REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1979 OF 2010

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7336 of 2007)

MAHARASHTRA STATE

ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION CO.

LTD. & ANR.

—APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

DATAR SWITCHGEAR LT D. & ORS. —RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Leave granted.

2.This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment, dated 9

th

October 2007, delivered by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal

Application No. 3715 of 2005, in a petition filed by the two appellants

herein under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in

short “the Code”). By the impugned judgment, the High Court has

declined to quash a criminal complaint filed by respondents No.1 to 3 in

1

this appeal against the appellants and others for offences under Sections

192 and 199 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for

short “the IPC”).

3.Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts, material for adjudication of the

issue arising in this appeal may be stated thus:

Appellant No.1, viz. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co.

Ltd.; constituted in terms of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 is the

successor in interest of Maharashtra State Electricity Board (for short

“MSEB”) and appellant No. 2 is its Chairman. Respondent No.1 is an

incorporated company, viz. M/s Datar Switchgear Ltd. and respondents No.2

and 3, senior officials of respondent No.1, are the complainants and

respondents No.4 to 7 are the co-accused.

4.Pursuant to various contracts entered into between respondent No. 1 and

MSEB in the year 1993-94 for installation of “Low Tension Load

Management Systems” (for short “LTLMS”), MSEB issued a work order

on 27

th

March 1997 whereby respondent No. 1 was required to install at

various locations and lease out 47,987 LTLMS to MSEB for a period of

10 years at a monthly rent of ` 825/- for the first six years, and about `

650/- per month for the remaining four years.

2

5.Clause 8.1 of the said contract stipulated that respondent No.1 would

send intimation to the Section-in-charge of MSEB regarding the

installation of the equipment, and thereafter, a commissioning report was

to be prepared in that regard, which was to be signed jointly by the

representative of the complainant and the concerned Section-in-charge of

the MSEB.

6.During the validity period of the contract, various disputes arose between

respondent No.1 and MSEB. On 19

th

February 1999, respondent No.1

partially terminated the contract, conveying to MSEB that it would not

install any more LTLMS, and would only maintain the installed items.

7.On 21

st

April 1999, respondent No.1 terminated the contract in entirety.

Nevertheless, they offered to maintain the installed objects provided

MSEB continued to pay rent during the duration of the work order. As

the dispute arose between respondent No. 1 and MSEB vide order dated

5

th

May 1999, the High Court of Bombay referred the disputes to Arbitral

Tribunal.

8.The arbitration proceedings commenced on 19

th

February 1999. The

controversy in the instant case pertains to the amended written statement

3

filed by the MSEB on 7

th

February 2000, the relevant extract of which

reads as follows:

“9A. The Respondents submit that the Claimants are not

entitled to claim any amount from the Respondents as claimed

or otherwise. In fact, as stated hereinafter, the Claimants are

bound to refund to the Respondents all the amounts recovered

by them from the Respondents along with interest thereon. The

Respondents submit that the Claimants are guilty of having

practiced fraud upon the Respondents. The Claimants have

fabricated documents as also are guilty of misrepresentation of

material facts in the matter of commissioning objects, installing

them, taking out print outs therefrom and submitting bills in

respect thereof…. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. ….

…. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. ...

a) COMMISSIONING/COM MISSIONING REPORTS

The provisions of Clause 8.1 of the work order provided for

installation and commissioning of LTLMS systems in presence

of Section in Charge of every Section. The Claimants not only

did not inform the concerned/Section in Charge as required by

Clauses (a) and (b) thereof, but submitted commissioning

reports for the LM systems making it appear as if the objects

were installed on a given date in presence of the representatives

of the Section in charge as mentioned in the said reports, and

thereafter submitted the same for the signature of the Sections

in charge. With a view that the sub divisions, divisions and

circles of the Respondents are not able to find out the same, the

Claimants failed and neglected to send copies of the

Commissioning reports as provided in Clause 8.0(d), thereby

making it impossible for the officers mentioned in clause (e)

thereof to depute representatives to inspect the commissioned

objects in the circle. The Claimants thus obtained payments

from the dates mentioned in the said reports fraudulently by

misrepresentation of the facts….”

4

9.The Arbitral Tribunal passed the final award on 18

th

June 2004 whereby

it directed MSEB to pay `185,97,86,399/- as damages to respondent

No.1, and pay interest at the rate of 10% p.a. on the sum of

`179,15,87,009/-. The award contained the following observations

suggesting that the MSEB had introduced certain fabricated documents

as evidence:

“As regards the Commissioning Reports produced by the

Respondents at Exhs. C-64 and C-74, the Claimants submitted,

and with considerable merit that the Respondents had indulged

in tampering the commissioning reports produced on the record.

