CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -1-

In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M)

Reserved on: 18.2.2025

Date of Decision: 12.3.2025

Manish Kumar and others ......Petitioners

Versus

State of Haryana and others .....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS SURI

Argued by:Mr. Akshay Jindal, Advocate,

Ms. Bhavya Vats, Advocate and

Mr. Mannat Sibal, Advocate

for the petitioners.

Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana,

Ms. Svaneel Jaswal, Addl. A.G. Haryana,

Mr. Pardeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana.

Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana,

Mr. Gaurav Bansal, DAG, Haryana and

Mr. Karan Jindal, AAG, Haryana

for the respondents-State.

Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate with

Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur, Advocate,

Ms. Saanvi Singla, Advocate and

Mr. Siddharth Arora, Advocate

for respondents No. 2 and 4.

Mr. Puneet Bali, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Gunjan Rishi, Advocate,

Mr. Gagandeep Singh, Advocate and

Ms. Hanima Grewal, Advocate

for respondent No. 5.

****

SURESHWAR THAKUR , J.

1. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioners seek the

quashing of the revised/replanned layout plan dated 10.5.2012/25.10.2021

(Annexure P-4) for Sector-21, Panchkula. Furthermore, the petitioners also

seek a writ in the nature of prohibition/restraining the respondent

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No. 1 from confirming the e-auction qua Nursing Home site-1, Nursing

Home site-2 and Nursing Home site-3, in front of House No. 1957-P, Sector-

21, Panchkula. In the earlier layout plan, the subject site was initially

declared as nursery and primary school sites, but in the revised layout plan,

it has been declared as Nursing Home site-1, Nursing Home site-2 and

Nursing Home site-3.

Brief facts of the case

2. It is averred in the instant petition, that the petitioners are the

allottees/subsequent purchasers of small residential houses measuring 6

marlas and 10 marlas situated in Sector-21, Panchkula. The said houses of

the petitioners are adjoining, and, opposite to the released land, where a

multi-specialty hospital under the name and style of Alchemist Hospital,

Sector-21, Panchkula is being run. The houses of the petitioners are situated

on a 9 meter road (C-Road) and owing to a huge rush of patients in the

above hospital, there always remain parking problems. It is averred thereins,

that the development plan of Sector-21, since the allotment of plots to the

petitioners till 25.10.2021, thus was depicting that a nursery school site and

a primary school rather would become located adjoining the subject land,

whereas, the supra hospital has been located thereons. The petitioners came

to know qua an e-auction becoming conducted regarding the primary school

site and nursery school site by converting them into three nursing home

sites. Subsequently, the petitioner procured the impugned development

plan, whereins, it has been mentioned that vide endorsement dated

25.10.2021, the nursery and primary school sites (supra) have been

replanned as Nursing Home site-1, Nursing Home site-2 and Nursing Home

site-3, and, it has also been proposed to develop a multiple level parking on

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the said site. The petitioners also received information from the office of

Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (for short ‘the HSVP’), that the highest

bids of Nursing Home site-1 and Nursing Home site-2, were given by the

Alchemist Hospital, whereas, the highest bid for Nursing Home site-3 was

given by one Ms. Sunita, however, the instant conversion is required to be

declared to be completely flawed.

Submissions on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits-

(i)That the exercise of revising/amending the initial layout

plan rather has been conducted at the behest of respondent No. 5, in order to

respectively extend benefit to it/him/her, and, since the e-auction was

conducted in less than a month after the revised layout plan became

approved by the HSVP. Therefore, not only the said amendment was made

in complete violation of the mandate(s) of law as well as to the principles of

natural justice, but also the conducting of the e-auction is ridden with the

vice of sub coloris officio.

(ii)That the respondents concerned, have violated the provisions of

Section 79 of the Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran Act, 1977 (for short

‘the HSVP Act’) and of Sections 4 and 5 of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and

Controlled Areas Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act of 1963). He further submits,

that sub-Section (3) of Section 79 of the HSVP Act, provides that before

making any amendments in the plan, the HSVP shall publish a notice calling

for objections and suggestions. Moreover when, Sections 17 and 19 of the

Panchkula Metropolitan Development Authority Act, provisions whereof

become extracted hereinafter, thus deal with the infrastructure development

plan, and, also contemplate the publication of a notice calling for objections

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and suggestions rather before approvals being made, vis-a-vis the

development plan.

“17. (1) The Chief Executive Officer shall, within a period of nine

months from the commencement of this Act and at such intervals

thereafter, as may be prescribed, after such consultations, as may

be specified by regulations, prepare an infrastructure development

plan for the notified area:

Provided that such infrastructure development plan shall be

in conformity with the final plans published under sub-section (7) of

section 5 of the Haryana Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas

Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963.

(2)The infrastructure development plan shall –

(a) describe and detail the infrastructure development work

and urban amenities, including but not limited to roads, water

supply, sewage disposal, storm water drainage, electricity, solid

waste management, public transportation, parking and other urban

amenities, required for the maintenance of a reasonable standard of

living of residents of the notified area or part thereof:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any

internal development work under the control and management of

the local authority or internal development work undertaken or

intended to be undertaken, by any owner who has been granted a

licence under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Haryana

Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975):

Provided further that the parameters for measuring the

reasonable standard of living of residents shall be such, as may be

determined by the Authority;

(b) specify the right of way requirements for infrastructure

development work under, over, along, across or upon any road or

public street or any property vested in or under the control or

management of the Authority, including but not limited to

electricity, telecommunications, piped natural gas, provided by

entities under a licence issued by or under any State law:

Provided that the right of way requirements shall make

provision for prevention of frequent damage to road and related

infrastructure standing thereon.

(3)The Chief Executive Officer shall cause the infrastructure

development plan to be published on the website of the Authority for

the purpose of inviting objections or suggestions thereon.

(4)Any person, including a member of the Residents Advisory

Council nominated under clause (g) of sub-section (2) of section 11,

may within a period of thirty days from the date of publication of the

plan under sub-section (3) send his objections or suggestions in

writing, if any, in respect of such plan to the Chief Executive Officer

and he shall submit, within a period of sixty days from the aforesaid

date, the infrastructure development plan alongwith his

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -5-

recommendations to the Authority.

(5)After considering the objections and suggestions, if any, and

the recommendations of the Chief Executive Officer thereon, the

Authority shall, subject to such modifications, as it deems fit,

prepare final infrastructure development plan and publish the same

on the website of the Authority.

