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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2006

Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate ….Appellant

VERSUS

State of Uttar Pradesh ....Respondent

J U D G M E N T

ANIL R. DAVE, J.

1.The present appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as

“the Act”) against the judgment and order dated 02.12.2005

delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in

Criminal Contempt Petition No. 16 of 2004, whereby the

High Court found the appellant guilty of Criminal Contempt

for intimidating and threatening a Civil Judge (Senior

Division), Etah in his Court on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003

and sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two months

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with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of the

fine, the appellant to undergo further imprisonment of 2

weeks. The High Court further directed the Bar Council of

Uttar Pradesh to consider the facts contained in the

complaint of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, and

earlier contempt referred to in the judgement and to initiate

appropriate proceedings against the appellant for

professional misconduct.

Reference to larger Bench and the Issue

2.On 27th January, 2006, this appeal was admitted by

this Court and that part of the impugned judgment, which

imposed the sentence, was stayed and the appellant was

directed not to enter the Court premises at Etah (U.P.).

Keeping in view the importance of the question involved

while admitting the appeal on 27

th

January, 2006, notice

was directed to be issued to the Supreme Court Bar

Association as well as to the Bar Council of India. The

matter was referred to the larger Bench. Learned Solicitor

General of India was requested to assist the Court in the

matter.

Page 3 3

3.On 6

th

March, 2013 restriction on entry of the

appellant into the court premises as per order dated 27

th

January, 2006 was withdrawn. Thereby, the appellant was

permitted to enter the court premises. The said restriction

was, however, restored later. On 20

th

August, 2015, notice

was issued to the Attorney General on the larger question

whether on conviction under the Contempt of Courts Act or

any other offence involving moral turpitude an advocate

could be permitted to practise.

4.Thus following questions arise for consideration:

(i)Whether a case has been made out for

interference with the order passed by the High

Court convicting the appellant for criminal

contempt and sentencing him to simple

imprisonment for two months with a fine of

Rs.2,000/- and further imprisonment for two

weeks in default and debarring him from

appearing in courts in judgeship at Etah; and

(ii)Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the

appellant can be allowed to practise.

The facts and the finding of the High Court

5.The facts of the present appeal discloses that the Civil

Judge (Senior Division), Etah made a reference under

Section 15 (2) of the Act to the High Court through the

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learned District Judge, Etah (U.P.) on 7.6.2003 recording

two separate incidents dated 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003,

which had taken place in his Court in which the appellant

had appeared before him and conducted himself in a

manner which constituted “Criminal Contempt” under

Section 2 (c) of the Act.

6.The said letter was received by the High Court along

with a forwarding letter of the District Judge dated 7.6.2003

and the letters were placed before the Administrative Judge

on 7.7.2003, who forwarded the matter to the Registrar

General vide order dated 18.6.2004 for placing the same

before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court and on

11.7.2004, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court

referred the matter to the Court concerned dealing with

contempt cases and notice was also issued to the appellant.

7.Facts denoting behaviour of the appellant, as recorded

by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah, can be seen from

the contents of his letter addressed to the learned District

Judge, Etah. The letter reads as under:-

Page 5 5

“Sir,

It is humbly submitted that on 16.4.2003, while I

was hearing the 6-Ga-2 in Original Suit No.114/2003

titled as “Yaduveer Singh Chauhan vs. The Uttar

Pradesh Power Corporation”, Shri Mahipal Singh Rana,

Advocate appeared in the Court, and, while using

intemperate language, spoke in a loud voice:

“How did you pass an order against my client in

the case titled as “Kanchan Singh vs. Ratan

Singh”? How did you dare pass such an order

against my client?

I tried to console him, but he started shouting in

a state of highly agitated mind:

“Kanchan Singh is my relative and how was this

order passed against my relative? No Judicial

Officer has, ever, dared pass an order against me.

Then, how did you dare do so? When any Judicial

officer passes an order on my file against my

client, I set him right. I shall make a complaint

against you to Hon’ble High Court”, and he

threatened me: “I will not let you remain in Etah in

future, I can do anything against you. I have

relations with highly notorious persons and I can

get you harmed by such notorious persons to the

extent I want to do, and I myself am capable of

doing any deed (misdeed) as I wish, and I am not

afraid of any one. In the Court compound, even my

shoes are worshipped and I was prosecuted in

two murder cases. And I have made murderous

assaults on people and about 15 to 20 cases are

going on against me. If you, in future, dare pass

an order on the file against my client in which I am

a counsel, it will not be good for you”.

Due to the above mentioned behaviour of Shri Mahipal

Singh Rana, Advocate, the judicial work was hindered

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and aforesaid act of Shri Mahipal Singh falls within the

ambit of committing the contempt of Court.

In this very succession, on 13.5.2003, while I was

hearing 6-Ga-2 in the O.S. No. No. 48/2003 titled as

“Roshanlal v Nauvat Ram”, Shri Mahipal Singh Rana

Advocate appeared in the Court and spoke in a loud

voice: “Why did you not get the OS No. 298/2001 title

as ‘Jag Mohan vs. Smt. Suman’ called out so far,

whereas the aforesaid case is very important, in as

much as I am the plaintiff therein”. I said to Shri

Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate: “Hearing of a case is

going on. Thereafter, your case will be called out for

hearing”, thereupon he got enraged and spoke: “That-

case will be heard first which I desire to be heard first.

Nothing is done as per your desire. Even an advocate

does not dare create a hindrance in my case. I shall get

the case decided which I want and that case will never

be decided, which I do not want. You cannot decide any

case against my wishes”. Meanwhile when the counsel

for Smt. Suman in O.S. No. 298/2001 titled as “Jag

Mohan vs. Smt. Suman” handed some papers over to

Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate for receiving the

same, he threw those papers away and misbehaved

with the counsel for Smt. Suman. Due to this act of Shri

Mahipal Singh Rana, the judicial work was hindered

and his act falls within the ambit of committing the

contempt of Court.

Your good self is therefore requested that in order to

initiate proceedings relating to committing the contempt

of Court against Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate,

my report may kindly be sent to the Hon’ble High Court

by way of REFERENCE”.

With regards,”

8.On the same day, the learned Civil Judge (Senior

Division) also wrote another letter to the Registrar-General

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of the High Court, giving some more facts regarding

contemptuous behaviour of the appellant with a request to

place the facts before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High

Court so that appropriate action under the Act may be

taken against the appellant. As the aforestated letters refer

to the facts regarding behaviour of the appellant, we do not

think it necessary to reiterate the same here.

9.Ultimately, in pursuance of the information given to

the High Court, proceedings under the Act had been

initiated against the appellant.

10.Before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of

the appellant that it was not open to the Court to proceed

against the appellant under the provisions of the Act

because if the behaviour of the appellant was not proper or

he had committed any professional misconduct, the proper

course was to take action against the appellant under the

provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961. It was also

contended that summary procedure under the Act could not

have been followed by the Court for the purpose of

punishing the appellant. Moreover, it was also submitted

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that the appellant was not at all present before the learned

Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on 16.4.2003 and

13.5.2003.

