filing the closure report way back in the  

year 2000 no effective investigation has taken place. 

(c)If investigation is allowed to continue even in  

absence of document, it will be futile and can only  

cause harassment to the appellant, serving no purpose  

as even in the departmental inquiry for said charges  

conducted against the appellant in the year 2009, the  

appellant was exonerated as none of the charges which  

also form the basis of the present FIR could be proved  

against the appellant. 

10.He also relied on decisions of this Court which will be  

discussed in the following paragraphs of this judgment.

11.The   State   of   Rajasthan   has   filed   counter   affidavit. 

According to them, the investigation is still continuing  

and the appellant himself is delaying the same due to non­

cooperative attitude adopted by him.  In any case, from the  

investigation carried out till now, offence under Section  

409 IPC is clearly made out against the appellant and on  

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this ground alone, the petition seeking quashing of FIR is  

liable to be dismissed and the legal process deserves to be  

taken to a logical end.

12.Though   the   aforesaid   stand   has   been   taken   by   the 

respondent in their counter affidavit, the respondent is  

silent about the documents i.e. whether they have been made  

available to the Police for further investigation. Further  

no   specific   instance   was   shown   to   suggest   that   the  

appellant failed to cooperate with the Investigating Agency  

on any particular date.

13.Before deciding the question whether under the given  

circumstances   the   High   Court   should   have   exercised   its 

inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC to prevent abuse of  

process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of  

justice,   it   will   be   desirable   to   notice   some   of   the 

decisions   of   this   Court   relating   to   categories   of   cases 

wherein extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.PC could  

be exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process  

of the Court.

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14.In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 (Suppl.) 1 SCC  

335 this Court while formulating the categories of cases by  

way of illustration, wherein the extraordinary power under  

the aforestated provisions could be exercised by the High  

Court to prevent abuse of process of the Court and observed  

as follows:­

“102.  In   the   backdrop   of   the   interpretation   of   the 

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter  

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this  

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise  

of   the   extraordinary   power   under   Article   226   or   the 

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we  

have   extracted   and   reproduced   above,   we   give   the  

following categories of cases by way of illustration  

wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent  

abuse   of   the   process   of   any   court   or   otherwise   to 

secure   the   ends   of   justice,   though   it   may   not   be 

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and  

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or  

rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad  

kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   first  

information report or the complaint, even if they are  

taken   at   their   face   value   and   accepted   in   their 

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or  

make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where   the   allegations   in   the   first   information 

report and other materials, if any, accompanying the  

FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an  

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)  

of   the   Code   except   under   an   order   of   a   Magistrate 

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the  

FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support  

of   the   same   do   not   disclose   the   commission   of   any 

offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where,   the   allegations   in   the   FIR   do   not  

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a  

non­cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted  

by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as  

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   FIR   or  

complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on  

the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a  

just   conclusion   that   there   is   sufficient   ground   for 

proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in  

any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act  

(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to  

the   institution   and   continuance   of   the   proceedings  

and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code  

or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for  

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where   a   criminal   proceeding   is   manifestly  

attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is  

maliciously   instituted   with   an   ulterior   motive   for  

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to  

spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

15.Need for speedy investigation and trial as both are  

mandated   by   the   letter   and   spirit   of   the   provisions   of 

Cr.PC have been emphasized by this Court in numerous cases.

16.In  Hussainara   Khatoon   v.   Home   Secretary,   State   of 

Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81  this Court observed that Article 21  

confers   a   fundamental   right   on   every   person   not   to   be 

deprived   of   his   life   or   liberty   except   according   to  

procedure established by law; that such procedure is not  

some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be  

“reasonable, fair and just”; and therefrom flows, without  

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doubt,   the   right   to   speedy   trial.   This   Court   further 

observed that:

