As per case facts, Eastern Coal Fields Limited (ECL) floated a tender for equipment hire, and the review applicant's offer was accepted. The applicant procured High Speed Diesel (HSD) from ...
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before:
The Hon’ble Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
RVW 193 of 2022
In
FMA 4686 of 2015
ANE Industries Private Limited
Vs.
M/s. Eastern Coalfields Limited & Ors.
With
RVW 194 of 2022
In
FMA 4689 of 2015
ANE Industries Private Limited
Vs.
M/s. Eastern Coalfields Limited & Ors.
With
RVW 195 of 2022
In
FMA 4690 of 2015
Mahalaxmi Infra Contract Private Limited
Vs.
M/s. Eastern Coalfields Limited & Ors.
For the review applicant : Mr. Kishore Dutta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Arijit Bardhan
Mr. Vivekananda Bose
Mr. Avik Ghatak
Mr. Soham De Dhara
Mr. Ratikanta Pal
Mr. Gourab Mondal ….. advocates
For the ECL : Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Sr. Adv.
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Mr. Syed Nurul Arefin
Mr. Rahul Singh
Mr. Sanju Agarwal
…… advocates
Reserved on : 20.02.2026
Judgment on : 03.06.2026
Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. Challenging the judgment and order dated September 22, 2015 passed by
the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petitions, Eastern Coal Fields
Limited (for short “ECL”) filed three intra court appeals which were disposed
of by a judgment and order dated 08.01.2020 thereby modifying the order
passed by the learned Trial Judge. Being aggrieved, by the judgment and
order dated 08.01.2020, the review applicants filed petitions for Special
Leave to Appeal which stood dismissed thereby granting liberty to the writ
petitioners to approach the High Court by way of filing review petitions.
Pursuant to the liberty granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the writ
petitioners approached this Court to review the judgment and order dated
08.01.2020.
2. The review petitions were thereafter assigned before this bench.
3. ECL floated a Notice Inviting Tender (for short “NIT”) dated 09.10.2009 for
the purpose of hiring equipments for Mohanpur-OC-Patch at Salempur area.
The offer of the review applicant was accepted and he was directed to make
preliminary arrangement to execute the work under the said NIT and further
approval was issued in favour of the review applicant intimating that the
competent authority approved the entire work and the tenure of the works
contract was for five years.
4. As per the said contract, the review applicant had to procure High Speed
Diesel (for short “HSD”) directly from Indian Oil Corporation Limited (for
short “IOCL”) as bulk consumer. The review applicant entered into an
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agreement with the IOCL by executing a Memorandum of Arrangement
dated 14.11.2012 wherein the IOCL was required to let out on hire basis,
bulk outlets consisting of HSD pump, underground tank and fittings near
the site to cater to the requirements of the review applicant.
5. IOCL initially charged the review applicants the price of HSD at the bulk
rate but subsequently, as per the arrangement, the IOCL offered subsidized
retail rate. It was, thereafter, detected that supplying HSD at the subsidized
rate to the bulk consumer creates a burden on the company and as per the
decision of the concerned Government, such arrangement was withdrawn
and thus, the review applicant was compelled to purchase the HSD at the
bulk rate inclusive of the subsidy offered to the retail consumers. This
resulted in a price difference, and ECL was approached for variation/
modification of the escalation clause in the Additional Terms and Conditions
(for short “ATC”).
6. In the 259
th
meeting of the Board of Directors of ECL held on 16.02.2013,
the proposal for price variation of the Diesel Escalation Formula was
considered and upon deliberation was approved. The resolution of the said
meeting was communicated to the review applicant on 08.03.2013.
Subsequently, in a meeting held on 20.02.2013, the proposal was made for
the base rate of HSD on the bulk consumer price with effect from
18.01.2013 i.e., the date from which IOCL started changing the market rate
on bulk purchase of HSD. The said decision was communicated to the
review applicant on 14.03.2013 and was circulated amongst various
authorities of ECL on 21.03.2013. Based on the aforesaid resolution, ECL
charged the price of the Diesel at the higher rate at which IOCL charged the
review applicant as bulk consumer.