(6)The infrastructure development plan may, from time to time,

as may be required, be modified after following the process

described in sub-sections (3) to (5), in so far as the modification is

concerned

18.x x x x

19.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other State

law for the time being in force, no board, company, agency or

person shall, except in accordance with the infrastructure

development plan, undertake any infrastructure development, within

the notified area of a nature that has been entrusted to the Authority

under this Act or rules or regulations made thereunder.

(2)Any board, company, agency or person desiring to undertake

infrastructure development referred to in sub-section (1) shall

intimate, in writing to the Chief Executive Officer, its proposal for

infrastructure development, in such form and manner, as may be

specified by regulations, alongwith a certificate to the effect that the

proposal is in accordance with the infrastructure development plan:

Provided that the local authority or any owner who has been

granted a licence under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Haryana

Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975)

shall not submit a proposal for internal development work to the

Authority: Provided further that the local authority shall inform the

Authority about its intent to undertake any infrastructure

development work other than an internal development work and

such information shall be provided, except when it is of an emergent

nature, at least thirty days prior to the commencement of such

infrastructure development work.

(3)The Chief Executive Officer immediately on the receipt of the

proposal referred to in sub-section (2) but not later than three

working days, shall cause to place the proposal alongwith all

documents submitted, on the website of the Authority.

(4)Any resident of the notified area may, within a period of

twenty-one days from the date on which the proposal was placed on

the website of the Authority under sub-section (3), submit his

objections or suggestions on the proposal to the Chief Executive

Officer.

(5)The Chief Executive Officer shall, within a period of sixty

days from the date on which the proposal was placed on the website

of the Authority under sub-section (3) and after examination of the

objections and suggestions and making such inquiry, as he

considers necessary, either give his concurrence to the proposal or

submit his recommendations alongwith reasons thereof to the

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -6-

board, company, agency or person submitting the proposal under

sub-section (2).

(6)The concurrence or the recommendations alongwith reasons

thereof referred to in sub-section (5) shall be placed on the website

of the Authority.

(7)If the Chief Executive Officer, while making his

recommendations under sub-section (5) comes to the conclusion

that the proposal has a material and pervasive effect and affects

public interest, he shall proceed forthwith to submit his

recommendations to the Chairperson of the Authority.

(8)The Authority shall, after consideration of the

recommendations of the Chief Executive Officer give such

directions, subject to the provisions of this Act and rules made

thereunder, as it may deem fit and the Chief Executive Officer shall

be bound to act in accordance with such directions.”

(iii)However, it has been contended that none of the supra

provisions became implemented at the instance of the respondent concerned,

wherebys there has been a breach to the principles of natural justice,

whereupon, the impugned layout plan is required to be quashed and set

aside.

(iv)That since at the time of allotment of residential plots to

the petitioners, in the development plan of Sector-21, rather the sites in

question were shown to be reserved for a nursery and a primary school site,

therefore, the HSVP is bound by the principle of promissory estoppel.

(v)That since owing to the existence of supra hospital in

proximity to the residential homes of the present petitioners, thus the

infrastructure is already burdened, thereupons in case more area is provided

for construction of nursing homes, therebys the basic infrastructural facilities

would become collapsed.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits, that the entire

exercise of amending the layout plan, has been malafidely done. Therefore,

it is prayed that the impugned revised layout plan be quashed.

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -7-

5. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the

petitioners has placed reliance on a judgment rendered by the Apex Court in

case titled as ‘M.C.Mehta versus Union of India and others (SC) reported

in JT 2018 (5) SC 383’. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment

becomes extracted hereinafter.

“15. Again unfortunately, instead of taking the people of Delhi into

confidence with regard to amendments to the Master Plan, a bogey

of public order and rioting has been sought to be communicated to

us as if the law and order situation in Delhi was getting out of

control. We are at a loss to understand the hyper-reaction and how

changes in the Master Plan are sought to be brought about without

any meaningful public participation with perhaps an intent to satisfy

some lobbies and curtailing a period of 90 days to just 3 days on

some unfounded basis. It must be appreciated that the people of

Delhi come first.”

6. On the basis of the judgment (supra), it is contended, that only

if in terms of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1963, provisions whereof

become extracted hereinafter, the respondent concerned, after inviting

objections from the concerned, thus had prepared the layout plan, therebys

alone, the preparation of the impugned layout plan was permissible, thus on

the ground that therebys, there was adherence made to the principles of

natural justice. The said adherence emanates on account of the fact that the

statutorily ordained objections becoming imperatively invited from the

present petitioners, besides prior to the preparation of the layout plan, thus

the said objections becoming rejected through thereons a well drawn

reasoned order becoming made. Consequently, it is vehemently contended

before this Court that the impugned layout plan also breaches the mandate of

law, as declared by the Apex Court in the judgment (supra).

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -8-

“4. Declaration of controlled area.

(1)The Government may by notification declare the whole or

any part of any area adjacent to and within a distance of -

(a) eight kilometers on the outer side of the boundary of any

town; or

(b) two kilometers on the outer side of the boundary of any

industrial or housing estate, public institution or an ancient

and historical monument, specified in such notification to be

controlled area for the purposes of this Act.

(2)The Government shall also cause the contents of the

declaration made under sub-section (1) to be published in at least

two newspapers printed in a language other than English.

5.Publication of plans etc. in controlled area.

(1)The Director shall, not later than three months from the

declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 4 or within such

further period as the Government may allow, prepare plans in the

prescribed manner showing the controlled area and signifying

therein the nature of restrictions and conditions proposed to be

made applicable to the controlled area and submit the plans to

the Government.

(2)Without prejudice to the generality of the powers specified

in sub-section (1), the plans may provide for any one or more of

the following matters, namely:-

(a)the division of any site into plots for the erection or re-

erection of any building and the manner in which such plots may

be transferred to intending purchasers or lessees;

(b)the allotment or reservation of land for roads, open spaces,

gardens, recreation grounds, schools, markets and other public

purposes;

(c)the development of any site into a township or colony and the

restrictions and conditions subject to which such development

may be undertaken or carried out;

(d)the erection or re-erection of buildings on any site and the

restrictions and conditions in regard to the open space to be

maintained in or around buildings and the height and character

of buildings;

(e)the alignment of buildings on any site;

(f)the architectural features of the elevation or frontage of

buildings to be built on any site;

(g)the amenities to be provided in relation to any site or

buildings on such site whether before or after the erection or re-

erection of buildings and the person or authority by whom such

amenities are to be provided;

(h)the prohibition or restrictions regarding erection or re-

erection of shops, workshops, ware houses or factories or

buildings of a specified architectural feature or buildings

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -9-

designed for particular purposes in any locality;

(i)the maintenance of walls, fences, hedges, or any other

structural or architectural construction and the height at which

they shall be maintained;

(j)the restriction regarding the use of any site for purposes other

than the erection or re-erection of building.

