Page 1 ‘ REPORTABLE’

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1300 OF 2009

Majendran Langeswaran …..Appellant

Versus

State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. ….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M.Y. EQBAL, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the

judgment and order dated 25

th

July, 2008 passed by the

High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 820 of 2002

whereby the judgment and order dated 9

th

August, 2002

passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in

Sessions Case No. 45 of 2001 convicting the accused-

appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(for short, “IPC”) and sentencing him to imprisonment for

Page 2 life and a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default of payment of fine,

rigorous imprisonment for one day was maintained and the

said appeal dismissed.

2. The prosecution version in a nutshell is that the

Cargo Ship Motor Vessel “Lok Prem” owned by the Shipping

Corporation of India was chartered by a private company of

South Africa on 6

th

November, 1996 for carrying Chrome

Alloy. The accused-appellant and the deceased L.

Shivaraman along with other were helmsmen/seamen (crew

members) on the said ship. When the ship was sailing from

South Africa to Japan via Singapore, the auto pilot went out

of order which could not be repaired for non-availability of

technicians on board and thus requiring the crew on board

to manually steer the ship. The accused and one M.Y.

Talgharkar showed reluctance to steer the ship manually

and insisted for repair of auto pilot and payment of their

long overdue overtime. The ship was taken to Singapore to

make the auto pilot functional but the same could not be

got repaired. The accused and said Talgharkar are alleged

to have instigated other crew members to insist and obtain

2

Page 3 it in writing from the Captain/Master of the ship (PW-5

Radha Krishan Ambady) that the ship would be got repaired

at Japan, otherwise they (crew members) shall not allow the

moving of the ship from Singapore. When the Captain of

the ship reported the matter to the Shipping Corporation of

India, the General Secretary of the Union (NSUI) directed

the crew members to perform their duties in obedience to

lawful commands of the Captain. On 30

th

November, 1996,

an altercation is stated to have taken place between the

accused and the deceased L. Shivaraman. As the accused

had sustained some cut injuries on his hands, he reported

the matter to the officials. On 1

st

December, 1996 when the

ship was on high seas, the appellant took off from his duty

as helmsman on the ground of pain in his hands due to cut

injuries and another helmsman Baria was asked to do the

duty as replacement. As the accused and the deceased

were staying in Cabin No. 25, the accused was temporarily

shifted from that cabin to Cabin No. 23 due to the above

incident of assault. At about 1510 hours, the accused

allegedly approached IInd Officer Kalyan Singh (PW-6) with

3

Page 4 a blood-stained knife in his hand and his hands smearing in

blood and is alleged to have confessed before him that he

had killed L. Shivaraman. On being asked by Kalyan Singh

(PW-6), the appellant handed over the blood-stained knife

to him which he placed in a cloth piece without touching the

same. Kalyan Singh (PW-6) then intimated the Captain and

other officers. The body of L. Shivaraman was found lying

in Cabin No. 23 in such a way that half of it was inside the

cabin and half of it outside. The officials of Shipping

Corporation of India were informed. On incident being

reported, pursuant to an instruction from concerned

quarter, the ship was diverted to Hongkong. On being so

directed by the Captain of the ship (PW-5), Kalyan Singh

(PW-6) got the body of the deceased cleaned up for being

preserved in the fish room with the help of Manjeet Singh

Bhupal (PW-4) and Chief Officer V.V. Muralidharan (PW-18)

took photographs. The blood-stained knife was kept in the

safe custody of PW-5. The accused was then apprehended,

tied and disarmed before being shifted to the hospital on

board. Since the ship was having Indian Flag, as per the

4

Page 5 International Treaty of which India was a signatory, the act

of the accused was subject to Indian laws. Accordingly, a

case bearing R.C. No. 10(S) of 1996 was registered by the

Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against the accused

on 6

th

December, 1996. On reaching Hongkong, the body of

deceased was handed over to Hongkong Police for post

mortem examination. Two CBI officers reached Hongkong

on 7

th

December, 1996. The investigation of the case was

conducted by Anil Kumar Ohri, Dy. Superintendent of Police,

C.B.I. (PW-23). The Investigation Officer (I.O.) visited the

ship and recorded the statements of witnesses under

Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short,

“Cr.P.C.”). The blood-stained knife (Ex. P-3) and

deceased’s boiler suit (Ex. 2a) as also relevant papers from

the Hongkong police were taken into his possession by the

I.O. The post mortem examination on the dead body was

conducted by Dr. Lal Sai Chak (PW-19). The accused was

arrested and brought to Delhi where he was medico legally

examined by a doctor. The specimen fingerprints and

signature of the accused were obtained. The knife and the

5

Page 6 specimen fingerprints were then sent to Central Forensic

Science Laboratory (CFSL) for comparison. The fingerprints

of the accused had tallied with the fingerprints appearing

on the knife (Ex.P-3). The accused was charged under

Section 302 IPC. In support of its case, the prosecution

examined as many as 23 witnesses.

3. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 9

th

August, 2002 held the appellant guilty of committing the

murder of L. Shivaraman taking note of the incident of

assault of 30

th

November, 1996 in which the appellant had

sustained injuries at the hands of the deceased as motive

on the part of the appellant for commission of crime, the

extra- judicial confession made by him to Kalyan Singh (PW-

6) and presence of his fingerprints on the knife that was

allegedly used as the weapon of offence.

4. Before the High Court while assailing the conviction

and sentence by the trial court, it was contended that there

was sufficient opportunity to force the appellant to hold the

knife (Ex.P-3) to get his fingerprints thereon; that no blood

was noticeable on the clothes of the appellant; that the

6

Page 7 clothes of the appellant which he was wearing at the

relevant time were not seized to establish that the same

carried blood stains of the deceased; two other helmsmen

Baria and Talgharkar who were present when the appellant

made confession before Kalyan Singh (PW-6) were not

examined by the prosecution; that the weapon of offence

i.e. knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the doctor concerned

who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead

body of the deceased to find out whether the injuries could

have been caused by that weapon; that all the injuries

could not have been caused by the said weapon of offence

which had one blunt edge and the other sharp; that more

than one weapon was used to cause injuries on the person

of the deceased by referring to existence of another knife

(Ex. 2b) in the parcel which contained deceased’s boiler suit

(Ex. 2a) which had also been sent to CFSL; that no

fingerprints were lifted from the second knife nor the same

was referred to the expert for matching with the cuts on the

boiler suit; and that the second knife was also not shown to

the doctor conducting post mortem on the body of the

7

Page 8 deceased to ascertain if the same could have been used as

a possible weapon of offence. As regards alleged extra-

judicial confession, the depositions of Captain Radha

Krishan Ambady (PW-5) and Kalyan Singh (PW-6) were

referred to and variance in words allegedly used by the

appellant while making the same was demonstrated;

absence of any mention of such a confession in the Official

Log Book was also pleaded; and it was contended that the

I.O. did not detect any blood in Cabin No. 23 as the scene of

crime had also been cleaned and on account of such

tampering the crime could not be connected with the

appellant. It was contended that it was on account of

officers on board including Captain of the ship being

unhappy with and inimical towards the appellant that he

was falsely implicated. It was contended that the previous

day incident of assault could not be reckoned as motive for

fatal assault on the deceased on the following day and such

motive alone in the absence of necessary links in the

circumstantial evidence would not be suffice to record

conviction against the appellant.

8

Page 9 5. After appreciation of the evidence of prosecution

witnesses and the documents exhibited therein, the High

Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has

established the guilt of the appellant in the commission of

the offence and accordingly dismissed the appeal affirming

the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed

by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

6. Mr. G.Tushar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and order of

conviction and sentence as being illegal and contrary to

facts and evidence on record. Learned counsel submitted

that the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence and

a chain with regard to the circumstances leading to the

guilt of the appellant has not at all been established.

Counsel submitted that it is settled law that extra-judicial

confession is a weak type of evidence and needs

corroboration in a case dependent wholly on circumstantial

evidence and in such cases the exact words used by the

accused have to be reproduced, but in this case even PW-6

before whom the appellant is alleged to have made

9

Page 10 confession has not been able to reproduce the exact words

and there are material contradictions in the statements of

prosecution witnesses. It is contended by the counsel that

the manner in which the alleged weapon of offence i.e.

knife Ex.P-3 was seized and sealed is not proper and the

probability of tampering with the knife cannot be ruled out.

Counsel submitted that circumstances and the evidence on

record indicate that the appellant was susceptible to being

forced to hold the knife so as to get his fingerprints on the

knife. It is surprising, counsel submitted, that there are

about 14 stab wounds both minor and major on the neck

and torso as per post mortem report, but there was no

blood noticeable on the appellant nor did any of the

witnesses noticed blood either on the clothes of the

appellant or the bridge or the alleyway from the scene of

occurrence to the bridge nor were the clothes of the

appellant were ever seized by the Captain/Master of the

ship (PW-5), IInd Officer (PW-6), the Chief Officer (PW-18),

Senior Inspector Hongkong Police (PW-20) or the

Investigating Officer of CBI (PW-23) and, therefore, the

10

Page 11 chain in the prosecution case of circumstantial evidence

gets fatally broken due to this aspect. It is submitted by

the counsel that from the evidence it is clear that at the

time when the appellant is alleged to have confessed to

Kalyan Singh (PW-6), there were two helmsmen, namely,

Baria and Talgharkar and as per the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses, they also could have heard the