11.Ultimately, after hearing the parties concerned, the

High Court did not accept the defence of the appellant and

after considering the facts of the case, it delivered the

impugned judgment whereby punishment has been imposed

upon the appellant. The High Court observed:

“22. Extraordinary situations demand extraordinary

remedies. The subordinate courts in Uttar Pradesh are

witnessing disturbing period. In most of the

subordinate courts, the Advocates or their groups and

Bar Associations have been virtually taken over the

administration of justice to ransom. These Advocates

even threaten and intimidate the Judges to obtain

favourable orders. The Judicial Officers often belonging

to different districts are not able to resist the pressure

and fall prey to these Advocates. This disturbs the

equilibrium between Bar and the Bench giving undue

advantage and premium to the Bar. In these

extraordinary situations the High Court can not

abdicate its constitutional duties to protect the judicial

officers.

xxxxx

24. ……………The criminal history of the contemnor,

the acceptance of facts in which his actions were found

contumacious and he was discharged on submitting

apologies on two previous occasions, and the

allegations against him in which he was found to

continue with intimidating the judicial officers

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compelled us to issue interim orders restraining his

entry of the contemnor in the judgeship at Etah. The

Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, is fully aware of his

activities but has chosen not to take any action in the

matter. In fact the Bar Council hardly takes cognizance

of such matters at all. The Court did not interfere with

the statutory powers of the Bar Council of Uttar

Pradesh to take appropriate proceedings against the

contemnor with regard to his right of practice, and did

not take away right of practice vested in him by virtue

of his registration with the Bar Council. He was not

debarred from practice but was only restrained to

appear in the judgeship at Etah in the cases he was

engaged as an Advocate. The repeated contumacious

conduct, without any respect to the Court committed by

him repeatedly by intimidating and brow beating the

judicial officers, called for maintaining discipline,

protecting the judicial officers and for maintaining

peace in the premises of judgeship at Etah.

25. Should the High Court allow such advocate to

continue to terrorise, brow beat and bully the judicial

officers? It is submitted that he has a large practice.

We are not concerned here whether the contemnor or

such advocates are acquiring large practice by

intimidating judicial officers. These are questions to be

raised before the Bar Council. We, however, must

perform our constitutional duty to protect our judicial

officers. This is one such case illustrated in para 78, of

the Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra), in

which the occasion had arisen to prevent the

contemnor to appear before courts at Etah. The

withdrawal of such privilege did not amount to

suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an

advocate in other courts or tribunal, drafting the

petitions and advising his clients. It only prevented him

from intimidating the judicial officers and from vitiating

the atmosphere conducive for administration of justice

in the judgeship at Etah.

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31. The Supreme Court held that Section 20 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, has to be construed in a

manner which would avoid anomaly and hardships

both as regards the litigant as also by placing a

pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its

contempt. In Pallav Seth the custodian received

information of the appellant having committed

contempt of taking over benami concerns, transferring

funds to these concerns and operating their accounts,

from a letter dated 5.5.1998, received from the Income

Tax Authorities. Soon thereafter on 18.6.1998 a

petition was filed for initiating action in contempt and

notices were issued by the Court on 9.4.1999. The

Supreme Court found that on becoming aware of the

forged applications the contempt proceedings were

filed on 18.6.1998 well within the period of limitation

prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. The action taken

by the special court by its order dated 9.4.1999

directing the applications to be treated as show cause

notice, was thus valid and that the contempt action

was not barred by Section 20 of the Act.

32. In the present case the alleged contempt was

committed in the court of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil

Judge (Senior Division) Etah on 16.4.2003 and

13.5.2003. The officer initiated the proceedings by

making reference to the High Court through the District

Judge vide his letters dated 7.6.2003, separately in

respect of the incidents. These letters were received by

the Court with the forwarding letter of the District

Judge dated 1.6.2003 and were placed before

Administrative Judge on 7.7.2003, who returned the

matter to the Registrar General with his order dated

18.6.2004 to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice

and that by his order dated 11.7.2004, Hon'ble the

Chief Justice referred the matter to court having

contempt determination. Show cause notices were

issued by the court to the contemnor on 28.10.2004. In

view of the law as explained in Pallav Seth (supra) the

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contempt proceedings would be taken to be initiated on

7.6.2003 by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah,

which was well within the period of one year from the

date of the incidents prescribed under Section 20 of the

Act.

xxxxxx

36. We do not find that the contemnor Shri Mahipal

Singh Rana is suffering from any mental imbalance. He

is fully conscious of his actions and take responsibility

of the same. He suffers from an inflated ago, and has a

tremendous superiority complex and claims himself to

be a champion for the cause of justice, and would not

spare any effort, and would go to the extent of

intimidating the judges if he feels the injustice has

been done to his client. We found ourselves unable to

convince him that the law is above every one, and that

even if he is an able lawyer belonging to superior

caste, he could still abide by the dignity of court and

the decency required from an advocate appearing in

any court of law.

37. The due administration of law is of vastly greater

importance than the success or failure of any

individual, and for that reason public policy as well as

good morals require that every Advocate should keep

attention to his conduct. An Advocate is an officer of

the Court apart of machinery employed for

administration of justice, for meeting out to the litigants

the exact measure of their legal rights. He is guilty of a

crime if he knowingly sinks his official duty, in what

may seem to be his own or his clients temporary

advantage.

38. We find that the denial of incidents and allegations

of malafides against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then

Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah have been made only

to save himself from the contumacious conduct.

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39. Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, the contemnor has

refused to tender apologies for his conduct. His

affidavit in support of stay vacation/modification and

supplementary affidavit do not show any remorse. He

has justified himself again and again, in a loud and

thundering voice.

40. We find that Shri Mahipal Rana the contemnor is

guilty of criminal contempt in intimidation and

threatening Shri Onkar Singh Yadav the then Civil

Judge (Senior Division) Etah in his court on 16.4.2003

and 13.5.2003 and of using loud and indecent

language both in court and in his pleadings in suit No.

515/2002. He was discharged from proceeding of

contempt in Criminal Contempt Petition No. 21/1998

and Criminal Contempt No. 60 of 1998 on his tendering

unconditionally apology on 3.8.1999 and 11.11.2002

respectively. He however did not mend himself and

has rather become more aggressive and disrespectful

to the court. He has virtually become nuisance and

obstruction to the administration of justice at the

Judgeship at Etah. We are satisfied that the repeated

acts of criminal contempt committed by him are of such

nature that these substantially interfere with the due

course of justice. We thus punish him under Section 12

of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, with two months

imprisonment and also impose fine of Rs. 2000/- on

him. In case non-payment of fine he will undergo

further a period of imprisonment of two weeks.

However, the punishment so imposed shall be kept in

abeyance for a period of sixty days to enable the

contemner Shri Rana to approach the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, if so advised.

41. We also direct the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to

take the facts constituted in the complaints of Shri

Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior

Division) Etah, the two earlier contempts referred in

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this judgment, and to draw proceedings against him

for professional misconduct.

42. Under the Rules of this Court, the contemnor shall

not be permitted to appear in courts in the Judgeship

at Etah, until he purges the contempt.

43. The Registrar General shall draw the order and

communicate it to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and

Bar Council of India within a week. The contemnor

shall be taken into custody to serve the sentence

immediately of the sixty days if no restrain order is

passed by the appellate court.”

