As per case facts, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, facing a recruitment ban, engaged contract workers through various agencies to meet its manpower requirements. The Respondent-Union, representing these contract ...
Renuka WP 3170 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3170 OF 2025
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 3172 OF 2025
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
Company Limited ...Petitioner
V/s.
Bhartiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh ...Respondent
______________
Mr. Prashant Chavan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nirav Shah and Ms.
Richika Kadam i/b M/s. Little & Co. for Petitioner.
Mr. G. R. Naik with Mr. Uresh U. Sawant and Ms. Rutika Naik i/b Mr. G.R.
Naik Co., for Respondent No. 4.
______________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
RESERVED ON: 14 JULY 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON: 21 JULY 2026.
JUDGMENT:
1) By these two petitions, the Petitioner has challenged the
Awards dated 24 April 2024, passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial
Tribunal, Thane in Reference (IT) Nos. 12 of 2018 and 16 of 2020. The
Industrial Tribunal has answered the References in the affirmative and
has directed the Petitioner to pay difference of arrears of wages at the
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rate of minimum of the pay scale at the lowest grade as that of
permanent employees to the members of the Respondent-Union w.e.f.
December 2016 in case of Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2018 and from May
2016 in case of Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020.
2) Petitioner is Maharashtra Electricity Distribution Company
Limited which has taken over the distribution undertaking of the
erstwhile Maharashtra Electricity Board. Petitioner is registered with the
Competent Authority under the provisions of Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA Act).
3) It appears that the Government of Maharashtra had
imposed ban on new recruitment on the establishment of the Petitioner,
which created difficulties for the Petitioner in carrying out its day-to-day
work. Petitioner therefore decided to award contracts for supply of
skilled and unskilled contract workers. Accordingly, work orders were
issued to various contractors from time to time for supply of manpower.
The contract workers started assisting the regular employees of
Petitioners in technical cadre such as Lineman, Meter Readers, etc.
Petitioner, however, denies any employer-employee relationship between
it and the contract workers.
4) Respondent in both petitions represent 40 + 49 contract
workers. A demand was served by the Respondent-Union on the
Petitioner on 5 April 2017 demanding equal wages to the contract
workers as paid to the permanent employees of the Petitioner. The
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Respondent-Union thereafter approached the office of Commissioner of
Labour. After failure of conciliation proceedings, the Additional
Commissioner of Labour made References to the Industrial Tribunal,
Thane vide orders dated 16 March 2018 and 18 March 2020. In respect of
Writ Petition No. 3172 of 2025, Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2018 was
registered, whereas in respect of Writ Petition No. 3170 of 2025,
Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020 was registered. The Respondent-Union
filed its statement of claim, which was resisted by the Petitioner by filing
written statement. The Respondent-Union led evidence of contract
workers. By separate Awards delivered on 24 April 2024, the Industrial
Tribunal has answered both the References in the affirmative, holding
that the contract workers were entitled to receive equal pay for equal
work in the form of minimum of the pay scale (at the lowest cadre in the
regular pay-scale) as that of permanent employees of the Petitioner. The
Industrial Tribunal has accordingly directed the Petitioners to pay to the
members of the Respondent-Union difference of wages calculated at the
rate of minimum of the pay scale payable to the permanent employees
with effect from December 2016 in case of Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2018
and from May 2016 in case of Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020. The Awards
dated 24 April 2024 are the subject matter in the present petitions.
5) Mr. Chavan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Petitioner submits that the Industrial Tribunal has grossly erred in
answering the References in the affirmative. He submits that there can
never be comparison between the workers engaged by the contractors
and permanent employees of the Petitioner. That the wages of the
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contract workers are not decided by the Petitioner and that Petitioner
merely pays the contract value based on tender process implemented by
it. He submits that it is for the contractor to decide how much wages are
to be paid to its worker. He submits that the ratio of the judgment of the
Apex Court in State of Punjab Versus. Jagjit Singh and Ors.
1
cannot be
extended to workers who are engaged by the contractors. He relies on
judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Council, Nandyal Municipality
Versus. K Jayaram and others.