appellant, but these two persons were not examined at all

which goes to show that the prosecution tried to hide

something. It is contended that the knife Ex. P-3 (weapon

of offence) was not shown to the doctor (PW-19) who

conducted the post mortem of the deceased on 6

th

December, 1996 in Hongkong to take his opinion as to

whether it could be Ex.P-3 alone which could have caused

the injuries on the body of the deceased and in the absence

of such examination, the weapon remains unconnected to

the injuries on the deceased. Counsel contended that the

injuries on the deceased were not consistent with the

weapon (Ex.P-3) and that too in the absence of the opinion

of the doctor who conducted post mortem and was not

11

Page 12 shown the alleged weapon of offence. The counsel

contended that from the evidence on record it is clear that

there was more than one weapon containing the blood of

the deceased as apart from Ex.P-3 knife, there was another

knife about which there is no mention nor any plausible

reason as to wherefrom it came and why no one bothered

about it. The counsel submitted that the doubt created by

this circumstance has neither been looked into, considered

or removed by the prosecution at all and this being a case

purely based on circumstantial evidence, the benefit of

doubt ought to be extended to the appellant. The

prosecution, counsel submitted, is expected and is duty

bound to eliminate every element of suspicion in every

circumstance relied upon by it so as to enable the courts to

come to the hypothesis consistent with the guilt of the

accused and simultaneously inconsistent with the

innocence of the accused person. It is contended that the

Captain of the ship got the scene of offence cleaned and no

site plan of the scene of occurrence prepared.

12

Page 13 7. Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing

for the respondent-CBI, on the other hand, submitted that

the trial court and the High Court have dealt with the issue

of extra-judicial confession being legally maintainable. The

prosecution has also been able to prove that the same was

without any inducement, threat or promise which factor the

appellant has not been able to discard from any of the

witness. The prosecution has been able to prove the motive

to commit such a crime. Similarly, the recovery of knife,

CFSL report and post mortem report clearly indicate that

the injuries were from a single blade weapon. Even though

there is no eye-witness to the actual crime, yet the

prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of the

accused under Section 302 IPC by proving the complete

chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. The

appellant neither in cross-examination of various witnesses

nor in any explanation in his statement under Section 313

Cr.P.C. has been able to make a dent in the entire evidence.

The counsel submitted that even in a case of circumstantial

13

Page 14 evidence, the evidence has to be appreciated as a whole

and not in pieces, one bit here and one bit there.

8. We have considered the arguments advanced by

the counsel on either side and have also gone through the

findings recorded by the trial court as also by the High

Court.

9. Admittedly, the entire case is based on the

circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the murder

having been committed by the accused-appellant. Although

the trial court has not given much weightage to the

confession alleged to have been made by the accused-

appellant before PW-5, PW-6 and PW-20, but the High Court

based the conviction on the basis of extra-judicial

confession also. The trial court while dealing with the

confession alleged to have been made by the accused,

observed as under:

“52. Now in the present case the prosecution

is relying on the confession of the accused

before Kalyan Singh (PW-6), the repetition

confession before Sh. R.K. Ambady (PW-5)

14

Page 15 and the confession allegedly made by the

accused before Inspector Wai (PW-20).

53. So far as the confession before R.K.

Ambady (PW-5) is concerned, I am not

inclined to accept the same. PW-5 claims to

have gone on the bridge. The accused had

confessed before him that he had killed Shiva

Raman and will kill the other persons

whosoever comes before him (Hum

Shivaraman Ko Khalash Kiya Aur Koi Ayega To

Usko Bhi Khalash Karenga) However, this

particular claim of PW-5 is conspicuous by its

absence from the official logbook entry

Ex.PW5/D which had been made on 2.12.96.

However, there is no reference of this

particular confession i.e. before PW-5.

54. So far as the confession before Inspector

Wai (PW 20) is concerned, the same cannot

be looked into in view of the law laid down in

State vs. Ranjan Raja Ram 1991 (1) CCC 134.

This particular judgment has been relied on

by counsel for the accused and it had been

argued that since the facts of the present

case were identical, therefore, the accused in

the present case deserves acquittal. I have

carefully gone through the judgment State vs.