Rival Contentions:

12.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant before

this Court specifically denied the instances dated 16.4.2003

and 13.5.2003 and further submitted that the appellant had

not even gone to the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior

Division), Etah on the aforestated two days and therefore,

the entire case made out against the appellant was false and

frivolous. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the

High Court had committed an error by not going into the

fact as to whether the appellant had, in fact, attended the

Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on

16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003. The learned counsel further

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submitted that the High Court ought to have considered the

fact that the appellant had filed several complaints against

the learned Judge who was the complainant and therefore,

with an oblique motive the entire contempt proceedings

were initiated against the appellant. The said complaints

ought to have been considered by the High Court. It was

further submitted that contempt proceedings were barred

by limitation. The incidents in question are dated 16

th

April,

2003 and 13

th

May, 2003 while notice was ordered to be

issued on 28

th

April, 2004.

13.The learned counsel, thus, submitted that the action

initiated against the appellant was not just and proper and

the impugned judgment awarding punishment to the

appellant under the Act is bad in law and therefore,

deserved to be set aside. In the alternative, it is submitted

that the appellant was 84 years of age and keeping that in

mind, the sentence for imprisonment may be set aside and

instead, the fine may be increased.

14.On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for

the State of Uttar Pradesh submitted that the impugned

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judgment was just, legal and proper and the same was

delivered after due deliberation and careful consideration of

the relevant facts. He submitted that looking at the facts of

the case, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that

the appellant was not only present in the Court on those

two days i.e. on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003, but the appellant

had also misbehaved and misconducted in such a manner

that his conduct was contemptuous and therefore, the

proceedings under the Act had to be initiated against him.

The learned counsel also drew attention of the Court to the

nature of the allegations made by the appellant against the

learned Judge and about the contemptuous behaviour of

the appellant. The learned counsel also relied upon the

report submitted to the learned District Judge and

submitted that the impugned judgment is just, legal and

proper. He also submitted that the misbehaviour and

contemptuous act of the appellant was unpardonable and

therefore, the High Court had rightly imposed punishment

upon the appellant.

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15.In response to the notice issued by this Court on 20th

August, 2015 in respect of the question framed, the learned

counsel appearing for the Bar Council of India submitted

that Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for a

bar against admission of a person as an advocate if he is

convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, apart

from other situations in which such bar operates. The

proviso however, provides for the bar being lifted after two

years of release. However, the provision did not expressly

provide for removal of an advocate from the roll of the

advocates if conviction takes place after enrollment of a

person as an advocate. Only other relevant provision under

which action could be taken is Section 35 for proved

misconduct. It is further stated that though the High Court

directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to initiate

proceedings for professional misconduct on 2.12.2005, the

consequential action taken by the Bar Council of the State

of Uttar Pradesh was not known. It is further stated that

the term moral turpitude has to be understood having

regard to the nature of the noble profession of law which

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requires a person to possess higher level of integrity. Even

a minor offence could be termed as an offence involving

moral turpitude in the context of an advocate who is

expected to be aware of the legal position and the conduct

expected from him as a citizen is higher than others. It was

further submitted that only the State Bar Council or Bar

Council of India posses the power to punish an advocate for

“professional misconduct” as per the provisions of Section

35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and reiterated the law laid

down by this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association

versus Union of India

1

. In addition, the counsel submitted

that a general direction to all the Courts be given to

communicate about conviction of an advocate for an offence

involving moral turpitude to the concerned State Bar

Council or the Bar Council of India immediately upon

delivering the judgment of conviction so that proceedings

against such advocates can be initiated under the Advocates

Act, 1961.

16. The Learned Additional Solicitor General of India

appearing on behalf of Union of India, submitted that

1

(1998) 4 SCC 409

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normally in case of all professions, the apex body of the

professionals takes action against the erring professional

and in case of legal profession, the Bar Council of India

takes disciplinary action and punishes the concerned

advocate if he is guilty of any misconduct etc. Reference was

made to Architects Act, 1972, Chartered Accountants Act,

1949, Company Secretaries Act, 1980, Pharmacy Practice

Regulations, 2015, Indian Medical Council (Professional

Conduct Etiquettes and Ethics) Regulations, 2002, National

Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, Cost and Works

Accountants Act, 1959, Actuaries Act, 2006, Gujarat

Professional Civil Engineers Act, 2006, Representation of

Peoples Act, 1951, containing provisions for disqualifying a

person from continuing in a regulated profession upon

conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude.

Reference was also made to Section 24A of the Advocates

Act which provides for a bar on enrolment as an advocate of

a person who has committed any offence involving moral

turpitude. It was further submitted that if a person is

disqualified from enrolment, it could not be the intention of

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the legislature to permit a person already enrolled as an

advocate to continue him in practice if he is convicted of an

offence involving moral turpitude. Bar against enrolment

should also be deemed to be bar against continuation. It

was further submitted that Article 145 of the Constitution

empowers the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating

practice and procedure including the persons practicing

before this Court. Section 34 of the Advocates Act

empowers the High Courts to frame rules laying down the

conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to

practice in courts. Thus, there is no absolute right of an

advocate to appear in court. Appearance before Court is

subject to such conditions as are laid down by this Court or

the High Court. An Advocate could be debarred from

appearing before the Court even if the disciplinary

jurisdiction for misconduct was vested with the Bar Council

as laid down in Supreme Court Bar Association (supra)

and as further clarified in Pravin C. Shah versus K.A.

Mohd. Ali

2

, Ex-Captain Harish Uppal versus Union of

India

3

, Bar Council of India versus High Court of

2

(2001) 8 SCC 650

3

(2003) 2 SCC 45

Page 20 20

Kerala

4

and R.K. Anand versus Registrar, Delhi High

Court

5

. Thus, according to the counsel, apart from the Bar

Council taking appropriate action against the appellant, this

Court could debar him from appearance before any court.

17.Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel and

President of the Supreme Court Bar Association supported

the interpretation canvassed by the learned Additional

Solicitor General. He submitted that image of the profession

ought to be kept clean by taking strict action against

persons failing to maintain ethical standards.

18.We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties and have perused the judgments cited by them.

Consideration of the questions

We may now consider the questions posed for consideration:

Re: (i)

19.Upon going through the impugned judgment, we are of

the view that no error has been committed by the High

4

(2004) 6 SCC 311

5

(2009) 8 SCC 106

Page 21 21

Court while coming to the conclusion that the appellant had

committed contempt of Court under the provisions of the

Act.

20.We do not agree with the submissions of the learned

counsel for the appellant that the appellant did not appear

on those two days before the Court. Upon perusal of the

facts found by the High Court and looking at the contents of

the letters written by the concerned judicial officers, we

have no doubt about the fact that the appellant did appear

before the Court and used the language which was

contemptuous in nature.

21.So far as the allegations made by the appellant with

regard to the complaints made by him against the

complainant judge, after having held that the appellant had

appeared before the Court and had made contemptuous

statements, we are of the opinion that those averments

regarding the complaints are irrelevant. The averments

regarding the complaints cannot be a defence for the

appellant. Even if we assume those averments about the

complaints to be correct, then also, the appellant cannot

Page 22 22

use such contemptuous language in the Court against the

presiding Judge.

22.There is no merit in the contention of the appellant

that there was delay on the part of the complainant Judge

in sending the reference and he could have tried the

appellant under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and

the procedure prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure.