“8. In regard to the exercise of the judicial power to  

release a prisoner awaiting trial on bail or on the  

execution of a personal bond without sureties for his  

appearance, I have to say this briefly. There is an  

amplitude of power in this regard within the existing  

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it  

is for the courts to fully acquaint themselves with  

the   nature   and   extent   of   their   discretion   in  

exercising   it.   I  think   it  is   no   longer   possible   to 

countenance a mechanical exercise of the power. What  

should   be   the   amount   of   security   required   or   the 

monetary   obligation   demanded   in   a   bond   is   a   matter 

calling   for   the   careful   consideration   of   several  

factors. The entire object being only to ensure that  

the   undertrial   does   not   flee   or   hide   himself   from 

trial,   all   the   relevant   considerations   which   enter 

into the determination of that question must be taken  

into   account.   A   synoptic   impression   of   what   the  

considerations   could   be   may   be   drawn   from   the  

following provision in the United States Bail Reform  

Act of 1966:

“In   determining   which   conditions   of   releases 

will reasonably assure appearance, the judicial  

officer   shall,   on   the   basis   of   available  

information, take into account the nature and  

circumstances   of   the   offence   charged,   the  

weight of the evidence against the accused, the  

accused's   family   ties,   employment,   financial  

resources, character and mental condition, the  

length of his residence in the community, his  

record   of   convictions,   and   his   record   of  

appearance at court proceedings or of flight to  

avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court  

proceedings.”

These are considerations which should be kept in mind  

when   determining   the   amount   of   the   security   or  

monetary   obligation.   Perhaps,   if   this   is   done   the 

abuses attendant on the prevailing system of pre­trial  

release in India could be avoided or, in any event,  

greatly reduced.” 

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17.In  Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC  

225, the Court formulated as many as 11 propositions with a  

note   of   caution   that   these   were   not   to   be   treated   as 

exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. 

86.  In   view   of   the   above   discussion,   the   following 

propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We  

must   forewarn   that   these   propositions   are   not  

exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations.  

Nor   is   it   possible   to   lay   down   any   hard   and   fast 

rules. These propositions are:

(1)   Fair,   just   and   reasonable   procedure   implicit   in 

Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the  

accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is  

the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial  

is   also   in   public   interest   or   that   it   serves   the 

social interest also, does not make it any the less  

the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all  

concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused  

is   determined   as   quickly   as   possible   in   the  

circumstances.

(2)   Right   to   speedy   trial   flowing   from   Article   21 

encompasses   all   the   stages,   namely   the   stage   of  

investigation,   inquiry,   trial,   appeal,   revision   and  

re­trial. That is how, this Court has understood this  

right   and   there   is   no   reason   to   take   a   restricted 

view.

(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial  

from the point of view of the accused are:

(a) the period of remand and pre­conviction detention  

should be as short as possible. In other words, the  

accused   should   not   be   subjected   to   unnecessary   or 

unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

(b) the   worry,   anxiety,   expense   and   disturbance   to 

his   vocation   and   peace,   resulting   from   an   unduly 

prolonged   investigation,   inquiry   or   trial   should   be 

minimal; and

(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the  

ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on  

account of death, disappearance or non­availability of  

witnesses or otherwise.

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(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it  

is usually the accused who is interested in delaying  

the proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a  

known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the  

guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay  

ordinarily   prejudices   the   prosecution.   Non­

availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence  

by lapse of time really work against the interest of  

the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where  

the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the  

proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right  

to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the  

first   question   to   be   put   and   answered   is   —   who   is 

responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either  

party   in   good   faith,   to   vindicate   their   rights   and 

interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as  

delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing  

such   proceedings   be   counted   towards   delay.   It   goes 

without   saying   that   frivolous   proceedings   or  

proceedings   taken   merely   for   delaying   the   day   of 

reckoning cannot  be treated as  proceedings taken in  

good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition  

is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior  

court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not  

frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex  

parte representation.

(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred  

(resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one  

must have regard to all the attendant circumstances,  

including   nature   of   offence,   number   of   accused   and 

witnesses,   the   workload   of   the   court   concerned,  

prevailing   local   conditions   and   so   on   —   what   is 

called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the  

obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and  

State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and  

practical approach should be adopted in such matters  

instead of a pedantic one.