Ranjan Raja Ram (supra). In that case the

extra judicial confession was made before a

person who had just joined the ship on 2.6.78

and the occurrence had taken place on

9

th

/10

th

June 1978. He was a stranger to the

accused. It was the prosecution case (in that

case) the accused had kept on telling his

having committed the murder to every one.

It was not believed by the court. In para 26 of

the judgment it was mentioned that the name

of PW in that case had come for the first time

15

Page 16 on 15.7.78. Therefore, that case is

distinguishable so far as confession made by

the present accused before Sh. Kalyan Singh

(PW6) is concerned. What is a confession?

What is the law on the subject? Whether

conviction can be based on extra judicial

confession?”

10. On the contentions of the accused-appellant,

the High Court while dismissing the appeal of the

accused by the impugned judgment held as under:

“13.……. One cannot lose sight of the fact

that according to Kalyan Singh (Pw-6), on

reaching the bridge of the ship, the appellant

had first told him that he had killed Shivraman

and then repeated the same in Hindi also by

uttering, ?KHALAS KAR DIYA?. The statement so

made in Hindi was only in continuation to the

confession initially made by him wherein he had

specifically named Shivraman. Thus, the

words ?KHALAS KAR DIYA? Uttered by the

appellant in Hindi are to be read in the context

of his initial confession naming Shivraman. No

real variance in the content of confession

initially made and the one repeated in Hindi is

thus brought out.

xxx xxx xxx

15. …. The omission to mention the exact

words in the log book entry dated 2.12.1996

vide Ex. PW-5/D in the circumstances cannot

make the testimony of Kalyan Singh (PW-6) in

regard to confession by the appellant

uncreditworthy. The log book entry (Ex.PW-5/D)

does carry a mention that the information

16

Page 17 regarding commission of the murder of

Shivraman by the appellant was given over

phone by Shri Kalyan Singh (PW-6) from which it

is evident that Shri Kalyan Singh (PW-6) had,

before passing on the information to the said

effect, come to know that it was the appellant

who had committed the crime. …… The

presence of the appellant at the bridge near

Kalyan Singh (PW-6) before Shri Radha Krishan

Ambady (PW-5) and Murlidharan (PW-20)

reached there and handing over of bloodstained

knife collected from the appellant by Kalyan

Singh (PW-6) lend sufficient corroboration to the

appellant having approached Kalyan Singh (PW-

6) at the bridge and making confessional

statement to him, as deposed by Shri Kalyan

Sijngh (PW-6). The stand of the appellant that

Shri Kalyan Singh (PW-6) had joined hands with

Shri Radha Krishan Ambady (PW-5) and others

on board being inimical to him is difficult to

accept, given the nature of friendly relationship

he enjoyed with Kalyan Singh (PW-6). The

learned trial court would, thus, appear to have

committed no error in reaching the conclusion

that the extra judicial confession made by the

appellant, as deposed in the court, was

voluntary and a truthful one and could, thus,

constitute an incriminating piece of evidence to

find his culpability in the commission of the

crime.

16. Non-examination of two seamen,

namely, Baria and Thalgharkar, who were

manually steering the ship at the relevant time

when the appellant made his confessional

statement before Kalyan Singh (PW-6) cannot

be a ground to discard an otherwise

unimpeached testimony of Kalyan Singh (PW-6)

in regard to confession made to him by the

17

Page 18 appellant. Acceptance of testimony of a

particular witness in regard to an extra judicial

confession is not dependent on corroboration by

other witnesses, if otherwise creditworthy. ……

The appellant and Talgharkar thus shared a

comradely bond and in such a situation looking

for a support from Talgharkar to PW Kalyan

Singh’s deposition on extra judicial confession

by the appellant would be expecting too much

from him.

xxx xxx xxx

20. ….. Since the clothes which the

appellant was wearing at the relevant time were

not taken into possession to prove the existence

of bloodstains, if any, thereon and as none of

the witnesses testifies about presence of

bloodstains on his clothes, the conclusion that

follows is that there were no bloodstains on his

clothes when the appellant approached Kalyan

Singh (PW-6) at the bridge to confess his guilty.