It is for the learned judge to decide as to whether action

should be taken under the Act or under any other law.

23.The High Court has rightly convicted the appellant

under the Act after having come to a conclusion that denial

of the incidents and allegations of malafides against the

complainant Judge had been made by the appellant to save

himself from the consequences of contempt proceedings.

The appellant had refused to tender apology for his conduct.

His affidavit in support of stay vacation/modification and

supplementary affidavit did not show any remorse and he

had justified himself again and again, which also shows that

he had no regards for the majesty of law.

Page 23 23

24.It is a well settled proposition of law that in deciding

whether contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment,

the Court will take into account the likelihood of

interference with the administration of justice and the

culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act

complained of is done is a material factor in determining

what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate. In

the case at hand, the High Court has rightly held that the

appellant was guilty of criminal contempt. We are however,

inclined to set aside the sentence for imprisonment in view

of advance age of the appellant and also in the light of our

further direction as a result of findings of question No. (ii)

Re: (ii)

Court’s jurisdiction vis a vis statutory powers of the Bar

Councils

25.This Court, while examining its powers under Article

129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution with regard to

awarding sentence of imprisonment together with

suspension of his practice as an Advocate, in Supreme

Court Bar Association (supra), the Constitution Bench

held that while in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, this

Page 24 24

Court cannot take over jurisdiction of disciplinary

committee of the Bar Council

6

and it is for the Bar Council

to punish the advocate by debarring him from practice or

suspending his licence as may be warranted on the basis of

his having been found guilty of contempt, if the Bar Council

fails to take action, this Court could invoke its appellate

power under Section 38 of the Advocates Act

7

. In a given

case, this court or the High Court can prevent the

contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts

till he purges himself of the contempt which is different from

suspending or revoking the licence or debarring him to

practise

8

.

26.Reference may be made to the following observations

in SCBA case (supra):

“79. An advocate who is found guilty of contempt of

court may also, as already noticed, be guilty of

professional misconduct in a given case but it is for

the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India to

punish that advocate by either debarring him from

practice or suspending his licence, as may be

warranted, in the facts and circumstances of each

case. The learned Solicitor General informed us that

there have been cases where the Bar Council of India

6

Paras 43, 57, 78

7

Para 79

8

Para 80

Page 25 25

taking note of the contumacious and objectionable

conduct of an advocate, had initiated disciplinary

proceedings against him and even punished him for

“professional misconduct”, on the basis of his having

been found guilty of committing contempt of court. We

do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the

State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be,

when apprised of the established contumacious

conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by this

Court, would rise to the occasion, and take

appropriate action against such an advocate. Under

Article 144 of the Constitution “all authorities, civil and

judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the

Supreme Court”. The Bar Council which performs a

public duty and is charged with the obligation to

protect the dignity of the profession and maintain

professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to

act “in aid of the Supreme Court”. It must, whenever

facts warrant, rise to the occasion and discharge its

duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner

advocate. It must act in accordance with the

prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn

by this Court to the contumacious and unbecoming

conduct of an advocate which has the tendency to

interfere with due administration of justice. It is

possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention

of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional

misconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the

State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed

by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There is

no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would

not rise to the occasion, as they are equally

responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the

majesty of law and prevent any interference in the

administration of justice. Learned counsel for the

parties present before us do not dispute and rightly so

that whenever a court of record records its findings

about the conduct of an advocate while finding him

guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or

refers the matter to be considered by the Bar Council

Page 26 26

concerned, appropriate action should be initiated by

the Bar Council concerned in accordance with law

with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and

to uphold the majesty of law and professional

standards and etiquette. Nothing is more destructive

of public confidence in the administration of justice

than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful conduct on

the part of a counsel towards the court or disregard by

the court of the privileges of the Bar. In case the Bar

Council, even after receiving “reference” from the

Court, fails to take action against the advocate

concerned, this Court might consider invoking its

powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for the

record of the proceedings from the Bar Council and

passing appropriate orders. Of course, the appellate

powers under Section 38 would be available to this

Court only and not to the High Courts. We, however,

hope that such a situation would not arise.

80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court

or the High Court, to prevent the contemner advocate

to appear before it till he purges himself of the

contempt but that is much different from suspending

or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise as

an advocate. In a case of contemptuous,

contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of

an Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses

jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to

withdraw his privilege to practice as an

Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred

by this Court and the power to grant the privilege

includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The

withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not

amount to suspending or revoking his licence to

practice as an advocate in other courts or tribunals.

81. We are conscious of the fact that the conduct of

the contemner in V.C. Mishra case [(1995) 2 SCC 584]

was highly contumacious and even atrocious. It was

unpardonable. The contemner therein had abused his

Page 27 27

professional privileges while practising as an

advocate. He was holding a very senior position in the

Bar Council of India and was expected to act in a

more reasonable way. He did not. These factors

appear to have influenced the Bench in that case to

itself punish him by suspending his licence to practice

also while imposing a suspended sentence of

imprisonment for committing contempt of court but

while doing so this Court vested itself with a

jurisdiction where none exists. The position would

have been different had a reference been made to the

Bar Council and the Bar Council did not take any

action against the advocate concerned. In that event,

as already observed, this Court in exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read

with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, might

have exercised suo motu powers and sent for the

proceedings from the Bar Council and passed

appropriate orders for punishing the contemner

advocate for professional misconduct after putting him

on notice as required by the proviso to Section 38

which reads thus:

“Provided that no order of the Disciplinary

Committee of the Bar Council of India shall be

varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially

affect the person aggrieved without giving him a

reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

But it could not have done so in the first instance.”

27.In Pravin C. Shah (supra) this Court held that an

advocate found guilty of contempt cannot be allowed to act

or plead in any court till he purges himself of contempt.

This direction was issued having regard to Rule 11 of the

Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section 34

Page 28 28

(1) of the Advocates Act and also referring to observations in

para 80 of the judgment of this Court in Supreme Court

Bar Association (supra). It was explained that debarring a

person from appearing in Court was within the purview of

the jurisdiction of the Court and was different from

suspending or terminating the licence which could be done

by the Bar Council and on failure of the Bar Council, in

exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The

observations are:

16. Rule 11 of the Rules is not a provision intended for

the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the

State or the Bar Council of India. It is a matter entirely

concerning the dignity and the orderly functioning of

the courts. The right of the advocate to practise

envelops a lot of acts to be performed by him in

discharge of his professional duties. Apart from

appearing in the courts he can be consulted by his

clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought

for, he can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or

any other documents, he can participate in any

conference involving legal discussions etc. Rule 11 has

nothing to do with all the acts done by an advocate

during his practice except his performance inside the

court. Conduct in court is a matter concerning the court

and hence the Bar Council cannot claim that what

should happen inside the court could also be regulated

by the Bar Council in exercise of its disciplinary

powers. The right to practise, no doubt, is the genus of

which the right to appear and conduct cases in the

court may be a specie. But the right to appear and

conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the

Page 29 29

court must have the major supervisory power. Hence

the court cannot be divested of the control or

supervision of the court merely because it may involve

the right of an advocate.