7. Payments on the higher price of HSD were made to the review applicant
between the period from 18.01.2013 and 12.11.2013. Subsequently, ECL
communicated to the review applicant that in a meeting of the Additional
Directors held on 18.11.2013, the earlier decision taken on 20.02.2013 has
been put under suspension. The aforesaid decision for suspension of the
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decision of the Additional Directors taken on 20.02.2013 was based upon a
recommendation and direction of the Central Vigilance Commission (for
short “CVC”) which recommended that because of the sale of HSD at the
retail price, the financial position of the oil companies were getting
weakened and to reduce such burden, HSD to the bulk consumers should
be made available at the price fixed thereof which includes the amount of
subsidy given to the retail consumer.
8. Review applicants filed separate writ petitions challenging the action of ECL
in deducting the difference between the rate of HSD charged from the bulk
consumer and the rate of HSD charged to the retail consumer.
9. The learned Single Judge after examination of the escalation clause
observed that the said clause clearly provides that in case of change in inter
alia price of Diesel, the Contractor would be entitled to claim reimbursement
for this escalation in costs. The learned Single Judge expressed an opinion
that since the review applicant was getting bulk Diesel at retail rates, both
parties understood the subsidized rate to be the contractual rate. After
noticing that from 18.01.2013 the review applicants had to buy HSD at a
much higher rate than the retail rate held that it amounts to escalation in
the price of bulk Diesel essential for performance for the contract and under
the escalation clause the review applicant was to be paid the difference. The
learned Single Judge further held that the Functional Directors very rightly
realized the injustice to the contractors, caused by the said situation and
decided to reimburse them for the difference in the rates. The learned Single
Judge also held that the decision of the Functional Directors amounts to
modification of the contract whereby ECL promised to pay the contractor the
enhanced rate of Diesel on equitable grounds.
10. In the light of the aforesaid observations, the learned Single Judge held that
the decision for suspension of the decision of the Additional Director with
retrospective effect is not supported by reason.
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11. After hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties in the intra court
appeals, three points were formulated by the Court in the judgment under
review.
(i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable pertaining to a dispute
arising out of the private contract and the interpretation of its
clauses?
(ii) Whether the escalation clause relating to the price of Diesel
incorporated in the Additional terms and conditions (for short
“ATC”) was in fact valid/ modified or not.
(iii) Whether ECL was within its authority to withdraw/ suspend the
earlier decision based on the report of Central Vigilance
Commission and ancillary to it whether the CVC retains the power
to pass any direction /orders on ECL to do or not to do an act
covered under the said contract?
12. The first issue was held in favour of the review applicant in the judgment
under review, and the third issue was not delved upon as the same had
become academic and elementary.
13. The second issue was decided against the review applicant and it was held
that the modified escalation formula was not incorporated in the GTC/ATC
in absence of any order of ECL.
14. The learned counsel for the review applicant and ECL restricted their
submission on the second issue only.
15. Mr. Datta, learned Senior advocate appearing in support of the review
petitions contended that the challenge in the writ petition was confined to
the decision taken by the Functional Directors in the meeting held on
18.11.2013 whereby the Functional Directors sought to keep the decision
taken by them in their meeting dated 20.02.2013 in abeyance and the
decision of the authorities of ECL to recover the amount paid to the review
applicant by the authorities of ECL during the period between 18.01.2013 to
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22.11.2013 on account of excess amount paid by the petitioners for bulk
purchase of HSD and the consequent deduction of the amounts from the
reported and R.A. Bills of the review applicant. He further contended that
the subject matter of consideration in the writ petition did not relate to the
price variation clause or the applicability of the formula for price variation.
16. Mr. Datta contended that the second issue framed in the judgment under
review was, thus, beyond the scope of the writ p etition. He further
contended that the judgment under review would suggest the existence of
two documents/communications of the same date, i.e., 20.03.2013. The first
communication was the resolution of the Functional Directors dated
20.02.2013 and the second communication was for communicating the
resolution of the Board of Directors dated 16.02.2013. He further contended
that the first communication was on record and the second communication
which was unconnected to the adjudication of the dispute, was considered
by the Division Bench while passing the judgment under review.
17. Mr. Datta, however, in his usual fairness, submitted that the second
communication must have been handed over to the Hon’ble Division Bench
by any of the counsels appearing for the respective parties Mr. Datta,
however, submitted that such document was placed before the Court by
mistake.
18. Mr. Datta contended that the Division Bench while passing the judgment
under review relied upon the second communication dated 20.03.2013
bearing Reference No. ECL/HQ/CMC/204 instead of the first
communication dated 20.03.2013 be aring no. ECL/HQ/CMC/209.
