2025 INSC 1254 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6813-14 OF 2013

M. JAMEELA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER ETC …RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

ARAVIND KUMAR, J.

1. These appeals by the original applicants arise from a common

judgment dated 28

th

February, 2012 of the High Court of Kerala in M.F.A.

Nos. 213 & 219 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the High Court

affirmed the order of the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode dated 20

th

March, 2007

dismissing the appellants‟ Original Applications (O.A.) Nos. 36 & 37 of

1997. The central question is whether the lands in question, comprising a

total of 37.50 acres in South Wayanad, Kerala are private forests vested in

the State by virtue of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment)

Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Vesting Act”), or whether they

stood exempt from vesting as bona fide coffee plantations existing prior to

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the Act‟s appointed day, 10

th

May, 1971, by operation of Sections 3(2) and

3(3) of the Act.

2. The dispute has a protracted history. The appellants (and their

predecessors) claim title and possession of the suit lands and assert that the

lands were developed as coffee and cardamom plantations well before 1971.

In 1997, faced with the Forest Department‟s assertion that these lands were

“vested forest” under the Vesting Act, the appellants filed O.A. Nos. 36 of

1997 and 37 of 1997 before the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode under Section 8

of the Act, seeking to declare that the lands are not vested in the

Government. The State resisted the applications, maintaining that the lands

in question constituted private forest as on the appointed day and hence

stood vested under Section 3(1) of the Act.

3. The Forest Tribunal initially adjudicated the matter by a common

judgment dated 30

th

September, 1999, dismissing the applications. In

essence, the Tribunal in that first round held that the appellants failed to

prove the existence of the claimed plantations prior to 10.05.1971. The

appellants carried the matter in appeal to the High Court. The High Court, by

order dated 11

th

December, 2006 in M.F.A. No. 618 of 2000 (which was the

earlier appeal arising from the 1999 Tribunal decision), set aside the

Tribunal‟s 1999 order and remanded the case for fresh consideration. The

High Court specifically directed the Tribunal to conduct a thorough inquiry

with the aid of scientific expertise to determine whether the coffee plants on

the property were planted before the appointed day. This direction was given

because the High Court found that the critical issue, i.e., the age of the

plantation had not been satisfactorily determined in the initial round.

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4. Pursuant to the remand, the Forest Tribunal appointed an Advocate

Commissioner, who in turn engaged an expert namely, a retired Deputy

Director of the Coffee Board to assist in ascertaining the age of the coffee

plants. An inspection of the properties was conducted, and the Advocate

Commissioner submitted a detailed report dated 20

th

February, 2007 (Exts.

C4 and C5) incorporating the expert‟s findings. After considering the

additional evidence, the Forest Tribunal rendered its final judgment on 20

th

March, 2007, again dismissing both O.A. Nos. 36/1997 and O.A. 37/1997.

The Tribunal acknowledged the new evidence but was not convinced that

the plantations were established before 10.05.1971 and thus denied the

exemption under the Act.

5. Aggrieved, the appellants (including the successor-in-interest of the

second original applicant) filed appeals before the High Court of Kerala

under Section 8A of the Act. These appeals were numbered M.F.A. No. 213

of 2007 and M.F.A. No. 219 of 2007. The High Court heard the parties and

by a common judgment dated 28

th

February, 2012 dismissed both appeals,

thereby affirming the Tribunal‟s order. The High Court concurred with the

Tribunal‟s view that the evidence was insufficient to establish the exemption

and found no error in the Tribunal‟s appreciation of the expert evidence.

Consequently, the appellants‟ claim that the land is not a vested forest was

rejected at both levels. It is against this judgment of the High Court that the

appellants have preferred the present civil appeals.

6. The factual matrix, as can be gathered from the record, is as follows.

The lands in question form part of what was historically known as the

Kalpetta Estate in South Wayanad Taluk (erstwhile Malabar district). The

Kalpetta Estate was a large private estate of about 6000 acres in the mid -

4

20

th

century. In the 1960s, the estate owners decided to alienate a portion of

their holdings. One K.V. Gopalan, a timber merchant, became interested in a

part of the estate land. Ultimately, on 24.01.1970, a parcel of 37.50 acres

was sold by Kalpetta Estate (through its proprietors and the legal heirs of

K.V. Gopalan, acting as confirming parties) to one Parappu Mappilakath

Imbichi Ahmed by a registered Jenmam deed No. 789/1970 of S.R.O.

Vythiri. This 37.50-acre plot, situated in Muppainad and Kottappady areas

of Wayanad constitutes the subject property now in dispute.

7. Prior to effecting the sale in 1970, necessary permissions were

obtained under the then-operative Madras Preservation of Private Forests

Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the “MPPF Act”). The District Collector

of Malabar, by proceedings dated 31.08.1956, granted sanction under

Section 3(1) of the MPPF Act for the alienation of the 37.50-acre plot to

Imbichi Ahmed. Additionally, on 26.11.1956, the Collector issued a clear-

felling permit authorizing the felling of trees in the said area. Pursuant to

these permissions, the entire 37.50 acres which was presumably forested

land at that time was clear-felled in 1956. By early 1957, possession of the

cleared land was handed over to Imbichi Ahmed, who had by then paid the

full sale consideration.

8. Having obtained a completely cleared tract of land, Imbichi Ahmed

proceeded to develop it for agricultural use. The record indicates that by

1957 itself, he had commenced planting the area with coffee and cardamom,

the two principal plantation crops suited to the region. The property was

effectively divided into two “bits” for cultivation purposes: Bit No.1,

approximately 25 acres, was planted entirely with coffee; Bit No.2,

approximately 12.50 acres, was planted with cardamom. By all accounts,

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these plantations grew and flourished under Imbichi‟s care in the ensuing

years. It is significant that these facts are corroborated by official records:

well before the 1971 Vesting Act came into force, the owner had obtained

formal registration of both the coffee and cardamom plantations under the

relevant commodity boards. In 1972, Imbichi Ahmed was issued Coffee

Plantation Registration Certificate No. 284/1972, covering the coffee

plantation on the 25-acre bit. Likewise, for the cardamom cultivation on the

12.5-acre bit, Cardamom Registration Certificate No. 81/SW was granted,

dated 30.06.1971. These certificates being official recognitions strongly

support the claim that as on the crucial date (10.05.1971) the entire 37.50

acres was under bona fide plantation cultivation (coffee in one part and

cardamom in the other). Indeed, the appellants emphasized that the estate

was fully planted up long before the appointed day.