17. When the Rules stipulate that a person who

committed contempt of court cannot have the

unreserved right to continue to appear and plead and

conduct cases in the courts without any qualm or

remorse, the Bar Council cannot overrule such a

regulation concerning the orderly conduct of court

proceedings. Courts of law are structured in such a

design as to evoke respect and reverence for the

majesty of law and justice. The machinery for

dispensation of justice according to law is operated by

the court. Proceedings inside the courts are always

expected to be held in a dignified and orderly manner.

The very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty

of contempt of court on the previous hour, standing in

the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a

witness on the same day, unaffected by the

contemptuous behaviour he hurled at the court, would

erode the dignity of the court and even corrode the

majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the

public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts.

This necessitates vesting of power with the High Court

to formulate rules for regulating the proceedings inside

the court including the conduct of advocates during

such proceedings. That power should not be confused

with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council

can exercise control over the latter, the High Court

should be in control of the former.

18. In the above context it is useful to quote the

following observations made by a Division Bench of

the Allahabad High Court in Prayag Das v. Civil

Judge, Bulandshahr {AIR 1974 All 133] : (AIR p. 136,

para 9)

Page 30 30

“The High Court has a power to regulate the

appearance of advocates in courts. The right to

practise and the right to appear in courts are not

synonymous. An advocate may carry on chamber

practice or even practise in courts in various other

ways, e.g., drafting and filing of pleadings and

vakalatnama for performing those acts. For that

purpose his physical appearance in courts may

not at all be necessary. For the purpose of

regulating his appearance in courts the High Court

should be the appropriate authority to make rules

and on a proper construction of Section 34(1) of

the Advocates Act it must be inferred that the High

Court has the power to make rules for regulating

the appearance of advocates and proceedings

inside the courts. Obviously the High Court is the

only appropriate authority to be entrusted with

this responsibility.”

xxxxx

24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable

element is expelled either from one’s own self or from

a society. It is a cleaning process. Purge is a word

which acquired implications first in theological

connotations. In the case of a sin, purging of such sin

is made through the expression of sincere remorse

coupled with doing the penance required. In the case

of a guilt, purging means to get himself cleared of the

guilt. The concept of purgatory was evolved from the

word “purge”, which is a state of suffering after this

life in which those souls, who depart this life with

their deadly sins, are purified and rendered fit to enter

into heaven where nothing defiled enters (vide Words

and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 307). In

Black’s Law Dictionary the word “purge” is given the

following meaning: “To cleanse; to clear. To clear or

exonerate from some charge or imputation of guilt, or

from a contempt.” It is preposterous to suggest that if

the convicted person undergoes punishment or if he

Page 31 31

tenders the fine amount imposed on him the purge

would be completed.

xxxxx

27. We cannot therefore approve the view that merely

undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is

sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of

the contempt, particularly in a case where the

contemnor is convicted of criminal contempt. The

danger in giving accord to the said view of the learned

Single Judge in the aforecited decision is that if a

contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediately

pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same

court, and then again pay the fine and persist with his

contemptuous conduct. There must be something more

to be done to get oneself purged of the contempt when

it is a case of criminal contempt.

28. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of

India highlighted the absence of any mode of purging

oneself of the guilt in any of the Rules as a reason for

not following the interdict contained in Rule 11. Merely

because the Rules did not prescribe the mode of

purging oneself of the guilt it does not mean that one

cannot purge the guilt at all. The first thing to be done

in that direction when a contemnor is found guilty of a

criminal contempt is to implant or infuse in his own

mind real remorse about his conduct which the court

found to have amounted to contempt of court. Next

step is to seek pardon from the court concerned for

what he did on the ground that he really and

genuinely repented and that he has resolved not to

commit any such act in future. It is not enough that he

tenders an apology. The apology tendered should

impress the court to be genuine and sincere. If the

court, on being impressed of his genuineness, accepts

the apology then it could be said that the contemnor

has purged himself of the guilt.”

Page 32 32

28.In Bar Council of India versus High Court of

Kerala

9

, constitutionality of Rule 11 of the Rules framed

by the High Court of Kerala for barring a lawyer from

appearing in any court till he got himself purged of

contempt by an appropriate order of the court was

examined. This Court held that the rule did not violate

Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution nor amounted

to usurpation of power of adjudication and punishment

conferred on the Bar Councils and the result intended by

the application of the rule was automatic. It was further

held that the rule was not in conflict with the law laid down

in the SCBA judgment (supra) . Referring to the

Constitution Bench judgment in Harish Uppal (supra), it

was held that regulation of right of appearance in courts

was within the jurisdiction of the courts. It was observed,

following Pravin C. Shah (supra), that the court must have

major supervisory power on the right to appear and conduct

in the court. The observations are:

“46. Before a contemner is punished for contempt, the

court is bound to give an opportunity of hearing to him.

Even such an opportunity of hearing is necessary in a

9

(2004) 6 SCC 311

Page 33 33

proceeding under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. But if a law which is otherwise valid

provides for the consequences of such a finding, the

same by itself would not be violative of Article 14 of

the Constitution of India inasmuch as only because

another opportunity of hearing to a person, where a

penalty is provided for as a logical consequence

thereof, has been provided for. Even under the penal

laws some offences carry minimum sentence. The

gravity of such offences, thus, is recognised by the

legislature. The courts do not have any role to play in

such a matter.”

29.Reference was also made to the following observations

in Harish Uppal (supra):

“34………The right to practise, no doubt, is the genus

of which the right to appear and conduct cases in the

court may be a specie. But the right to appear and

conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the

court must and does have major supervisory and

controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not

divested of control or supervision of conduct in court

merely because it may involve the right of an

advocate. A rule can stipulate that a person who has

committed contempt of court or has behaved

unprofessionally and in an unbecoming manner will

not have the right to continue to appear and plead and

conduct cases in courts. The Bar Councils cannot

overrule such a regulation concerning the orderly

conduct of court proceedings. On the contrary, it will

be their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided

by. Courts of law are structured in such a design as to

evoke respect and reverence to the majesty of law and

justice. The machinery for dispensation of justice

according to law is operated by the court. Proceedings

inside the courts are always expected to be held in a

dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an

advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of

Page 34 34

unbecoming or unprofessional conduct, standing in the

court would erode the dignity of the court and even

corrode its majesty besides impairing the confidence of

the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts.

The power to frame such rules should not be confused

with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council

can exercise control over the latter, the courts are in

control of the former. This distinction is clearly brought

out by the difference in language in Section 49 of the

Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145 of the

Constitution of India and Section 34(1) of the

Advocates Act on the other. Section 49 merely

empowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying down

conditions subject to which an advocate shall have a

right to practise i.e. do all the other acts set out above.

However, Article 145 of the Constitution of India

empowers the Supreme Court to make rules for

regulating this practice and procedure of the court

including inter alia rules as to persons practising

before this Court. Similarly Section 34 of the

Advocates Act empowers High Courts to frame rules,

inter alia to lay down conditions on which an advocate

shall be permitted to practise in courts. Article 145 of

the Constitution of India and Section 34 of the

Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute

right to an advocate to appear in a court. An advocate

appears in a court subject to such conditions as are

laid down by the court. It must be remembered that

Section 30 has not been brought into force and this

also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in

a court. Even if Section 30 were to be brought into

force control of proceedings in court will always

remain with the court. Thus even then the right to

appear in court will be subject to complying with

conditions laid down by courts just as practice outside

courts would be subject to conditions laid down by the

Bar Council of India. There is thus no conflict or clash

between other provisions of the Advocates Act on the

one hand and Section 34 or Article 145 of the

Constitution of India on the other.”

