REPORTABLE

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  1912­1913   OF 2020

   (Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) Nos.2704­2705 of 2019)

Mangayakarasi                .…Appellant(s)

Versus

M. Yuvaraj           ….  Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

A.S. Bopanna,J.

        Leave granted.     

2.     The   appellant   is   before   this   Court   assailing   the

judgment dated 20.07.2018 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Madras in CMSA Nos.23 & 24 of 2016.  The

appellant is the wife of the respondent.  Since the rank of

parties was different in the various proceedings as both

the parties had initiated proceedings against each other,

for the  sake  of convenience and  clarity  the appellant

herein would be referred to as ‘wife’ and the respondent

herein would be referred to as ‘husband’ wherever the

context so admits.  

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3. The husband initiated the petition under Section

13 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking dissolution of the

marriage.     The   wife   on   the   other   hand   initiated   the

petition   under   Section   9   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act

seeking  restitution  of  conjugal  rights.    The  respective

petitions     registered   as   H.M.O.P   No.13/2010   (old

No.532/2007)   and   H.M.O.P   No.27/2008   were   clubbed

and   the   learned   Subordinate   Judge,   Pollachi   by   the

judgment dated 26.11.2010 dismissed the petition filed

by the husband and allowed the petition filed by the wife.

The   husband   claiming   to   be   aggrieved   by   the   said

judgment preferred the appeals in CMA No.90/2011 and

71/2011 before the Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Coimbatore, namely, the First Appellate Court.  The First

Appellate Court having considered the matter, dismissed

the   appeals   filed   by   the   husband.     The   husband,

therefore, filed the Second Appeal under Section 100 of

the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court of

Judicature at Madras in CMSA Nos.23 & 24 of 2016.  The

High Court has through the impugned judgment dated

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20.07.2018 allowed the appeals, set aside the order for

restitution of conjugal rights and dissolved the marriage

between   the   parties   herein.     It   is   in   that   light   the

appellant­wife is before this Court in these appeals.

4. The undisputed position is that the marriage of the

parties was solemnised on 08.04.2005 which in fact was

after the parties had fallen in love with each other.  As

per the averments, the wife is elder to the husband by six

to seven years.  The parties also have a female child born

on 03.01.2007.  During the subsistence of the marriage

certain differences cropped up between the parties.  The

husband   alleged   that   the   wife   was   of   quarrelsome

character and used filthy language in the presence of

relatives and friends and also that she had gone to the

college where the husband was employed and had used

bad language in the presence of the students which had

caused insult to him.  The husband, therefore, claiming

that   he   belongs   to   a   respectable   family   and   cannot

tolerate such behaviour of the wife got issued a legal

notice dated 07.12.2006 which was not responded to by

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the wife.   The husband therefore filed a petition under

Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act in H.M.O.P No.65/2007

seeking dissolution of marriage.  The husband contends

that the wife appeared before the Trial Court and on the

assurances put forth by her of leading a normal married

life the petition was not pressed further.   The husband

alleges that merely about five days thereafter the wife

went to the college and abused him and also left the

marital home on 12.04.2007.  In that background on the

very   allegations   which   had   been   made   in   the   first

instance, the petition seeking dissolution of marriage in

H.M.O.P No.13/2010 (old No.532/2007) was filed. 

5. The   wife   who   appeared   and   filed   objection

statement disputed the allegations of the husband.  The

factual aspects with regard to the qualification of the

husband at the time of the marriage and his employment

were also disputed.  It was contended by her that after

marriage they resided together at Sathiyamangalam up to

the   year   2005   and   thereafter   at   Saravanampatti   till

December, 2006.     It was contended that the distance

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between the hometown of the parents of the husband and

the said places referred to is more than 120 kms and

travelling   the   said   distance   was   difficult.     Hence   the

allegation of insulting them is not true. Subsequently

when   the   relationship   between   the   husband   and   his

parents   were   cordial   and   were   living   together,   it   is

claimed that the wife had behaved well with the relatives

and the visitors.   Hence the allegation about her rude

behaviour is disputed.   In respect of the legal notice

issued by the husband on 07.12.2006 it is contended

that during the pregnancy, the husband told her that his

parents are insisting on issuing the legal notice and the

husband did not mean what had been indicated therein.