The submission is correct.”

10.On the basis of the said observations in the arbitral award, on 23

rd

June

2004 respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed criminal complaint No. 476 of 2004

before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nasik for offences under

Sections 192 and 199 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Judicial

Magistrate, First Class, Nasik took cognizance of the said complaint and

issued summons against all the accused named in the complaint.

11.Being aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the

complaint, appellants preferred the afore-stated petition under Section

482 of the Code before the High Court of Bombay for quashing of the

complaint.

5

12.As stated above, the High Court, vide the impugned judgment has

dismissed the said petition. The High Court has inter alia observed that a

prima facie case has been made out against the accused and the

complaint clearly establishes the joint action of the accused to attract

vicarious liability under the IPC. Hence, the present appeal by two of the

accused.

13.Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that the dispute

between the parties was purely civil in nature, and the criminal justice

system has been set in motion only to pressurize the appellants. In order

to buttress the contention that the High Court would be justified in

exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash a vexatious

criminal complaint to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court,

learned counsel commended us to the decisions of this Court in Inder

Mohan Goswami & Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Ors.

1

, K.L.E.

Society & Ors. Vs. Siddalingesh

2

, Baijnath Jha Vs. Sita Ram & Anr.

3

,

Suneet Gupta Vs. Anil Triloknath Sharma & Ors.

4

and G. Sagar Suri &

Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

5

1

(2007) 12 SCC 1

2

(2008) 4 SCC 541

3

(2008) 8 SCC 77

4

(2008) 11 SCC 670

5

(2000) 2 SCC 636

6

14.Relying on the decisions in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Special

Judicial Magistrate & Ors.

6

, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta

Bhalla & Anr

7

and Keki Hormusji Gharda & Ors. Vs. Mehervan

Rustom Irani & Anr.

8

, learned counsel contended that the IPC, save and

except in some specific cases, does not contemplate vicarious liability of

a person who is not directly charged for the commission of an offence,

and a person cannot be made an accused merely by reason of his official

position. Further, it was contended that in order to launch prosecution

against the officers of a company, the complainant must make specific

averments as to the role played by each of the officials accused in the

complaint. In order to buttress the contention, learned counsel placed

reliance on the decisions of this Court in N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh

& Ors.

9

, Sharon Michael & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu

10

, S.K. Alagh

Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

11

and Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of

Gujarat & Ors.

12

.

15.Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents No.1

& 2, on the other hand, while emphasizing that power under Section 482

6

(1998) 5 SCC 749

7

(2005) 8 SCC 89

8

(2009) 6 SCC 475

9

(2007) 9 SCC 481

10

(2009) 3 SCC 375

11

(2008) 5 SCC 662

12

(2008) 5 SCC 668

7

of the Code is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, argued

that in the instant case, in light of the averments in the complaint, a

prima facie case is made out against the appellants and, therefore, the

High Court was fully justified in declining to exercise its jurisdiction

under the said provision. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the

respondents reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in Sunita

Jain Vs. Pawan Kumar Jain

13

and Som Mittal Vs. Government of

Karnataka

14

to contend that the present case does not fall in the category

of “rarest of rare” cases, warranting exercise of jurisdiction by the High

Court under Section 482 of the Code. Learned counsel contended that the

offence of fabrication of false evidence cannot be described as a civil act,

and in any event, the existence of a civil remedy does not preclude the

maintainability of criminal complaint.

16.Relying on the decisions of this Court in Tarun K. Shah Vs. C.R.

Alimchandani & Ors.

15

and K.M. Mathew Vs. K.A. Abraham & Ors.

16

, it

was next contended that it was not necessary to allege an overt act by

each of the accused, and in that regard, the averments in the complaint

were sufficient. Moreover, the use of the expression “whoever causes

13

(2008) 2 SCC 705

14

(2008) 3 SCC 574

15

(2001) 9 SCC 728

16

(2002) 6 SCC 670

8

any circumstance to exist” in Section 192 of the IPC indicates that

vicarious liability is in-built within the Section, and the complaint

contains specific averments to that effect.

17.Learned counsel urged that the offences under Sections 192 and 199 IPC

were complete when the accused had adduced the fabricated

commissioning reports in proceedings before the arbitrators, who had

adversely commented on the conduct of the appellants. It was argued that

the said offences would survive irrespective of the sustenance or

otherwise of the arbitral award. Commending us to the decisions of this

Court in In Re: Suo Moto Proceedings Against R. Karuppan,

Advocate

17

, Sushil Kumar Vs. Rakesh Kumar

18

and Murray & Co. Vs.

Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr.

19

, learned counsel pleaded that the offences

of perjury and fabrication of false evidence require stern action to be

taken against persons indulging in such acts.

18.Before embarking on an evaluation of the rival submissions, it would be

apposite to briefly examine the nature of the power of the High Court

under Section 482 of the Code.

17

(2001) 5 SCC 289

18

(2003) 8 SCC 673

19

(2000) 2 SCC 367

9

19.It is well settled that though the inherent powers of the High Court under

Section 482 of the Code are very wide in amplitude, yet they are not

unlimited. However, it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an

absolute rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of

the Court. Nevertheless, it is trite that powers under the said provision

have to be exercised sparingly and with caution to secure the ends of

justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Where the

allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at its

face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence

alleged, the High Court would be justified in invoking its powers under

Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings. (See: R.P.

Kapur Vs. State of Punjab

20

and Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. Vs. Kanwar

Pal Singh Gill & Anr.

21

.)

20.In Som Mittal (supra), a three judge bench of this Court, while holding

that the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash criminal

proceedings should be used sparingly, and with circumspection in the

“rarest of rare cases”, observed that:

“When the words “rarest of rare cases” are used after the

words “sparingly and with circumspection” while describing

the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasise and

20

AIR 1960 SC 866

21

(1995) 6 SCC 194

1

reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words

“sparingly and with circumspection”. They mean that the

power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be

used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution,

only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to

interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The

expression “rarest of rare cases” is not used in the sense in

which it is used with reference to punishment for offences

under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasise that the power under

Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings

should be used sparingly and with circumspection. Judgments

are not to be construed as statutes. Nor words or phrases in

judgments to be interpreted like provisions of a statute. Some

words used in a judgment should be read and understood

contextually and are not intended to be taken literally. Many a

time a judge uses a phrase or expression with the intention of

emphasising a point or accentuating a principle or even by

way of a flourish of writing style. Ratio decidendi of a

judgment is not to be discerned from a stray word or phrase

read in isolation.”

21.Thus, the question for consideration is whether or not in light of the

allegations in the complaint against the appellants, the High Court was

correct in law in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482

of the Code?

22.In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be

expedient to refer to the relevant portions of the complaint:

“5. In the said Arbitration proceedings it was falsely contended

by the Accused at para 9(A)(a) of the Written Statement that the

Complainant No. 1 had submitted false and fabricated

Commissioning Reports and the equipment particularized

therein was installed without the presence of the MSEBs

Section-in-Charge and the Accused relied upon a copy of the

1

Commissioning Report inter alia pertaining to Shirpur Section

in Dhule Circle. The said Commissioning Report as relied upon

by the Accused was tendered as Exhibit ‘C-64’ by the witness

examined on behalf of the Accused No. 1. The said

Commissioning Report contained an endorsement ‘not installed

in presence’ to allege that the Commissioning of the equipment

particularized in the said Commissioning Report at Exhibit ‘C-

64’ was not done in the presence of MSEBs Section Officer.

The said Commissioning Report contained the signature of the

representative of the Complainant No. 1 and the said

endorsement was made above the said signature of the

Complainant No. 1’s representative in a manner to depict as if

the Complainant No. 1’s representative had accepted the fact

alleged in the said endorsement.

6. On the other hand, the Complainant No. 1 brought on record

their copy of the Commissioning Report pertaining to Shirpur

Section in Dhule Circle as Exhibit ‘C-74’ which had no such

endorsement as is found on the face of Exhibit ‘C-74’. It is the

case of the Complainant No.1 that the Accused with common

criminal intent caused the impugned endorsement “not installed

in presence” to be superscribed on Exhibit ‘C-64’ after it was

duly signed by the representative of the Complainant No. 1 and

the Section in charge of MSEB so as to convey the impression

that the Complainant No.1’s representative had accepted the

fact alleged in the said endorsement. The said falsification and

fabrication of the record was brought to the notice of the Ld.

Arbitrators in the Arbitration proceedings and the Ld.

Arbitrators observed in their award dated 18.06.2004 as

under:…. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. ….