Page 35 35

30.In R.K. Anand (supra) it was held that even if there

was no rule framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act

disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal

contempt is not only a measure to maintain dignity and

orderly function of courts, it may become necessary for the

protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of

court proceedings. Thus, the court not only has a right but

also an obligation to protect itself and save the purity of its

proceedings from being polluted, by barring the advocate

concerned from appearing before the courts for an

appropriate period of time

10

. This court noticed the

observations about the decline of ethical and professional

standards of the Bar, and need to arrest such trend in the

interests of administration of justice. It was observed that

in absence of unqualified trust and confidence of people in

the bar, the judicial system could not work satisfactorily.

Further observations are that the performance of the Bar

Councils in maintaining professional standards and

enforcing discipline did not match its achievements in other

10

Paras 238, 239, 242

Page 36 36

areas. This Court expressed hope and expected that the

Bar Council will take appropriate action for the restoration

of high professional standards among the lawyers, working

of their position in the judicial system and the society. It

was further observed:

“331. The other important issue thrown up by this

case and that causes us both grave concern and

dismay is the decline of ethical and professional

standards among lawyers. The conduct of the two

appellants (one convicted of committing criminal

contempt of court and the other found guilty of

misconduct as Special Public Prosecutor), both of them

lawyers of long standing, and designated Senior

Advocates, should not be seen in isolation. The bitter

truth is that the facts of the case are manifestation of

the general erosion of the professional values among

lawyers at all levels. We find today lawyers indulging

in practices that would have appalled their

predecessors in the profession barely two or three

decades ago. Leaving aside the many kinds of

unethical practices indulged in by a section of

lawyers we find that even some highly successful

lawyers seem to live by their own rules of conduct.

xxxxxxxx

333. We express our concern on the falling

professional norms among the lawyers with

considerable pain because we strongly feel that

unless the trend is immediately arrested and

reversed, it will have very deleterious consequences

for the administration of justice in the country. No

judicial system in a democratic society can work

satisfactorily unless it is supported by a Bar that

enjoys the unqualified trust and confidence of the

Page 37 37

people, that shares the aspirations, hopes and the

ideals of the people and whose members are

monetarily accessible and affordable to the people.

xxxxxxxx

335. Here we must also observe that the Bar Council

of India and the Bar Councils of the different States

cannot escape their responsibility in this regard.

Indeed the Bar Council(s) have very positively taken

up a number of important issues concerning the

administration of justice in the country. It has

consistently fought to safeguard the interests of

lawyers and it has done a lot of good work for their

welfare. But on the issue of maintaining high

professional standards and enforcing discipline

among lawyers its performance hardly matches its

achievements in other areas. It has not shown much

concern even to see that lawyers should observe the

statutory norms prescribed by the Council itself. We

hope and trust that the Council will at least now sit

up and pay proper attention to the restoration of the

high professional standards among lawyers worthy

of their position in the judicial system and in the

society.”

31.In Re: Sanjiv Dutta & Ors.

11

, it was observed that the

members of legal profession are required to maintain

exemplary conduct in and outside of the Court. The respect

for the legal system was due to role played by the stalwarts

of the legal profession and if there was any deviation in the

said role, not only the profession but also the

11

(1995) 3 SCC 619

Page 38 38

administration of justice as a whole would suffer. In this

regard, relevant observations are :

“20. The legal profession is a solemn and serious

occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who

belong to it are its honourable members. Although the

entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely

the qualification of technical competence, the honour as

a professional has to be maintained by the its members

by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the

court. The legal profession is different from other

professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not

only an individual but the administration of justice

which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both as

a leading member of the intelligential of the society and

as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct

himself as a model for others both in his professional

and in his private and public life. The society has a

right to expect of him such ideal behavior. It must not be

forgotten that the legal profession has always been

held in high esteem and its members have played an

enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and

judicial systems in this country is in no small measure

due to the tiredness role played by the stalwarts in the

profession to strengthen them. They took their

profession seriously and practised it with dignity,

deference and devotion. If the profession is to survive,

the judicial system has to be vitalised. No service will

be too small in making the system efficient, effective

and credible. The casualness and indifference with

which some members practise the profession are

certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to

enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the

institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in

the profession on account of the deviant ways of some

of its members, it is not only the profession which will

suffer but also the administration of justice as a whole.

The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a

stage when the system will be found wrecked from

Page 39 39

within before it is wrecked from outside. It is for the

members of the profession to introspect and take the

corrective steps in time and also spare the courts the

unpleasant duty. We say no more.”

32.In Bar Council of Maharashtra versus M.V.

Dabholkar

12

following observations have been made about

the vital role of the lawyer in administration of justice.

“15. Now to the legal issue bearing on canons of

professional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built

on the ruins of democracy, for where law ends

tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the

very survival of our Republic, the integral bond

between the lawyer and the public is unbreakable.

And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon (his

probity and professional life style. Be it remembered

that the central function of the legal profession is to

promote the administration of justice. If the practice of

law is thus a public utility of great implications and a

monopoly is statutorily granted by the nation, it

obligates the lawyer to observe scrupulously those

norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the

community in him as a vehicle of justice-social justice.

The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive

to thrive on litigation. Canons of conduct cannot be

crystallised into rigid rules but felt by the collective

conscience of the practitioners as right:

It must be a conscience alive to the proprieties and the

improprieties incident to the discharge of a sacred

public trust. It must be a conscience governed by the

rejection of self-interest and selfish ambition. It must

be a conscience propelled by a consuming desire to

play a leading role in the fair and impartial

administration of justice. to the end that public

12

(1976) 2 SCC 291

Page 40 40

confidence may be kept undiminished at all times in

the belief that we shall always seek truth and justice

in the preservation of the rule of law. It must be a

conscience, not shaped by rigid rules of doubtful

validity, but answerable only to a moral code which

would drive irresponsible judges from the profession.

Without such a conscience, there should be no judge.

and, we may add, no lawyer.

Such is the high standard set for professional conduct

as expounded by courts in this country and

elsewhere.”

33.In Jaswant Singh versus Virender Singh

13

, it was

observed :

“36. …………. An advocate has no wider protection

than a layman when he commits an act which

amounts to contempt of court. It is most unbefitting for

an advocate to make imputations against the Judge

only because he does not get the expected result,

which according to him is the fair and reasonable

result available to him. Judges cannot be intimidated

to seek favorable orders. Only because a lawyer

appears as a party in person, he does not get a license

thereby to commit contempt of the Court by

intimidating the Judges or scandalising the courts. He

cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during

arguments, which is either intemperate or

unparliamentary. These safeguards are not for the

protection of any Judge individually but are essential

for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the Courts

and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and

courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and

reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments,

even if, out-spoken, but made without any malice or

attempting to impair the administration of justice and

made in good faith in proper language do not attract

13

1995 Supp.(1) SCC 384

Page 41 41

any punishment for contempt of court. However, when

from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and

calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the

image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to

impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the

administration of justice into disrepute the courts must

bistre themselves to uphold their dignity and the

majesty of law. The appellant, has, undoubtedly

committed contempt of the Court by the use of the

objectionable and intemperate language. No system of

justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part

of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit himself the

liberty of scandalising a Court by casting unwarranted,

uncalled for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity,

ability, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the

discharge of his judicial functions as it amounts to an

interference with the dues course of administration of

justice.”

