REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 611 OF 2011

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2550/2010)

M. MOHAN ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE

DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 612 OF 2011

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2687/2010)

VELMURUGAN & ANR. ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE

DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. Leave granted in both the matters.

2. Since the facts of both the appeals are common, therefore,

these appeals are decided by a common judgment.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 612 OF 2011

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2687/2010)

3. We deem it proper to take the facts of Criminal Appeal

arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.2687 of 2010 filed by Velmurugan,

Accused No.4 and Anna Lakshmi, Accused No.5 (for short 'A-4 and

A-5' respectively). This appeal emanates from the judgment and

order dated 22.02.2010 delivered by the Madurai Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Original Petition (MD)

No.94 of 2006.

4. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are

recapitulated as under:

5. One Kamatchi (deceased), daughter of Duraipandi Nadar

(complainant) was married to Anandraj (A-1), son of Mahalinga

Nadar on 6.9.2001. Mahalinga Nadar and his wife Anna Lakshmi

(A-5) had three sons whose names are shown as under :

Mahalinga Nadar

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Son(A-1) Son(A-2) Son(A-4)

| | |

Anandraj M. Mohan Velmurugan

Husband of married

deceased to

Kamatchi Easwari (A-3)

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Anandraj (A-1) even after marriage with Kamatchi (the

deceased)stayed with his two brothers and parents in the joint

family. Kamatchi delivered a female child on 7.1.2003. Accused

Anandraj's elder brother, M. Mohan (A-2) and his wife Easwari (A-3)

owned a Qualis car. On the date of Pongal, i.e., on 14.01.2005,

Kamatchi's in-laws family planned a visit to the Theme Park at

Madurai from Karaikudi. Deceased Kamatchi, her husband

Anandraj (A-1) were denied the use of the said family car. Other

members of the family had gone to the Theme Park in the family car

whereas the deceased Kamatchi and her husband Anandraj (A-1)

were told by Easwari (A-3) to reach the destination by public bus

who is alleged to have said to Kamatchi that “if you want to go by a

car, you have to bring a car from your family”.

6. Kamatchi along with her husband Anandraj and a child,

took a public transport(bus) from Karaikudi to Madurai for reaching

the said Theme Park and returned to her matrimonial home in a

bus. Kamatchi was deeply hurt by the taunting statement of

Easwari (A-3) regarding denial of the use of family car.

7. Immediately thereafter, Kamatchi demanded a car from her

father for personal use and after four days, i.e., on 18.1.2005 at

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about 1.30 p.m. she committed suicide by hanging herself in her

bedroom using her sari.

8. On receipt of the information, the father of the deceased

Kamatchi reached Karaikudi and filed a complaint with the

Karaikudi Police Station (South) at about 5.00 p.m. alleging that

his son-in-law Anandraj (A-1) and his elder brother's wife Easwari

(A-3) were responsible for his daughter's suicide. On receipt of the

said complaint, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Karaikudi (South)

Police Station registered a case under Section 174 of the Criminal

Procedure Code (for short 'Cr.P.C.') by assigning Crime No.13/2005

on 18.01.2005.

9. The Sub Inspector of Police forwarded a copy of the First

Information Report (for short 'F.I.R.') to the Revenue Divisional

Officer (for short 'R.D.O.') to hold an inquest and also a copy to the

Deputy Superintendent of Police (for short 'D.S.P.'), Karaikudi, for

further investigation, who commenced inquiry on the same day as

Kamatchi had committed suicide within three and a half years of

her marriage.

10.The D.S.P., Karaikudi on receipt of the F.I.R. from the

Karaikudi South Police Station, took up the complaint for

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investigation and filed an Alteration Report on 19.1.2005 before the

Jurisdictional Magistrate, Karaikudi under Sections 498-A and 306

I.P.C. against Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-3) respectively.