Within about 25 days thereafter the wife had delivered a

female child and even in respect of the earlier petition in

H.M.O.P   No.65/2007   she   was   made   to   appear   and

submit about her readiness to live with him which she

had done unsuspectingly.  The said case was also stated

to be instigated by his parents.  In that light, the wife had

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denied the allegations and sought for dismissal of the

petition.

6. In the petition filed by the wife under Section 9 of

the Hindu Marriage Act seeking for restitution of conjugal

rights   she   had   referred   to   the   manner   in   which   the

marriage has taken place and had indicated that they are

living separately without  valid reasons  and, therefore,

sought for the relief.  The husband having appeared filed

the objection statement referring to the parties belonging

to different communities as also the age difference.  The

further averments made in the petition were denied. The

husband also referred to the complaint filed by the wife

before   the   Negamam   Police   Station   in   Crime

No.401/2007 in which the husband was arrested by the

police and was in judicial custody for seven days.  In that

light, it was contended that the marriage between the

parties had broken down to a point of no return, hence

sought for dismissal of the petition.  

7. The Trial Court framed the issues based on the

rival contentions. The husband examined himself and the

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witnesses as PW1 to PW4 and exhibited the documents

A1   to   A5,   while   the   wife   examined   herself   and   the

witnesses as RW1 to RW3 and exhibited the documents

as   R1   to   R3.     The   Trial   Court   after   referring   to   the

evidence tendered, has dismissed the petition.   While

doing so the Trial Court had referred in detail to the

evidence that had been tendered and in that light insofar

as the allegations, the Trial Court was of the opinion that

the husband has not examined any witnesses to prove

that after 15 months of the marriage the quarrel started

between   them   and   that   he   had   to   shift   about   seven

houses due to quarrelling nature of the wife with the

neighbours.     It   was   further   observed   that   from   the

witnesses who have been examined, the evidence do not

relate to the allegation that the wife had abused the

husband in front of the students and the co­workers.  In

that   light,  the   Trial  Court  noticed  that  the   allegation

made by the husband as PW1 and the relatives who were

examined as witnesses (PW2 and PW3) had alleged that

the wife had lived a luxurious life at her parent’s house.

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In that light, the Trial Court taking into consideration the

manner in which the marriage between the parties had

taken place and also taking note that a female child was

born from the wedlock on 03.01.2007 had formed the

opinion that the petition seeking divorce had been filed at

the instigation of the parents of the husband and there

was no real cause for granting the divorce.

8. The   First   Appellate   Court   while   considering  the

appeals   filed   by   the   husband   had   taken   note   of   the

evidence   which   had   been   referred   to   before   the   Trial

Court and in that light having reappreciated the matter

had upheld the judgment of the Trial Court.

9. In the Second Appeal filed before the High Court, it

raised   the   following   substantial   questions   of   law   for

consideration:

“1. Whether the courts below are correct

and   justified   in   failure   to   dissolve   the

marriage of the appellant and respondent

on   the   ground   of   mental   cruelty   (when

particularly   the   alleged   complaint   dated

24.11.2007 for dowry harassment lodged

by  the  respondent   against  the  appellant

and her in­laws and the consequent arrest

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by   the   police   would   unquestionably

constitutes cruelty as postulated in section

13(1)(ia) of the  Hindu Marriage Act?

2.    Whether the judgments of the courts

below in dismissing the petition for divorce

overlooking   the   subsequent   event

regarding   the   lodging   of   false   criminal

complaint   by   the   respondent­wife   for

dowry   harassment   against   the   appellant

and her in­laws are sustainable in law?  

3.Whether the judgment of the courts

below   are   correct   and   justified   when

particularly   the   criminal   prosecution

initiated in C.C.No.149 of 2008 on the file

of the Judicial Magistrate No.2, Pollachi for

dowry harassment is ended in Honorary

acquittal?

4.Whether the judgment of the courts

below are perverse?”

10.It   is   in   that   background,   the   High   Court   had

arrived at the conclusion that the criminal case filed by

the   wife,   which   was   proceeded   in   C.C.   No.149/2008

alleging that the husband had demanded dowry and in

the said proceedings when the allegation is found to be

false for want of evidence the same would be an act of

inflicting   mental   cruelty   as   contemplated   under

Section13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in that

light had allowed the appeal. 