34.In Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India

14

, it was

observed :

“188. The number of similar litigants, as the parties in

this group of cases, is on the increase. They derive their

strength from abuse of the legal process. Counsel are

available, if the litigant is willing to pay their fee. Their

percentage is slightly higher at the lower levels of the

judicial hierarchy, and almost non-existent at the level

of the Supreme Court. One wonders what is it that a

Judge should be made of, to deal with such litigants

who have nothing to lose. What is the level of merit, grit

and composure required to stand up to the pressures of

today’s litigants? What is it that is needed to bear the

affront, scorn and ridicule hurled at officers presiding

over courts? Surely one would need superhumans to

handle the emerging pressures on the judicial system.

The resultant duress is gruelling. One would hope for

support for officers presiding over courts from the legal

14

(2014) 8 SCC 470

Page 42 42

fraternity, as also, from the superior judiciary up to the

highest level. Then and only then, will it be possible to

maintain equilibrium essential to deal with complicated

disputations which arise for determination all the time

irrespective of the level and the stature of the court

concerned. And also, to deal with such litigants.”

35.In Amit Chanchal Jha versus Registar, High Court

of Delhi

15

this Court again upheld the order of debarring

the advocate from appearing in court on account of his

conviction for criminal contempt.

36.We may also refer to certain articles on the subject. In

“Raising the Bar for the Legal Profession” published in the

Hindu newspaper dated 15

th

September, 2012, Dr.

N.R.Madhava Menon wrote:

“……..Being a private monopoly, the profession is

organised like a pyramid in which the top 20 per cent

command 80 per cent of paying work, the middle 30 per

cent managing to survive by catering to the needs of the

middle class and government litigation, while the

bottom 50 per cent barely survive with legal aid cases

and cases managed through undesirable and

exploitative methods! Given the poor quality of legal

education in the majority of the so-called law colleges

(over a thousand of them working in small towns and

panchayats without infrastructure and competent

faculty), what happened with uncontrolled expansion

was the overcrowding of ill-equipped lawyers in the

bottom 50 per cent of the profession fighting for a piece

of the cake. In the process, being too numerous, the

middle and the bottom segments got elected to

15

(2015) 13 SCC 288

Page 43 43

professional bodies which controlled the management

of the entire profession. The so-called leaders of the

profession who have abundant work, unlimited money,

respect and influence did not bother to look into what

was happening to the profession and allowed it to go its

way — of inefficiency, strikes, boycotts and public

ridicule. This is the tragedy of the Indian Bar today

which had otherwise a noble tradition of being in the

forefront of the freedom struggle and maintaining the

rule of law and civil liberties even in difficult times.

37.In “Browbeating, prerogative of lawyers”, published in

the Hindu newspaper dated 7

th

June, 2016, Shri S.

Prabhakaran, Co-Chairman of Bar Council of India and

Senior Advocate, in response to another Article “Do not

browbeat lawyers”, published in the said newspaper on

June 03, 2016, writes :

“……The next argument advanced against the rules is

that the threat of action for browbeating the judges is

intended to silence the lawyers. But the authors have

forgotten very conveniently that (i) when rallies and

processions were taken out inside court halls

obstructing the proceedings, (ii) when courts were

boycotted for all and sundry reasons in violation of the

law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ex-Capt.

Harish Uppal, (iii) when two instances of murder of

very notorious lawyers inside the Egmore court

complex took place on the eve of elections to the Bar

Associations, (iv) when a lady litigant who came to the

Family Court in Chennai was physically assaulted by

a group of lawyers who also coerced the police to

register a complaint against the victim, (v) when a

group of lawyers barged into the chamber of a

Page 44 44

magistrate in Puducherry and wrongfully confined him

till he released a lawyer on his own bond in a criminal

complaint of sexual assault filed by a lady, (vi) when a

group of lawyers gheraoed a magistrate for not

granting bail and one of them spat on his face, leading

to strong protests by the Association of Judicial

Officers, and (vii) when very recently, a lady litigant

was physically assaulted by a group of lawyers for

sitting in the chair intended for lawyers inside the

court hall, lawyers such as the authors of the article

under response maintained a stoic silence.

Even lawyers who claim to be human rights activists

choose to be silent when the human rights of millions

of litigants are affected by boycott of courts. It shows

that some lawyers, like the authors of the article under

response, have always maintained silence and do not

mind being silenced by a few unruly members of the

Bar who go on the rampage at times. But they do not

want to be silenced by any rule prescribing a decent

code of conduct in court halls. The raison d'être

appears to be that browbeating is the prerogative of

the lawyers and it shall be allowed with impunity.”

Undesirability of convicted person to perform important

public functions:

38.It may also be appropriate to refer to the legal position

about undesirability of a convicted person being allowed to

perform important public functions. In Union of India

versus Tulsiram Patel

16

it was observed that it was not

advisable to retain a person in civil service after

conviction.

17

. In Rama Narang versus Ramesh Narang

18

16

(1985) 3 SCC 398

17

Para 153

18

(1995) 2 SCC 513

Page 45 45

reference was made to Section 267 of the Companies Act

barring a convicted person from holding the post of a

Managing Director in a company. This Court observed that

having regard to the said wholesome provision, stay of

conviction ought to be granted only in rare cases. In Lily

Thomas versus UOI

19

, this Court held that an elected

representative could not continue to hold the office after

conviction

20

. In Manoj Narula versus UOI

21

similar

observation was made. In Election Commission versus

Venkata Rao

22

the disqualification against eligibility for

contesting election was held to operate for continuing on the

elected post.

Interpretation of Section 24-A: Need to amend the

provision

39.Section 24A of the Advocates Act is as follows:

“24A. Disqualification for enrolment.—

(1) No person shall be admitted as an advocate on a

State roll—

(a) if he is convicted of an offence involving moral

turpitude;

(b) if he is convicted of an offence under the provisions

of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 (22 of 1955);

2[(c) if he is dismissed or removed from employment or

19

(2013) 7 SCC 653

20

Para 28.

21

(2014) 9 SCC 1

22

AIR 1953 SC 210

Page 46 46

office under the State on any charge involving moral

turpitude. Explanation.—In this clause, the expression

“State” shall have the meaning assigned to it under

Article 12 of the Constitution:] Provided that the

disqualification for enrolment as aforesaid shall cease

to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed

since his 3[release or dismissal or, as the case may

be, removal.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to

a person who having been found guilty is dealt with

under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act,

1958 (20 of 1958).”