2
6) Mr. Chavan further submits that the Industrial Tribunal has
erroneously relied on provisions of Rule 25 of the Maharashtra Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolishing) Rules,1971 (Maharashtra Rules) in
the present case. That the contract workers do not perform same nature
of work as performed by the permanent employees. That the burden was
on Respondent-Union to prove similarity in the nature of work which is
not discharged by them. He relies on admissions given in the cross
examination of the Respondents’ witness about failure to produce any
documentary evidence to demonstrate similarity of work. He submits
that a specific defence was raised in the written statement before the
Industrial Tribunal about difference of work performed by the contract
workers and the permanent employees. He submits that in any case, the
ratio of the judgment in Municipal Council, Nandyal Municipality
(supra) would prevail over the interpretation made by the Tribunal in
respect of Rule 25 of the Maharashtra Rules. He prays for setting aside
the impugned Awards.
1
2017 (1) SCC 148
2
SLP(C) NO. 17711 of 2019 decided on 16 December 2025.
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7) Mr. Naik the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-
Union, opposes both the petitions. He submits that the contract workers
are engaged by the Petitioners in view of ban imposed by the
Government of Maharashtra on new recruitment. That contract workers
are engaged with a view to come over the difficulty of absence of regular
manpower. That therefore contract workers are required to perform same
duties and responsibilities as performed by the permanent employees.
That the Respondent-Union led evidence of performance of same duties
and responsibilities by the contract workers. He submits that Petitioner
has registered itself under the provisions of CLRA Act and that therefore
it is statutorily obliged to follow the provisions of Rule 25 of the
Maharashtra Rules. That in addition to provisions of Rule 25 of the
Maharashtra Rules, the judgment of the Apex Court in Jagjit Singh lays
down a clear law that employer cannot distinguish between contract
workers and regular employees in the matter of payment of wages. He
submits that the judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Council,
Nandyal Municipality is delivered in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of that case where the issue before the Apex Court was
with regard to regularization of contract workers. That the Apex Court
has indeed granted regularization to the contract workers. That therefore
the said judgment does not assist the case of the Petitioner in any
manner. He prays for dismissal of the petition.
8) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for
my consideration.
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9) The issue involved in the petition is whether workers
engaged by the contractors of the Petitioner are entitled to receive wages
in the minimum of pay scale payable to the permanent employees of the
Petitioner. Petitioner has apparently engaged large number of contract
workers to take care of manpower requirement due to ban imposed by
the State Government for new recruitment. Petitioner has placed on
record one of the work orders placed on M/s. Shagun Guards Security
Agency in pursuance of tender floated for providing outsourcing
manpower for Pen Circle Office, Pen Testing Division, Roha Division and
Panvel Division. As per the work order, the contractor was required to
supply man power in the form of skilled persons into technical cadres,
semi-skilled persons in technical and non-technical cadres and unskilled
persons (Poen). It appears that the total manpower requirement was for
222 personnel under the work order. The rates payable per person per
day were as under:
RATE PER PERSON PER DAY including Bonus and excluding
contractor service charge/Profit as per revised Special
Allowance/DA effective from 01.01.2019 to 30.06.2019 is as below:
1) Skilled Persons (Technical) -Rs492/-
2) For Semi-Skilled Persons (Technical & Non-Technical)-Rs 471/-
3) For Unskilled Person (Peon) - Rs 450/-
10) This is how Petitioner was required to hire manpower for
carrying out its activities by issuing various contracts throughout the
State.
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11) At the instance of the Respondent-Union, two References
were registered before the Industrial Tribunal, Thane for adjudication of
demands relating to equal pay for equal work. The Tribunal has answered
the References in the affirmative by issuing following directions.
i. Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020, is Answered in Affirmative.
ii. It is hereby held that the Member Employees of the Second Party
Employees Union are entitled to receive Equal Pay for Equal Work, and
are entitled to the Wages at the Minimum of the Pay-Scale (at the
Lowest Grade, in the Regular Pay-scale) as that of Permanent
Employees of the First Party Management.
iii. The First Party Management is hereby directed to pay all the
difference of Arrears of Wages, at the rate of the Minimum of the Pay-
Scale (at the Lowest Grade, in the Regular Pay- Scale, as that of
Permanent Employees of the First Party Management), to the Member
Employees of the Second Party Employees Union, as are named in the
List Annexed to the Schedule of Reference, with effect from May 2016,
till the date of their engagement, within a period Six Months from the
date of Publication of this Award.
iv. First Party Management is further directed to pay to the Member
Employees of the Second Party Employees Union, as are named in the
List Annexed to the Schedule of Reference, wages equal to wages of the
Minimum of the Pay-Scale (at the Lowest Grade, in the Regular Pay-
Scale, as that of Permanent Employees of the First Party Management),
in the similar category, for which the Member Employees are engaged.
v. List of the Member Employees, Annexed to the Schedule of Reference,
shall form the part of this Award.
vi. No order as to costs.
vii. Cost of this Award be sent to the Competent Authority, for its
publication.