(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice  

the   accused.   Some   delays   may   indeed   work   to   his 

advantage.   As   has   been   observed   by   Powell,   J.   in 

Barker “it cannot be said how long a delay is too long  

in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but  

deliberate”. The same idea has been stated by White,  

J. in U.S. v. Ewell in the following words:

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‘...   the   Sixth   Amendment   right   to   a   speedy   trial   is 

necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and  

has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its  

essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing  

a   prosecution   amounts   to   an   unconstitutional  

deprivation   of   rights   depends   upon   all   the  

circumstances.’

However,   inordinately   long   delay   may   be   taken   as  

presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the  

fact   of   incarceration   of   accused   will   also   be   a 

relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed  

to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution  

become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a  

given case.

(7)   We   cannot   recognize   or   give   effect   to,   what   is 

called   the   ‘demand’   rule.   An   accused   cannot   try  

himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the  

prosecution.   Hence,   an   accused's   plea   of   denial   of 

speedy   trial   cannot   be   defeated   by   saying   that   the 

accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a  

given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was  

not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his  

favour,   but   the   mere   non­asking   for   a   speedy   trial 

cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the  

relevance   of   demand   rule   has   been   substantially  

watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases.

(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the  

several   relevant   factors   —   ‘balancing   test’   or  

‘balancing   process’   —   and   determine   in   each   case  

whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a  

given case.

(9)   Ordinarily   speaking,   where   the   court   comes   to   the 

conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused  

has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as  

the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the  

only course open. The nature of the offence and other  

circumstances   in   a   given   case   may   be   such   that  

quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of  

justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to  

make such other appropriate order — including an order  

to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the  

trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where  

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the trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and  

equitable in the circumstances of the case.

(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any  

time­limit   for   trial   of   offences.   Any   such   rule   is 

bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be  

evolved   merely   to   shift   the   burden   of   proving  

justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution.  

In   every   case   of   complaint   of   denial   of   right   to 

speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to  

justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is  

the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances  

of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint.  

The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to  

fix any such outer time­limit in spite of the Sixth  

Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such  

outer   limit   ineffectuates   the   guarantee   of   right   to 

speedy trial.

(11)   An   objection   based   on   denial   of   right   to   speedy 

trial and for relief on that account, should first be  

addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court  

entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay  

the   proceedings,   except   in   a   case   of   grave   and  

exceptional   nature.   Such   proceedings   in   High   Court  

must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.”

18.Seven learned Judges of this Court in    P. Ramachandra 

Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 , considered the 

validity of the ratio laid down in Common Cause case (I) as  

modified in Common Cause case (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I)  

and   (II)   cases   wherein   this   Court   prescribed   periods   of 

limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a  

criminal proceeding cannot continue and directed to close  

the proceeding by an order acquitting or discharging the  

accused in such cases. In the said case of  P. Ramachandra 

Page 14 14

Rao(supra) after exhaustive consideration of the authority  

on the subject this Court held:

“29.  For   all   the   foregoing   reasons,   we   are   of   the 

opinion that in Common Cause case (I) [as modified in  

Common Cause (II)] and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) the  

Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation  

beyond   which   the   trial   of   a   criminal   case   or   a 

criminal   proceeding   cannot   continue   and   must  

mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting  

or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold:

(1)  The  dictum   in  A.R.   Antulay  case  is  correct   and 

still holds the field.

(2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the  

Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial  

laid   down   as   guidelines   in   A.R.   Antulay   case  

adequately   take   care   of   right   to   speedy   trial.   We 

uphold and reaffirm the said propositions.

(3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case are  

not   exhaustive   but   only   illustrative.   They   are   not 

intended to operate as hard­and­fast rules or to be  

applied   like   a   straitjacket   formula.   Their  

applicability  would  depend   on  the  fact  situation  of  

each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations  

and no generalization can be made.