9. After the Vesting Act came into force on 10

th

May, 1971, initially

there appears to have been no immediate interference with Imbichi Ahmed‟s

possession of the plantation. On the contrary, further evidence suggests that

government authorities treated the land as agricultural plantation, not forest.

In land reform proceedings under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, the

Taluk Land Board in 1976 recorded these 37.50 acres as exempt plantation

land under Section 81 of that Act. Since plantations (such as coffee, tea,

cardamom, etc.) were exempt from the land ceiling by virtue of Section 81,

no portion of this land was taken as surplus which is an implicit

acknowledgment of its plantation character. Imbichi Ahmed continued in

occupation, paying land revenue and also remitting Plantation Tax and

Agricultural Income Tax on yields from the land.

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10. In 1979, Imbichi Ahmed decided to divest his ownership. By two

registered sale deeds both dated 24.04.1979, he assigned the land in roughly

two equal halves. One half, measuring 18.75 acres, was sold to P.P.

Mehmood (also referred to as P.P. Muhammed) under Document No.

2104/1979. The remaining 18.75 acres was sold to M. Jameela (the present

appellant) under Document No. 2105/1979. It is not a coincidence that each

18.75-acre parcel contained a mix of coffee and cardamom cultivation. As

described in the evidence, out of the original Bit No.1 (25 acres coffee),

12.50 acres of coffee went to P.P. Mehmood and the remaining ~12.50 acres

of coffee to Jameela. Similarly, the cardamom Bit No.2 (12.50 acres) was

divided roughly into 6.25 acres each to Mehmood and Jameela. In this

manner, both purchasers acquired portions of the coffee plantation and

cardamom plantation. The Coffee Board and Spices Board were duly

notified of these transfers. Upon sale, Imbichi Ahmed surrendered his

plantation registration certificates to the concerned authorities so that fresh

certificates could be issued to the purchasers for their respective portions.

The coffee plantation registration was accordingly transferred to P.P.

Mehmood‟s name for the 12.5-acre coffee area he acquired (a new

Registration No. RC 13091/80/SW was issued for that portion). The record

indicates that P.P. Mehmood thereafter continued to maintain the plantation

on his 18.75 acres, and he too regularly paid land revenue, plantation tax and

agricultural income tax for his holding.

11. A few years later, in 1983, P.P. Mehmood sold his 18.75-acre share

to the appellant M. Jameela. This transfer was effected through two

registered sale deeds (Doc. Nos. 777/1983 and 893/1983 of S.R.O. Vythiri).

By 1983, therefore, the entire 37.50 acres came to be consolidated in the

hands of Smt. M. Jameela (the appellant), who is a planter by profession.

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From 1983 onwards, Jameela has been in possession of the entirety of the

land, treating it as one estate and continuing the cultivation of coffee and

cardamom thereon. It is on record that she, like her predecessors, dutifully

paid the land taxes and agricultural income taxes due for the property and

maintained the plantation without interference for many years.

12. The first signs of dispute with the Forest Department arose only in

the late 1990s. Initially, when the Forest Department conducted its

demarcation survey of vested private forests post-1971, it did not treat this

plantation as vested forest. In fact, the demarcation officers at the time

expressly excluded the coffee plantation area from the notified vested forest

boundaries. The appellants have produced evidence showing that concrete

boundary markers (jundas) were placed along the outer edges of the

plantation, keeping the entire 12.50-acre coffee area outside the demarcated

government forest. The Department‟s survey team had found that this area

was a cultivated plantation well before the cutoff date, and hence not a

“private forest” within the meaning of the Vesting Act. However, in or about

1997, local forest officials revisited the matter and took a divergent stand.

They began asserting that a portion of the estate was in fact vested forest that

had been mistakenly left out earlier. Specifically, the Forest Department laid

claim to about 2 acres of land (described as the „A Schedule‟ in the O.A.

37/1997) on the periphery of the coffee plantation, contending that this patch

was not under coffee cultivation as of 10.05.1971 and thus had vested in the

Government. They also seemingly disputed certain parts of the cardamom-

planted area, totaling roughly 6.25 acres, as vestible forest land. In total,

approximately 8.25 acres out of the 37.50 acres were now alleged by the

Department to be vested forest (2 acres from the coffee bit and 6.25 acres

from the cardamom bit). The remaining extent (mostly the coffee-planted

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area of about 29.25 acres) was still acknowledged by the Department as a

pre-existing plantation not subject to vesting.

13. Faced with this the appellant Jameela (who by 1997 had become the

owner of the entire estate) initiated legal action to protect her property. O.A.

No. 36 of 1997 was filed by Smt. M. Jameela seeking a declaration that

12.50 acres of her land (presumably the portion primarily under coffee but

including any disputed part thereof) is not a vested forest. O.A. No. 37 of

1997 was filed by the other affected title holder (Naduvilakath S. Nazim

Bushra, who was by then holding an interest, but subsequently assigned it to

Jameela), in respect of 8.25 acres (the portion corresponding to the disputed

2-acre coffee patch plus 6.25-acre cardamom patch). In substance, both

O.A.s together covered the entire 20.75 acres that the Forest Department had

started to claim (though initially the Department‟s claim was 8.25 acres, the

applications appear to also preemptively cover the remaining plantation area

to forestall any further claim). The appellants‟ consistent case was that the

entire 37.50 acres had been fully converted to plantation by 1957 and

remained so at the time of vesting in 1971; hence no part of it was “private

forest” subject to government takeover.

14. To summarize the factual position established on record: Parappu

Mappilakath Imbichi Ahmed lawfully purchased 37.50 acres of land in

1956-57, obtained government permissions, cleared the jungle, and planted

coffee and cardamom crops over the whole extent well before 1971. These

plantations were duly registered with statutory boards by 1971-72. The land

was treated as agricultural plantation in land ceiling proceedings (exempt

under law). Through subsequent transfers, the appellant acquired the entire

area and continued cultivation. The Forest Department itself initially

9

recognized the non-forest status of at least the coffee-planted portion,

excluding it from vested forest boundaries. The controversy arose when the

Department, after a gap of decades, claimed that certain pockets

(aggregating about 8.25 acres) were not under plantation on the crucial date

and therefore vested. These conflicting positions led to the litigation at hand.

15. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Chidambaresh on behalf of the

appellants contended forcefully that the courts below have misread both

facts and law in denying the exemption to the subject lands. The appellants

submit that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the existence of a

bona fide plantation on the land well before 10.05.1971, which takes the

land out of the purview of vesting. It is emphasized that the 37.50-acre

property was part of a larger estate and was specifically acquired by their

predecessor for cultivation. By 1957 itself, the entire area was planted with

coffee and cardamom, and it has been continuously utilized for those crops

ever since. He further pointed out that this is not a case of casual or sporadic

cultivation, but of a systematically developed plantation estate with decades

of continued agricultural operations.

16. The learned Senior Counsel referred in detail to the documentary

evidence on record, namely, the registration certificates for the plantations:

Certificate No. 284 of 1972 for the coffee estate, and Certificate No. 81/SW

of 1971 for the cardamom area. These official certificates, issued shortly

after the appointed date, are said to be conclusive proof that the respective

crops (coffee and cardamom) were planted and in existence at least by 1971.

It was argued that one cannot obtain such certificates unless the plantation is

actually established and verified on the ground by the authorities concerned.

The coffee certificate, being dated 1972, indicates the coffee plants were

10

mature enough by then thereby pointing to a planting in the 1960s, well

before vesting. Similarly, the cardamom registration dated June 1971 shows

that crops were also planted by that time. Learned counsel submitted that the

High Court failed to attach due weight to these evidentiary records, which

strongly corroborate the appellants‟ case.

17. The learned Senior Counsel further placed reliance on the

proceedings under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. He submitted that in

1976, the Taluk Land Board (Sulthan Bathery) in Case No. 929/73/SW

acknowledged that the land in question was a plantation exempt under

Section 81 of the Land Reforms Act. The Land Board‟s order (Annexure P-

11) listed the disputed area as plantation land not subject to the land ceiling

limit. The appellants argue that this official finding is highly relevant: it

evidences that the State itself treated the land as a plantation

(coffee/cardamom) and not as wild or fallow land in the post-1971 period.

While conceding that the Land Board‟s exemption was for a different

statutory purpose, the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted

that the factual determination underlying it, that the land was under

plantation cultivation, cannot be ignored in deciding vesting status. In

essence, if the government in 1976 considered the land a plantation for land

reform purposes, it is incongruous for the Forest Department to label it as

“forest” for vesting purposes. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is

a consistency in all records up to the 1980s portraying the land as

agricultural estate land.

18. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further highlighted the

Forest Department‟s own conduct. According to the Learned Senior

Counsel, when the private forests in the region were surveyed and vested in

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the 1970s, the Department‟s surveyors did not include this land in the

vesting notification. On the contrary, as evidenced by the letter and sketch

from the forest demarcation file, the Department‟s officials physically

demarcated the boundaries so as to exclude the 12.50-acre coffee plantation

from the adjoining reserve forests. It is submitted that the Department

thereby effectively admitted that this portion was not a private forest but a

pre-existing plantation. Learned Senior Counsel pointed to the categorical

statement in the appellants‟ pleadings (and supporting documents) that

concrete boundary stones were erected at the extreme boundary of the

plantation, leaving it outside the vested forest map. This, the Learned Senior

Counsel argued, is an admission which binds the State. Having once

accepted that at least 12.50 acres under coffee was exempt, the State cannot

arbitrarily come back decades later and cherry-pick 2 acres within it to claim

as forest. The Learned Senior Counsel representing the appellants contended

that the belated claim over an internal 2-acre patch (and another 6.25-acre

cardamom patch) is ill-founded and appears to be the result of a mistaken or

overzealous re-survey.

19. Further relying on the statutory provisions, the Learned Senior

Counsel contended that they squarely fall within the exemptions carved out

in Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Vesting Act. Learned Senior Counsel took

us through the language of these provisions. He submitted that Section 3(1)

is the vesting clause, but it operates “subject to the provisions of sub-

sections (2) and (3)”. Section 3(2) provides that nothing in the vesting clause

shall apply to so much of a private forest that is held by the owner under

personal cultivation (as defined) up to the extent of the ceiling area

applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The Explanation to

Section 3(2) expansively defines “cultivation” to include cultivation of trees

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or plants of any species, which would undeniably cover a coffee or

cardamom plantation. Section 3(3) further exempts any private forest land

held under a valid registered document of title executed before the appointed

day, intended for cultivation by the owner, to the extent that the total holding

(together with other lands of the owner) does not exceed the land ceiling

limit. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the present case fulfills

both these exemptions. He submitted that Imbichi Ahmed was the owner of

the land under a registered sale deed of 1970 (pre-appointed day), and the

land was indisputably held for cultivation by him. At the time of vesting, he

and his family held this 37.5-acre estate. The appellants maintain that this

extent was within the permissible ceiling area when his family unit is

considered, and moreover, since the land was a plantation, it was exempt

land under the Land Reforms Act, meaning the question of ceiling excess

did not arise in the same manner. He further pointed out that in similar

situations, courts have allowed family owners to club their ceiling

entitlements to retain larger plantation holdings. He further urged that even

if one were to theoretically split hairs about a few acres vis-à-vis the ceiling,

that exercise is unnecessary here because the entire property was under

cultivation and the Act does not intend to divest genuine plantations.

20. Learned Senior Counsel further placed reliance on the decision of

the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Balagopal

1

for the proposition

that the burden lies on the claimant to prove that land is not private forest on

the appointed day, a burden which, they assert, has been fully discharged in

the present case. He also placed reliance on the Full Bench ruling in State of

1

(1986) KLT SN 17

13

Kerala v. Chandralekha

2

, wherein it was underscored that lands which were

effectively cultivated prior to 1971 do not vest, and that the owner‟s

intention and preparatory acts to cultivate (even if cultivation was not fully

accomplished) are relevant to claim exemption. In State of Kerala &

Another v. A.C.K. Rajah

3

, this Court had upheld the High Court‟s finding

that about 60 acres of land were under the owner‟s personal cultivation (as a

family unit) at vesting and hence exempt under Section 3(2). By analogy, the

Learned Senior Counsel contended that their case is even more compelling

because the area here (37.5 acres) is smaller and the evidence of cultivation

is concrete and historical. He submits that the courts below failed to properly

apply these principles and precedents favoring a liberal interpretation of the

exemption for genuine plantations.