This fact could have been of considerable

significance in adjudging the culpability of the

appellant had the effect of the same been not

offset by the strong incriminating evidence

which constitute the basis for convicting the

appellant. … The clothes of the appellant, as

noticed earlier, were not soaked in deceased’s

blood nor there is any evidence of his feet or

footwear, if any, the appellant was wearing,

having got smeared in deceased’s blood before

his proceeding to the bridge and in such

circumstances, no blood could be expected to

have fallen down in the alleyway from the scene

of the crime to the bridge.

xxx xxx xxx

18

Page 19 23. Apart from the bloodstained knife Ex.P.3 and

certain other items, as mentioned in the letter

(Ex. PW-21/2) of the investigating officer, one

sealed cardboard parcel ‘containing a blue

coloured soaked boiler suit’ worn by deceased

at the time of incident marked as ‘B’ was also

sent to CFSL for examination and opinion. Such

sealed cardboard box was, on opening, found to

contain two Exhibits 2a and 2b vide CFSL report

Ex.PW-22/1. Ex.2a was the dark blue coloured

boiler suit and Ex.2b was a metallic blade fitted

in a wooden handle like a knife. The length of

the metallic blade is about 5.5 centimeters with

one edge sharp and another blunt having a

round tip at one end. None of the prosecution

witnesses, including the investigating officer,

stated anything as to how and wherefrom the

said knife Ex.2b was recovered and kept with

the boiler suit in the same cardboard box. This

knife Ex.2b, like knife Ex.P-3, also bore human

bloodstains matching ‘O’ group of the deceased.

Existence of knife Ex.2b was made a basis, by

learned counsel for the appellant, to argue that

the same could have been used to cause stab

wounds on the neck and chest of the deceased,

as noted in the postmortem report (Ex.PW-

19/A). Countering the argument related to

nature of weapon of offence used in commission

of the crime, as raised by the learned counsel

for the appellant, learned counsel for CBI

contended that even though the prosecution

witnesses kept silent as to how the knife Ex.2b

came to be sealed in the cardboard box

containing the boiler suit (Ex.2a), in view of

sufficient evidence on record proving beyond

doubt commission of the crime by the appellant

with the knife Ex.P-3, there is no real basis to

support the contention that knife Ex.2b could

also be a possible weapon of offence.

19

Page 20 xxx xxx xxx

25. The theory of more than one weapon

being used in the commission of the crime, as

propounded by learned counsel for the

appellant, as noticed earlier, emanates from the

nature of certain injuries on the body of the

deceased and existence of knife Ex.2b with

bloodstains thereon matching the blood group of

the deceased. Learned counsel for the

appellant contended that unlike knife Ex.P-3 the

knife Ex.2b was not subjected to examination to

find the presence of finger prints, if any, on its

handle. The same was also not shown to Dr. Lal

Sai Chak (PW-19), who conducted the

postmortem examination on the body of the

deceased to seek his opinion if the same could

have been the possible weapon of offence, nor

the opinion of the expert witness Shri C.K. Jain

(PW-22) was sought in respect thereto if the

cuts on the boiler suit could have been caused

by that knife.

xxx xxx xxx

28. Keeping in view the incriminating

evidence available on record proving the guilt of

the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, we find

no reason to arrive at a finding different from

the one recorded by the learned trial court in

regard to the complicity of the appellant in

committing the murder of L. Shivaraman on

board. Hence, the impugned conviction and

sentence are maintained and the appeal is

dismissed being bereft of merit.”

20

Page 21 11. Now, we have to consider whether the judgment of

conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed by the

High court can be sustained in law. As noticed above, the

conviction is based on circumstantial evidence as no one

has seen the accused committing murder of the deceased.

While dealing with the said conviction based on

circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the

conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should in the first

instance be fully established, and all the facts so

established should also be consistent with only one

hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the accused, which would mean

that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove that the chain

of event is complete and not to leave any doubt in the mind

of the Court.

12. In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs.

State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343, this Court observed as

under:

“It is well to remember that in cases where

the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the

circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance

21

Page 22 be fully established, and all the facts so

established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,

the circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature and tendency and they should be such

as to exclude every hypothesis but the one

proposed to be proved. In other words, there

must be a chain of evidence so far complete

as not to leave any reasonable ground for a

conclusion consistent with the innocence of

the accused and it must be such as to show

that within all human probability the act must

have been done by the accused. ….”

13. In the case of Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of

A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, this Court opined as under:

“10. Before adverting to the arguments

advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at

the threshold point out that in the present

case there is no direct evidence to connect

the accused with the offence in question and

the prosecution rests its case solely on

circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series

of decisions has consistently held that when a

case rests upon circumstantial evidence such

evidence must satisfy the following tests:

(1)the circumstances from which an

inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must

be cogently and firmly established;

(2)those circumstances should be of a

definite tendency unerringly pointing towards

guilt of the accused;

22

Page 23 (3)the circumstances, taken cumulatively,

should form a chain so complete that there is

no escape from the conclusion that within all

human probability the crime was committed

by the accused and none else; and

(4)the circumstantial evidence in order to

sustain conviction must be complete and

incapable of explanation of any other

hypothesis than that of the guilt of the

accused and such evidence should not only

be consistent with the guilt of the accused

but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

(See Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, (1982)

2 SCC 351)”

14. In the case of C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. vs. State

of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, this Court while considering a

case of conviction based on the circumstantial evidence,

held as under:

“21. In a case based on circumstantial

evidence, the settled law is that the

circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such

circumstances must be conclusive in nature.