(4)   It   is   neither   advisable,   nor   feasible,   nor  

judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer  

limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The  

time­limits  or  bars  of  limitation  prescribed   in  the  

several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo  

Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been  

so   prescribed   or   drawn   and   are   not   good   law.   The 

criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or  

criminal   proceedings   merely   on   account   of   lapse   of 

time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common  

Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At  

the   most   the   periods   of   time   prescribed   in   those 

decisions  can  be  taken  by  the  courts  seized  of   the  

trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may  

be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts  

and   circumstances   of   the   case   before   them   and  

determine   by   taking   into   consideration   the   several 

relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay case  

and   decide   whether   the   trial   or   proceedings   have 

become   so   inordinately   delayed   as   to   be   called  

oppressive   and   unwarranted.   Such   time­limits   cannot  

Page 15 15

and will not by themselves be treated by any court as  

a   bar   to   further   continuance   of   the   trial   or  

proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to  

terminate   the   same   and   acquit   or   discharge   the  

accused.

(5)   The   criminal   courts   should   exercise   their  

available  powers,  such   as  those  under  Sections   309,  

311   and   258   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   to 

effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and  

diligent   trial   Judge   can   prove   to   be   a   better  

protector   of   such   right   than   any   guidelines.   In  

appropriate   cases,   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court  

under Section 482 CrPC and Articles 226 and 227 of the  

Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief  

or suitable directions.

(6)   This   is   an   appropriate   occasion   to   remind   the 

Union   of   India   and   the   State   Governments   of   their 

constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary  

—   quantitatively   and   qualitatively   —   by   providing  

requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope  

and trust that the Governments shall act.”

19.This Court in  Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar,  

(2009) 3 SCC 355   considered the question of quashing of  

criminal   proceedings   due   to   delay,   when   warranted.  

Referring to earlier decisions of this Court on the issue,  

this Court held that speedy investigation and trial, both  

are   enshrined   in   Cr.PC.   The   right   to   speedy   trial   is 

guaranteed under Article 21 and the same is applicable not  

only   to   actual   proceedings   in   court   but   also   includes 

within   its   sweep   the   preceding   police   investigations   as 

well.

20.In  Vakil Prasad Singh(supra)   one search operation was  

conducted by the office of Superintendent of Police, Crime  

Page 16 16

Investigation Department (Vigilance), Muzaffarpur, on the  

basis of a complaint lodged by a civil contractor against  

the   accused,   an   Assistant   Engineer   in   the   Bihar   State 

Electricity   Board   (Civil)   Muzaffarpur,   for   allegedly  

demanding   a   sum   of   Rs.1000   as   illegal   gratification   for 

release of payment for the civil work executed by him.  The  

case was instituted on 8

th

 April, 1981 and the charge­sheet  

for aforesaid offences was filed against the accused on 28

th 

February,   1982.     The   Magistrate   took   cognizance   on   9

th 

December,1982 but nothing substantial happened. The accused  

filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.PC before the Patna  

High Court against the order passed by the Special Judge,  

Muzaffarpur taking cognizance of the said offences, on the  

ground that the Inspector of Police, who had conducted the  

investigations, on the basis whereof the charge­sheet was  

filed,  had no jurisdiction to do so.  Accepting the plea,  

the High Court by its order dated 7

th

 December, 1990 quashed  

the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and directed  

the prosecution to complete the investigation within three  

months.     However,   no   further   progress   was   made   and   the 

matter   rested   there   till   1998,   when   the   accused   filed 

another petition under Section 482 Cr.PC, giving rise to  

the appeal before this Court.  

Page 17 17

21.Having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in  

number of cases including    State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal  

(supra), Hussainara Khatoon (supra),  Abdul Rehman Antulay  

(supra)  etc. and the relevant facts of   Vakil Prasad Singh  

(supra) case, this Court was of the view that it was a fit  

case where the High Court should have exercised its power  

under Section 482 Cr.PC as the State was not sure as to  

whether a sanction for prosecuting the accused is required  

and if so, whether it has been granted or not and that the  

case was pending for about 17 years and the proceedings  

against the appellant was quashed. 