11.The R.D.O. commenced enquiry on 18.1.2005 and examined

many witnesses and on 3

rd

February, 2005 a report was sent by

him to the D.S.P. in which he had categorically stated that there

was no dowry harassment in the suicide case, especially in view of

the fact that even the parents of the deceased had not informed him

about the harassment of dowry. The parents of the deceased had

specifically stated before the R.D.O. that because of the taunts

made by Easwari (A-3) their daughter had committed suicide. The

D.S.P., in addition to the inquest held by the R.D.O., proceeded to

investigate the case and filed a Charge Sheet on 29.4.2005 not only

against Anandraj (A-1), the deceased's husband and M. Mohan (A-

2), her brother-in-law and his wife, Easwari (A-3), but also against

the appellants herein who are elder brother of the husband of the

deceased and the mother of appellant No.1 respectively under

Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (for short

'I.P.C.'). A copy of the charge sheet dated 29.4.2005 was filed before

the learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi.

12.The learned Magistrate, on perusing the final report, took the

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same on file by assigning P.R.C.No.11/2005 and summoned the

accused to furnish copies before committing the case to the Court

of Sessions for trial.

13.The appellants, aggrieved by the vexatious prosecution

initiated at the behest of the respondent approached the High Court

of Judicature at Madras for quashing the proceedings against them

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge, while

quashing the charges under Sections 498-A and 304-B I.P.C.

against the appellants, partly allowed their petition and held that

they have to face trial for the offence under Section 306 I.P.C.

insofar as challenge to Section 306 I.P.C. was concerned.

14.The High Court in the impugned judgment observed that in

the F.I.R. lodged by the complainant, no whisper of demand for

dowry has been made against the appellants. A perusal of the

F.I.R. would reveal that Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari, A-3 were

torturing the deceased on some pretext or the other especially in

connection with getting a car from her father. The deceased was

denied use of the car for going to the Theme Park near Madurai on

14.01.2005. The deceased was also abused by Anandraj (A-1) in

this regard. They had to go to the Theme Park at Madurai by bus.

After returning, the deceased contacted her father on phone and

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narrated the entire incident and on 18.1.2005 at around 1.30 p.m.,

Kamatchi committed suicide by hanging herself. On registration of

the case under Section 174 Cr.P.C., the complainant and his wife

and others were examined. Even in the statement, the complainant

had not made a whisper about the demand of dowry on the part of

the appellants but harped upon the ill treatment to his daughter at

the hands of Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-3). Even at the inquest

conducted by the R.D.O., the complainant has not even whispered

with regard to the demand of dowry on the part of the appellants.

The statement of witnesses including that of the complainant were

recorded on 27.01.2005. The relevant portion of the exact version

given in the F.I.R. reads as under :

“.....My eldest daughter is aged about 21 years. She was

given in marriage by me to one Anandaraj son of

Mahalinga Nadar of Karaikudi 3 years ago in the year

2002, and next daughter was given in marriage at

Coimbatore and other two daughters are yet to be

married. At the time of marriage of my daughter

Kamatchi, to Anandraj, I gave them one Kilo of Gold,

Diamonds and jewels, and other utensils and articles.

They were living along with his elder brother Mohan as

joint family. They possess one Qualis car of their own.

The said car was purchased in the name of Easwari my

son-in-law's brother's wife. My daughter felt very hurt

when she was not allowed to use the said car and was

taunted by my son-in-law Anandraj and Mohan's wife

Easwari to get a car from her parental home if she

wished to go by a car. When she disclosed this matter to

me I was ready to give her a car. At this junction, during

last Pongal festival, her family had gone to Madurai

('Athisayam') in the said Qualis car. They refused to take

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my daughter along with them in the said car, and they

have also teased and insulted her and told her to come in

the bus and also said 'do you want to use a car then why

you did not get a car'. My daughter informed about this

incident to me over the phone and before I could get a car

ready for her today on 18.1.2005, at about 1.30 hours,

my son-in-law, Anandraj, informed over phone that my

daughter had hanged herself and is dead. My son-in-

law Anandraj and Mohan's wife Easwari who were cause

for my daughter's death.....”