Moreover, all the circumstances should be

complete and there should be no gap left in

the chain of evidence. Further, the proved

circumstances must be consistent only with

the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and

totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the

present case the courts below have

overlooked these settled principles and

allowed suspicion to take the place of proof

23

Page 24 besides relying upon some inadmissible

evidence.”

15. In the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy

vs. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172, this Court again

considered the case of conviction based on circumstantial

evidence and held as under:

“26. It is now well settled that with a view to

base a conviction on circumstantial evidence,

the prosecution must establish all the pieces

of incriminating circumstances by reliable and

clinching evidence and the circumstances so

proved must form such a chain of events as

would permit no conclusion other than one of

guilt of the accused. The circumstances

cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also

well settled that suspicion, however grave it

may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof

and the courts shall take utmost precaution in

finding an accused guilty only on the basis of

the circumstantial evidence. (See Anil Kumar

Singh

v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67 and Reddy

Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC

603).”

16. In the case of Sattatiya vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210, this Court held as under:

24

Page 25 “10. We have thoughtfully considered the

entire matter. It is settled law that an offence

can be proved not only by direct evidence but

also by circumstantial evidence where there

is no direct evidence. The court can draw an

inference of guilt when all the incriminating

facts and circumstances are found to be

totally incompatible with the innocence of the

accused. Of course, the circumstances from

which an inference as to the guilt is drawn

have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt

and have to be shown to be closely connected

with the principal fact sought to be inferred

from those circumstances.”

This Court further observed in the aforesaid decision that:

“17. At this stage, we also deem it proper to

observe that in exercise of power under

Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court will

be extremely loath to upset the judgment of

conviction which is confirmed in appeal.

However, if it is found that the appreciation of

evidence in a case, which is entirely based on

circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious

errors and on that account miscarriage of

justice has been occasioned, then the Court

will certainly interfere even with the

concurrent findings recorded by the trial court

and the High Court—Bharat v. State of M.P.,

(2003) 3 SCC 106. In the light of the above,

we shall now consider whether in the present

case the prosecution succeeded in

establishing the chain of circumstances

leading to an inescapable conclusion that the

appellant had committed the crime.”

25

Page 26 17. In the case of State of Goa vs. Pandurang

Mohite, (2008) 16 SCC 714, this Court reiterated the

settled law that where a conviction rests squarely on

circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be

justified only when all the incriminating facts and

circumstances are found to be incompatible with the

innocence of the accused or the guilt of any person. The

circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the

accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable

doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with

the principal fact sought to be inferred from those

circumstances.

18. It would be appropriate to consider some of the

recent decisions of this Court in cases where conviction was

based on the circumstantial evidence. In the case of G.

Parshwanath vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 8 SCC 593,

this Court elaborately dealt with the subject and held as

under:

26

Page 27 “23. In cases where evidence is of a

circumstantial nature, the circumstances

from which the conclusion of guilt is to be

drawn should, in the first instance, be fully

established. Each fact sought to be relied

upon must be proved individually. However,

in applying this principle a distinction must be

made between facts called primary or basic

on the one hand and inference of facts to be

drawn from them on the other. In regard to

proof of primary facts, the court has to judge

the evidence and decide whether that

evidence proves a particular fact and if that

fact is proved, the question whether that fact

leads to an inference of guilt of the accused

person should be considered. In dealing with

this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of

benefit of doubt applies. Although there

should not be any missing links in the case,

yet it is not essential that each of the links

must appear on the surface of the evidence

adduced and some of these links may have to

be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing

these inferences, the court must have regard

to the common course of natural events and

to human conduct and their relations to the

facts of the particular case. The court

thereafter has to consider the effect of proved

facts.

24. In deciding the sufficiency of the

circumstantial evidence for the purpose of

conviction, the court has to consider the total

cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each

one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt

and if the combined effect of all these facts

taken together is conclusive in establishing

the guilt of the accused, the conviction would

be justified even though it may be that one or

27

Page 28 more of these facts by itself or themselves

is/are not decisive. The facts established

should be consistent only with the hypothesis

of the guilt of the accused and should exclude

every hypothesis except the one sought to be

proved. But this does not mean that before

the prosecution can succeed in a case resting

upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must

exclude each and every hypothesis

suggested by the accused, howsoever,

extravagant and fanciful it might be. There

must be a chain of evidence so complete as

not to leave any reasonable ground for the

conclusion consistent with the innocence of

the accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by

the accused, where various links in chain are

in themselves complete, then the false plea

or false defence may be called into aid only to

lend assurance to the court.”