22.To find out the factual scenario, we have noticed the  

background in a greater detail as mentioned hereunder:

23.On 4

th

 January, 2000, the following allegation was made  

by   the   complainant­District   Literacy   &   Education   Mission 

Officer, Dausa in the FIR, the relevant portion of which is  

quoted below:

“First Information Report

Office of literacy and continuous education mission,  

Dausa File No.672 dated 4.1.2000

To,

The SHO

Police Station: Dausa

Page 18 18

Subject: Regarding misappropriation of the amount of  

pending Bill for the period 11.96­11.97 by Sh.Lokesh  

Jain LDC(Cashier),

In   reference   to   the   above   subject,   it   is   requested 

that Sh. Lokesh Jain, Lower Division Clerk (Cashier)  

presently under suspension while working on the post  

of cashier has committed financial irregularities for  

which financial department and office of CAG conducted  

an enquiry which is annexed herewith.

As   per   the   enquiry   report   Rs.4,39,617   has   been  

misappropriated, all the copies of the original bill  

are   present   in   the   office   of   CAG   and   the   original 

documents are available in the office of Directorate  

State Literacy and Education Mission.

Hence,   it   is   requested   that   an   FIR   may   be   got 

registered on the basis of the annexed enquiry report  

of the office of the CAG.

Enclosures enquiry 8 pages

Sd/­

District Literacy & Education

Mission Officer, Dausa”

24.After   conducting   investigation,   the   Investigation  

Agency submitted Final Report on 2

nd

  June,2000 before the  

CJM, Dausa, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:

“Brief Facts of the case:

Respected Sir,

The   facts   of   the   present   case   are   that   on 

4.1.2000   Sh.   Murari   lal   S/o   Sh.   Harmukh   Prasad,  

caste:   Brahmin,   aged   56   years,   R/o   Village:   Oonch, 

P.S: Nandbai, District:Bharatpur presently posted as  

district   literacy   and   mission   education   officer,  

Dausa, presented in the Police Station and filed one  

report against Sh. Lokesh Kumar Jain (LDC) presently  

under   suspension   that   Lokesh   Jain   while   working   as 

cashier,   committed   certain   financial   irregularities  

which   emerged   during   an   enquiry   conducted   by   the 

office of the Controller and Auditor General as per  

Page 19 19

which   misappropriation   of   Rs.4,39,619/­   has   been  

reflected.

Copy of report is annexed; copies of the original  

document   of   CAG   and   original   document   of   state  

literacy and mission education office are available.  

On the basis of the said report FIR No.10/2000 u/s  

409 of IPC was registered and investigation witnesses  

were recorded. Oral requests were made several times  

to   the   concerned   department   for   producing   the  

requisite   document   pertaining   to   the   case   but   was 

ineffective subsequently on 13.4.2000.  A  notice was  

issued   u/s   91   Cr.PC     for   making   available   of   the 

requisite   document   but   despite   that   no   record   was 

made available.

Again   on   21.4.2000   a   notice   u/s   91   Cr.PC   was 

issued and directions were given that in case of non­

supply of document one  sided  action will  be taken.  

No document, no record was produced.

During the course of investigation pertaining to  

Lokesh   Jain   (LDC)   for   the   period   11.96   ­11.97  

statements of Sh. Kailash and Ram Kishor Bairwa (Jr.  

accountant)   who   stated   that   during   investigation  

credit­debit record was not made available and they  

showed their inability to produce the record before  

the I.O, No. T.P. 31162, a complaint was also given  

in   this   regard,   C.O.   has   also   written   to   the  

department   to   produce   the   record   but   they   showed 

their inability to produce the same. 

The present case, several requests were made for  

production of record but the same was not produced.  

No evidence came  against Sh.  Lokesh Jain, from  the  

file of the education department.  The case has been  

pending   since   long   and   there   is   no   probability   of 

availability of record in the near future.   Further  

investigation   will   be   taken   on   the   receipt   of   the 

records from the concerned departments.

Hence   FR   No.67/2000   is   being   filed   for   kind 

perusal   and   acceptance   because   of   insufficient  

evidence.”

25.On perusal of Final Report, the CJM, Dausa passed the  

following order:

Page 20 20

“Before the Chief Judicial Magistrate

District: Dausa, Dausa

Complainant: Murari Lal

FIR No. 10/2000

18.11.2000

Present App.

Present complainant: Sh Murari Lal Sharma

In   this   case   final   report   has   been   filed   with   the 

avernment   that   the   original   record   has   not   been  

supplied to the SHO and hence investigation cannot be  

carried out.  The complainant Murari Lal is present and  

he is ready to cooperate with the police officers for  

procuring the said records.