The above quoted portion of the F.I.R. also indicates that all

allegations are confined to Anandraj (A-1), the husband of the

deceased and his sister-in-law, Easwari (A-3). According to the

appellants, from the entire material available on record, by no

stretch of imagination, an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was

made out against the appellants and the impugned judgment of the

High Court is contrary to the law as has been laid down by this

court in a series of judgments.

15.According to the appellants, the High Court in the impugned

judgment has seriously erred in not quashing the charge under

Section 306 I.P.C. despite the fact that there is absolutely no

material on record to proceed against the appellants either for

cruelty or for dowry harassment.

16.The appellants contended that the learned Single Judge,

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after examining the F.I.R., R.D.O. report and Statements of the

Witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. found that there were no

allegations against the appellants herein from the inception either

by the complainant or by the mother of the deceased and has

further held that there was no element of dowry related harassment

and/or any cruelty meted out to the deceased by her sister-in-law

or for that matter by any of the accused. In view of the above

categorical findings, the learned Single Judge quashed the charges

under Sections 304-B and 498-A I.P.C. However, the learned Single

Judge failed to appreciate that on the basis of the material available

on record and in the absence of any allegation, if no offence is made

out against the appellants under Sections 304-B and 498-A, then

the appellants cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C. It is

stated that to attract the provisions of Section 306 I.P.C., the

allegations as to the existence of cruelty, dowry harassment and

abetment to suicide are all integrated. In absence of any allegations

under Sections 498-A and 304-B I.P.C. provisions of Section 306

I.P.C. cannot be attracted.

17.The appellants submitted that this Court in the case of

Gangula Mohan Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh one of us,

Dalveer Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment), reported in

9

(2010)(1) SCC 750, while interpreting Section 306 I.P.C. held that

abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or

intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without a

positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in

committing suicide, there cannot be any conviction. It was further

held that to attract Section 306 I.P.C. there has to be a clear mens

rea to commit the offence. It is further stated that the present case

is squarely covered by the above decision as even if the case of the

prosecution is taken to be true and the finding of the High Court

that there are no elements of cruelty or dowry related harassment

and that the witnesses have improved upon their earlier statements

is ignored, then also Section 306 I.P.C.. is not attracted in the facts

of the present case.

18.According to the appellants, the present case is a fit case

wherein the charges under Section 306 I.P.C. are liable to be

quashed for the following sequence of events and reasons:

“On 06.09.2002, Kamatchi, (the deceased in the case) got

married to Anandaraj (A-1). After the marriage they lived

with two other brothers of the AI and the parent in laws

jointly. Deceased is stated to have had cordial relations

with every member of the family.

On 7.1.2003, Anandaraj (A-1) and Kamatchi were blessed

with one female child. The child was christened as

Nithyasree.

1

On 14.1.2005, the entire family decided to go to

'Adisayam' a Theme park at Madurai to celebrate and

enjoy the Pongal Holidays. Kamatchi was prevented from

travelling in a Qualis car by Easwari (A-3) and is alleged

to have taunted Kamatchi, “if you want to travel by a car

please get a car from your parents”. Thereafter, leaving

Anandaraj, Kamatchi and their child, they proceeded to

Madurai to visit the Theme Park 'Adisayam' by a Qualis

car.

Anandaraj and his family also proceeded to Madurai to

visit the Theme Park and after their visit they returned to

their native Karaikudi. Both to and fro, the family

traveled by bus.

On 18.01.2005 at about 1.30 p.m. Kamatchi committed

suicide at her matrimonial home, using her sari to hang

herself.

At about 5.00 p.m. Mr.Duraipandi Nadar, the father of

the deceased Kamatchi lodged a complaint before

Karaikudi South Police Station. It is the specific

allegation in the complaint that A1 and A3 alone are the

cause of the suicide of his daughter.

The Sub Inspector of Police, Under Section 174 of Cr.P.C.

Registered the said complaint by assigning

Cr.No.13/2005.

At about 6.00 p.m. R.D.O. conducted an enqury and

prepared and Mahazar and seized the diary of the

deceased, a letter and the sari which was used by her

commit suicide.

D.S.P. Karaikudi, examined S.V.Duraipandi, the father of

the deceased (L.W.1) and recorded his statement.