19. In the case of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik vs.

State of Maharashtra , (2012) 4 SCC 37, while dealing

with the case based on circumstantial evidence, this Court

observed as under:

“12. There is no doubt that it is not a case of

direct evidence but the conviction of the

accused is founded on circumstantial

evidence. It is a settled principle of law that

the prosecution has to satisfy certain

conditions before a conviction based on

circumstantial evidence can be sustained.

The circumstances from which the conclusion

28

Page 29 of guilt is to be drawn should be fully

established and should also be consistent

with only one hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the

accused. The circumstances should be

conclusive and proved by the prosecution.

There must be a chain of events so complete

as not to leave any substantial doubt in the

mind of the court. Irresistibly, the evidence

should lead to the conclusion which is

inconsistent with the innocence of the

accused and the only possibility is that the

accused has committed the crime.

13. To put it simply, the circumstances

forming the chain of events should be proved

and they should cumulatively point towards

the guilt of the accused alone. In such

circumstances, the inference of guilt can be

justified only when all the incriminating facts

and circumstances are found to be

incompatible with the innocence of the

accused or the guilt of any other person.”

20. Last but not least, in the case of Brajendrasingh

vs. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 289, this Court while

reiterating the above principles further added that:

“28. Furthermore, the rule which needs to

be observed by the court while dealing with

29

Page 30 the cases of circumstantial evidence is that

the best evidence must be adduced which the

nature of the case admits. The circumstances

have to be examined cumulatively. The court

has to examine the complete chain of events

and then see whether all the material facts

sought to be established by the prosecution

to bring home the guilt of the accused, have

been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has

to be kept in mind that all these principles are

based upon one basic cannon of our criminal

jurisprudence that the accused is innocent till

proven guilty and that the accused is entitled

to a just and fair trial. (Ref. Dhananjoy

Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220;

Shivu v. High Court of Karnataka, (2007) 4

SCC 713 and Shivaji v. State of Maharashtra,

(2008) 15 SCC 269)”

21. As discussed hereinabove, there is no dispute with

regard to the legal proposition that conviction can be based

solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on

the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence as

laid down by this Court. In such a case, all circumstances

must lead to the conclusion that the accused is the only one

who has committed the crime and none else.

22. From the prosecution side, a number of witnesses

have been examined to complete the chain of events and to

prove the version given in the FIR and subsequent thereto.

30

Page 31 We have re-appreciated and analysed the evidence brought

on record from the prosecution side. On the analysis of the

evidence, we have found many inconsistencies and

infirmities in the prosecution version as mentioned

hereinafter.

23. Admittedly, there is no eye witness in this case

despite the fact that the occurrence took place in the cargo

ship and obviously some of the crew members were living

and/or on duty around the ship. Both the accused and the

deceased were good friends and both were staying in one

cabin viz. Cabin No.25. Before the occurrence, the accused

was shifted to Cabin No.23. Admittedly, therefore both the

accused and the deceased were staying in separate cabin

on the date of occurrence.

24. The accused-appellant and the deceased were

helmsmen on the ship which was sailing from South Africa

to Japan via Singapore. Since the auto-pilot went out of

order and could not be repaired, the crew members were

directed to manually steer the ship. The accused and one

Talghakar showed reluctance to steer the ship manually

31

Page 32 and insisted for repair of the auto-pilot and payment of their

long overdue overtime. The prosecution case is that the

accused and the said Talghakar instigated other crew

members to insist and obtain it in writing from the Captain

(PW-5) that the ship would be got repaired at Japan

otherwise they (crew members) shall not allow moving of

the ship from Singapore.

25. The prosecution case is that the accused is alleged

to have confessed before PW-6 about the commission of the

offence and the blood-stained knife was handed over to PW-

6 which was subsequently seized but no blood was

noticeable on the clothes of the appellant which were found

at the relevant time. The otherhelmsmen, namely, Baria

and Talghakar who were present when the appellant is

alleged to have made confession before PW-6, were not

examined by the prosecution.

26. The knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the doctor

concerned who had conducted post mortem examination on

the dead body of the deceased to find out whether the

32

Page 33 injuries could have been caused by that weapon.

Surprisingly, another knife (Ex.2b) alleged to have been

recovered from the boiler suit was also not shown to the

doctor to ascertain whether the said knife was also used in

the commission of the offence.