12) The Industrial Tribunal has inter-alia relied on ratio of the
judgment of the Apex Court in Jagjit Singh in which the Apex Court has
held that the principle of equal pay for equal work would apply to all
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temporary workers who are differently described as work charged, daily
wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual etc. The Apex Court has held that such
temporary employees need to be paid wages at the minimum of the pay
scale (at the lowest grade in the regular pay scale) extended to the
regular employees holding the same post. The Apex Court has held in
Jagjit Singh as under:
57. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for
equal work’ has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions
of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large
number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law
declared by this Court The same is binding on all the courts in India,
under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the
principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove.
The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has also been extended to
temporary employees (differently described as workcharge, daily-wage,
casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to
temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44
hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly
declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again.
58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial
parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same
work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties
and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action
besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human
dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do
so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at
the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and
at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would
suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of
paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes
an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering
position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and
coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation.
60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the
application of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in relation to
temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees,
employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the
like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the
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concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties
and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees,
holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the
application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal
work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the
instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to
record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly
acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab,
that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were
appointed against posts which were also available in the regular
cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of
their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being
randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at
some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise,
regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to
discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees,
from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the
duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in
the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by
regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the
respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for
appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the
State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay
parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42
hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for
equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary
employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with
the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government
employees, holding the same post.
61. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph,
we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary
employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw
wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the
regular pay-scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same
post.
13) The law expounded in Jagjit Singh has been reiterated by the
Apex Court in Sabha Shanker Dube Versus. Divisional Forest Officer
and others
3
in which it is held in paras-11 and 12 as under:
3
2019 12 SCC 297
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11. The issue that was considered by this Court in Jagjit Singh is
whether temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc
appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual
employees and likewise) are entitled to the minimum of the regular pay
scales on account of their performing the same duties which are
discharged by those engaged on regular basis against the sanctioned
posts. After considering several judgments including the judgments of
this Court in Tilak Raj and Surjit Singh, this Court held that temporary
employees are entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay scales
which are applicable to the regular employees holding the same post.
12. In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh, we are unable to uphold the
view of the High Court that the appellants herein are not entitled to be
paid the minimum of the pay scales. We are not called upon to
adjudicate on the rights of the appellants relating to the regularisation
of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by
this Court initially in Putti Lal Z relating to persons who are similarly
situated to the appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh that
temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long
as they continue in service.
14) Thus, as per the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Jagjit Singh, where temporary workers are engaged by the employer
under whatever nomenclature, they must be paid wages in the minimum
of the pay scale which is extended to the permanent employees. The
ratio of the judgment however essentially applies where there is a direct
engagement by the employer of temporary workers. The Apex Court has
undoubtedly used the word 'contractual' while describing the temporary
employees. However, sometimes employers do make direct contractual
engagement of workers. There may be direct contracts executed between
the employer and the workman or even in absence of a formal contract,
the nature of engagement is described as contractual. However, in both
the cases, there is direct relationship between the employer and the
worker and the wages are paid to the worker directly by the employer.
The difficulty arises when the employer issues contract to an agency for
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supply of manpower. The contractor quotes the rates of wages payable to
the workers to be supplied to the employer and on the basis of rates so
offered in the competitive bidding process, decision is taken by awarding
contract to a particular contractor. The employer then pays a lump-sum
amount to the contractor and it becomes the responsibility of the
contractor to pay the wages to its own workers. The employer is not
really concerned with the wages actually paid by the contractor to its
workers.