(k)any other matter which is necessary for the proper planning

of any controlled area and for preventing building being erected

or re-erected haphazardly in such area.

(3)The Government may either approve the plans without

modifications or with such modifications as it may consider

necessary or reject the plans with directions to the Director to

prepare fresh plans according to such directions.

(4)The Government shall cause to be published by notification

the plans approved by it under sub-section (3) for the purpose of

inviting objections thereon.

(5)Any person may, within thirty days from the date of

publication of the notification under sub-section (4), send to the

Director his objection and suggestion in writing, if any, in respect

of such plans and the Director shall consider the same and

forward them with his recommendations to the government within

a period of sixty days from the aforesaid date.

(6)The Director shall also give reasonable opportunities to

every local authority, within whose local limits any land included

in the controlled areas is situated, to make any representation

with respects to the plans.

(7)After considering the objections, suggestions and

representations, if any, and the recommendations of the Director

thereon, the Government shall decide as to the final plans

showing the controlled area and signifying therein the nature of

restrictions and conditions applicable to the controlled area and

publish the same in the Official Gazette and in such other manner

as may be prescribed.

(8)Provision may be made by rules made in this behalf with

respect to the form and content of the plans and with respect to

the procedure to be followed, and any other matter in connection

with the preparation, submission and approval of the plans.

(9)Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, the

Government may direct the Director to furnish such information

as the Government may require for the purpose of approving the

plans submitted to it under this section.”

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has further placed

reliance on a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in case

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titled as Innovative Techno Park Private Limited versus State of Haryana

(P&H) (DB) reported in 2018 (4) RCR (Civil) 743, relevant paragraphs

whereof become extracted hereinafter, to contend, that unless the procedure

envisaged in the Act of 1963 became complied with, especially appertaining

to adherence being made to the principles of natural justice, therebys the

conversion of the initial layout plan to the one, as made in the impugned

layout plan rather was grossly impermissible.

“38. Faced with this, the respondents' contended that the

restrictions in the development plan and the provisions of law do

not apply to the instrumentalities of the State including HUDA,

which is wholly owned, controlled and managed by the Government

of Haryana. This submission was sought to be supported firstly on

the basis of Sections 18 and 24 of the Haryana Development and

Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 which read as under:-

"Section 18: [Nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the

Government, Improvement Trusts, Housing Board, Haryana, [any

local authority or another authority constituted under any law for

the time being in force by the State Government for carrying out the

development of urban area.] to develop land or impose restrictions

upon the use and development of any area under any other law for

the time being in force, [but such power except the power

exercisable by the Government, shall be exercised on payment of

such sum as may be decided by the Government from time to time.]

Section 24. Power to make rules:-

(1) The Government may, by notification in the official gazette,

subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for

carrying out the purposes of this Act and may give them prospective

or retrospective effect.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the

foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the

following matters, namely:-

(a) fee, form and manner of making an application for obtaining

licence under sub-section (1) of section 3 ;

(b) form of licence and agreement under sub-section (3) of section

3 ;

(c) fee for grant or renewal of licence under sub-section (4) of

section 3;

(d) form of registers to be maintained under section 4 ;

(e) form of accounts to be maintained under sub-section (2) of

section 5 ;

(f) manner of getting the accounts audited under sub-section (2) of

section 6 ;

(g) manner in which preference is to be given to the plot-holders

under sub-section (3) of section 8 ;

(h) form and manner of making application under sub-section (2) of

section 9 ;

[(i) any other matter in connection with preparation, submission and

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -11-

approval of plans.]

(2A)In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the

foregoing power and the matters specifically provided for in this

Act, the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette,

make rules for efficient administration of the Board. Such Rules may

provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(i) Prescribing the procedure to be adopted for project

identification, prioritization, public hearing, finalization of scope,

funding and structuring of infrastructure projects, conducting

feasibility analysis, public bidding of the project, concessionaire

selection, negotiation of contract, formation of Special Purpose

Vehicles, execution of concession agreement, implementation and

completion of project as well as its monitoring maintenance and

impact assessment i.e. covering the complete spectrum of project

cycle;

(ii) Prescribing the procedure for project implementation

including determination of tariff, assignments of assets, assessing

feasibility, and viability of finalized infrastructure projects,

termination of concession agreement etc. for successful

implementation of project and its termination in case of violation

of provisions of agreement;

(iii) Prescribing the form and manner in which finance, accounts

and audit of the Board of maintained, conducted and submitted

along with the form and manner in which the annual report of the

Board of prepared and placed and returns are submitted;

(iv) Prescribing the form and manner of furnishing returns,

statements and other particulars as may be decided;

(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may

be, after it is made, before the House of the State Legislature,

white it is in session."]

39. The submission is not well founded. The provisions of law, that

we have referred to, apply equally to HUDA as they apply to others.

The opening words of section 18 "Nothing in this Act shall affect the

power of the Government etc........." (emphasis supplied) themselves

indicate that it is the provision of the 1975 Act that do not affect the

rights of the Government etc. stipulated in Section 18. The section

does not make inapplicable to the Government etc. the provisions of

other Acts with regard to the provisions stipulated in section 18. The

instrumentalities of the State including the HUDA are not excluded

from the purview of these provisions. Section 18 only permits the

entities mentioned therein to develop the land or to impose

restrictions upon use and development of any area under any other

law. Section 18 does not curb the power of the authorities

mentioned therein to impose the restrictions upon the use and

development of any area. Section 18 also provides that nothing

contained in the 1975 Act affects the power of the authorities

mentioned therein to develop the land. The provision for the

preparation of the development plan and the user of the land are

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stipulated under the 1963 Act and not under the 1975 Act. It follows,

therefore, that Section 18 does not entitle the authorities to develop

the land contrary to the users stipulated in the development plan.”

8. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed

reliance on a judgment rendered by this Court in case titled as Haryana

Urban Development Authority now (HSVP) versus Satish Kumar Dubey

(P&H), reported in 2011(3) PLR 786, whereins, the relevant therein

conversion became dis-countenanced, thus on grounds paramateria to the

grounds raised in the instant petition. Therefore, it is vehemently argued

that the impugned layout plan is required to be quashed and set aside. The

relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted hereinafter.