21. Learned Senior Counsel took us through the Advocate

Commissioner‟s report (Ext. C4 series) and the testimony regarding the

expert‟s findings. He submitted that the expert, a retired Deputy Director of

the Coffee Board with decades of field experience, inspected the coffee

plants on the property in February 2007. By examining the girth of the

trunks and the number of nodal rings on the coffee stems, he estimated many

of the coffee plants to be around 40 to 42 years old as of 2007. This would

place their origin in the mid-1960s (circa 1965–67), squarely supporting the

claim that they were planted well before May 1971. The expert also

identified the varieties of coffee present, noting a predominance of Arabica

(which was commonly planted in the 1960s) and some Kauveri (Cauvery)

variety plants. The Advocate Commissioner‟s report recorded that there

were indeed some young coffee seedlings in small patches where older

2

(1995) 2 KLJ 121 (FB)

3

AIR 1994 SC 1030

14

plants had been felled and replaced. However, this did not detract from the

fact that the bulk of the plantation comprised old, well-established coffee

trees. The Learned Senior Counsel emphasized that the expert‟s

methodology i.e., visual and physical inspection to gauge age, is a

scientifically accepted practice in plantation agronomy, and that the expert

had no doubt in concluding that the coffee plants in question were of pre-

1971 origin. It is pointed out that the State did not produce any counter-

expert or alternative scientific evidence; the expert opinion on record stands

unimpeached and not contradicted. Learned counsel argues that both the

Tribunal and the High Court erred in brushing aside this expert evidence.

According to him, once an expert, who is a neutral officer of the court,

supported the appellants‟ case with a plausible scientific basis, the courts

ought not to have disregarded it absent any cogent reason or contrary

evidence. He contended that the standard of proof required in such civil

proceedings is only a preponderance of probability, and by that standard, the

expert report tilts the balance decisively in their favor.

22. Summing up, the Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the

concurrent findings of the Tribunal and High Court are manifestly erroneous

and warrant reversal by this Court. He argued that both forums below placed

an unrealistically high burden of proof on the appellants, almost akin to

proving a negative, whereas in practical terms, a claimant in 1997 could not

be expected to produce direct evidence from the 1950s or 60s beyond what

has been produced (official permits, registrations, tax receipts, etc.). He

further submits that they have done all one could reasonably do: they

produced title deeds, government permissions, plantation registers, tax

receipts, and even got an expert to assess the age of the plants, all of which

point in one direction. He contends that if despite this the courts below

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remained unsatisfied, it reflects a mis-appreciation of the evidence and a

failure to give effect to the beneficial purpose of the exemption clauses

(which is to protect genuine cultivators). He urged this Court to re-appraise

the evidence in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction (especially since the

High Court‟s appellate review under Section 8A was itself on facts and law),

and to set aside the impugned judgment. Lastly the Learned Senior Counsel

submitted that he is praying for a declaration that the suit lands are not

vested forest but exempted private lands, and for consequential directions

restoring their full ownership and possession.

23. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Sri Jayanth Muth Raj appearing

for the State of Kerala supported the judgment of the High Court and the

findings of the Forest Tribunal. At the outset, he submitted that the scope of

the Vesting Act must be kept in mind: it was a social welfare legislation

aimed at vesting large tracts of private forests in the State for conservation

and for assignment to the landless. The Act was intended to put an end to

deforestation and land monopolization by private estates. Given this context,

the exemption clauses (Sections 3(2) & 3(3)) have to be construed strictly,

and the burden lies on the person claiming exemption to clearly establish

their case. Learned counsel emphasized that mere assertion of plantation is

not enough; the claimant must prove with convincing evidence that the land

was under cultivation (of the specified kind) as on the appointed day and that

all conditions of the exemption provision are satisfied. In the present case,

he further contended that the appellants failed to discharge this onus to the

degree required, and thus the High Court was right in denying relief.

24. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Kerala refuted the

appellants‟ factual narrative to the extent that it suggests the entire 37.50

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acres was fully planted with coffee/cardamom by 10.05.1971. While not

disputing that some cultivation had been undertaken by the late 1960s, the

learned Senior Counsel argued that the extent and completeness of such

cultivation is doubtful. He pointed out that cardamom, for instance, is a

shade-loving crop usually grown under forest canopies or planted in cleared

areas but takes years to yield. The cardamom registration obtained in June

1971, learned counsel argues, does not conclusively prove that all 12.5 acres

were covered with mature cardamom by May, 1971 and it only shows the

owner‟s intent and initial steps. Similarly, for the coffee area, the State

contends that significant portions of the land might have remained

undeveloped or only sparsely planted by the cutoff date, which would still

classify as “private forest” under the Act‟s definition if the area is above the

threshold (which it is, being over 5 hectares). The respondents maintain that

the appellants have not produced records from around 1971 (such as

plantation journals, labour records or photographs) that delineate the actual

cropped area at that time. The heavy reliance on later documents (1972

coffee certificate, 1976 Land Board order, etc.) is, in the State‟s view,

misplaced because those do not incontrovertibly speak to the ground reality

as on 10.05.1971. At best, they show a general recognition of plantation

activity, but the question under the Vesting Act is a precise one i.e., whether

each portion of the land was under cultivation on the appointed day. Learned

Senior Counsel submitted that any portion not so cultivated would vest, even

if other parts were cultivated. Thus, if the Forest Department found in 1997

that about 8.25 acres within the estate did not bear evidence of pre-1971

plantation, that determination should not be disturbed lightly.

25. The learned Senior Counsel took strong exception to the appellants‟

invocation of the Forest Department‟s initial demarcation. He clarified that

17

exclusion by demarcation officers does not confer any legal status; many a

time, errors in demarcation have had to be corrected upon further

verification. The State‟s stand is that upon careful resurvey, it was noticed

that a 2-acre portion within the so-called coffee area had no old coffee

growth and appeared to have been either vacant or naturally re-forested

around the 1970s, indicating it was not part of the genuine plantation. As for

the 6.25-acre cardamom segment, it was argued that cardamom cultivation

under tree shade is often hard to distinguish from forest, and in this case the

claimant did not prove that the entire 6.25 acres were planted with

cardamom before the appointed day. The High Court noted the cardamom

registration certificate was issued only in mid-1971, which might mean the

planting was done around that time and not substantially earlier. The State‟s

counsel urged that the High Court‟s finding that there was no credible

material to hold these disputed portions were planted before 10.05.1971 is a

reasonable and permissible inference from the evidentiary gaps. It is not,

according to him, a case of ignoring evidence but rather of finding the

evidence insufficient or unpersuasive on the critical point.