…. …. …. …. …. …. …. …

The Complainants say and submit that the Ld. Arbitrators have

thus held that the said endorsement was fabricated and was

admittedly tendered in evidence by the Accused No.1 acting

under the control and management of Accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and

5. The Accused No. 6 was particularly responsible for the

conduct of the MSEBs officers in the Shirpur Section which

falls under the Dondaicha Division of Dhule District. The

Complainants say and submit that the Accused acted with

common criminal intent to falsify and fabricate the said

1

endorsement with the intention to support the case of the

Accused No. 1 that the equipment was installed by the

Complainant No. 1 without the presence of the officers of the

MSEB. The Complainants say and submit that the said action

was therefore clearly intended to pervert the course of justice

and misled (sic) the Ld. Arbitrator into entertaining in

erroneous opinion touching upon the point of material

determination as to whether the Complainant No. 1 had

installed the equipment without the presence of the MSEBs

Section-in-charge. The Complainants say and submit that the

Accused fabricated false evidence which has been tendered by

them in the course of judicial proceedings before the Ld.

Arbitrators and the Accused are guilty of offence u/s 192, 199

r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Complainants say

and submit that the Accused acted with common criminal

intention to play fraud on the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal and deny

justice to the Complainant No. 1.”

(Emphasis supplied by us)

23.It is manifest that the allegation against the appellants herein is that

appellant No.1 had, acting under the control and management of all the

accused, including appellant No. 2 and in particular accused No. 6,

superscribed an endorsement on Exhibit C-64 with an intention to

support its case and tendered the same in the course of judicial

proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal, thereby committing offence of

fabricating false evidence in terms of Section 192 and 199 read with

Section 34 IPC.

24.At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant statutory

provisions and examine the legal position.

1

25.Sections 192 and 199 IPC, read as follows:

“192. Fabricating false evidence.-Whoever causes any

circumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book or

record, or electronic record or makes any document or

electronic record containing a false statement, intending that

such circumstance, false entry or false statement may appear in

evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by

law before a public servant as such, or before arbitrator, and

that such circumstance, false entry or false statement, so

appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such

proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain

an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result

of such proceeding, is said “to fabricate false evidence”.”

“199. False statement made in declaration which is by law

receivable as evidence.- Whoever, in any declaration made or

subscribed by him, which declaration any Court of Justice, or

any public servant or other person, is bound or authorized by

law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement

which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false

or does not believe to be true, touching any point material to the

object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be

punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.”

26.It is plain that for constituting an offence under Section 192 IPC, the

following ingredients must be satisfied:

(i) Causing any circumstance to exist, or making any false entry

in any book or record or making any document containing a

false statement.

(ii) Doing one of the above acts with the intention that it may

appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding

taken by law before a public servant or an arbitrator.

(iii) Doing such act with the intention that it may cause any

person, who in such proceeding, is to form an opinion upon the

evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point

1

material to the result of such proceeding. (See: Babulal Vs.

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

22

.)

27.Similarly, Section 199 IPC requires the following ingredients to be

established:

“(i) Making of a declaration which a Court or a public servant

is bound or authorised by law to receive in evidence.

(ii) Making of a false statement in such declaration knowing or

believing it to be false.

(iii) Such false statement must be touching any point material to

the object for which the declaration is made or used.”

28.A bare perusal of the complaint shows that the gravamen of the allegation

is that a fabricated document containing the offending endorsement was

tendered in evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal on behalf of MSEB by

accused No. 6, who was in-charge of Shirpur section. It is evident from

the afore-extracted paragraphs of the complaint that other accused have

been named in the complaint because, according to the complainant,

MSEB-accused No. 1 was acting under their control and management. It

bears repetition that the only averment made against appellant No. 2 is

that appellant No.1, i.e. MSEB was acting under the control and

management of appellant No. 2 along with other three accused. There is

no denying the fact that appellant No. 2 happened to be the Chairman of

22

AIR 1964 SC 725.

1

MSEB at the relevant time but it is a settled proposition of law that one

cannot draw a presumption that a Chairman of a company is responsible

for all acts committed by or on behalf of the Company. In the entire body

of the complaint there is no allegation that appellant No. 2 had personally

participated in the arbitration proceedings or was monitoring them in his

capacity as the Chairman of MSEB and it was at his instance the subject

interpolation was made in Exhibit C-64. At this stage, we may refer to

the extract of a Board resolution, pressed into service by the respondents

in support of their plea that appellant No. 2 was responsible for the

conduct of business of appellant No. 1. The said resolution merely

authorises the Chief-Engineer to file counter claim before the Arbitral

Tribunal in proceedings between appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 1.

It rather demonstrates that it was the Chief Engineer who was made

responsible for looking after the interest of the appellant No. 1 in those

proceedings. In this regard, it would be useful to advert to the

observations made by a three judge bench of this Court in S.M.S.

Pharmaceuticals (supra) :-

“There is no universal rule that a director of a company is in

charge of its everyday affairs. We have discussed about the

position of a director in a company in order to illustrate the

point that there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it

director, manager or secretary. It all depends upon the

respective roles assigned to the officers in a company. A

1

company may have managers or secretaries for different

departments, which means, it may have more than one manager

or secretary.”