According to Mr. Datta, such an error amounts to misconce ption of a
material fact. Mr. Datta further contended that the submission of the
learned Senior advocate for the writ petitioners in course of hearing of the
appeal that the “modified escalation clause” was “implemented and the
benefits were extended to the respondent no. 1” i.e., review applicant is
incorrect as it is contrary to the pleadings in the writ petition. He further
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contended that the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the writ
petitioner being contrary to the pleadings cannot bind the writ petitioner.
19. Mr. Datta contended that misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an
advocate squarely falls within the expression “sufficient reason” appearing
in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submitted that
an application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the
doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit. In support of such contention
Mr. Datta placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti Madan Kansagra , reported at
(2019) 20 SCC 753 . Mr. Datta contended that review jurisdiction is
available in a case of an error apparent on the face of the record and non-
consideration of relevant documents and in support of such contention he
placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Rajender Singh vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands,
reported at (2005) 13 SCC 289.
20. Mr. Ghosh learned Senior Advocate appearing for ECL seriously d isputed
the contention of Mr. Datta. He contended that the second communication
dated 20.03.2013 cannot be said to be a document extraneous to the issue
in controversy as such document also form part of the Special Leave
Petition. Mr. Ghosh contended that the communication dated 09.04.2013
records the approval of the Board of Directors of the EC L at the 259
th
meeting which purports to modify the existing Diesel Escalation formula,
which was subsisting, in the 220
th
meeting held on 16.06.2008. He
contended that by a subsequent communication dated 14.06.2013, the
General Manager, ECL intimated that the modification of the price variation
clause for Diesel escalation would come into effect on and from the date of
issue of the Office Order by the ECL and the GTC and the bid documents
would be amended accordingly. He submitted that the communication
records that the Board after detailed deliberation approved that in case of
ongoing contracts and future tenders the modification in the general and
additional terms and conditions of the bid document would come into effect
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from the date of issue of office order by ECL regarding modification/
notification of price variation clause for Diesel escalation/de-escalation. He
further submitted that by a communication dated 10.12.2013 , ECL has
directed suspension of payment of Diesel escalation bulk rate, and the
review applicants had not challenged such decision in the writ petition. He
submitted that the contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the review
applicant that the modified escalation formula was not raised or urged
before the Hon’ble Division Bench is a misconceived one.
21. Mr. Ghosh contended that review in the garb of an appeal is not
maintainable and in support of such contention he placed reliance upon a
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.S. Raghavendra vs.
Bharti Airtel Ltd., reported at (2024) SCC Online SC 3121 ; S. Murali
Sundaram vs. Jothibai Kannan, reported at (2023) 13 SCC 515 . Mr.
Ghosh further contended that when the parties have entered into a contract
by reducing the terms and conditions in writing, rewriting of such contract
by the Court is impermissible and in support of such contention he placed
reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Venkataraman Krishnamurthy v s. Lodha Crown Buildmart (P) Ltd. ,
reported at (2024) 4 SCC 230.
22. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the materials
placed.
23. The legal position as regards the scope of a petition for review has been
summarized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.S. Raghavendra (supra).
In paragraph 4 of the said reports, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the
scope of review as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay
Kumar Agarwal vs. State Tax Officer reported at (2024) 2 SCC 362. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus-
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“16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an
error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from
that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and
compelling character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the
face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPC, it is not
permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”.
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to
be “an appeal in disguise”.
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been
addressed and decided.
16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere
looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-
drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably
be two opinions.
16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a
coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for
review.”
24. In Lily Thomas vs. Union of India reported at (2000) 6 SCC 224 it was
held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake
but not to substitute a view.
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs.
Netaji Cricket Club, reported at (2005) 4 SCC 741 held that application for
review is also maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What
would constitute “sufficient reason” would depend on the facts and
circumstances of the case. The words “sufficient reason” in Order 47 Rule 1
of the Code of Civil Procedure is wide enough to include a misconception of
fact or law by a Court or even an advocate. It was further held that an
application for review may be insisted by way of invoking the doctrine actus
curiae neminem gravabit .
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26. In Perry Kansagra (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering the
catena of decision on exercise of the power of review summed up its
conclusions in paragraph 15.1 of the said reports. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court held thus-
“15.1
……..
(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error
apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record
must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the
record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on
the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the grou nd that the
decision was erroneous on merits.
(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason
which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a
court or even an advocate.
(v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of Invoking
the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.”
27. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in S. Murali Sundaram (supra).