D.S.P. Karaikudi examined Mrs.Tamil Selvi, the mother

of the deceased (L.W.2).

On 19.01.2005 alteration report filed by the D.S.P. under

Section 306 and 498 A IPC against A-1 and A-3 alone.

1

On 3.2.2005 RDO who commenced enquiry from the date

of incident itself and examined the records and the

statements of various witnesses. He filed a report with a

recommendation from the D.S.P. to conduct further

investigation to determine the real reasons for the suicide

with a specific finding that the suicide death is not due to

any dowry harassment. R.D.O. has also recorded the

statement of the de facto complainant and the mother of

the deceased to the effect that the deceased was having a

very cordial relationship with every one in the family

including the husband except the A-3 the second

daughter in law”.

19.All these facts would clearly show and demonstrate that

neither at the time of inquest nor during the R.D.O. enquiry or at

the time of the complaint by the complainant, who is also the

father of the deceased, any allegation was attributed against the

appellants and, on the contrary, it was the case of the complainant

that allegedly Easwari (A-3) alone was responsible for the suicide of

the deceased and this formed the basis of the learned Single Judge

to come to the conclusion that Sections 304-B and 498-A-I.P.C. are

not attracted.

20.The appellants submitted that there is no allegation against

the appellants Velmurugan and Anna Lakshmi, who are arrayed as

Accused 4 and 5 respectively in the final report either at the time

of lodging of the complaint and registration of FIR or at the time of

inquest enquiry or even in the statements before the R.D.O. On the

contrary the complainant has alleged that it is only Easwari (A-3)

1

who is the cause of the suicide. It may be relevant to extract

certain portions of the F.I.R., R.D.O. Report and the Alteration

Report filed by the respondent.

21.In the R.D.O. Report dated 3.2.2005, the following statement

of the complainant is extracted :

“My son-in-law Thiru M.Anandraj is running a provision

shop at Karaikudi of his own. In that his brother Mohan

is also having a share. My son-in-law looked after my

daughter in good manner. All of them in their house

treated my daughter in a good way. He informed that

Smt.Eswari, wife of Mohan alone used to quarrel with my

daughter often. Due to her torture alone my daughter

might have hanged herself and committed suicide. In the

death, apart from Smt.Eswari, he informed that no other

is having any part. He has also stated that there is no

dowry harassment in the death. (emphasis added)”

22.Again in the said Report the R.D.O. concludes as

under :

“From the inquest it can be found that the death did not

happen due to dowry harassment. The reason is that

even the father and mother of the deceased girl said the

death has not happened due to dowry harassment.

Therefore, I inform that the death is not caused due to

dowry harassment. Further, the father and mother of the

deceased girl said that the death is caused due to the

torture of Smt.Easwari. Therefore, the police may take

up the case for investigation and on proper investigation

the cause for the death may be found out.”

23.Again in the Alteration Report by 'D.S.P.', the following is

1

recorded :

“It is found that the deceased Kamatchi committed

suicide only due to the harassment by her husband

Anandaraj and his elder brother's wife Eswari often

demanding car as dowry from her parents.”

24.Again in the F.I.R. the only allegation is that:

“My son-in-law Anandraj and Easwari, wife of Mohan

have abetted my daughter Kamatchi to commit suicide.

They are responsible for my daughter's death. Therefore,

I request that action may be taken against Anandaraj

and Easwari alone for the death of my daughter.”

25.The appellants also submitted that the entire case of the

prosecution does not reveal even remote connection of the

appellants with the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 306 I.P.C.

26.The case of the prosecution is that on 14

th

January,2005, the

deceased wanted to use the family car to go to the Theme Park at

Madurai from Karaikudi along with other family members but she

was denied the permission to use the car. At that juncture Easwari

(A-3) taunted the deceased that if she wanted to go around in a car,

she has to get a car from her parents. These words deeply hurt the

deceased and she had committed suicide on 18

th

January,2005 at

1.30 p.m. at her matrimonial home.