29.It is trite law that wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious

liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally

involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it

has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned. In our opinion,

neither Section 192 IPC nor Section 199 IPC, incorporate the principle of

vicarious liability, and therefore, it was incumbent on the complainant to

specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint. It

would be profitable to extract the following observations made in S.K.

Alagh (supra) :-

“As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the

Company, even if the appellant was its Managing

Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence

under Section 406 of the Penal Code. If and when a

statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it

provides specifically therefor. In absence of any

provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a

Company or an employee cannot be held to be

vicariously liable for any offence committed by the

Company itself.”

30.Therefore, we are of the view that even the Board Resolution, adduced by

the complainant, does not establish that appellant No.2 was involved in

the alleged fabrication of false evidence or adducing the same in

1

evidence before the arbitral tribunal. In the absence of any such specific

averment demonstrating the role of appellant No.2 in the commission of

the offence, we find it difficult to hold that the complaint, even assuming

it to be correct in its entirety, discloses the commission of an offence by

appellant No.2 under Sections 192 and 199 of IPC.

31.However, in so far as the case of appellant No.1 company is concerned,

bearing in mind the fact that Exhibit C-64 was submitted with the

intention to support the averments in the written statement filed on their

behalf, which could possibly influence the decision of the arbitral

tribunal in relation to the conduct of the respondent No. 1 while

discharging their obligations under the contract between them and

appellant No. 1, we are unable to hold that prima facie, a case of offences

under Sections 192 and 199 IPC is not made out against them. It is

evident from the observations of the Tribunal quoted in para 9 (supra)

that had the tribunal not doubted the veracity of the said document, it

could have made a material difference to the result of the arbitral

proceedings.

32.It was faintly argued that the arbitral award on the basis whereof the said

complaint has been filed has been set aside and therefore, the complaint

is liable to be quashed on this ground. The submission is untenable as

1

the offences under Sections 192 and 199 IPC, if made out, exist

independent of the final arbitral award. We are, therefore, of the opinion,

that it is not a fit case for the exercise of power under Section 482 of the

Code, in favour of appellant No. 1.

33.We shall now examine whether appellant No.2 could be made liable for

the afore-mentioned offences by operation of Section 34 of IPC. It is trite

that Section 34 IPC does not constitute a substantive offence, and is

merely in the nature of a rule of evidence, and liability is fastened on a

person who may have not been directly involved in the commission of

the offence on the basis of a pre-arranged plan between that person and

the persons who actually committed the offence. In order to attract

Section 34 IPC, the following ingredients must be established:

“(i) there was common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged

plan;

(ii) the person sought to be so held liable had participated in

some manner in the act constituting the offence.” (See:

Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani & Ors. Vs. State of

Maharashtra

23

; Hamlet @ Sasi & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala

24

;

Surendra Chauhan Vs. State of M.P.

25

)

34.It is manifest that common intention refers to a prior concert or meeting

of minds, and though, it is not necessary that the existence of a distinct

23

1998 SCC (Cri) 698

24

(2003) 10 SCC 108

25

(2000) 4 SCC 110

1

previous plan must be proved, as such common intention may develop at

the spur of the moment, yet the meeting of minds must be prior to the

commission of offence suggesting the existence of a pre-arranged plan.

Therefore, in order to attract Section 34 of the IPC, the complaint must,

prima facie, reflect a common prior concert or planning amongst all the

accused. In our opinion, in the present case, the complaint does not

indicate the existence of any pre-arranged plan whereby appellant No. 2

had, in collusion, with the other accused decided to fabricate the

document in question and adduce it in evidence before the arbitral

tribunal. There is not even a whisper in the complaint indicating any

participation of appellant No. 2 in the acts constituting the offence, and

that being the case we are convinced that Section 34 IPC is not attracted

in his case.

35.In the final analysis, we are of the opinion that no prima facie case has

been made out against appellant No.2 in respect of offences under

Sections 192 and 199 of the IPC, even with the aid of Section 34 of the

IPC. Therefore, it was a fit case where the High Court should have

exercised its powers under Section 482 of the Code by quashing the

complaint against appellant No. 2.

2

36.For the aforegoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed qua appellant No. 1; it

is allowed in relation to appellant No.2; and consequently order of the

Magistrate taking cognizance against appellant No. 2 in Complaint

No.476 of 2004 is quashed.

.……………………………………J.

(D.K. JAIN)

.…………………………………….J.

(H.L. DATTU)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 8, 2010

2