15) However, engagement of contract workers is governed by
the provisions of CLRA Act. Under Section 21 of the CLRA Act, though it
is the primary responsibility of the contractor to pay wages, the principal
employer becomes liable to pay wages in the event of failure by the
contractor to pay wages. In exercise of powers under Section 35 of the
CLRA Act, the State of Maharashtra has notified Maharashtra Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. Under Rule 25 of the
Maharashtra Rules, one of the conditions for grant of license for
engagement of contract workers is with regard to the wages payable to
them. Rule 25 (2)(iv)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Rules deal with wages
payable to the contract workers. Under Rule 25 (2)(iv)(a), the rates of
wages payable to the workmen by the contractor cannot be less than the
minimum rates of wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Act,1948.
However, under Rule 25 (2)(iv)(b), where a workman employed by the
contractor performs same kind of work as workman directly employed by
the principal employer, the rates of wages payable to the workman of the
contractor shall be the rates payable to the workman directly employed
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by the principal employer doing same kind of work. Rule 25 (2)(iv)(a) and
(b) provides thus:
25. Form and terms and conditions of licence:-
(1) Every licence granted under Rule 23 or renewed under Rule 29 shall
be in Form No. VI.
(2) Every such licence shall be subject to the following conditions,
namely:-
(i) the licence shall be non-transferable;
(ii) the number of workmen employed as contract labour in the
establishment shall not, on any day, exceed the maximum number
specified in the licence;
(iii) save as provided in these rules, the fees paid for the grant, or as the
case may be, for renewal of the licence shall be non-refundable;
(iv) (a) The rate of wages payable to the workmen by a contractor shall
not be less than the minimum rates of wages fixed under the Minimum
Wages Act, where that Act applies, where the rates have been fixed by
agreement, settlement or award shall not be less than the rates so fixed,
and where rates have been fixed under the Minimum Wages Act and
also under any agreement, settlement or award, the rates, shall not be
less than the higher of the two rates;
(b) where the workmen employed by the contractor perform the
same kind of work as the workmen or a class of workmen directly
employed by the principal employer, the rates of wages payable to
the workmen by the contractor shall be the rates payable to the
workmen directly employed by the principal employer doing the
same kind of work.
(c) in any other case, the rates of wages shall be such as may be
specified in this behalf by the Commissioner of Labour;
xxx
(emphasis added)
16) Thus, it is a statutory duty imposed under Rule 25(2)(iv)(b)
of the Maharashtra Rules on the contractor to pay same wages to its
workers as payable to the workmen of principal employer if both perform
same kind of work.
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17) The Tribunal has conducted a factual inquiry about the
nature of work performed by the members of the Respondent-Union.
After assessing the evidence on record, the Industrial Tribunal has
recorded findings that the members of the Respondent-Union perform
same work as is performed by the regular employees of the Petitioner. I
have my own limitations for interfering in the said finding of the fact
recorded by the Industrial Tribunal, unless a case of perversity is made
out. In fact, Petitioner has emphatically admitted in the Petition that
engagement of contract workers is necessitated on account of ban
imposed by the State of Government on new recruitment. This is clear
from pleadings in paragraph 3.1 of the Petition which reads thus:
3.1 There was totally ban on new recruitment as per notification issued
by the Government of Maharashtra. There were vacancies due to
retirement, restructuring, increased in consumers and to overcome the
situation and providing better service to the consumer, the Petitioner
requires manpower for its day-to-day work and therefore invites/floated
tenders for providing skilled and unskilled contract workers.
18) Thus, contract workers are engaged on account of shortage
of manpower due to retirement/promotion coupled with ban by the State
Government. The contract workers are thus engaged to perform the work
which is supposed to be performed by the regular employees. From the
Work Order relied upon by the Petitioner, it is clear that contract workers
are engaged to perform duties of Driver, Up Kendra Sahayyak, Vidyut
Sahayyak, Office Assistant, Peon, etc. Thus, whenever regular employees
of MSEDCL retire or get promoted, the post vacated by him/her is
manned by contract workers. The Petitioner has itself admitted in the
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Petition that the contract workers are engaged in view of recruitment
ban imposed by the State Government. There is ample material on record
which is relied upon by the Respondent-Union to infer that there is
similarity of work performed by regular and contract workers. In view of
the above position, though a contention is raised before me that there is
failure on the part of Respondent-Union to prove similarity in work, I am
not inclined to accept the said contention or to interfere in the findings
of fact recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. I accordingly uphold the
finding that the contract workers are engaged to perform work of
permanent employees of the Petitioner.