26. He further submitted that the so-called expert did not follow any

rigorous scientific procedure such as dendrochronology (ring analysis) or

carbon dating to fix the age of the plants. Instead, he employed a rough-and-

ready method of visual inspection, which can be subjective. The Advocate

Commissioner‟s report indicates that the expert “told him” about the method

of counting nodes to assess age, suggesting that the expert‟s observations

were relayed informally and not as a formally sworn deposition or detailed

written analysis. The High Court found this to be of limited evidentiary

value. The State supports that view, arguing that expert evidence is just one

piece of the puzzle, and the court is not bound to accept it especially if it

18

lacks proper foundation. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the

existence of young saplings in the area, as noted by the expert himself, raises

the possibility that substantial replanting took place post-1971, which would

mean those parts were not continuously under the original plantation. The

respondents assert that the courts below rightly exercised caution and did not

treat the expert‟s opinion as conclusive.

27. The learned Senior Counsel also touched upon the legal

requirements of Sections 3(2) and 3(3). He argued that even assuming some

portion of the land was under cultivation, the appellants needed to

demonstrate that the area was within the “ceiling limit” of the owner as of

1971. Imbichi Ahmed, an individual owner, would ordinarily have a land

ceiling of far less than 37.5 acres under the Kerala Land Reforms Act

(typically 15 acres for a family of five, unless plantations are not counted).

The respondents suggest that the exemptions in the Vesting Act were not

intended to allow a single person to hold 37.5 acres of what would otherwise

be forest, merely by planting some crops. In their view, Sections 3(2) and

3(3) were meant to protect small holders and family holdings under the

ceiling limit, not larger estate acquisitions by individuals. The State thus

contends that the lower courts‟ decisions can also be justified on the ground

that the appellants never clearly established compliance with the ceiling-area

limitation for the original owner. He submitted that the appellants fell short

of proving both prerequisites: (a) full cultivation on the appointed day, and

(b) confinement within the permissible extent.

28. Finally, learned Senior counsel for the State urged that this Court, in

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136, ought not to disturb concurrent

factual findings of the courts below. He submitted that the Forest Tribunal

19

had the advantage of seeing the materials and evidence first-hand, and the

High Court as first appellate court re-appraised the same and came to the

same conclusion. Unless manifest perversity or legal error is shown, he

argues, the Supreme Court would be slow to interfere with such findings. He

further submitted that the High Court gave cogent reasons for not accepting

the appellants‟ version – including the lack of proof of pre-1971 planting

and the inconclusive nature of the expert evidence and those reasons are

neither perverse nor absurd. Therefore, he prayed that the appeals be

dismissed and the impugned judgment be upheld, so that the disputed

portions of land continue to vest in the Government to be managed as forest

or assigned as per law.

29. We have heard the Learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of

the appellants and the respondents. From the rival submissions and perusal

of the record, according to us the following key points arise for

determination in these appeals:

I. Whether the appellants have established that the suit lands

(37.50 acres in two parts) were under personal cultivation

(coffee/cardamom plantation) as on the appointed day

(10.05.1971) so as to be exempt from vesting under Section 3(2)

of the Act.

II. Whether the conditions of Section 3(3) of the Act are satisfied,

i.e. the land was held under a valid title deed executed before the

appointed day with intention for cultivation, and the extent of land

so held (together with any other lands of the owner) did not

exceed the ceiling area applicable under the Kerala Land Reforms

Act.

20

III. Whether the findings of the Forest Tribunal and High

Court suffer from any legal infirmity, misreading of evidence, or

failure to apply correct principles, in particular, whether they erred

in their appreciation of the expert evidence and other documentary

evidence regarding the age and existence of the plantation.

IV. What is the consequence of the above findings: if the

land (or any part of it) is found to be exempted from vesting, and

what are the reliefs and directions to be issued.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

30. For ease of reference and convenience we have reproduced Section 3

of the “Vesting Act” below:

“3. Private forests to vest in Government. –

(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in

force, or in any contract or other document, but subject to the provisions of

sub-sections (2) and (3), with effect on and from the appointed day, the

ownership and possession of all private forests in the state of Kerala shall by

virtue of this Act, stand transferred to and bested in the Government free from

all encumbrances, and the right, title and interest of the owner or any other

person in any private forest shall stand extinguished.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-sections (1) shall apply in respect of so much

extent of land

comprised in private forests held by an owner under his personal cultivation

as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms

Act, 1963 (1 of 1964) or any building or structure standing thereon or

appurtenant thereto.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, "cultivation" includes

cultivation of trees or plants of any species.

(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of so much

extent of private forests held by an owner under a valid registered document

of title executed before the appointed day and intended for cultivation by him,

which together with other lands held by him to which Chapter III of the

Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, is applicable, does not exceed the extent of

the ceiling are applicable to him under Section82 of the said Act.

21

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Reforms Act,

1963, private forests shall, for the purposes of sub-section (2) or sub-section

(3), be deemed to be lands to which Chapter III of the said Act is applicable

and for the purposes of calculating the ceiling limit applicable to an owner,

private forests shall be deemed to be "other dry lands" specified in Schedule

II to the said Act.”

31. Before delving into the factual analysis, it is apposite to outline the

statutory framework of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment)

Act, 1971 relevant to this case. The Act came into force retrospectively on

10

th

May, 1971, declared as the “appointed day”. Section 3 is the heart of the

Act. Section 3(1) provides that, save as otherwise provided in sub-sections

(2) and (3), with effect from the appointed day, the ownership and

possession of all private forests in the State of Kerala stand transferred to

and vested in the Government, free from all encumbrances. The expression

“private forest” is defined in Section 2(f) of the Act (read with the schedule)

broadly to include any area of land which was a private forest as per the

Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, as well as any forest as

per normal dictionary meaning, admeasuring more than the prescribed limit

(e.g. >2 hectares in Malabar) and not principally under cultivation or

inhabited, etc.. Importantly, Sections 3(2) and 3(3) carve out exceptions to

the sweeping vesting of Section 3(1). These provisions, quoted earlier,

essentially aim to spare bona fide agricultural lands from vesting, even if

they formally fell within the definition of private forest.

32. Section 3(2) exempts “so much extent of land comprised in private

forests held by an owner under his personal cultivation as is within the

ceiling limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963”.