27. From the evidence, it reveals that after the said

incident the appellant was tied up and kept on the bridge

for at least 2 to 3 days before being shifted. The contention

of the appellant’s counsel was that the appellant was

susceptible of being forced to hold the knife (Ex.P-3) so as

to get his fingerprints on the knife which was never kept

inside the fish room along with the dead body.

28. Apart from the aforesaid, it appears from the post

mortem report that there were about 14 stab wounds on

the neck but there was no blood found on the dress of the

appellant or on the scene of occurrence. Though the

deceased was alleged to have been assaulted as many as

14 times by a sharp-edged weapon and there was massive

blood at the site of the offence, no blood had spilled on the

33

Page 34 appellant or his clothes. Moreover, there is nothing on

record by way of explanation from the prosecution side as

to why the clothes of the appellant were not seized.

Further, the alleged knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the

doctor who conducted the post mortem of the deceased in

Honkong to take his opinion as to whether it was Ex.P-3

alone which could have caused those injuries especially

when another knife was found from the boiler suit.

29. A very relevant piece of evidence which has been

noticed by the High Court, but not given due consideration,

is that apart from the blood-stained knife (Ex. P-3) and

certain other items mentioned in the letter of Investigating

Officer, one sealed cardboard parcel containing blue soaked

boiler suit worn by the deceased at the time of incident was

also sent to CFSL for examination and opinion. In the said

sealed cardboard box, two Exhibits (2a and 2b) were found.

Ex.2a was the dark blue coloured boiler suit and the Ex.2b

was metallic blade fitted in a wooden handle like a knife.

The length of the metallic blade is about 5.5 centimeter

with one edge sharp and another blunt having a round tip

34

Page 35 at one end. None of the prosecution witnesses including

the Investigating Officer, stated anything as to how and

wherefrom the said knife (Ex.2b) was recovered and kept

with the boiler suit in the same cardboard box. This knife

(Ex.2b) also bore human blood-stained matching ‘O’ group

of the deceased. As per the post mortem report, stab

wounds on the neck and chest of the deceased might be by

the use of the said weapon Ex.2b. The said knife (Ex.2b)

was not subjected to examination to find out the presence

of fingerprints, if any, of the appellant. The said knife

(Ex.2b) was also not shown to the doctor (PW-19) who

conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the

deceased, to seek his opinion if the same could have been

possible weapon of offence. Even the opinion of the expert

witness (PW-22) was not sought as to whether the cuts on

the boiler suit could have been caused by that knife.

30. One more important aspect which has not been

taken note of by the trial court and the High Court is that as

per the prosecution case, the appellant was the trouble

maker and instigated other crew members not to steer the

35

Page 36 ship manually unless the officers give it in writing about

fulfillment of their demand of payment of long overdue

overtime. This vital piece of evidence regarding the enmity

of the appellant with the higher officials and others has

been suppressed: instead, the prosecution tried to show

that there was no enmity towards the appellant.

31. Admittedly, after the alleged incident, the Master of

the ship got the scene of offence cleaned like a vision and

nothing was kept intact in and around the cabin where the

offence was committed. Even the Investigating Officer

failed to inspect the cabin. No site plan was prepared by

the Investigating Officer. Before the arrival of the

Investigating Agency officials, the place of occurrence

including cabin was completely washed and cleaned in such

a way as if nothing had happened in the cabin and the

place around it.

32. On consideration of all these relevant facts and vital

piece of evidence, it can safely be concluded that the

offence committed by the appellant has not been fully

36

Page 37 established beyond all reasonable doubts. The very fact

that two blood-stained knives were found by the

prosecution proves that the prosecution failed to give

sufficient explanation as to who had assaulted the

deceased by using another knife (Ex.2b). The High Court

has committed grave error in holding that in view of the

findings arrived at by the trial court that offence was

committed by using the knife (Ex.P-3), the presence of

another knife (Ex.2b) with blood-stains will not demolish

the case of the prosecution. In our view, from the

circumstances the conclusion of the guilt of the appellant

herein has not been fully established beyond all shadow of

doubt as the circumstances are not conclusive in nature --

neither the chain of events is complete nor the

circumstances lead to the conclusion that the offence was

committed by the appellant and none else. Hence, the

impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the

judgment of conviction passed by the trial court cannot be

sustained in law.

37

Page 38 33. For the reasons aforestated, this appeal deserves to

be allowed and the impugned judgment is liable to be set

aside. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the

judgments of the High Court and the trial court are set

aside. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith if

not required in any other case.

…………………………… .J.

(P. Sathasivam)

…………………………… .J.

(M.Y. Eqbal)

New Delhi,

July 1, 2013.

38