Hence u/s 156(3) Cr.PC the SHO Dausa is directed to re­

investigate the case with the assistance of Sh. Murari  

Lal literacy and mission education officer to procure  

the original records.   Final report is not accepted,  

case diary is being returned.

Sd/­ CJM

District: Dausa, Dausa”

26.Thereafter, nothing on the record suggest that after  

the order dated 18

th

 November, 2000 passed by the CJM, Dausa  

the   respondent   produced   the   original   records   before   the 

Investigation Agency for further investigation. 

27.At   least   for   more   than   nine   years   neither   original 

records could be traced by the Authorities nor any relevant  

document   could   be   found   to   implicate   the   appellant,   as 

evident   from   the   Inquiry   Report   dated   15

th

  December,2008 

submitted by the Inquiry Officer whereby the appellant was  

Page 21 21

exonerated over the identical charges for which criminal  

case   was   lodged.     The   respondent   inspite   of   repeated  

requests   by   the   Inquiry   Officer   failed   to   produce   any 

records including originals from the Bank to establish the  

guilt of the delinquent official, Sh.Lokesh Kumar Jain. The  

relevant   portions   of   Inquiry   Report   dated   15

th

  December, 

2008 are quoted hereunder:

“The   prosecuting   officer   after   the   lapse   of   various 

dates has presented the following documents:

a)   Books   of   accounts,   Encashment   Register   and   Bill 

register (all photocopies)

b)   Letter   dated   26­04­2004   issued   by   S.B.B.J.   Bank 

Branch   Dausa   which   was   addressed   to   the   office   of 

Literacy officer, Dausa.

c) Letter dated 21­11­2008 issued by the office of the  

treasurer of the treasury.

d)   Letter   bearing   CA/II/Dausa/176   dated   04­11­2008  

issued by the office of the chief auditor.

According to  the aforesaid documents, the photocopies  

of   the   original   documents   was   shown   to   the   alleged 

officer.     After   the   perusal   of   the   photocopies,   the 

alleged officer denying the same has  again  filed  the  

application on 12­01­2009 and demanded that he might be  

allowed to peruse the original records.  The objections  

were raised by the alleged officer and the prosecuting  

officer   was   given   strict   direction   to   present   the  

original   record   and   evidence.     On   the   next   several 

dates   also   the   prosecuting   officer   failed   to   produce 

any other original record.

On   24­07­2009,   the   alleged   officer   along   with   the  

assistant perused the case and the related document and  

letters in the  presence of  the prosecution  party  and  

for the purpose of the presenting the written argument  

the   case   was   fixed   for   29­07­2009.   The   defence  

Page 22 22

appearing   along   with   the   assistant   has   filed   his  

written argument which was taken on record.

The prosecution party and the defence party were given  

one   last   and   final   opportunity   to   present   the  

witness/evidence/documents   in   accordance   with   the  

principle of natural justice. On the date fixed neither  

the   prosecution   nor   the   defence   has   filed   their  

witness/evidence/documents.

According   to   the   notification,   following   offence   was 

alleged against Shri Jain on 22­12­2007:

1. That you Shri Lokesh Kumar Jain (Cashier) being in  

the   office   of   the   District   Education   and   Education 

officer Dausa from 20­11­1995 to 13­11­1997, was given  

the work of accountant.

According   the   inquiry   report   of   11/96   to   11/97,   an 

embezzlement of Rs.4,39,617/­ was found to be done by  

you.

The details of the allegation is depicted as follows:

a) Bills of F.V.C. amounting to Rs.65,330/­ is found to  

be entered in the Bill Register but after the passing  

of the bill from the treasury, the entry of which was  

not   found   in   the   encashment   register   and   books   of 

account.