The Explanation to 3(2) clarifies that “cultivation” for this purpose includes

cultivation of trees or plants of any species. This was intended to ensure that

22

owners of forest land who had actually brought portions of it under

cultivation (including plantation crops like tea, coffee, rubber, etc.) could

retain those portions up to their land reform ceiling extent. Section 3(3), on

the other hand, addresses lands held under a valid registered document of

title executed before the appointed day which are intended for cultivation by

the owner, subject again to the ceiling area limit. In simpler terms, 3(3)

covers cases where an owner had purchased or otherwise acquired forest

land before 1971 with the genuine intention of cultivating it (even if

cultivation hadn‟t fully commenced by 1971), allowing him to keep that land

(up to the ceiling extent) rather than vesting in the State. Together, these

provisions seek to strike a balance between conservation and private

interests: preserving truly forested areas while protecting the rights of those

who had invested in converting forests to farmland within legal landholding

limits.

33. It is well-settled, and Learned Senior Counsels on both sides concur

on this point, that the burden of proof lies on the person who claims the

benefit of these exemptions. This has been affirmed in multiple precedents,

including Joseph & Another v. State of Kerala & Another,

4

wherein it was

held that the applicant before the Forest Tribunal must establish that the land

does not fall within the definition of private forest under the Act i.e., in other

words, either that it was not a forest at all, or that it was exempt by virtue of

Sections 3(2) and 3(3). The rationale is that vesting is the norm and

exemption is the exception; hence the claimant must prove the applicability

of the exception. We approach the evidence with this principle in mind. At

the same time, we bear in mind that these are civil proceedings, and the

4

(2007) 6 SCR 347

23

standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond

reasonable doubt. The claimant is not required to demonstrate their case with

absolute certainty or direct evidence of every historical fact which in many

cases from 1971 would be impossible but must lead such evidence that a

reasonable fact-finder can conclude that it is more likely than not that the

ingredients of the exemption are satisfied.

34. A second guiding principle is that the concurrent factual findings of

the Tribunal and the High Court are ordinarily given deference by this Court.

However, where the findings are shown to be clearly against the weight of

evidence or vitiated by disregard of relevant materials or wrong legal

standards, this Court would be justified in overturning them. In the present

case, the High Court‟s analysis (as evident from the judgment) was

relatively brief and, in our view, did not engage with several critical pieces

of evidence. The High Court‟s conclusion was that “there was no credible

material” to show the coffee plants were pre-1971, and it agreed with the

Tribunal in not relying on the expert‟s report. If it emerges that the lower

courts overlooked significant undisputed evidence or applied an excessively

onerous standard of proof, that would amount to a legal infirmity enabling us

to interfere. With these principles in mind, we proceed to evaluate the

evidence on record point by point.

RE: Point – I

35. Existence of Coffee and Cardamom Plantations prior to

10.05.1971: On this crucial factual issue, we find the evidence adduced by

the appellants to be not only credible but also largely unrefuted by the State.

The historical narrative, supported by various documents, reveals that as

24

early as 1956–57 the entire 37.50-acre plot was deforested and planted with

coffee and cardamom by the then owner Shri Imbichi Ahmed. The

proceedings of the District Collector in 1956 (granting sanction to alienate

and clear-fell) and the very sale deed of 1970 (Annexure P-1) reflect this

fact. In particular, the sale deed in favor of Imbichi Ahmed (Ext. A1 before

the Tribunal) recites the obtaining of the Collector‟s permission under the

MPPF Act and the clear-felling carried out in 1956. Thus, it is

incontrovertible that the land was a blank slate by 1957, no longer forest in

the sense. The next incidental point that would arise is: whether it was

planted up is evidenced by the registrations of plantations with statutory

bodies: Coffee Board Certificate in 1972 and Cardamom registration in mid-

1971. The fact of issuance of these certificates is admitted. The High Court

appears to have given little importance to them, but in our opinion, these are

cogent evidence. A Coffee Board registration in 1972 implies the planter had

an established coffee cultivation that needed to be brought within the

Board‟s regulatory purview (including for marketing the produce). It is in

evidence that the coffee cultivation spanned 25 acres (Bit No.1) and the

cardamom 12.5 acres (Bit No.2). We also have on record the certificate

number for cardamom (No. 81/SW) dated 30.06.1971, i.e. within about 50

days of the appointed date. This strongly suggests that by May, 1971 the

cardamom crop was existent (likely planted a few years prior, as cardamom

typically takes 2-3 years to mature). The respondents argued that registration

in June 1971 might mean planting happened around that time. We cannot

accept that speculation; it is more reasonable that the planting had occurred

before and the registration application was processed and approved by June.

There is no evidence that the registration was for a nascent plantation, on the

contrary, being a number as low as 81 in the Wayanad region indicates it

25

was among early registrations, consistent with a plantation that had been

there.

36. Further, official records in subsequent years corroborate the

continuous plantation use. The Taluk Land Board‟s 1976 proceedings (Ext.

A11 series) explicitly list the land as exempted plantation. The appellant

Jameela‟s ownership was recorded in the land tax registers, and she paid

plantation tax (a levy exclusively on plantation holdings) copies of such tax

receipts from the 1980s are on file (Ext. A7, A17, etc.). There is also

evidence that agricultural income tax assessments were made for the yields

from this land (Imbichi Ahmed and later P.P. Mehmood had been assessees).

The State did not rebut or challenge these documents. Cumulatively,

therefore, the record shows a consistent picture from 1957 up to 1997: the

land was treated as an agricultural plantation by all concerned agencies/

authorities.

37. Now, the specific bone of contention is the finer question of whether

any portions of the land (specifically 2 acres within the coffee area and 6.25

acres of the cardamom area) lacked plantation on 10.05.1971, as the State

belatedly claims. On this, the State‟s evidence is scant, mostly inferential,

whereas the appellants‟ evidence is direct and circumstantial is compelling.

The Forest Tribunal in 2007 seemed swayed by the fact that the expert and

commissioner noted some young coffee plants in the area, presuming that to

mean parts were planted later. However, as the appellants rightly argued, the

presence of younger plants in a plantation in 2007 does not automatically

prove that area was barren in 1971. Plantations are dynamic; old plants die

or are felled, and new ones are put in their place. What matters is the overall

character of the land. Was it retained under cultivation, or did it revert to

26

wilderness? Here, all evidence points to the former. The Forest

Department‟s own initial demarcation conclusively indicates that as of the

1970s, they found a contiguous plantation of 12.5 acres of coffee and did not

consider any part of it vestible. The record at Ext. A24 (demarcation sketch

and memo) was produced, evidencing that concrete markers were placed

around the 12.5-acre coffee block, excluding it from the vested forest. It is

mentioned that only in 1997 did officials attempt to claim 2 acres within that

block. The High Court unfortunately did not discuss this aspect. We find it

difficult to accept the State‟s explanation that this was a mere correction of

an error. If indeed those 2 acres were untouched forest amidst the coffee, it

is improbable that the original survey team would have missed that fact. No

convincing reason or evidence was given by the State as to what changed or

what new information came to light in 1997 prompting the claim on exactly

2 acres. This arbitrary approach lends credence to the appellants‟ stance that

the 2-acre claim was unjustified.

