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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA

AGARTALA

W.P.(C).No.715 of 2023

M-TECH INNOVATIONS LIMITED

having its registered office at Plot No. P-1/2, Rajib Gandhi Infotech Park, Phase I, Hinjawadi,

Pune-411057, represented by Rajkumar M Gandhi, Director of M- Tech, Innovations Limited

.............Petitioner(s)

Versus

1.THE STATE OF TRIPURA AND ORS

Represented by the Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Tripura, New Capital

Complex, PO- Kunjaban, PS- New Capital Complex, Agartala, District-West Tripura

2.THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

Government of Tripura, Transport Department, New Capital Complex, P.O- Kunjaban, PS- New

Capital Complex, Agartala, District- West Tripura

3.THE TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER

Paribahan Bhawan, Agartala, PS- West Agartala, PO and Sub-Division-Agartala, District- West

Tripura

4.THE ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER

Paribahan Bhawan Agartala, PS- West Agartala, PO and Sub- Division-Agartala, District-West

Tripura

5.THE JOINT TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER,

Paribhahan Bhawan, Agartala, PS-West Agartala, PO and Sub-Division- Agartala, District-West

Tripura

6.ROSMERTHA TECHNOLOGY LIMITED

having its office at 402, 4th Floor, World Trade Tower Barakhamba Lane, Connaught Place,

Central Delhi, New Delhi, Delhi, India, 110001

..............Respondent(s)

For Petitioner(s) : Ms Rumela Guha, Advocate

For Respondent(s) : Mr. BN Majumder, Sr. Advocate,

Mr. Kohinoor N Bhattacharyya, GA

Mr. Suman Bhattacharjee, Advocate

Mr. Samrat Sarkar, Advocate

Date of hearing : 01.07.2026.

Date of pronouncement : 09.07.2026.

Whether fit for reporting : YES.

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

JUDGMENT & ORDER

JUDGMENT (BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE):

1. The petitioner is a Company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 and is

engaged in the business inter alia of manufacture of Smart Cards.

2. The Respondent no.1 is the State of Tripura rep., by it‟s Secretary, Transport

Department and respondents 2-5 are employees of the said Department.

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3. The petitioner had been awarded the tender for Personalisation of Smart Card

based Driving Licence and vehicle registration Certificate Project on BOOT

basis on Public-Private on 6.6.2017 for 5 years by the respondents previously.

4. The Additional Transport Commissioner (respondent no.4) published a

Request for Proposal (for short „RFP‟) dt.28.12.2022 for selection of service

provider for Personalisation of Smart Card based Driving Licence and vehicle

registration Certificate Project on BOOT basis on Public-Private Basis for the

next 5 years. It was also uploaded on the e-procurement system of the Govt. of

Tripura on the same day. A corrigendum was also issued to it on 16.1.2023.

5. The petitioner submitted it‟s bid online with certain annexures by the

stipulated date. The respondent no.6 was also one of the bidders.

6. The result of evaluation of the technical bids submitted by all bidders including

the petitioner was uploaded on 9.6.2023 on the web site.

7. The Technical Evaluation Summary (Annexure-6) so uploaded indicated that

bid of petitioner and one other bidder M/s PHO-COM-NET Pvt.Ltd were

declared „non-responsive‟ and that the bid of respondent no.6 was accepted.

No reasons were indicated why the petitioner‟s bid was termed „non-

responsive‟.

8. The record further reveals that financial bid was opened thereafter and was

approved on 14.8.2023 and the Contract Agreement was signed on 16.11.2023

between the respondent no.1 and respondent no.6. On 26.11.2023, work order

was issued to respondent no.6 to commence work.

9. The petitioner filed this Writ Petition on 16.11.2023 challenging the decision

of the Technical Evaluation Committee of the respondents 1-5, seeking it‟s

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revocation/rescission and for a direction to the respondents 1-5 to take a fresh

decision.

10. Petitioner contended in the Writ Petition that no reasons were assigned for

treating it‟s proposal/bid as „non-responsive‟ inspite of representations

dt.13.6.2023 and dt.12.9.2023 given by the petitioner. It contended that the

action of respondents 1-5 in treating it‟s bid as „non-responsive‟ is illegal and

was done with a malafide intention only to favour respondent no.6.

The stand of the respondents and it’s consideration by the Court

The grounds for interference by High Court in Tender matters

11. The scope of judicial review in the matters relating to award of tenders by

State/Instrumentalities of the State was elaborately considered in Tata

Cellular v. Union of India

1

and the Supreme Court had held:

“The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its

concern should be:

1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers,

2. committed an error of law,

3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,

4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have

reached or,

5. abused its powers.

“Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular

policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is

fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions

have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from

case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative

action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as

under:

1

(1994) 6 SCC 651

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(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand

correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must

give effect to it;

(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety.

The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition

of further grounds in course of time.” ( emphasis supplied)

12. Explaining the same , the Supreme Court stated in Asia Foundation &

Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd.

2

, :

“10. Therefore, though the principle of judicial review cannot be

denied so far as exercise of contractual powers of government bodies

are concerned, but it is intended to prevent arbitrariness or

favouritism and it is exercised in the larger public interest or if it is

brought to the notice of the court that in the matter of award of a

contract power has been exercised for any collateral purpose.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. In Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka

3

, this was again

reiterated in the following terms:

“23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:

(a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the

State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat

of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to

the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and

not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the

2

(1997) 1 SCC 738, at page 746

3

(2012) 8 SCC 216, at page 228 :

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bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into

consideration the national priorities;

(b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of

the executive and the courts hardly have any role to play in this

process except for striking down such action of the executive as is

proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in

conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as

awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the

interference by courts is very limited;

(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and

awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to

the State authorities unless the action of the tendering authority is

found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers,

interference by courts is not warranted;

(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid

down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources

to successfully execute the work; and

(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in

public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by court

is very restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental right to

carry on business with the Government.

24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual

matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself

the following questions:

(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is

mala fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process

adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court

can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting

reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have

reached”? and

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(ii) Whether the public interest is affected?”

14. In Municipal Corpn., Ujjain v. BVG India Ltd.

4

, the Supreme Court stated

that the State has the right to refuse the lowest or any other tender, provided

that it tries to get the best person or the best quotation. It held that where there

is irrationality or arbitrariness, judicial review is permissible.

15. Keeping in mind the above legal principles, we shall consider the contentions

of parties with reference to material on record.

The tender conditions

16. In the RFP dt.28.12.2022, certain conditions of eligibility for bidders were laid

down in Section –II (A.General).

Clause 1.1. of the same which is relevant for the instant case stated

that „Bidder shall have to submit the copy of latest Income Tax return bearing

Permanent Account Number (PAN) submitted to the Income Tax Officer of

the Circle concerned, for the previous financial year along with the bid‟.

Clause 1 (n) of Section VIII of RFP also reiterates this.

Since the RFP was issued on 28.12.022, the previous financial year will

be 2021-22 and the Assessment Year will be 2022-23.

The latest Income Tax return required to be filed is thus the return for

Assessment Year 2022-23.

17. Section V (Evaluation for Qualification) of the RFP under the heading

“4. Financial Capability” is relevant.

(a) Clause 4.1 therein stated that the Financial Capability of the Bidders would

be evaluated on the basis of the „Average Annual Turnover for the last

three financial years‟. Clause 1 (m) of Section VIII indicates that the

4

(2018) 5 SCC 462 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 291, at page 475

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bidder must submit a certificate issued by a CA as proof of turnover

condition of minimum of Rs.1 Cr from IT business – IT services, Hardware

/Network equipment sales and Maintenance and Smart project for financial

years 2019-20,2020-21 and 2021-22.

(b) Clause 4.3 states that the Proposal must be accompanied by the audited

annual financial statements of the bidder for the last 3 completed financial

years.

Since the RFP was issued on 28.12.022, the previous 3 completed

financial years will be 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22.

18. In para 6 of the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1-5 , they say as regards

compliance of clause 4.1 by petitioner that it had filed only acknowledgment

of Income Tax Return instead of audited certificate for last three years.

But at pg.279 of the paper book, petitioner has filed along with it‟s

rejoinder, the document complying with clause 4.1. It indicates the petitioner‟s

Gross turnover for 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2020-21 separately from IT enabled

citizen centric services, Hardware/Network Equipment Sales maintenance and

Integration of Smart Card based project each of which is above Rs.1 Cr.

19. As regards compliance with clause 4.3, the respondent No.s 1-5 contend that

the petitioner did not submit audited certificate for assessment years 2017-18,

2018-19 and 2019-20.

But at pg.269-274, petitioner has also filed along with it‟s rejoinder, the

document complying with clause 4.3 i.e., audited annual financial statements

of the bidder for the last 3 completed financial years 2019-20, 2020-21 and

2020-21.

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20. The petitioner has stated that the above documents were filed online with it‟s

bid which statement is not disputed by the respondent No.s1-5.

21. Further, clause 4.3 uses the words “audited annual financial statements of the

bidder for the last 3 completed financial years”.

Such financial years would obviously be the three financial years

before 28.12.2022 i.e., financial years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22.