“16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, appraised the

paper book, case laws cited at bar and the documents handed over

during the course of hearing and of the view that the revision

petition is liable to be dismissed as the order under challenge does

not call for interference, for, the lower Appellate Court found the

ingredients of Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC i.e. prima facie case,

balance of convenience and irreparable loss in favour of respondent

No.1- plaintiff and the reason is not one but many.

(i) The lower Appellate Court has, in my view, not committed any

illegality in interpreting the provisions of Section 79 of the 1977

Act, which has already been referred to in paragraph 13 of the

impugned order. Section 79 of 1977 Act provides that the Local

Development Authority may make any amendment on the master

plan or the sectoral/zonal/development plan, which it thinks fit

and does not effect important alterations in the character of the

plan and do not relate to the extent of land uses or standards of

population density. But before making any amendment in the

plan, the Local Development Authority or as the case may be, the

State Government shall publish a notice in at least one

newspaper having circulation in the LDA by inviting objections.

The full particulars of such amendments shall be reported to the

State Government within 30 days of the date on which such

amendments came into operation. However, in the instant case,

no such procedure has been followed by the Chief Administrator,

HUDA as vide letter dated 12.02.2018, had passed the following

order:-

"The proposal for carving out alternate petrol pump site in place

of taxi stand at Sector 42, Gurugram, received vide letter under

reference, has been approved by Chief Administrator, HUDA. A

part showing the duly approved site is enclosed herewith for

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information and further necessary action. Zoning plan of the

approved site may also be got finalized and send to this office for

approval on priority.

It is also requested to provide some other site for Taxi Stand in

near vicinity."

(ii) During the course of hearing, provisions of Rule 2 (d)

pertaining to definitions of Punjab Scheduled Roads and

Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Rules,

1963 was referred to demonstrate that 'development plan' would

mean the final plan notified in the official Gazette under

subsection 7 of Section 5 of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and

Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act,

1963 and the 'Sector' would be any part of the controlled area

indicated as such in the Development Plan and as well as the

provisions of Section 4 of the 1963 Act, which deals with the

power of the Government to publish by notification the plans

approved by it under sub-section (4) for the purpose of inviting

objections. For the sake of brevity, sub-section 4 & 5 of Section 5

of the 1963 Act are reproduced as under:-

"(4) The Government shall cause to be published by notification

the plans approved by it under sub-section (3) for the purpose of

inviting objections thereon.

(5) Any person may, within thirty days from the date of

publication of the notification under sub-section (4), send to the

Director his objection and suggestion in writing, if any, in

respect of such plans and the Director shall consider the same

and forward them with his recommendations to the government

within a period of sixty days from the aforesaid date."

(iii) A perusal of the aforementioned provisions reveals that same

procedure has been prescribed in the Gurugram Metropolitan

Development Authority Act, 2017. It is yet to be decided whether

the Chief Administrator had the power vis-a-vis the change of use

of the land after promulgation of GMDA Act, 2017, for, the said

Act has already been implemented as per the tender notice

invited by Advisor (Engineering) for and on behalf of the Chief

Executive Officer.

(iv) Both the counsel had argued the matter to such an extent as

if it is a writ petition or regular second appeal but in my opinion,

it is yet to be proved whether the plaintiff would be entitled for

permanent injunction on the grounds stated in the plaint, for,

provisions of the GMDA Act of 2017 and photographs shown at

bar have not been controverted by learned counsel for the

petitioners, thus, it would be domain of the trial Court subject to

proof in accordance with law to adjudicate upon the controversy.

(v) In view of the judgment referred by Mr. Aggarwal in Rajat

Kuchhal and others v. State of Haryana and others (supra),

prima facie, the authority of the Chief Administrator, HUDA was

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held to be wanting, for, it was held that change in the

development plan cannot be done by one stroke of pen by the

Chief Administrator, HUDA. It is also yet to be proved whether

the Chief Administrator, HUDA would have the power or the

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation in view of the decision

rendered in Rajat Kuchhal's case (supra) or there has to be

amendment in the Rule as per the procedure prescribed under the

prevailing Act.

(vi) During the course of hearing, it has not also been explained

by the counsel for the petitioners that as to why the area already

earmarked for petrol pump on the 30 mtr wide road as indicated

in the approved site plan cannot be used for shifting the existing

petroleum pump at IFFCO chowk and what was the reason for

converting the taxi stand into a petrol pump, particularly, when

there is already a high pressure petroleum product pipeline

maintained by the authority referred to above, therefore, the

provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC,in my view, are in

favour of the respondent No.1-plaintiff for adjudication of the

revision petition. Since the pleadings are already completed,

appropriate direction can be issued to the trial Court to expedite

the disposal of the trial particularly when the order of the lower

Appellate Court granting injunction by restraining the defendants

from converting the site earmarked for taxi stand into petrol

pump is in vogue.

17. As an upshot of my finding, the impugned order is upheld and

the revision petition is disposed of with the following directions:-

(a) In case, the issues are not framed, the trial Court shall

undertake an exercise of admission and denial of the

documents, which will curtail the unnecessary evidence, for,

the parties would be leading evidence on the issues which are

at variance.

(b) Since the entire controversy is rested on the basis of the

documentary evidence and the provisions of the Acts and

Regulations referred to herein above, the oral evidence

would not be that essential. However, without taking away

right of either of the parties to examine any oral evidence, I

deem it appropriate to direct the trial Court to give 4-4

effective opportunities to the respondent No.1- plaintiff and

the petitioners-defendants in accordance with law. They will

be at liberty to examine witnesses through the assistance of

the Court by moving application on deposit of process fee

and diet money. The four opportunities may span over a

period of four months from the date of receipt of certified

copy of this order and the trial Court shall expedite the

decision the suit within a period of four months thereafter.

(c) I would be restraining myself from commenting upon the

application of the Policies dated 29.07.2013 and 12.02.2013

with regard to minimum area prescribed for setting up a

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -15-

petrol pump on various areas/roads as it would also be proof

of evidence and domain of the trial Court.

(d) anything observed, herein, shall not be construed an

expression of opinion on merits of the suit pending

adjudication.”