1

27.The appellants submitted that even if the prosecution story

that she was denied permission to use the car on 14

th

January,

2005 and the suicide had taken place on 18

th

January, 2005 is

believed, it cannot be said that the suicide by the deceased was the

direct result of the expressions exchanged between the deceased

and Easwari (A-3) on 14

th

January, 2005. Viewed from the aforesaid

circumstances independently, still the ingredients of the “abetment”

are totally absent in the case at hand. In these facts and

circumstances, to compel the appellants to face the rigmarole of a

trial would be an abuse of law.

28.The appellants also submitted that there is no material on

record to proceed against the appellants for an offence punishable

under Section 306 I.P.C. No conviction can be recorded in absence

of legal evidence. According to the appellants, any further

proceeding in this case will be an abuse of the process. According to

them, this is a fit case warranting interference by this Court.

29.The appellants contended that the genesis of the prosecution

is on the basis of the complaint preferred by the father of the

deceased Kamatchi. He had categorically stated that his daughter

had committed suicide due to the taunts of Easwari (A-3).

According to the complainant, his son-in-law, Anandraj (A-1) and

1

the said Easwari (A-3) alone were responsible for the death of his

daughter.

30.The appellants also contended that in pursuance to that

complaint, the R.D.O. held an inquest by examining few witnesses

including the father, the mother and the brother-in-law (sister's

husband) of the deceased and others. In their statements, none of

them had stated any dowry harassment against the accused or any

other member of the family of the accused. On the contrary, they

have categorically stated that there was no dowry harassment

suffered by the deceased in her in-law's house. Thus, the

requirement to bring home the ingredient of the offence Under

Section 304-B I.P.C., namely, the 'dowry' demand as found by the

learned Single Judge was absent in the prosecution case. They

contended that the High Court has held that no allegation of cruelty

against the appellants were found from the very inception and the

charge under Section 498-A was liable to be quashed. In this

background, by no stretch of imagination, the appellants can ever

be convicted under Section 306 IPC.

31.The appellants submitted that the summoning of an accused

in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set

into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant

1

has to bring only two witnesses to support allegations in the

complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the

Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has

applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable

thereto. He has to examine the nature of the allegations made in

the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary, in

support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to

succeed in bringing home the charge against the accused? It is not

that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of

preliminary evidence before the summoning of the accused. The

Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on

record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and

his witnesses to elicit answers to point out the truthfulness of the

allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is

prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.

32.The appellants submitted that the prosecution must produce

evidence before the Court, which is capable of being converted into

legal evidence after the charges are framed. In this case admittedly,

there is no legal evidence connecting the appellants with any crime,

much less the offences alleged, as the materials are not capable of

being converted into legal evidence. Hence, in the absence of any

1

material which can be converted into legal evidence, the

proceedings as against the appellants under Section 306 IPC are

also liable to be quashed.

33.The appellants has placed reliance on a judgment of this

Court in Mahendra Singh & Another v. State of M.P. 1995

Supp. (3) SCC 731. In this case the allegations levelled were as

under:-

“My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law

(husband’s elder brother’s wife) harassed me. They beat me

and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a

second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-

law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want

to die by burning.”

34.This Court while acquitting the appellant observed that

neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the

statement of the deceased.

35.In the instant case, what to talk of existence of instances or

illustrations of instigation, there are no specific allegations levelled

against the appellants. On a careful perusal of the entire material

on record, no offence under Section 306 IPC can be made out

against the appellants, in view of our clear and definite finding that

1

there is no material whatsoever against the appellants much less

positive act on the part of the appellants to instigate or aid in

committing the suicide.

36.The main substantial questions of law which arise in this

appeal are whether the conviction of the appellants under Section

306 I.P.C. is sustainable and whether in the facts and

circumstances of this case, the High Court was justified in not

quashing the proceedings against the appellants under its inherent

powers.

37.We would like to deal with the concept of 'abetment'. Section

306 of the Code deals with 'abetment of suicide' which reads as

under:

“306.Abetment of suicide – If any person commits

suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extent to ten years, and

shall also be liable to fine.”