19) Thus, provisions of Rule 25 (2)(iv)(b) of the Maharashtra
Rules would apply with full force in the present case and it is a statutory
duty to pay same wages to contract workers as are paid to the regular
employees of the Petitioner. Thus, the ratio of the judgment of the Apex
Court in Jagjit Singh is just an additional facet to be considered in the
present case. Otherwise, there is a statutory right of contract workers to
receive same wages as are paid to the regular employees. Here it must be
observed that the judgment of the Apex Court in Jagjit Singh makes a
slight departure in favour of the employers in that it directs payment of
wages in the minimum of the pay scale. Thus, an Office Assistant
working with the Petitioner for 10 years may draw higher salary on
account of grant of 10 increments. However, his counterpart working on
contract basis would receive wages only in the minimum of the pay-
scale. To this extent, there would be some difference in the wages drawn
by the two employees on account of difference in length of service. Be
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that as it may. The minimum that needs to be paid to the contract
workers performing duties of regular employees is the wages in the
minimum of the pay scale.
20) Mr. Chavan has strenuously relied upon judgment of the
Apex Court in Municipal Council, Nandyal Municipality in support of
contention that the principle of equal pay for equal work and payment of
salary in the minimum of pay scale cannot be made applicable to the
workers of the contractor. The Apex Court has held in paragraphs 7, 8 and
9 of the judgment as under:
7. Having considered the matter, we find substance in the contention of
learned counsel for the appellant. The moot point on which the issue
revolves is the nature of employment/ relationship of the appellant
with the respondents. It is not in dispute that the appellant had
engaged the respondents and other similarly situated persons through
a contractor, which also had changed periodically. However, at the same
time, the respondents may have continued to work for the appellant,
though through some other contractor. Further, the respondents may
have also continued for long periods. Thus, at first blush the
reasoning may seem to be attractive that there was discrimination
as they were also performing the duties as was being performed by
other regular employees and were required to be suitably paid
and, at least, the minimum time scale of the pay attached to the
regular post, however, a deeper probe would reveal that the matter
cannot be dealt with in such a simplistic way. The test which
would actually throw light and would be relevant in the facts and
circumstances of the present case is to whether the relationship,
which is direct between two parties in whatever manner, can be
differentiated with a relationship which had no direct connection
with the two parties who are contesting, but rather the
relationship is through a third-party which in the present case is
the contractor.
8. From the facts discussed above, it is clear that the appellant had no
direct connection with the actual persons who were employed by the
contractor, i.e., the respondents. The obligation and responsibility of
the appellant was to pay to the contractor the amount which had been
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contracted and agreed to between the appellant and the contractor, and
the responsibility then was that of the contractor to ensure payment of
wages and other emoluments as per the terms of the contract to the
persons who were actually sent by the contractor to the appellant for
performing various types of job.