9. Therefore, reiteratedly it is contended that the impugned layout

plan smacks of gross arbitrariness, besides of misuse of the executive

powers, as the said layout plan, but is in derogation of the Act of 1963,

rather on the premise, that no adherence becomes made by the respondent

concerned, vis-a-vis the provisions embodied in sub-Section (3) of Section

79 of the HSVP Act. Moreover, the impugned layout plan reiteratedly also

is contended to be breaching the mandate of Sections 17 and 19 of the

Panchkula Metropolitan Development Authority Act, whereins,

contemplations are made, that prior to the making of the infrastructure

development plan, thus a notice is required to be published for therebys

objections and suggestions becoming invited from the aggrieved, especially

before the finalization of the proposed amendment.

Submissions on behalf of the learned counsels for the respondents

10. The learned counsels for the respondents submit-

(i)That the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 are

not applicable in the instant case, and, the reliance made thereons by the

petitioners is inapt. He further submits, that the Act of 1963, the Haryana

Urban Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (for short

‘the Act of 1975), and the HSVP Act, thus became enacted for achieving the

ultimate objective of development of infrastructure, but in a regulated

manner.

(ii)That the Chief Administrator, HSVP is the competent

authority to approve zoning plan/layout plan of HSVP lands/sectors, and, is

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -16-

also competent to amend/modify any layout plan, at any point of time, if it is

felt that the earlier approved plan rather is not fulfilling its purpose and also

is not found to be feasible, thus owing to any circumstances or current

requirement of the development of the town/city.

(iii)That the HSVP is an autonomous body under the Act,

and, the planning of the land vested under Section 14 of the HSVP Act,

rather is within the exclusive domain of the HSVP.

(iv)That the reliance made on the provisions of Section 79 of

the Act of 1979 is also inconsequential, as the said provisions are not

applicable in the instant case.

(v)That neither any material change nor any amendment to

the layout plan has taken place, and, that the primary school sites and

nursery school sites, as became declared in the initial layout plan, but have

been merely replanned in order to increase the utility of the subject sites,

through creating thereovers three nursing home sites.

(vi)That the petitioners have failed to make a plea as to how

prejudice is caused to them owing to the action of the competent authority

by amending the layout plan (supra). Therefore, in the absence of any

prejudice being caused to the petitioners, therebys they cannot lay a

challenge to the approved layout plan.

(vii)That the petitioners have made the allegations without

any supportive evidence, and, that the e-auction was conducted by HSVP in

a transparent manner according to the provisions of law. Moreover,

respondent No. 5 had already deposited Rs. 50,81,120/- in the year 2021,

and, till date no LOI has been issued to it.

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -17-

11. In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel for

respondent No. 5 has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Apex

Court in case titled as (i) State of U.P. versus Sudhir Kumar Singh reported

in (2021) 19 SCC 706, (ii) Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. versus CCE, reported

in (2015) 8 SCC 519 and (iii) Patel Engg. Ltd. versus Union of India,

reported in (2012) 11 SCC 257. The relevant paragraphs of the judgments

(supra) become extracted hereinafter.

(i) State of U.P. versus Sudhir Kumar Singh reported in

(2021) 19 SCC 706

“36. What is important to note is that it is the Court or Tribunal

which must determine whether or not prejudice has been caused,

and not the authority on an ex parte appraisal of the facts. This has

been well-explained in a later judgment, namely Dharampal

Satyapal Ltd. v. Dy. Comm. Of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors.

(2015) 8 SCC 519, in which, after setting out a number of

judgments, this Court concluded:

"38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on

the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the

manner mentioned above, at the same time, the courts have

also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural

justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in

any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of

functions performed and to the extent to which a person is

likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the

aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain

circumstances. For example, the courts have held that it

would be sufficient to allow a person to make a

representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all

cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of

the case, not only full- fledged oral hearing but even cross-

examination of witnesses is treated as a necessary

concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in

service matters relating to major punishment by way of

disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-

fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as

well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an

admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is

held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is

for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-

decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the

courts have held that under certain circumstances principles

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -18-

of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse

factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.

39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present

case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking

action. While emphasising that the principles of natural

justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the

aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the

jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural

justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural

fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social

goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for

some reason-perhaps because the evidence against the

individual is thought to be utterly compelling-it is felt that a

fair hearing "would make no difference"-meaning that a

hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by

the decision maker- then no legal duty to supply a hearing

arises. Such an approach was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce

in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 1 WLR 1578], who

said that: (WLR p. 1595)

"... A breach of procedure ... cannot give [rise to] a remedy

in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance

which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in

vain."

Relying on these comments, Brandon L.J. opined

in Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [(1980) 1 WLR

582] that: (WLR p. 593)

"... no one can complain of not being given an opportunity to

make representations if such an opportunity would have

availed him nothing."

In such situations, fair procedures appear to serve no

purpose since the "right" result can be secured without

according such treatment to the individual.

40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception

which has been carved out to the aforesaid principle by the

courts. Even if it is found by the court that there is a violation

of principles of natural justice, the courts have held that it

may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the

matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision after

complying with the procedural requirement in those cases

where non-grant of hearing has not caused any prejudice to

the person against whom the action is taken. Therefore, every

violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the

conclusion that the order passed is always null and void. The

validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of

"prejudice". The ultimate test is always the same viz. the test

of prejudice or the test of fair hearing.

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -19-

xxx xxx xxx

42. So far so good. However, an important question posed by

Mr Sorabjee is as to whether it is open to the authority,

which has to take a decision, to dispense with the

requirement of the principles of natural justice on the ground

that affording such an opportunity will not make any

difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative

authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by

itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person

against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to be

in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to jump

over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the

ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have

served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will

serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage

and such things cannot be presumed by the authority.This

was so held by the English Court way back in the year 1943

in General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943 AC 627].

This Court also spoke in the same language in Board of High

School and Intermediate Education v. Chitra Srivastava

[(1970) 1 SCC 121], as is apparent from the following

words: (SCC p. 123, para 7)

"7. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr C.B. Agarwala,

contends that the facts are not in dispute and it is further

clear that no useful purpose would have been served if the

Board had served a show-cause notice on the petitioner. He

says that in view of these circumstances it was not necessary

for the Board to have issued a show-cause notice. We are

unable to accept this contention. Whether a duty arises in a

particular case to issue a show-cause notice before inflicting

a penalty does not depend on the authority's satisfaction that

the person to be penalised has no defence but on the nature

of the order proposed to be passed."

43. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, Mr Sorabjee

may also be right in his submission that it was not open for

the authority to dispense with the requirement of principles of

natural justice on the presumption that no prejudice is going

to be caused to the appellant since the judgment in R.C.

Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725] had closed all the windows for

the appellant.