28. Mr. Datta learned Senior Advocate would vehemently contend that there is
sufficient reason to review the judgment dated 08.01.2020 as the same is a
product of misconception of fact of law by the Court as well as the advocate.
He further contended that non-consideration of a relevant material and
consideration of an irrelevant material also amounts to error apparent on
the face of the record.
29. Keeping in mind the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court on exercise of the power of review, this Court shall now
proceed to consider the subm issions of the learned advocates for the
respective parties.
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30. When the appeal was taken up for consideration the learned Senior Counsel
for ECL submitted that the formula for escalation for the price of the Diesel
incorporated in the original ATC was never modified nor stood modified by
the Functional Directors as it was subject to future order to be passed by
the ECL. It was further submitted by the said learned Senior Counsel that
though the decision was taken at one point of time to vary and/or modify
the escalation formula later on, it was suspended on the recommendation
having been received from the CVC and, therefore, any mistaken act cannot
confer any special right upon the writ petitioner.
31. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel representing the writ
petitioners in course of hearing of the appeal contended that the moment
the writ petitioner was directed to purchase the Diesel without any
component of subsidy offered to the retail consumer, such would be the
price of the Diesel and, therefore, the Functional Directors in their meeting
dated 20.02.2013 rightly recommended, approved and modified the
escalation clause. The said learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
once the modified escalation clause is implemented and the benefits were
extended to the writ petitioner, the subsequent decision to put on hold such
decision by the Functional Directors themselves on the basis of the
recommendation of CVC is illegal.
32. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions the issue relating to escalation
clause contained in ATC and its alleged modification by the resolution taken
in the meeting of the Functional Directors was answered in the judgment
under review with the following observations.
33. The contention of the learned senior counsel appearing in the ECL that
subsidy can never form a part of the price was not accepted with the
following observation-
“The price in ordinary parlance means the price at which the seller sells
the goods and the purchaser purchases it. The subsidy is an integral
part of the price and cannot be segregated there from so as to become a
standalone component. It is the policy of the Government to give
subsidy to the public at large who buys the diesel for personal use.
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However, the Government does not propose to give incentives in the
form of subsidy to the bulk consumers who are using the same for
commercial purposes. The contention of Mr. Jayanta Mitra that subsidy
can never form a part of the price is not acceptable if a component
cannot be segregated, dissected and/or taken up from the final price
charged by a seller, it remains an integral part of the price.”
34. Initially IOCL used to charge the review applicant the price of HSD at bulk
rate then subsequently, as per the directions of the Government of India the
review applicant was compelled to purchase HSD at the market base price
(without any subsidy). Such revision of price was made effective from
18.01.2013. Review applicant submitted a letter dated 19.01.2013 before
the Chairman cum Managing Director, ECL requesting the authority to
modify the Diesel Escalation clause. From the communication dated March
8, 2013 it is evident that the Board of Directors of ECL in its 259
th
meeting
held on 16.02.2013 vide item no. 259.04(H) after detailed deliberation
approved that in case of ongoing and future tenders, the modification in the
General and Additional terms and conditions of the bid document would
come into effect from the date of issue of Office Order by ECL regarding
modification/inclusion of price variation clause for Diesel escalation/ de-
escalation the Performance Security & medical treatment of the contractors
workmen in lying with CIL guideline.
35. The letter dated 14.03.2013 records the minutes of the meeting of the
Functional Directors of ECL held on 20.02.2013 wherein it was recorded
that Functional Directors, after detailed deliberation, approved the proposal
for considering the base rate of HSD on bulk consumer price with effect
from 18.01.2013 as brought out in agenda. The communication dated
14.03.2013 was annexed as Annexure P6 to the writ petition.
36. The General Manager (CMC) by a letter under reference no.
ECL/HQ/CMC/204 dated 20.03.2013 recorded that the Board of Directors
of ECL had approved the modification to be incorporatd in GTC in the bid
document in the 259
th
meeting held on 16.02.2013.
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37. The General Manager (CMC) issued the letter under reference no.
ECL/HQ/CMC/209 dated 20.03.2013 addressed to the CGM/GM wherein it
was recorded that the Functional Directors in its meeting held on
20.02.2013 approved the proposal for base rate of HSD on consume r price
with effect from 18.01.2013.
38. Mr. Datta would vehemently contend that the letter under reference no.
ECL/HQ/CMC/204 dated 20.03.201 3 recording that the Board of Directors
had approved the modification to be incorporated in the GTC in the bid
document in 259
th
meeting held on 16.02.2013 is extraneous to the writ
petition.