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11.Heard Mr. S. Nandakumar, learned counsel for the

appellant­wife, Mr. B. Ragunath, learned counsel for the

respondent­husband and perused the appeals papers.

12.In the light of the contentions put forth by the

learned counsel, a perusal of the papers would disclose

that the petition for dissolution of marriage instituted by

the husband was on the allegation that the behaviour of

the wife was intemperate as she was quarrelsome with

the   neighbours,   friends   and   with   the   visitors.   It   was

alleged   that   she   had   also   gone   over   to   the   place   of

employment of the husband and demeaned him in the

presence   of   the   students   and   other   co­workers.     In

respect of the said allegations, the Trial Court having

taken note of the evidence tendered through PW1 to PW4

had arrived at the conclusion that the said evidence was

insufficient to prove the allegations which were made in

the petition.  A bare perusal of the judgment passed by

the Trial Court would indicate that the evidence available

on   record   has   been   referred   to   extensively   and   a

conclusion has been reached. The First Appellate Court

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has also referred to the said evidence, reappreciated the

same   and   has   arrived   at   its   conclusion.     In   such

circumstance,   in   a   proceeding   of   the   present   nature

where the Trial Court has referred to the evidence and

the   First   Appellate   Court   being   the   last   Court   for

reappreciation of the evidence has undertaken the said

exercise and had arrived at a concurrent decision on the

matter, the position of law is well settled that neither the

High Court in the limited scope available to it in a Second

Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is

entitled to reappreciate the evidence nor this Court in the

instant appeals is required to do so.  

13.It is in that view, we have not once again referred

to the evidence which was tendered before the Trial Court

which   had   accordingly   been   appreciated   by   the   Trial

Court.  In such situation the High Court had the limited

scope for interference based on the substantial question

of law. The substantial questions of law framed by the

High Court has been extracted and noted in the course of

this judgment.   At the outset, the very perusal of the

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questions   framed   would   disclose   that   the   questions

raised does not qualify as substantial questions of law

when the manner in which the parties had proceeded

before the Trial Court is noticed. The questions framed in

fact provides scope for re­appreciation of the evidence

and not as substantial questions of law.  As noticed, in

the instant facts the husband filed a petition at the first

instance,   seeking   dissolution   of   marriage   in   H.M.O.P

No.65/2007   and   the   same   was   predicated   on   the

allegation about the wife using filthy language in the

presence of the relatives and friends and also using such

language in the presence of the students of the husband.

It is in that light, the husband alleged cruelty and sought

for dissolution of marriage on that ground.  It is no doubt

true that the said petition which was initially filed was

not pressed though the contentions of the parties in that

regard   is   at   variance,     inasmuch   as   the   husband

contends that the petition was not pressed as the wife

had assured of appropriate behaviour henceforth, while

the wife contends that the said proceedings had been

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initiated   at   the   instigation   of   his   parents   and   had

accordingly not been pressed thereafter.  

14.Be that as it may, though the subsequent petition

was filed by the husband in H.M.O.P No.13/2010 which

was originally numbered as H.M.O.P No.532/2007, the

same   was   also   filed   on   the   same   set   of   allegations.

Further at that point in time the wife had also filed a

petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.  In

that   background,   though   subsequently   in   the

proceedings before the Trial Court a reference is made to

the criminal proceedings, as on the date when the cause

of action had arisen for the husband who initiated the

proceedings   seeking   dissolution   of   the   marriage,   the

criminal case filed against him was not the basis whereby

a ground was raised of causing mental cruelty by filing

such   criminal   complaint.     If   that   be   the   position,   a

situation   which   was   not   the   basis   for   initiating   the

petition for dissolution of marriage and when that was

also not an issue before the Trial Court so as to tender

evidence and a decision be taken, the High Court was not

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justified in raising the same as a substantial question of

law and arriving at its conclusion in that regard.   A

perusal of the judgment of the High Court indicates that

there   is   no   reference   whatsoever   with   regard   to   the

evidence based on which the dissolution of marriage had

been sought, which had been declined by the Trial Court

and   the   First   Appellate   Court   and   whether   such

consideration had raised any substantial question of law.