38.The word 'suicide' in itself is nowhere defined in the Indian

Penal Code, however, its meaning and import is well known and

requires no explanation. ‘Sui’ means ‘self’ and ‘cide’ means ‘killing’,

thus implying an act of self-killing. In short a person committing

suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means

1

employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.

39.In our country, while suicide itself is not an offence

considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law,

attempt to suicide is an offence under section 309 of I.P.C.

40.‘Abetment of a thing’ has been defined under section 107 of

the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce section 107, which

reads as under:

“107. Abetment of a thing – A person abets the doing of a

thing, who –

First – Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly – Engages with one or more other person or

persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if

an act or illegal omission takes places in pursuance of

that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing;

or

Thirdly – Intentionally aides, by any act or illegal

omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with

section 107 reads as under:

“Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at

the time of the commission of an act, does

anything in order to facilitate the commission

of that act, and thereby facilitate the

commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of

that act.”

41.Learned counsel also placed reliance on yet another

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judgment of this court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of

Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, in which a three-Judge Bench of

this court had an occasion to deal with the case of a similar

nature. In a dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant

husband uttered “you are free to do whatever you wish and go

wherever you like”. Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh

Kumar committed suicide. This Court in paragraph 20 has

examined different shades of the meaning of “instigation’. Para 20 reads

as under:

“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke,

incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the

requirement of instigation though it is not necessary

that actual words must be used to that effect. or what

constitutes instigation must necessarily and

specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a

reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must

be capable of being spelt out. the present one is not a

case where the accused had by his acts or omission or

by a continued course of conduct created such

circumstances that the deceased was left with no

other option except to commit suicide in which case

an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered

in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the

consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be

instigation.”

42.In the said case this court came to the conclusion that there

is no evidence and material available on record wherefrom an

inference of the accused-appellant having abetted commission of

2

suicide by Seema (appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be

drawn.

43.In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal & Another

(1994) 1 SCC 73, this Court has cautioned that the Court should

be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of

each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of

finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact

induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to

the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to

ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life, quite

common to the society, to which the victim belonged and such

petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a

similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit

suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for

basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of

suicide should be found guilty.

44.This court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of

NCT of Delhi) 2009 (16) SCC 605, had an occasion to deal with

this aspect of abetment. The court dealt with the dictionary

meaning of the word “instigation” and “goading”. The court opined

that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the

2

doing of an act by the latter. Each person’s suicidability pattern is

different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self-

esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any

straight-jacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has

to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.

45.Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person

or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a

positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in

committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.

46.The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases

decided by this court are clear that in order to convict a person

under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit

the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the

deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must

have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that

he/she committed suicide.

47.In V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Limited and

Others (2010) 10 SCC 361, this court has held that when prima

facie no case is made out against the accused, then the High Court

ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under section 482 of the

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Cr.P.C. and quashed the complaint.

48.In a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Madan

Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2010 ) 8 SCC 628,

this Court quashed the conviction under Section 306 IPC on the

ground that the allegations were irrelevant and baseless and

observed that the High Court was in error in not quashing the

proceedings.

49.In the instant case, what to talk of instances of instigation,

there are even no allegations against the appellants. There is also

no proximate link between the incident of 14.1.2005 when the

deceased was denied permission to use the Qualis car with the

factum of suicide which had taken place on 18.1.2005.

50.Undoubtedly, the deceased had died because of hanging.

The deceased was undoubtedly hyper-sensitive to ordinary

petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day

life. In a joint family, instances of this kind are not very

uncommon. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from

person to person. Each individual has his own idea of self-esteem

and self-respect. Different people behave differently in the same

situation. It is unfortunate that such an episode of suicide had

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taken place in the family. But the question remains to be answered

is whether the appellants can be connected with that unfortunate

incident in any manner?

51.On a careful perusal of the entire material on record and the

law, which has been declared by this Court, we can safely arrive at

the conclusion that the appellants are not even remotely connected

with the offence under Section 306 of the I.P.C.. It may be relevant

to mention that criminal proceedings against husband of the

deceased Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-3) are pending

adjudication.