44. At the same time, it cannot be denied that as far as courts

are concerned, they are empowered to consider as to whether

any purpose would be served in remanding the case keeping

in mind whether any prejudice is caused to the person

against whom the action is taken. This was so clarified in

ECIL itself in the following words: (SCC p. 758, para 31)

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -20-

"31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not

furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary

proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of

the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has

not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and

given the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case

was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after

hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion

that the non-supply of the report would have made no

difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given,

the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of

punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set

aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was

not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The

courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the

courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the

question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting

aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate

or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the

principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable

opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the

furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the

result in the case that it should set aside the order of

punishment."

45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even

when we find that there is an infraction of principles of

natural justice, we have to address a further question as to

whether any purpose would be served in remitting the case to

the authority to make fresh demand of amount recoverable,

only after issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In

the facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise

would be totally futile having regard to the law laid down by

this Court in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725] ."

37. In State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC

364, a Division Bench of this Court distinguished between

"adequate opportunity" and "no opportunity at all", and held that

the "prejudice" exception operates more especially in the latter

case. This judgment also speaks of procedural and substantive

provisions of law which embody the principles of natural justice

which, when infracted, must lead to prejudice being caused to the

litigant in order to afford him relief, as follows:

"32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the

preceding para, would setting aside the punishment and the

entire enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-

clause (iii) be in the interests of justice or would it be its

negation? In our respectful opinion, it would be the latter.

Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests

of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished

and that technicalities and irregularities which do not

occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends

of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to

achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -21-

achieve the very opposite end. That would be a

counterproductive exercise.

33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the

above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be

exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of

disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by

an employer upon the employee):

(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee

consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in

violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions

governing such enquiries should not be set aside

automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire

whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature

or (b) whether it is procedural in character.

(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with

as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial

compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable

in such a case.

(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the

position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant

for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the

delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking,

conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every

procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate

the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under -

"no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories,

the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be

examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether

such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee

in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found

that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be

made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting

aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no

prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is

obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it

may be remembered that there may be certain procedural

provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose

violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not

insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the

body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision

expressly providing that after the evidence of the

employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an

opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given

case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in

spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The

prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need

be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -22-

prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing

considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be

looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory

provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under

(4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same

aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct

principle.

(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a

mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be

examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be

that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a

provision can be set aside only where such violation has

occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.

(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which

is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether

the provision is conceived in the interest of the person

proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the

former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer

has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his

conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of

punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said

violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent

officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could

not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should

make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the

order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted

by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC

727]. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of

prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any

rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation

is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that

matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by

the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or

the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total

violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and

violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body

of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made

between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e.,

between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a)

In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be

invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to).

In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the

Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in

accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But

in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule

of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -23-

standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or

Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the

circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not

have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend

upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this

principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against

bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.]

(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the

primary principle of natural justice) the

Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the

ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule,

viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no

failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them

in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before

them.

(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or

public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi

alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to

balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural

justice and arrive at an appropriate decision."

35. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 237, the

expression "admitted and indisputable facts" laid down in

Jagmohan (supra), as also the interesting divergence of legal

opinion on whether it is necessary to show "slight proof" or "real

likelihood" of prejudice, or the fact that it is an "open and shut

case", were all discussed in great detail as follows:

"16. Courts are not infrequently faced with a dilemma

between breach of the rules of natural justice and the Court's

discretion to refuse relief even though the rules of natural

justice have been breached, on the ground that no real

prejudice is caused to the affected party.

xxx xxx xxx

22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we

would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural

justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are

not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a

considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can

be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the

applicant is not one of "real substance" or that there is no

substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not

be different, even if natural justice is followed. See Malloch v.

Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 1 WLR 1578] (per Lord Reid and

Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University [(1971) 1 WLR

487], Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [(1980) 1

WLR 582] and other cases where such a view has been held.

The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates'

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -24-

court, ex p Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn LR 351, 358] (Admn

LR at p. 358) (see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89) (1998) where

Straughton, L.J. held that there must be "demonstrable

beyond doubt" that the result would have been different. Lord

Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [(1987) 2 WLR 821, 862] (WLR

at p. 862) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in

certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand

Court in McCarthy v. Grant [1959 NZLR 1014] however

goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is

sufficient for the applicant to show that there is "real

likelihood - not certainty - of prejudice". On the other hand,

Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says

that slight proof that the result would have been different is

sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart

from Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40], Megarry, J. in John v.

Rees [(1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always

"open and shut cases" and no absolute rule of proof of

prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but

for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the

"useless formality theory" is a dangerous one and, however

inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship

observed that "convenience and justice are often not on

speaking terms". More recently Lord Bingham has

deprecated the "useless formality" theory in R. v. Chief

Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton

[1990 I RLR 344] by giving six reasons. (See also his article

"Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL,

p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the "useless

formality theory" has been made much earlier in "Natural

Justice, Substance or Shadow" by Prof. D.H. Clark of

Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch

[(1971) 1 WLR 1578] and Glynn [(1971) 1 WLR 487] were

wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn.,

1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596)

and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be

decided by the decision-making authority de Smith (5th Edn.,

1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet

committed themselves to any one view though discretion is

always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn.,

1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be

issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature

of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those

relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a

considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant

can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his

favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can

prove a "real likelihood" of success or if he is entitled to

relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -25-

may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts

are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a

considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of

their "discretion", refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus

or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We

may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in

State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364],

Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] that

even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a

distinction is to be made between cases where the provision

is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is

intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can

be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.

23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the

correctness or otherwise of the "useless formality" theory and

leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case,

inasmuch as, in the case before us, "admitted and

indisputable" facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as

pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J."

(ii) Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. versus CCE, (2015) 8

SCC 519 and

“38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on

the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the

manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have

also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural

justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in

any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of

functions performed and to the extent to which a person is

likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the

aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain

circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it

would be sufficient to allow a person to make a

representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all

cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of

the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-

examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant

of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service

matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary

action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged

opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On

the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of

charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the

punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this

reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional

hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have

held that under certain circumstances principles of natural

justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -26-

time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.