9. The Court would pause here to indicate that it is not anybody’s case
that the mode of employment through a contractor itself was illegal or
there was any illegality in the terms and conditions of the contract so as
to make it ultra vires any constitutional provision or to make it
discriminatory, and further there has been no challenge to such
contract or any of the terms stipulated in the contract. Another issue on
facts, which has been addressed by learned counsel for the respondents
is that the respondents could not have been exploited by the parties
and the fact that they were the same persons being sent, though
through different contractors itself shows that the relationship was
direct and only a sham camouflage was created; that of a contractor
being the intermediary. To this, in our considered view, the answer may
not be in clear black and white terms and is still a grey area for the
reason that even if the respondents were the same persons who actually
worked for the appellant, there can be instances where the new
contractor, to maintain continuity and to ensure that there is no
complaint from the employer, the appellant in the present case,
continues with the same persons who were already employed and were
working with the appellant. Thus, there is argument for and against
such stand, which we will not dwell on any further. Another issue which
has been flagged by learned senior counsel for the respondents is that
the respondents being in the position they are, and the relief given
being the minimum of the time scale of the pay attached to the regular
post cannot be termed as giving them something which was not due or
something excessive, for ultimately they also have a family to support
and they are also performing the job which is performed by people on
the regular establishment. We have absolutely no doubt in our mind
that such issue raised by learned senior counsel is of relevance, but the
Court feels that the mode of contractual employment, that too, by a
contractor and not directly by the employer will have to be seen in a
different light in the eyes of law. If all such distinctions between a
regular employee and such contractual employees is not made, then the
basic concept of hiring through various modes and in different capacity
would lose its purpose and sanctity and ultimately everybody would be
getting exactly the same benefit. This cannot be permitted in law for
the reason that employment under a State entity is a public asset and
every citizen of the country has a right to apply for it. In a regular
employment, directly made by the said State entity, there are
safeguards to ensure that the system of employment/engagement is
transparent and fulfills a minimum criterion and is open to all eligible
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persons and a mode/procedure is adopted for ultimately choosing the
right person. When employees/workmen are taken through a
contractor, it is the absolute discretion of the contractor as to whom
and through which mode he would choose such persons to be sent to
the principal. This is where the difference lies, which is a very valid
distinction in law. The reason why there are safeguards in regular
appointment is that there should not be any favoritism or other
extraneous consideration where persons, only on merit, are recruited
through a fully transparent procedure known in law. If the persons
who are employed through a contractor, and have come to work,
are given equal benefit and status as a regular employee, it would
amount to giving premium and sanction to a process which is
totally arbitrary as there is no mode prescribed in any contract as
to how the contractor would employ or choose the persons who
are to be sent, except for the basic qualification, i.e., knowledge in
the field for which they are required. The judgment/ order relied
upon by learned counsel for the appellant aptly covers the field in the
present case. The judgment cited by learned senior counsel for the
respondents is basically different on facts for the reason that there the
contractual employment was directly by the principal and in that
background contractual workers have been regularized.
(emphasis added)
21) Thus, in its judgment in the Municipal Council, Nandyal
Municipality, the Apex Court has drawn distinction between the
employees who were directly employed by the employer and workers
engaged through the contractor. The Apex Court has held that even if the
workers have worked for a considerable time on contract basis, in
absence of employer-employee relationship, the principle of payment of
wages in the minimum of pay scale cannot be extended to contract
workers. Thus, the judgment of the Apex Court in the Municipal Council,
Nandyal Municipality, does seem to suggest that the principle of equal
pay for equal work and payment of wages in the minimum of pay scale
cannot be made applicable where workers are engaged through a
contractor.
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22) However, it appears that in Municipal Council, Nandyal
Municipality, the prayer was for regularization since the employees were
continued for a long time by change of contractors. The High Court had
granted not just the wages in time scale of pay but also the annual
increments, which is clear from the opening part of the judgment, which
reads thus:
2. The present appeals arise out of a common order dated 23.08.2018
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of
Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, by which the appellant has
been directed to grant minimum time scale of pay to 1the respondents
and also to add annual grade increments as and when they fell due from
time to time.
3. The appellant had engaged the respondents not directly, but through
a third-party contractor starting from the year 1994. However, upon the
change of contractors also, they continued to perform their duties and
work for the appellant. They approached the A.P. Administrative
Tribunal, Hyderabad1 seeking regularization and for payment of the
minimum of the scale of that post which was given to the regular
employees. The Tribunal ruled against them and they approached the
High Court. The High Court vide the impugned order has reversed the
order of the Tribunal and has directed the appellant in the terms as
indicated above.
23) Also, the Apex Court, though set aside the order of the High
Court directing payment of wages in the minimum of pay-scale and
increments, ultimately directed consideration of cases of casual workers
for regularization by issuing following directions, with the caveat that
the same shall not be treated as precedent:
Having passed the order, we feel that sometimes justice is required to
be tempered with mercy as human factors cannot be totally lost sight
of. In such view of the matter, we would require the appellant to look
into whether the jobs which were being done by the respondents, in the
background that they have not been disengaged or returned to the
contractor on the ground of being unsatisfactory, having uninterrupted
service under the appellant for decades can be regularized on posts,
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which prima facie appears to be perpetual in nature. We make it clear
that this direction is limited for the purposes of the present case only as
it has been passed in the special facts and circumstances of the present
case and shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case. We
expect the appellant to take a compassionate and sympathetic view in
the matter.