38. Regarding the 6.25-acre cardamom area, that entire segment had

always been under shade trees with cardamom beneath, which might

superficially resemble forest. The appellants‟ evidence, however, establishes

that cardamom was planted there from the late 1950s and continuing (the

cardamom certificate covers the whole 12.5 acres of Bit No.2 originally,

which was then split into 6.25 + 6.25 for Mehmood and Jameela‟s portions).

Cardamom is a crop that regenerates and can persist if maintained or perish

if abandoned. The fact that plantation tax was being paid on it indicates it

was maintained. There is no evidence that the cardamom area was

abandoned at any time. The Tribunal‟s reasoning seemed to imply that since

coffee was more obviously cultivated, they were more inclined to accept the

coffee portion but were doubtful about cardamom. This is a

27

misapprehension; cardamom cultivation may be less conspicuous, but it is

cultivation nonetheless. The statute‟s explanation explicitly includes

cultivation of any species of plants. We are satisfied from the documents

(especially the cardamom registration, tax receipts, and the continuous

possession by planters) that the entire cardamom area of 12.5 acres (and thus

each 6.25-acre portion thereof) was indeed a cultivated private spice

plantation on the appointed day. No part of it was wild forest that got vested.

The High Court‟s failure to discuss the cardamom aspect separately is a

lapse. They seemed to have focused mainly on coffee and generalized the

lack of proof, which we find untenable.

39. Turning to the expert evidence, we find that the courts below took an

unduly dismissive view of it. The Advocate Commissioner‟s Report along

with the expert‟s notes (Exts. C4, C5) was part of the evidence. The expert,

Mr. T.K. Mathew (as seen from records), was a former Coffee Board Deputy

Director and his expertise was acknowledged even by the Tribunal. He

inspected representative samples of the coffee plants. His finding was that a

substantial number of coffee plants were in the range of 40-42 years old in

2007. This aligns perfectly with a planting in the mid-1960s. The

Commissioner‟s report describes the method: counting the nodal whorls

(each year‟s growth of a coffee plant often leaves a ring or node on the stem)

and measuring girth. These are standard, field-expedient techniques in

agronomy to estimate age. No doubt, they are not as precise as lab tests, but

they give a reasonable approximation. The respondents did not object to or

cross-examine on the expert‟s methodology at the time; their objection

seems to have been raised only at the appellate stage to downplay the

findings. It is true that the expert‟s observations were funneled through the

Advocate Commissioner‟s report (perhaps the expert did not file a separate

28

report of his own). But the Commissioner‟s report is evidence once duly

proved, and the expert‟s opinions therein are part of that evidence. The

Tribunal and High Court could have sought clarification or even summoned

the expert if they had doubts, and in absence, they ought to give due weight

to the uncontroverted assertions in the report.

40. The High Court called the expert opinion “not scientifically

substantiated.” We respectfully disagree with that characterization. Within

the limitations, the expert did scientifically substantiate it by reference to

observable physical indicators on the plants. It was not a mere guess.

Moreover, nothing in the report suggests that the entire case rested on one or

two trees; the expert surveyed the plantation generally. Even if we assume

some margin of error in his age estimation, even a ±5-year error would still

largely place the origin of the coffee before 1971 (e.g. even if some plants

were only 35 years old in 2007, that pegs them to 1972, which could be

explained by staggered planting or replanting of a few gaps, while majority

were older). The presence of young seedlings was noted, but the expert

never said the whole plantation was young, to the contrary, he identified

most plants as decades old. We therefore find that the expert evidence,

instead of being marginalized, should have been seen as reinforcing the

appellants‟ case that the plantation was an established one dating back to the

1960s.

41. It is also important to note that the State did not adduce any evidence

in rebuttal. If the State doubted the age of the plants, nothing prevented them

from bringing in a Forest Department expert arborist or requesting a core

sample test on some stumps, etc. They did not do so. In such a scenario, the

unchallenged expert evidence on record takes a persuasive value. The

29

Tribunal and High Court, in our view, fell into error by effectively placing a

higher standard (almost requiring scientific certainty) on the appellants. We

reiterate that in vesting matters, once the claimant produces substantial

evidence of cultivation, slight gaps or doubts should not negate the claim,

especially if the claimant‟s version is inherently probable and the State has

largely left it uncountered. This approach is supported by the Full Bench

ruling in M.S. Bhargavi Amma v. State of Kerala

5

, which held that the

object of the Act was not to divest areas which were genuinely under

cultivation and that the authorities must adopt a practical view of the

evidence, not a technical or pedantic view. The High Court here

unfortunately took a rather technical view, focusing on perceived

inadequacies (like not having a more “scientific” test or not proving the

exact year of planting) while ignoring the larger picture painted by the

evidence.

RE: Point No – II.

42. We now address the ceiling limit issue raised by the State. It is true

that Sections 3(2) and 3(3) both incorporate the ceiling area limitation. In the

present case, the original owner, Imbichi Ahmed, held 37.50 acres of

plantation land as of 10.05.1971. Under the Kerala Land Reforms Act,

ordinarily an adult individual (with a normal family) could hold 15 standard

acres (which for dry land might equal around that in ordinary acres) as the

ceiling, with some allowances for larger families. On the face of it, 37.5

acres exceeds a single person‟s ceiling. Does that mean only part of it is

exempt and the rest vested? In principle, the Act could operate so indeed, the

5

(1997) 2 KLT 866 (F.B.)