39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present

case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking

action. While emphasising that the principles of natural

justice cannot be applied in straight-jacket formula, the

aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the

jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural

justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural

fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social

goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for

some reason - perhaps because the evidence against the

individual is thought to be utterly compelling - it is felt that a

fair hearing 'would make no difference' - meaning that a

hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by

the decision-maker - then no legal duty to supply a hearing

arises. Such an approach was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce

in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, (1971) 1 WLR 1578 at

1595, who said that a 'breach of procedure...cannot give (rise

to) a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something

of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court dos

not act in vain'. Relying on these comments, Brandon LJ

opined in Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, (1980) 1

WLR 582 at 593 that 'no one can complain of not being given

an opportunity to make representations if such an

opportunity would have availed him nothing'. In such

situations, fair procedures appear to serve no purpose since

'right' result can be secured without according such

treatment to the individual.”

(iii) Patel Engg. Ltd. versus Union of India, reported in

(2012) 11 SCC 257

“23. From the impugned order it appears that the 2nd

respondent came to the conclusion that; (1) the petitioner is

not reliable and trustworthy in the context of a commercial

transaction; (2) by virtue of the dereliction of the petitioner,

the 2nd respondent suffered a huge financial loss; and (3) the

dereliction on the part of the petitioner warrants exemplary

action to "curb any practice of 'pooling' and 'mala fide' in

future".

24. We do not find any illegality or irrationality in the

conclusion reached by the 2nd respondent that the petitioner

is not (commercially) reliable and trustworthy in the light of

its conduct in the context of the transaction in question. We

cannot find fault with the 2nd respondent's conclusion

because the petitioner chose to go back on its offer of paying

a premium of L 190.53 crores per annum, after realising that

the next bidder quoted a much lower amount. Whether the

decision of the petitioner is bona fide or mala fide, requires a

further probe into the matter, but, the explanation offered by

the petitioner does not appear to be a rational explanation.

The 2nd respondent in the impugned order, while rejecting

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -27-

the explanation offered by the petitioner, recorded as

follows:

"Further the fact remains that clarification/amendments

communicated by NHAI were 'minor' and cannot be

attributed as a cause for occurrence of an 'error' of 'major'

nature and magnitude. With project facilities clearly spelt out

in the RFP document, the project cost gets frozen well in

advance and similarly traffic assessment & projections,

which largely impact the financial assessment, are also not

expected to be left for last few days of bid submission.

Therefore stating that an 'error' of this nature and magnitude

occurred is neither correct nor justified......... "

25. We cannot say the reasoning adopted by the 2nd

respondent either irrational or perverse. The dereliction,

such as the one indulged in by the petitioner, if not handled

firmly, is likely to result in recurrence of such activity not

only on the part of the petitioner, but others also, who deal

with public bodies, such as the 2nd respondent giving scope

for unwholesome practices. No doubt, the fact that the

petitioner is blacklisted (for some period) by the 2nd

respondent is likely to have some adverse effect on its

business prospects, but, as pointed out by this Court

in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and others, (2007) 14

SCC 517:

"Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect

private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide

contractual disputes."

The prejudice to the commercial interests of the petitioner, as

pointed out by the High Court, is brought about by his own

making. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned

decision of R-2 lacks proportionality.

26. Coming to the submission that R-2 ought to have given an

oral hearing before the impugned order was taken, we agree

with the conclusion of the High Court that there is no

inviolable rule that a personal hearing of the affected party

must precede every decision of the State. This Court in Union

of Indian and another v. Jesus Sales Corporation, (1996) 4

SCC 69, held so even in the context of a quasi-judicial

decision. We cannot, therefore, take a different opinion in the

context of a commercial decision of State. The petitioner was

given a reasonable opportunity to explain its case before the

impugned decision was taken.

27. We do not see any reason to interfere with the Judgment

under Appeal. The S.L.P. is, therefore, dismissed.”

Inferences of this Court

12. In the wake of the above contentions of the learned counsels for

the parties, it is but required to be determined whether the supra extracted

statutory provisions, rather are or are not applicable to the facts at hand.

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -28-

13. The principles, which can be succinctized, from the expositions

of law made in the judgments (supra), are inter alia (i) that the requirements

of adherence being made to natural justice, thus are dependent upon the facts

and circumstances of each case. In other words, there cannot be any rigidly

cast straight-jacket formula vis-a-vis the necessity of adherence being made

to the principles of natural justice, especially when for want of adherence

being made to the principles of natural justice, thus the executive decisions

are impugned before the High Court. (ii) Ex facie, the jurisprudential basis

for the adherence being made to the principles of natural justice, do become

grounded, on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome

leading to general social goals, etc. (iii) Moreover, such adherence is

required to be more rigorously insisted, upon, in case the apposite decision

making process becomes embarked into by the Courts of law or by the

authority(ies), who exercises quasi judicial functions.

14. The supra necessity becoming aroused in those lis’, whereins,

an acerbic contest emerges on the contentious assertions of the litiganting

parties, wherebys not only the procedural proprieties, rather for therebys

ensuring adherence being made to the principles of natural justice, but

require a rigorous adherence thereto, but also, the consequent thereto

assignings of adequate opportunities to the contesting litigants, thus to

adduce evidence on the relevant contentious issues, does concomitantly

become a dire necessity.

15. Resultantly in the supra genre of lis’ the wants of prejudice

accruing to the litigants affected by the decision but would be of no

relevance.

16. However, yet the rule or test of prejudice becoming proven to

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -29-

be encumbered, by apposite executive decision(s), though becomes also

exposited in the verdicts (supra), to somehow being construable rather to be

an exception, to the necessity of strictest adherence being made to the

principles of natural justice.

17. Nonetheless, qua the said factual scenario, there yet cannot be

any rigidly formulated straight-jacket formula. The reason for stating so

becomes grooved in the factum, that unless the statutory provisions omit to

entail a necessity upon the executive to adhere to the principles of natural

justice, therebys if the executive decision is yet made but without adherence

being made to the principles of natural justice, thereupons, the rule of

prejudice becoming encumbered upon the aggrieved, who however is also

not a party to the lis, nor is a party to the executive decision making process,

thus emerges to the forefront. Resultantly therebys, the aggrieved has to

bring-forth thus telling evidence, that the outcome of the lis has severely

prejudiced his rights over such disputed lands, over which he otherwise is

not directly invested with any right, title and interest, but only has some

incorporeal rights thereovers.