But the entire consideration has been by placing reliance

on the judgment which was rendered in the criminal

proceedings   and   had   granted   the   dissolution   of   the

marriage.  The tenor of the substantial questions of law

as framed in the instant case and decision taken on that

basis if approved, it would lead to a situation that in

every case if a criminal case is filed by one of the parties

to the marriage and the acquittal therein would have to

be automatically treated as a ground for granting divorce

which will be against the statutory provision.

15.It cannot be in doubt that in an appropriate case

the unsubstantiated allegation of dowry demand or such

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other allegation has been made and the husband and his

family members are exposed to criminal litigation and

ultimately   if   it   is   found   that   such   allegation   is

unwarranted and without basis and if that act of the wife

itself   forms   the   basis   for   the   husband   to   allege   that

mental cruelty has been inflicted on him,   certainly, in

such   circumstance   if   a   petition   for   dissolution   of

marriage is filed on that ground and evidence is tendered

before the original court to allege mental cruelty it could

well   be   appreciated   for   the   purpose   of   dissolving   the

marriage on that ground.  However, in the present facts

as already indicated, the situation is not so.  Though a

criminal   complaint   had   been   lodged   by   the   wife   and

husband has been acquitted in the said proceedings the

basis on which the husband had approached the Trial

Court is not of alleging mental cruelty in that regard but

with   regard   to   her   intemperate   behaviour   regarding

which   both   the   courts   below   on   appreciation   of   the

evidence had arrived at the conclusion that the same was

not proved.  In that background, if the judgment of the

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High Court is taken into consideration, we are of the

opinion   that   the   High   Court   was   not   justified   in   its

conclusion. 

16.The learned counsel for the respondent however,

contended that ever since the year 2007 the parties have

been   litigating   and   were   living   separately.     In   that

situation it is contended that the marriage is irretrievably

broken down and, therefore, the dissolution as granted

by   the   High   Court   is   to   be   sustained.     The   learned

counsel has relied on the decisions in the case of Naveen

Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558, in the case of

Sanghamitra Ghosh vs. Kajal Kumar Ghosh  (2007) 2

SCC 220 and in the case of  Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya

Ghosh  (2007) 4 SCC 511 to contend that in cases where

there has been a long period of continuous separation

and   the   marriage   becomes   a   fiction   it   would   be

appropriate to dissolve such marriage.  On the position of

law enunciated it would not be necessary to advert in

detail inasmuch as the decision to dissolve the marriage

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apart from the grounds available, will have to be taken on

case to case basis and there cannot be a strait jacket

formula. This Court can in any event exercise the power

under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   of   India   in

appropriate cases.  However, in the instant facts, having

given   our   thoughtful   consideration   to   that   aspect   we

notice   that   the   parties   hail   from   a   conservative

background   where   divorce   is   considered   a   taboo   and

further they have a female child born on 03.01.2007 who

is presently aged about 13 years.  In a matter where the

differences   between   the   parties   are   not   of   such

magnitude and is in the nature of the usual wear and

tear of marital life,  the future of the child and her marital

prospects   are   also   to   be   kept   in   view,   and   in   such

circumstance the dissolution of marriage merely because

they have been litigating and they have been residing

separately for quite some time would not be justified in

the present facts, more particularly when the restitution

of conjugal rights was also considered simultaneously.  

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17.In that view, having arrived at the conclusion that

the   very   nature   of   the   substantial   questions   of   law

framed   by   the   High   Court   is   not   justified   and   the

conclusion reached is also not sustainable, the judgment

of the High Court is liable to be set aside.

18.In   the   result,   the   judgment   dated   20.07.2018

passed in CMSA Nos.23 & 24 of 2016 is set aside.  The

judgment   dated   26.11.2010   passed   in   H.M.O.P

Nos.13/2010 and H.M.O.P No.27/2008 and affirmed in

CMA   No.90/2011   and   CMA   No.71/2011   are   restored.

The Appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to

costs.  

19.         Pending applications if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

………….…………….J.

(R. BANUMATHI)

          .……………………….J.

                                               (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

………….…………….J.

                                              (A.S. BOPANNA)

New Delhi,

March 03, 2020

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