30

text “so much extent… as is within the ceiling limit” suggests a possibility

of partial vesting. However, two factors weigh against applying that harsh

result here. First, as a plantation, this land was exempt from the land ceiling

altogether by Section 81 of the KLR Act, which means the “ceiling limit

applicable” to this owner in respect of this land was, in a sense, not a small

figure but the full extent (since plantations were excluded from

computation). An argument was made by the appellants that if land is

exempt under Section 81, then it implicitly satisfies the ceiling test because

the legislature did not intend to break up plantations. Second, even if we

were to strictly impose a ceiling of (say) 15 acres on Imbichi Ahmed, we

note that he was not a solitary individual in the legal sense. The records

show that the property was part of a Marumakkathayam tavazhi of the

family (though acquired in his name) – the A.C.K. Rajah case (supra)

recognized that in matrilineal or joint families, the ceiling must be computed

based on the family unit. Here, evidence (Ext. A12 Karar of 1963) indicated

that the property was treated as part of the family pool with at least 10

members in the tavazhi. The High Court in A.C.K. Rajah had noted that 10

members in a Marumakkathayam family could retain up to 75 acres under

the Land Reforms ceiling. In the present case, though the matter was not

elaborated in the Tribunal‟s findings, the appellants did place genealogy

materials suggesting Imbichi‟s family structure. Considering that, 37.5 acres

would likely fall well within the family‟s aggregate ceiling limit. Crucially,

the State did not specifically contend or lead evidence that the original

owner‟s ceiling entitlement was exceeded rather they only made a passing

argument in appeals, which is mostly academic. In absence of a concrete

contest on this point at trial and given our finding that the land was a

plantation exempt under KLR, we conclude that the ceiling condition does

31

not bar the appellants‟ claim. The exemption provisions should be

interpreted in light of their object, i.e., to save cultivated land and not to

forfeit parts of an established plantation on a technicality of ceiling,

especially when the land reforms law itself exempted it.

43. On point (I) and (II) framed above, therefore, our finding is firmly in

favor of the appellants. The suit lands were under personal cultivation

(coffee and cardamom plantation) on 10.05.1971, and the owner held them

under a valid title deed of 1970 with the intent (indeed the reality) of

cultivation. The entire extent qualifies for exemption. There is no portion

that can be segregated as vested forest, since even the parts the State

disputed were in our view part of the integrated plantation. The conditions of

Sections 3(2) and 3(3) are met: by virtue of the land being a registered

estate, cultivated, and within permissible holdings, it escapes vesting. We

clarify that this finding covers the full 37.50 acres, which encompasses O.A.

Nos. 36/1997 and O.A. 37/1997 lands together.

RE: Point – III.

44. Coming to point (III), we hold that the Tribunal and the High Court

committed legal errors in their assessment. They approached the evidence

with unwarranted skepticism and failed to consider material evidence in

favor of the claimants. The High Court‟s one-line dismissal that no credible

material was shown is, with respect, contrary to the record which we have

detailed. Such an observation, despite the voluminous documents and an

expert report to the contrary, indicates a misdirection. It is possible that the

sheer passage of time (and the consequent challenges of proof) coloured the

courts‟ perspective, but that cannot justify denying relief when the available

32

evidence actually tilted the balance in favor of the appellants. The High

Court also did not address the legal import of the prior proceedings (land

board, plantation tax, etc.) or the effect of the Department‟s initial stand, all

of which bolster the appellants‟ case. As such, the concurrent findings are

manifestly unsustainable on the evidence and deserve to be set aside. This is

one of those exceptional cases where, notwithstanding two lower court

decisions, the interference of this Court is warranted to prevent miscarriage

of justice to bona fide cultivators.

RE: Point No – IV.

45. In view of our findings, it is unnecessary to remand the matter again

(which would be pointless given the ample evidence already on record). This

Court can directly grant the relief due. We hold that the appellants (and their

predecessor-in-title) have established their case that the lands in question are

not private forests vested in the Government but are exempted lands under

Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of Act 26 of 1971. Consequently, the declaration

prayed for in O.A. Nos. 36/1997 and 37/1997 must be granted.

46. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High

Court of Kerala dated 28.02.2012 in M.F.A. Nos. 213 & 219 of 2007 and the

order of the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode dated 20.03.2007 (dismissing O.A.

Nos. 36/1997 and 37/1997) are hereby set aside. We answer the core issue in

favor of the appellants and hold that the lands comprising 37.50 acres in

South Wayanad (originally covered by Jenmam Assignment Deed No.

789/1970 of SRO Vythiri) are not vested in the Government under the

Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. The entirety of

the said lands stands exempted from vesting by virtue of Sections 3(2) and

33

3(3) of the Act, being lands under bona fide coffee and cardamom

plantations existing prior to the appointed day.

47. Consequently, we direct as follows:

(a) It is declared that the appellants are the lawful owners in

possession of the aforesaid lands, and that those lands did not vest in

the Government on 10.05.1971. The appellants‟ title and possessory

rights over the property shall stand confirmed.

(b) The State of Kerala, the Custodian of Vested Forests, and their

officials are restrained from interfering with the appellants‟ peaceful

possession, enjoyment, and management of the said plantation lands

on the premise of vesting under Act 26 of 1971. Any ancillary

proceedings or orders inconsistent with this declaration (such as

listing of the land as vested forest in government records) are quashed.

(c) If, in the interregnum, the Forest Department has erected any

boundary marks that incorrectly encroach into the appellants‟ land or

has taken any action treating the disputed portions as government

land, the same shall be corrected forthwith. Specifically, the boundary

shall be realigned (if shifted) to exclude the entirety of the 37.50 acres

from the vested forest demarcation. This exercise shall be completed

by the Custodian of Vested Forests in coordination with the local

revenue authorities within six (6) weeks from today.

(d) There shall be no order as to costs, given the facts and

circumstances. However, the appellants will be entitled to refund of

any fee or deposit made in respect of the appeals.

34

48. The declaration and directions above shall secure to the appellants

the full enjoyment of their property rights. The interim order, if any, passed

by this Court during the pendency of the appeals stands vacated.

49. Before parting, we commend the painstaking efforts taken by the

learned Advocate Commissioner and the expert in this matter, which have

aided the cause of justice. Genuine cultivators should not be made to fight a

prolonged battle to vindicate rights that are apparent from the public records.

It is hoped that the State will henceforth show greater circumspection and

fairness in scrutinizing claims of this nature, to avoid unnecessary litigation

against citizens who have prima facie valid exemptions.

50. In conclusion, the appeals are allowed with the aforesaid

declarations and directions. The impugned High Court judgment is set aside,

and the appellants‟ Original Applications 36/1997 and 37/1997 stand

allowed as prayed. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

.……………………………., J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR]

.……………………………., J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

New Delhi;

October 15

th

, 2025.