52.Next question which arises in this case is that in view of the

settled legal position whether the High Court ought to have

quashed the proceedings under its inherent power under Section

482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the facts and circumstances

of this case?

53.This Court had an occasion to examine the legal position in

a large number of cases. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR

1960 SC 866, this Court summarized some categories of cases

where the High Court in its inherent power can and should

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exercise to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal

bar against the institution or continuance of the

proceedings;

(ii)where the allegations in the first

information report or complaint taken at

their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not constitute the offence

alleged;

(iii)where the allegations constitute an offence, but

there is no legal evidence adduced or the

evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to

prove the charge.

54.In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi

and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process

against the accused can be quashed or set aside :

“(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the

statements of the witnesses recorded in support of

the same taken at their face value make out

absolutely no case against the accused or the

complaint does not disclose the essential

ingredients of an offence which is alleged against

the accused;

(2)where the allegations made in the complaint are

patently absurd and inherently improbable so that

no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused;

(3)where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in

issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having

been based either on no evidence or on materials

which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

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(4)where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal

defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a

complaint by legally competent authority and the

like”.

55.This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy &

Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power

under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a

proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the

proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the

court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings

ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with

inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a

salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or

persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice

are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be

administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case

has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this

court and other courts.

56.In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4

SCC 551, a three-Judge Bench of this court held as under:-

".....In case the impugned order clearly brings

out a situation which is an abuse of the process of the

court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice

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interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,

then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or

affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High

Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far

between. One such case would be the desirability of the

quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally,

vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The

present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the

power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482

of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of

the revisional power of the High Court is

impermissible."

57.This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v.

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692,

observed in para 7 as under:

"The legal position is well settled that when a

prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be

quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to

whether the uncontroverted allegations as made

prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the

court to take into consideration any special features

which appear in a particular case to consider whether

it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit

a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis

that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique

purpose and where in the opinion of the court

chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and,

therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by

allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court

may while taking into consideration the special facts

of a case also quash the proceeding even though it

may be at a preliminary stage."

58.In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992) 4 SCC

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305 the court observed as under :

“131. Section 482 which corresponds to Section

561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the Civil

Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and

deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The

rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim

“Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id

sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest” which means that when the

law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those

things without which the thing itself could not exist.

132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent

power to make such orders as may be necessary for the

ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and

undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily

exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases,

ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for

the administration of which alone the courts exist. The

powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482

of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the

power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must

be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this

power is based on sound principles.”

59.In Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 and

Lala Jairam Das v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 94 the Judicial

Committee has taken the view that Section 561-A of the old Code

which is equivalent to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. gave no new

powers but only provided that already inherently possessed should

be preserved. This view holds the field till date.

60. In Dr Raghubir Sharan v. State of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR 336,

this court observed as under

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“... [E]very High Court as the highest court

exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has

inherent power to make any order for the purpose of

securing the ends of justice .... Being an

extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed

in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a

subordinate court of its powers ....”

61.In the said case, the court also observed that the inherent

powers can be exercised under this section by the High Court (1) to

give effect to any order passed under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse

of the process of the court; (3) otherwise to secure the ends of

justice.

62.In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1964 AC

1254, Lord Ried at page 1296 expressed his view “there must

always be a residual discretion to prevent anything which savours

of abuse of process” with which view all the members of the House

of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this entitled a Court to

stay a lawful prosecution.

63.In Kurukshetra University and Another v. State of

Haryana and Another (1977) 4 SCC 451, this court observed as

under:

“Inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction

on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.

That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with

circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Thus, the

High Court in exercise of inherent powers under Section

482, Criminal Procedure Code cannot quash a first

information report more so when the police had not even

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commenced the investigation and no proceeding at all is

pending in any Court in pursuance of the said FIR.”

64.In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others

reported in (1992) Suppl.1 SCC p.335, this court had an occasion

to examine the scope of the inherent power of the High Court in

interfering with the investigation of an offence by the police and laid

down the following rule: [SCC pp. 364-65, para 60: SCC (Cri) p.