24) Thus, the judgment in Municipal Council, Nandyal
Municipality is rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case. Also, the Apex Court did not have an occasion to consider
applicability of Rules made under CLRA Act which required payment of
same wages. In the present case, Petitioner is registered under CLRA Act
and has been issued a license to engage contract workers. The grant of
such license is subject to a condition under Rule 25 (2)(iv)(b) to pay same
wages to the contract workers as are paid to the regular employees when
contract workers perform same work. Thus, there is a statutory duty to
pay equal wages to the contract workers. Under the provisions of CLRA
Act if the contractor fails to pay wages payable under Act or the Rules to
its workers, it becomes the responsibility of the principal employer to
pay the same. In my view, therefore, there is no warrant for interference
in the direction made by the Tribunal for payment of equal pay for equal
work.
25) However, it needs to be clarified here that this Court is
upholding the Awards for payment of wages in the minimum of pay
scales only on account of establishment of similarity in works in the
peculiar facts of the present case. The present case involves a peculiar
circumstance where the Petitioner is unable to recruit regular employees
and is forced to recruit contract workers to perform jobs of regular
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Renuka WP 3170 of 2025
employees. The judgment therefore cannot be read to mean as if laying
down an abstract proposition that every worker of a contractor would
always be entitled to payment of wages in the minimum of pay scales.
The direction of the Industrial Court is upheld mainly in the light of
provisions of Rule 25 of the Maharashtra Rules.
26) The Tribunal has directed payment of difference of wages
from May 2016/December 2016 till the time the members of the
Respondent-Union remain engaged on contract basis. It is however, seen
that the demand for payment of wages in the minimum of the pay scale
was made vide notice dated 5 April 2017. In pursuance of the said
demand, two References appear to have been made by the Additional
Commissioner of Labour. Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2018 was made by
order dated 16 March 2018 in respect of 49 workmen whereas Reference
(IT) No. 16 of 2020 was made by order dated 18 March 2020 in respect of
40 workmen. The Tribunal has however directed payment of difference of
wages from May 2016/December 2016. There is absolutely no basis for
seeking wages in minimum of pay scale from May 2016/December 2016.
It is also seen that Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020 was made after
considerable delay. In such circumstances directing Petitioner to pay
difference of wages since May 2016 would put substantial financial
burden on the Petitioner. It is well settled position, that though payment
of less salary or wages is a continuous cause of action, limitation would
apply to the relief of payment of arrears. The law in this regard is well
settled by the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs.
Tarsem Singh
4
.
4
(2008) 8 SCC 648
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27) In my view, therefore, it would be appropriate to restrict the
arrears from the date of which References were made to the Industrial
Tribunal. Accordingly, the difference of wages needs to be paid from 16
March 2018 to the members of Respondent-Union in Reference (IT) No.
12 of 2018 and the same needs to paid w.e.f 18 March 2020 to the
members of Respondent-Union in Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020. To this
limited extent, some modification in the impugned Awards would be apt.
28) Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following order:
(i)The impugned Awards are upheld to the extent of
declaration made by the Industrial Tribunal for payment of
wages to the members of Respondent-Union in the
minimum of pay scale (at the lowest grade in the regular
pay scale) as that of permanent employees of the
Petitioner.
(ii)However, direction for payment of difference of wages
from December 2016 in case Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2018
and from May 2016 in case of Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020
is modified by directing that the difference of wages shall
be payable to the members of Respondent-Union forming
part of Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2018 w.e.f. 16 March 2018
and to the members of Respondent-Union forming the part
of Reference (IT) No. 16 of 2020 w.e.f. 18 March 2020.
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(iii)The difference of wages shall be payable only till the
time members of the Respondent remain/remained to be
employed by the contractors with the Petitioner.
29) With the above directions, both the Petitions are partly
allowed and disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
30) After the judgment is pronounced the learned counsel
appearing for the Petitioner prays for stay of the judgment for a period of
4 weeks. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.4 opposes for
stay of the judgment. Considering the reasons recorded in the judgment,
I deem it appropriate not to grant stay as requested. The request for stay
is accordingly rejected.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Page No. 22 of 22
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In a landmark decision, the Bombay High Court has issued a significant ruling concerning Maharashtra contract worker wages, affirming the principle of equal pay for equal work in India for contract employees performing similar duties as permanent staff. This judgment, pertaining to Writ Petitions No. 3170 and 3172 of 2025 involving the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL), reinforces statutory obligations and stands as a crucial reference point on CaseOn for understanding worker rights in the contract labour framework.
The Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL), facing a government ban on new recruitments, resorted to engaging a substantial number of contract workers through various agencies. These contract workers performed essential duties, mirroring the roles of permanent employees such as Linemen, Meter Readers, Office Assistants, and Peons. The Respondent-Union, representing these contract workers, demanded wages equivalent to those paid to permanent MSEDCL employees, arguing for the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'.
After conciliation failed, the matter proceeded to the Industrial Tribunal, Thane, which ultimately ruled in favour of the contract workers. The Tribunal directed MSEDCL to pay the difference in arrears of wages at the minimum of the pay scale applicable to the lowest grade of permanent employees, effective from May/December 2016. MSEDCL then challenged these Awards before the Bombay High Court.
The primary issue before the High Court was: Are contract workers, engaged through intermediaries, entitled to wages at the minimum of the pay scale of permanent employees performing similar work, considering the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA Act) and the Maharashtra Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971, alongside judicial precedents on 'equal pay for equal work'?
The High Court extensively referred to the Supreme Court's pronouncements on 'equal pay for equal work':
Crucially, the Court highlighted the statutory duty imposed by Rule 25(2)(iv)(b) of the Maharashtra Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1971. This rule explicitly mandates that:
"where the workmen employed by the contractor perform the same kind of work as the workmen or a class of workmen directly employed by the principal employer, the rates of wages payable to the workmen by the contractor shall be the rates payable to the workmen directly employed by the principal employer doing the same kind of work."
The Court noted that MSEDCL, being registered under the CLRA Act, is statutorily obliged to adhere to these rules. Additionally, under Section 21 of the CLRA Act, the principal employer (MSEDCL) bears responsibility for wage payment if the contractor fails to do so.
The Petitioner relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Municipal Council, Nandyal Municipality v. K Jayaram and others, which seemed to suggest that the 'equal pay for equal work' principle might not extend to contractor-engaged workers due to the absence of a direct employer-employee relationship and concerns about regularization. However, the High Court distinguished this case, explaining that:
The High Court found no perversity in the Industrial Tribunal's factual finding that contract workers performed the same work as regular MSEDCL employees. This finding was supported by MSEDCL's own admission that contract workers were engaged to fill vacancies arising from recruitment bans and retirements, effectively performing duties that would otherwise be carried out by permanent staff.
The Court emphasized that Rule 25(2)(iv)(b) of the Maharashtra Rules applies with full force, creating a statutory duty for MSEDCL to ensure that contract workers receive wages on par with regular employees for similar work. The _Jagjit Singh_ principle served as a strong reinforcing factor, confirming the entitlement to at least the minimum of the pay scale.
For legal professionals analyzing complex rulings such as this, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs prove invaluable. They distill the core arguments, judicial reasoning, and final directives of *these specific rulings*, enabling a swift yet thorough understanding for busy practitioners.
While upholding the core principle, the High Court modified the period for which arrears were to be paid. The Industrial Tribunal had directed payments from May/December 2016. Citing the absence of a clear basis for these earlier dates and the principle of limitation for arrears (as established in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Tarsem Singh), the High Court restricted the payment of arrears to commence from the dates the respective References were made to the Industrial Tribunal:
This modification acknowledges the practical implications and potential financial burden on the Petitioner while ensuring justice for the workers from the point their demands were formally escalated.
The Bombay High Court partly allowed the petitions, leading to the following conclusions:
This judgment serves as a critical precedent for advocates dealing with labour law, particularly cases involving contract workers and the application of 'equal pay for equal work'. It clarifies the interplay between constitutional principles and specific statutory rules like Maharashtra's CLRA Rules, emphasizing that a statutory mandate can compel equal wages even in contractual employment. Understanding the distinction drawn from Nandyal Municipality is vital for navigating similar cases where regularization versus equal pay is at issue. The modification regarding arrears also highlights the importance of the date of reference in determining the scope of retrospective financial relief.
This case is an excellent example for students to grasp:
It vividly illustrates the judiciary's role in protecting worker rights against exploitative practices, even within the complex framework of contract labour.
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.
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