There   is   no   entry   of   any   bill   of   F.V.C.   in   the 

aforesaid manner in the photocopy of the records (Cash  

book, Encashment Register) filed by the prosecution in  

respect of the offence alleged.  From the bare perusal  

it becomes clear that the bill which is entered, the  

earlier entry record of which is entered according to  

the   rules.   The   letter   of   both   the   agencies   were  

produced in respect of the withdrawal of various bills  

of F.V.C. amounting to Rs.65,330/­ (P­1) from the banks  

and   in   respect   of   passing   from   the   treasury   and   the 

said bills are also found to be mentioned in the bill  

register (P­2) (P­3). The entries of the bills are not  

available   in   the   other   records   apart   from   the   Bill 

Register.  On the basis of the documents produced (P­2)  

(P­3) by the prosecution, the original bill which was  

to be obtained from the office of the Chief Auditor,  

was not received (P­4).

Hence it is not clear that which person has withdrawn  

the said bills from the bank nor the original bill is  

there   on   record,   looking   into   the   pages   of   which 

Page 23 23

conclusion  could  be drawn that  who has  withdrawn  the  

amount of the said bills from the bank.

In the light of the said evidence (P­2) (P­3) the first  

part of the offence (1), the offence of embezzlement of  

amount by withdrawing the amount of said bills from the  

banks could not establish the guilt of the Delinquent  

Officer Shri Lokesh Kumar Jain. Hence the part of the  

offence is not established in respect of the accused.

2. The   entry   of   the   Bills   of   F.V.C.   amounting   to 

Rs.2,96,100/­ is found in the Bill Register, Encashment  

Register and Books of account:­

In respect of the said offence, the original bill or  

the carbon copy of the said bills is not filed by the  

prosecution.  On the basis of the documents P­1 and P­2  

filed by the State, the delinquent member could not be  

held   guilty   for   the   withdrawal   of   the   amount   of   the 

said bills.   The said offence merely on the basis of  

the   letters   of   the   bank   and   Treasury   could   not   be 

regarded as cogent evidence. The entries of the bills  

are not available on any record of the related office.  

In  the inquiry, the original bills are  not available  

with   the   Assistant   Agency   Treasury   nor   the   carbon  

copies of the bills are available in the office.   In  

the   said   facts   and   circumstances,   it   could   not   be 

established that the said bills are withdrawn by Shri  

Lokesh   Kumar   Jain   because   in   ordinary   course   of  

business   it   is   not   possible   for   single   person   to 

execute the entire work that is to say generation of  

bills, getting it passed and withdrawing the same.

Hence the second part of offence is not proved against  

Shri   Lokesh   Kumar   Jain   for   want   of   cogent   and  

sufficient proof.

3. Embezzlement   of   the   amount   of   Rs.78,179/­   by  

withdrawing the bills of  the other department in  the  

head of Literacy and Education in the Budget.  

The prosecution has filed the evidence of (P­2) (P­3)  

in respect of the offence.  According to the evidence,  

the   payment   was   made   for   the   purpose   of   making   the 

payment of the  bills  of said  Sparsh Vidyalaya RAMAVI  

Dhigariya but in the budget the same is under the head  

of Literacy and Education department.

The entire part of the offence is completely disputed.  

There   is   withdrawal   of   the   bills   of   the   other  

department in the head of Literacy and Education in the  

Page 24 24

Budget but it is not clear as to who has received the  

payments.   Merely on the basis of the Treasury office  

regarding   the   fact   of   expenditure   and   receiving   the 

payments does not prove the delinquent officer  to be  

the guilty of the offence.   It is possible that error  

might have happened by the other assisting agency.  It  

is   also   impossible   to   pass   the   bill   merely   on   the 

budget   head.     It   could   not   be   ascertained,   without 

looking to pages of the original records, whether the  

guilty  officer has  obtained the payment of  the bills  

from the bank or not.

CONCLUSION:

On   the   basis   of   the   records,   evidence   and   documents 

presented   in   the   proceedings   and   upon   the   basis   of 

written   and   oral   arguments   of   both   the   parties,   the 

undersigned comes to the conclusion that who was made  

the payment of amount of various bills alleged in the  

offence is doubtful.  All the said bills were passed by  

the Treasurer.   The original and carbon copies of the  

said entire bills is not available with the department.  

Merely   on   the   basis   of   the   letters   of   the   Assisting 

Agencies the offence against the alleged officer is not  

found to be established. 