456, para 60].

“The sum and substance of the above deliberation results

in a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the

field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose

powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to

investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately

exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling

under Chapter XII of the Code and the courts are not

justified in obliterating the track of investigation when

the investigating agencies are well within their legal

bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature

of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a

Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police

investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with

the actual investigation or to direct the police how that

investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer

transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly

and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach

of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to

the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then

the court on being approached by the person aggrieved

for the redress of any grievance, has to consider the

nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate

orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to

the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a

dear value of our Constitution.”

65.In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others

(supra), this court in the backdrop of interpretation of various

relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under

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Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in

a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., gave the following categories of

cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised

either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae

and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein

such power should be exercised:

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima

facie constitute any offence or make out a case against

the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report

and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation

by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155 (2) of the Code.

3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

same do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, on investigation is permitted by a police officer

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without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of

which no prudent person can ever reach a just

conclusion that there is sufficient grounds for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceedings is instituted) to the

institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the

grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

66.In G. Sagar Suri & Another v. State of UP & Others

(2000) 2 SCC 636, this Court observed that it is the duty and

obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of

caution in issuing the process particularly when matters are

essentially of civil in nature.

67.In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy and

Another (2004) 6 SCC 522, this court observed as under:-

“Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a

case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The

3

section does not confer any new powers on the High

Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court

possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages

three circumstances under which the inherent

jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to

an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the

process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of

justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down

any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of

inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing

with procedure can provide for all cases that may

possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers

apart from express provisions of law which are necessary

for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed

upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds

expression in the section which merely recognizes and

preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,

whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any

express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all

such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo

a wrong in course of administration of justice on the

principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et

id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a

person anything, it gives him that without which it

cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section,

the Court does not function as a court of appeal or

revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though

wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the

tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be

exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial

justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.

Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice

and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as

to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such

abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to

allow any action which would result in injustice and

prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers

court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it

finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to

abuse of the process of court or quashing of these

proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.

When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court

3

may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is

sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the

materials to assess what the complainant has alleged

and whether any offence is made out even if the

allegations are accepted in toto.

68.This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. &

Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122,

observed thus:-

"It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow

any action which would result in injustice and prevent

promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court

would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds

that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of

the process of court or quashing of these proceedings

would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no

offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may

examine the question of fact. When a complaint is

sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the

materials to assess what the complainant has alleged

and whether any offence is made out even if the

allegations are accepted in toto."

69.In Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another (2009) 7 SCC 495, this court observed as under:-

“There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned

propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that

the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if

the allegations made in the first information report, even

if given face value and taken to be correct in their

entirety, do not make out any offence. When the

allegations made in the first information report or the

evidences collected during investigation do not satisfy the

ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not

encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for

3

nothing.”

70.In State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and Others 2010

(11) SCC 226, this court observed that the power under section 482

of the Code of Criminal Procedure is vide and they require care and

caution in its exercise. The interference must be on sound principle

and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the

legitimate prosecution. The court further observed that if the

allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of

which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the

High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power

under section 482 of the Code.

71.In the light of the settled legal position, in our considered

opinion, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition

filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for

quashing the charges under Section 306 I.P.C. against them. The

High Court ought to have quashed the proceedings so that the

appellants who were not remotely connected with the offence under

Section 306 I.P.C. should not have been compelled to face the

rigmaroles of a criminal trial.

72.As a result, the charges under Section 306 I.P.C. against the

3

appellants are quashed.

73.Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and the

appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No.2687 of 2010

filed by the appellants is allowed and disposed of.

Crl.Appeal No. 611 of 2011 (arising out of SLP Crl.) No.2550/2010)

74.In view of the decision in Criminal Appeal arising out of

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2687 of 2010, this appeal is also

allowed and disposed of.

….…………….. ......................J

(DALVEER BHANDARI)

…..……………. ......................J

(SURINDER SINGH

NIJJAR)

New Delhi;

March 1, 2011

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