40.Dealing with the above provision, the Division Bench of

the Gujarat High Court in C. versus Bar Council

23

observed:

“2. … …. …. We, however, wish to avail of this

opportunity to place on record our feeling of distress

and dismay at the fact that a public servant who is

found guilty of an offence of taking an illegal

gratification in the discharge of his official duties by a

competent Court can be enrolled as a member of the

Bar even after a lapse of two years from the date of his

release from imprisonment. It is for the authorities who

are concerned with this question to reflect on the

question as to whether such a provision is in keeping

with the high stature which the profession (which we

so often describe as the noble profession) enjoys and

from which even the members of highest judiciary are

drawn. It is not a crime of passion committed in a

moment of loss of equilibrium. Corruption is an offence

which is committed after deliberation and it becomes a

way of life for him.

23

(1982) 2 GLR 706

Page 47 47

3. A corrupt apple cannot become a good apple with

passage of time. It is for the legal profession to

consider whether it would like such a provision to

continue to remain on the Statute Book and would like

to continue to adroit persons who have been convicted

for offences involving moral turpitude and persons who

have been found guilty of acceptance of illegal

gratification, rape, dacoits, forgery, misappropriation of

public funds, relating to counter felt currency and coins

and other offences of like nature to be enrolled as

members merely because two years have elapsed after

the date of their release from imprisonment. Does

passage of 2 years cleanse such a person of the

corrupt character trait, purify his mind and transform

him into a person fit for being enrolled as a member of

this noble profession? Enrolled so that widows can go

to him, matters pertaining to properties of minors and

matters on behalf of workers pitted against rich and

influential persons can be entrusted to him without

qualms. Court records can be placed at his disposal,

his word at the Bar should be accepted? Should a

character certificate in the form of a Black Gown be

given to him so that a promise of probity and

trustworthiness is held out to the unwary litigants

seeking justice? A copy of this order may, therefore, be

sent to the appropriate authorities concerned with the

administration of the Bar Council of India and the State

Bar Council, Ministry of Law of the Government of

India and Law Commission in order that the matter

maybe examined fully and closely with the end in view

to preserve the image of the profession and protect the

seekers for justice from dangers inherent in admitting

such persons on the rolls of the Bar Council.”

41.Inspite of the above observations no action appears to

have been taken at any level. The result is that a person

convicted of even a most heinous offence is eligible to be

Page 48 48

enrolled as an advocate after expiry of two years from expiry

of his sentence. This aspect needs urgent attention of all

concerned.

42.Apart from the above, we do not find any reason to

hold that the bar applicable at the entry level is wiped out

after the enrollment. Having regard to the object of the

provision, the said bar certainly operates post enrollment

also. However, till a suitable amendment is made, the bar is

operative only for two years in terms of the statutory

provision.

43.In these circumstances, Section 24A which debars a

convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate

on the rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if

convicted for contempt.

44.In addition to the said disqualification, in view

judgment of this Court in R.K. Anand (supra), unless a

person purges himself of contempt or is permitted by the

Court, conviction results in debarring an advocate from

appearing in court even in absence of suspension or

termination of the licence to practice. We therefore, uphold

Page 49 49

the directions of the High Court in para 42 of the impugned

order quoted above to the effect that the appellant shall not

be permitted to appear in courts of District Etah until he

purges himself of contempt.

Inaction of the Bar Councils – Nature of directions

required

45.We may now come to the direction to be issued to the

Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh or to the Bar Council of India.

In the present case, inspite of direction of the High Court as

long back as more than ten years, no action is shown to

have been taken by the Bar Council. Notice was issued by

this Court to the Bar Council of India on 27

th

January, 2006

and after all the facts having been brought to the notice of

the Bar Council of India, the said Bar Council has also

failed to take any action. In view of such failure of the

statutory obligation of the Bar Council of the State of Uttar

Pradesh as well as the Bar Council of India, this Court has

to exercise appellate jurisdiction under the Advocates Act in

view of proved misconduct calling for disciplinary action. As

already observed, in SCBA case (supra) , this Court

observed that where the Bar Council fails to take action

Page 50 50

inspite of reference made to it, this Court can exercise suo

motu powers for punishing the contemnor for professional

misconduct. The appellant has already been given sufficient

opportunity in this regard.

46. We may add that what is permissible for this Court by

virtue of statutory appellate power under Section 38 of the

Advocates Act is also permissible to a High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution in appropriate cases on

failure of the Bar Council to take action after its attention is

invited to the misconduct.

47.Thus, apart from upholding the conviction and

sentence awarded by the High Court to the appellant, except

for the imprisonment, the appellant will suffer automatic

consequence of his conviction under Section 24A of the

Advocates Act which is applicable at the post enrollment

stage also as already observed.

48.Further, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under

Section 38 of the Advocates Act, we direct that the licence of

the appellant will stand suspended for a further period of

five years. He will also remain debarred from appearing in

Page 51 51

any court in District Etah even after five years unless he

purges himself of contempt in the manner laid down by this

Court in Bar Council of India (supra) and R.K. Anand

(supra) and as directed by the High Court. Question (ii)

stands decided accordingly.

49.We thus, conclude:

(i)Conviction of the appellant is justified and is

upheld;

(ii)Sentence of imprisonment awarded to the

appellant is set aside in view of his advanced age

but sentence of fine and default sentence are

upheld. Further direction that the appellant shall

not be permitted to appear in courts in District

Etah until he purges himself of contempt is also

upheld;

(iii)Under Section 24A of the Advocates Act, the

enrollment of the appellant will stand suspended

for two years from the date of this order;

Page 52 52

(iv)As a disciplinary measure for proved misconduct,

the licence of the appellant will remain

suspended for further five years.

An Epilogue

50.While this appeal will stand disposed of in the manner

indicated above, we do feel it necessary to say something

further in continuation of repeated observations earlier

made by this Court referred to above. Legal profession

being the most important component of justice delivery

system, it must continue to perform its significant role and

regulatory mechanism and should not be seen to be wanting

in taking prompt action against any malpractice. We have

noticed the inaction of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh as

well as the Bar Council of India inspite of direction in the

impugned order of the High Court and inspite of notice to

the Bar Council of India by this Court. We have also

noticed the failure of all concerned to advert to the

observations made by the Gujarat High Court 33 years ago.

Thus there appears to be urgent need to review the

provisions of the Advocates Act dealing with regulatory

Page 53 53

mechanism for the legal profession and other incidental

issues, in consultation with all concerned.

51. In a recent judgment of this Court in Modern Dental

College and Research Centre versus State of M.P. in

Civil Appeal No.4060 of 2009 dated 2

nd

May, 2016, while

directing review of regulatory mechanism for the medical

profession, this court observed that there is need to review

of the regulatory mechanism of the other professions as

well. The relevant observations are:

“There is perhaps urgent need to review the regulatory

mechanism for other service oriented professions also.

We do hope this issue will receive attention of

concerned authorities, including the Law Commission,

in due course.”

52.In view of above, we request the Law Commission of

India to go into all relevant aspects relating to regulation of

legal profession in consultation with all concerned at an

early date. We hope the Government of India will consider

taking further appropriate steps in the light of report of the

Law Commission within six months thereafter. The Central

Government may file an appropriate affidavit in this regard

within one month after expiry of one year.

Page 54 54

53.To consider any further direction in the light of

developments that may take place, put up the matter for

further consideration one month after expiry of the period of

one year.

……………………………… J.

(ANIL R. DAVE)

……………………………… J.

(KURIAN JOSEPH)

……………………………… J.

(ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

New Delhi

July 05, 2016.