Sd/­ Chitarmal Meena

Inquiry Officer and Principal Officer,

RAU Department Bhandarej, Dausa.”

28.In P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1,  this 

Court   noticed   that   the   appellant   was   exonerated   in   the 

departmental   proceeding   in   the   light   of   report   of   the 

Central   Vigilance   Commission   and   concurred   by   the   Union 

Public   Service  Commission.   The  criminal  case   was  pending  

since long, in spite of the fact that the appellant was  

exonerated in the departmental proceeding for same charge.

Page 25 25

29.Having regard to the aforesaid fact, this Court held  

that   if   the   charges   which   is   identical   could   not   be 

established in a departmental proceedings, one wonders what  

is there further to proceed against the accused in criminal  

proceedings where standard of proof required to establish  

the guilt is far higher than the standard of proof required  

to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings.   

30.Having regard to the factual scenario, noted above, and  

for the reasons stated below, we are of the opinion that  

the present case of the appellant is one of the fit cases  

where the High Court should have exercised its power under  

Section 482 Cr.PC.   It is not disputed by the respondent  

that the departmental proceeding was initiated against the  

appellant with regard to identical charges made in the FIR.  

It was alleged that as per CAG Inquiry Report dated 15

th 

December,   2008   Rs.4,39,617/­   has   been   misappropriated   by  

the   appellant,   all   the   copies   of   original   bills   and  

documents   are   available   in   the   office   of   CAG   and   the 

original   documents   are   available   in   the   office   of   the 

Directorate, State Literacy Programme.  

31.In the departmental proceeding identical allegation was  

made   that   as   per   the   Inquiry   Officer   Report,   an  

Page 26 26

embezzlement of Rs.4,39,617/­ was found to be done by the  

appellant. 

32.During  the   investigation   inspite  of  several  requests  

made by the Investigating Agency (Police), the records in  

respect of allegation were not produced.  No evidence came  

against the appellant­Lokesh Kumar Jain, from the file of  

the education department.   As the   case was pending since  

long and there was no possibility of availability of record  

in the near future, FR No.67/2000 against the appellant was  

filed before the CJM, Dausa. The CJM, Dausa by his order  

dated 18

th

  November, 2000 on perusal of Final Report, in  

exercise   of   power   conferred   under   Section   156(3)   Cr.PC  

directed the SHO, Dausa to re­investigate the case with the  

assistance   of   complainant   and   to   procure   the   original  

records.   Inspite of order dated 18

th

  November, 2000, for  

nine years, records were not made available, as apparent  

from the Inquiry Report dated 15

th

 December,2008. 

33.There is nothing on the record, even by way of counter  

affidavit filed before this Court to show that record has  

now been traced to make it available to the Investigating  

Agency.   There   is   no   probability   of   finding   out   original 

documents or evidence mentioned in the counter affidavit.  

Page 27 27

Though,   delay   has   been   alleged   on   the   part   of   the  

appellant, there is nothing on the record to suggest that  

the appellant caused delay in the matter of investigation.  

On   the   other   hand,   the   silence   on   the   part   of   the 

respondent regarding availability of the original record or  

other evidence before the Investigating Agency shows that  

the   delay   caused   due   to   inaction   on   the   part   of   the 

respondent. Therefore, in our view, keeping investigation  

pending for further period will be futile as the respondent  

including Directorate for the State Literacy Programme is  

not   sure   whether   original   records   can   be   procured   for 

investigation  and  to  bring  home  the  charges.  Considering  

the fact that delay in the present case is caused by the  

respondent,   the   constitutional   guarantee   of   a   speedy  

investigation   and   trial   under   Article   21   of   the  

Constitution is thereby violated and as the appellant has  

already been exonerated in the departmental proceedings for  

identical   charges,   keeping   the   case   pending   against   the 

appellant   for   investigation,   is   unwarranted,   the   FIR  

deserves to be quashed. 

Page 28 28

34.In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed   and   the   FIR 

No.10/2000 lodged in Police Station, Dausa as against the  

appellant is hereby quashed. 

………………………………………………………………………… .J.

                  (T.S. THAKUR)

……………………………………………………………………….J.

                     (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

NEW DELHI,

JULY 9,2013