It is ridiculous for the respondents to contend that the words „last three

financial years‟ occurring in clause 4.3 refer to 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20,

and because petitioner did not submit them, it is not technically qualified.

22. These pleas in the counter affidavit are false pleas disproved by record and

appear to have made with the intention to mislead the Court.

23. Relying on a Check list contained in Annexure VII to the RFP, it is contended

by counsel for respondent No.s 1-5 that petitioner had not submitted last 3

years IT return Copies i.e., for AY 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20, and that

petitioner had submitted only acknowledgments of filing of returns, that too of

2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23 AY and that this is not as per requirement of

RFP.

24. There is actually no mention in clause 1.1 in Section –II (A.General) about

filing of last 3 years Income Tax returns. It only mentions latest Income Tax

return i.e.2021-22 FY (2022-23 AY).

25. The check list, in our opinion, cannot override the clause 1.1 and the

respondents cannot take advantage of the check list to insist that Income Tax

returns of AY 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 ought to have been filed by

petitioner.

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26. As decided above, the words „last 3 years‟ used in Check list also cannot mean

AY 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 as is being contended by the respondents

1-5, and can only mean AY 2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23.

27. Thus the respondents have deliberately misread the condition in the RFP and

again tried to mislead the Court.

28. As stated supra the Income Tax return for 2022-23 AY alone was necessary

and the petitioner did not file it and it had only filed acknowledgments issued

by the IT department of last 3 years (pg.280-282). But she contended that that

these acknowledgments show the income and tax paid and other details are

also contained in the audited financial statements filed by petitioner referred to

above.

29. More importantly, the petitioner has alleged that respondent no.6 did not

submit IT return for AY 2022-23 (FY 2021-22) and that it has also filed only

acknowledgment receipts instead of IT return for AYs 2018-19,2019-20, 2010-

21 and 2021-22.

30. In other words, respondent no.6 also did not file it‟s full IT returns for those

years or even for AY 2022-23 (FY 2021-22) (which is required to be filed by

clause 1.1 in Section –II (A.General) of the RFP) or even acknowledgment of

filing such a return along with it‟s bid.

31. So even the bid of respondent no.6 is defective and did not conform to the

conditions prescribed in the RFP.

32. The counsel for respondent no.s 1-5 and the counsel for respondent no.s 1-6

have not disputed the above allegation of the petitioner.

33. So if the respondent no.s 1-5 have waived for respondent no.6, compliance of

this requirement of filing full IT return for last 3 financial years as mentioned

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in „Check List‟ in Annexure VII to the RFP or IT return for AY 2022-23 as

mentioned in clause 1.1 in Section –II (A.General) of the RFP, they cannot

apply the said requirement to the petitioner to disqualify the petitioner.

34. It must be applied to both petitioner and respondent no.6 or waived for both

parties. It cannot be selectively be applied to petitioner, and waived for

respondent no.6. That would be blatantly arbitrary, but that is what the

respondent No.s 1-5 did.

35. Counsel for respondents also contended that petitioner did not submit

certificate from the Statutory Auditor in the format indicated in Annexure-X,

but such a certificate was uploaded by petitioner, and it is at pg.277 of the

papers filed along with rejoinder by it. Firstly there is no such plea in the

counter affidavit and secondly, as the record shows, the contention is without

any merit.

36. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India

5

, the

Supreme Court of India held that the State has to abide by the standards it lays

down in tenders and if it does not, it‟s action can be invalidated. It held:

“10. Now, there can be no doubt that what para (1) of the notice

prescribed was a condition of eligibility which was required to be

satisfied by every person submitting a tender. The condition of

eligibility was that the person submitting a tender must be conducting

or running a registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and he must

have at least 5 years‟ experience as such and if he did not satisfy this

condition of eligibility, his tender would not be eligible for

consideration. This was the standard or norm of eligibility laid down

by Respondent 1 and since the Respondents 4 did not satisfy this

standard or norm, it was not competent to Respondent 1 to entertain

the tender of Respondents 4. It is a well-settled rule of administrative

5

(1979) 3 SCC 489, at page 503 :

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law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the

standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must

scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an

act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr Justice

Frankfurter in Viteralli v. Saton1 where the learned Judge said:

“An executive agency must be rigorously held to the

standards by which it professes its action to be judged .…

Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a

defined procedure, even though generous beyond the

requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be

scrupulously observed .... This judicially evolved rule of

administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may

add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall

perish with the sword.”

This Court accepted the rule as valid and applicable in India in A.S.

Ahluwalia v. Punjab

6

and in subsequent decision given in Sukhdev v.