39. This Court is not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Datta for the
following reasons. Firstly, in paragraph 10 of the writ petition it was
specifically stated that in the 259
th
meeting of the Board of Directors of
respondent no. 1 (i.e., ECL) held on 16.02.2013, the Board of Directors
considered the subject of price variation of Diesel Escalation Formula and
after much deliberation approved that in case of “ongoing” and future
tenders the modification in general and additional terms and conditions of
the bid document would come into effect from the date of issue of Office
Order by the ECL regarding modifications/inclusion of price variation clause
for Diesel escalation /de-escalation performance security etc. in line with
Coal India Limited. The Memo under reference No. ECL/HQ/CMC/204
dated 20.03.2013 only records such fact.
40. Even if the contention of Mr. Datta is accepted that such document was not
annexed to the writ petition but the same cannot be said to be extraneous to
the issue involved in the writ petition. The letter dated 09.04.2013 was
issued in continuation of the earlier letter dated 20.03.2013 in respect of
modification to be incorporated in GTC in the bid document approved by
ECL, Board of Directors in its 259
th
meeting. The letters dated 09.04.2013
and 14.06.2013 were taken into consideration while passing the judgment
under review and it was held that the ECL has approved the substitution of
the modified escalation formula but it would be apparent and evident from
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the letter dated 14.06.2013 that it was so approved subject to further order
to be issued by ECL indicating the date from which it would take effect and
there is a complete silence thereafter. The following observation was made in
the judgment under review.
“There is no document forthcoming that su ch modified escalation
formula was, in fact, implemented and/or given effect to by an order of
the ECL. Mere acceptance of the request and approval at one level does
not confer an undisputed right upon the respondent no.1 to take shelter
under the modified escalation formula in absence of any specific order
passed by the ECL/appellant.”
41. The learned Single Judge held that the decision of the Functional Directors
amounts to modification of the contract and a unilateral act of renouncing
obligation under a contract amounts to breach thereof.
42. On the other hand, in the judgment under review, it was held that mere
acceptance of the request and approval at one level do es not confer a
undisputed right upon the respondent no. 1 to take shelter under th e
modified escalation formula in the absence of any specific order passed by
the ECL.
43. The judgment under review thus applied the well settled proposition of law
that the Court has to simply apply the terms and conditions of the
agreement as agreed between the parties [ see Venkataraman
Krishnamurthy (supra)].
44. From the submissions of the learned Senior Counsels for the respective
parties, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Datta that
the second issue framed and adjudicated by the judgment under review was
beyond the scope of the writ petition.
45. After going through the judgment under review this Court finds that the
issue relating to escalation clause contained in the ATC and its alleged
modification taken in the meeting of the Funcitonal Directors were raised
Page 15 of 16
and argued at length by the parties and such submissions were considered
while passing the judgment under review.
46. Both the communications dated 20.03.2013 were available on the records of
the case and submissions were made by the respective parties on the second
communication dated 20.03.2013. Thus, it is not a case of either non-
consideration of relevant materials or consideration of irrelevant materials.
47. There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in Rajendra Singh
(supra) that a review petition can be entertained on the ground of non -
consideration of relevant documents. However, the said decision cannot
come to the aid of the review applicant in view of the aforesaid observation.
48. To the mind of this Court, there is no error apparent on the face of the
record in the judgment under review.
49. The review applicant attempted a rehearing of the entire matter, and the
object behind such rehearing was to substitute the view taken in the
judgment under review which is impermissible as observed in Lily Thomas
(supra).
50. The judgment under review also does not suffer from any misconception of
law or fact of the Court or of the advocate.
51. The review applicant/writ petitioners were represented by an experienced
learned senior counsel at the time of hearing of the appeal. The said Counsel
after proper appreciation of the facts and the laws applicable thereto raised
specific points to defend the order of the learned Senior Judge. Such
submissions were taken note of and dealt with by assigning reasons while
passing the judgment under review.
52. For such reason this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of Mr.
Datta that the submission of the learned Senior Counsel who represented
the writ petitioners in the appeal was contrary to the case made out in the
writ petition.
Page 16 of 16
53. To the mind of this Court, there is no sufficient ground for review.
Accordingly, the application for review stand rejected. Connected
applications, if any, also stands rejected.
54. Urgent photostat certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties
upon compliance of all formalities.
I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya,J.) (Hiranmay Bhattacharyya,J.)
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