Bhagatram

7

, Mathew, J., quoted the above-referred observations of

Mr Justice Frankfurter with approval. It may be noted that this rule,

though supportable also as an emanation from Article 14, does not

rest merely on that article. It has an independent existence apart from

Article 14. It is a rule of administrative law which has been judicially

evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the

executive authority.”

(emphasis supplied)

37. This principle has been reiterated in several subsequent decisions of the

Supreme Court such as Netai Beg v. State of W.B

8

and M.P.Power

Management Co.Pvt.Ltd v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd

9

.

38. But in the instant case, for obvious oblique motives, they have chosen not to

follow the above principle.

6

(1975) 3 SCC 503

7

(1975) 1 SCC 421

8

(2000) 8 SCC 262

9

(2023) 2 SCC 703

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39. In other words, the Technical Evaluation Committee of respondent No.s 1-5

has (a) deliberately ignored material filed by petitioner, (b) misread the tender

conditions wrongly, (c) ignored the fact that respondent no.6 has also not

complied with the tender conditions, and held that the bid of respondent no.6

was „responsive‟ while that of the petitioner is „non-responsive‟. This is

arbitrary, unreasonable and violates Art.14 of the Constitution of India.

40. They have also raised false, frivolous and vexatious pleas instead of acting

like a model litigant.

41. In Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra

10

, it was held by the

Supreme Court that the State should be a model litigant and should not put

forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct

the path of justice. It held:

“14. This Court, has time and again held, that the State should act

as a model litigant. In this respect, we can gainfully refer to the

following observations made by this Court in Urban Improvement

Trust, Bikaner v. Mohan Lal11 : (SCC pp. 515-16, paras 6-9)

“6. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that

Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal

litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious,

technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice. We

may refer to some of the decisions in this behalf.

7. In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India12 this Court extracted

with approval the following statement [from an earlier decision of

the Kerala High Court (P.P. Abubacker case13, AIR pp. 107-08,

para 5)] : (SCC p. 562, para 25)

„25. … “5. … The State, under our Constitution, undertakes

economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and

10

(2020) 19 SCC 241, at page 245

11

(2010) 1 SCC 512

12

(1974) 3 SCC 554

13

AIR 1972 KERALA 103

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inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it

must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to

win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for

the State‟s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial

defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker

party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply

because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The State is a

virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic

successes so that if on the merits the case is weak, Government

shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and

other lesser motivations which move private parties to fight in

court. The layout on litigation costs and executive time by the State

and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large

amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and

wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the

twin methods of not being tempted into forensic showdowns where a

reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a

pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of

Government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not

indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic

national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law

Ministers of India way back in 1957.” ‟

8. In Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International14 this Court

held : (SCC p. 177, para 2)

„2. … It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt

the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of

defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to

the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a public authority takes

up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well

founded, it has to be upheld by the court, but what we feel is that

such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a

public authority, unless of course the claim is not well founded and

14

(1979) 4 SCC 176

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by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of

resisting such a claim has become unavailable.‟

9. In a three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh v. State (UT of

Chandigarh)15 this Court held : (SCC p. 741, para 3)

„3. … The State Government must do what is fair and just to the

citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax

or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the

State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced,

take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the

citizen.‟” (emphasis supplied)

42. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that this action of respondents in awarding

of the contract to respondent no.6 is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of

Art.14 of the Constitution of India and they had acted deliberately with a

malafide intention to disqualify the petitioner and favour the respondent no.6.

43. The respondents no.1-5, in para 5 of their counter affidavit dt.22.12.2023,

referred to certain lapses by petitioner when it performed the same work which

had been entrusted to it earlier during the period 6.6.2017- 30.11.2023.

44. These pleas are not relevant because admittedly the petitioner was allowed to

continue the work during the 5 years it was awarded the said work and even

thereafter upto 30.11.2023 without interruption, and it was never informed by

respondent No.s 1-5 about these things during the said period. In our view,

these pleas are now being raised only as an afterthought by respondent no.s1-5

to justify their illegal and arbitrary actions.

45. For all the aforesaid reasons, the decision of the respondents to award the

work of the subject RFP dt.28.12.2022 to respondent no.6 is declared,

15

(1984) 3 SCC 737

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arbitrary, unreasonable, malafide and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of

India; and consequently, the work order dt. 28.11.2023 issued by respondent

no.s 1-5 to respondent no.6, and the Agreement dt.16.11.2023 entered into by

respondent no.1 with the respondent no.6, are set aside. The respondents are

directed to call for fresh tenders for the said work immediately. The respondent

No.s 1-5 together and respondent no.6 individually shall also pay costs of

Rs.20,000/- each to petitioner within 6 weeks.

46. All other applications shall stand disposed off.

(BISWAJIT PALIT), J (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO), CJ