18. Nonetheless, insofar as the instant factual scenario is concerned,

the impugned decision if imperatively required, as argued by the learned

counsel for the petitioners, that prior thereto objections and suggestions, thus

purportedly in terms of the supra statutory provisions, thus were statutorily

required to be elicited, from the present petitioners, and, yet theirs not being

either elicited, nor any speaking decision becoming made thereons, therebys

alone this Cout would proceed to accept the submissions addressed before

this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the said regard, it is

also necessary to incisively dwell upon the import of the provisions

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -30-

embodied in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1963. However, before

proceeding to do so, it is necessary to bear in mind the objects and reasons

for the said enactment becoming made. The relevant objects and reasons for

the making of the said enactment was apparently to prevent a haphazard and

sub-standard development on the scheduled road, and, in the controlled areas

in the State of Haryana. Now for determining whether the supra stated

objects and reasons behind the passing of the supra legislation, thus become

proven to be breached, it was but necessary for the learned counsel for the

petitioners to initially make out a case, that a declaration in terms of Section

4 of the Act of 1963 became passed, wherebys the subject sites became

declared to be a controlled area, whereafters alone in terms of Section 5 of

the Act of 1963, the government became bestowed with a discretion to

prepare plans in the prescribed manner, wherebys became regulated the

infrastructure laying mechanism(s) on the sites concerned. Therefore, the

learned counsel for the petitioners became enjoined to place on record, the

notification issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1963, wherebys the subject

sites became declared to be a controlled area. However, the said notification

remains omitted to be placed on record. The effect of non-placing on record

of the said notification leads to an inference, that the provisions of the Act of

1963, rather were not applicable to the subject sites, nor therebys any

statutory necessity became cast upon the respondent concerned, to before

finalizing the impugned layout plan, thus invite scribed objections and

suggestions from the aggrieved, nor for the supra omission there was any

violation to the principles of natural justice.

19. If so, with the statute omitting to make any explicit speaking

qua in the said manner adherence being made to the principles of natural

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -31-

justice, therebys the apposite exception to adherence being made to the

principles of natural justice, became aroused. The said exception thus

becomes grooved in the factum, that therebys there was a necessity for the

present petitioners, to prove palpable prejudice becoming wreaked, vis-a-vis

their incorporeal rights over the subject sites being jeopardized.

20. However, for the further reasons, as detailed hereinafter, rather

no purported prejudice becomes encumbered upon the present petitioners,

vis-a-vis their incorporeal rights, vis-a-vis the subject sites, as no cogent

material in respect thereof becomes placed on record.

21. Be that as it may, though in view of the supra summarization(s)

of the principles, as culled from the judgments (supra), there cannot be any

strictly cast straight-jacket formula, thus for ensuring adherence being made

to the principles of natural justice. However, when as stated (supra), when

for breach, if any, being caused to the rules of natural justice, did yet require

the proven wreakings of prejudice to the aggrieved concerned, especially

when the statutory rules, do not entail any obligation upon the respondents

concerned, to adhere to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, when in

the instant case, this Court has stated that sub-Section (5) of Section 5 of the

Act of 1963, thus mandating that prior to the finalization of the layout plan,

there was a necessity of objections being invited from the aggrieved, rather

is not applicable, on the ground, that no statutory declaration was made in

terms of Section 4 of the Act of 1963. Resultantly therebys, the effect of

non-application of the said provisions, to the subject sites, unless the vires of

the said sub-Section became challenged, which however, has not been done,

but is that, qua therebys there is a preemption or a foreclosure of any right of

personal hearing to the aggrieved. Consequently, the present petitioners

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -32-

cannot constrain this Court that yet the impugned layout plan is required to

be quashed and set aside, unless palpable prejudice becomes provenly

encumbered upon the present petitioners, especially, vis-a-vis their

incorporeal rights over the subject sites, which however for the reasons to be

assigned hereafter rather has not been so demonstrated.

22. In other words, the provisions, as embodied in the Act of 1963,

thus are completely inapplicable to the facts at hand. The reasons for stating

so, as become underscored from the above discussion inter alia are-

(i) That from the contemplations made in Section 4 of the Act

of 1963, provisions whereof become extracted hereinabove, whereins, it

becomes expressedly stated, that the government is required to be making a

notification whereby it declares, any area outside the limits of the municipal

town or any other area, which in its opinion, has the potential for building

activities, industrial, commercial, institutional, recreational estates etc., thus

to be controlled area.

(ii)Therefore, for making applicable the said provisions to

the instant facts, such material was required to be existing on record, thus

manifesting that in terms of the said provisions, a notification became issued

by the respondent concerned, wherebys the subject sites also became

declared to be a controlled area.

(iii)However, reiteratedly since it is fairly conceded, before

this Court, by all the concerned that no such declaration in terms of Section

4 of the Act of 1963, became made by the government.

23. Therefore, reiteratedly since the precursor, for the applicability

of the Act of 1963 but is the making of a notification in terms of Section 4

thereof. However, when the said notification is not made, thus declaring the

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -33-

subject sites to be a controlled area. In sequel, the provisions of Section 4 of

the Act of 1963 are inapplicable to the facts at hand, nor therebys if any

provisions thereof became breached at the instance of the respondents

concerned, therebys there is no merit in the submissions made by the learned

counsel for the petitioners, that as such, the instant conversion is

impermissible, nor he can make any argument erected upon the judgments

(supra) that the relevant conversion is ridden with vices of gross arbitrariness

or excess of executive fiat, or qua the same becomes ridden with a vice of

sub coloris officio.

24. The reason for stating so stems from the factum, that the

Hon’ble Supreme Court and this High Court respectively, had declared the

thereins drawings of the relevant plans to be suffering from a gross infirmity,

but on the ground that therebys there was a palpable breach caused to the

relevant therein statutory provisions. However, since in the instant case,

though breach is alleged to be made by the respondents concerned, to the

provisions, as become engrafted in the Act of 1963, to the extent that prior to

the finalization of the layout plan, there was a requirement of adherence

being made to the principles of natural justice by the respondents concerned,

through theirs inviting written objections, from the present petitioners,

whereas, the said objections becoming not invited, therebys the impugned

layout plan is liable to be declared to be non est. However, since this Court

has hereinabove yet underscored the fact, that the said breaches would be of

somber/utmost relevance, only when a notification in terms of Section 4 of

the Act of 1963 became made, thus declaring the subject sites to be a

controlled area. Moreover since it has also been stated above, that the said

notification became not issued, as such, when therebys the other provisions

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -34-

also requiring adherence thereto being made, rather also did not emerge to

the forefront. Therefore, the Act of 1963 is completely inapplicable to the

facts at hand, nor the judgments (supra) are applicable to the facts at hand,

especially when instantly there are statutory foreclosures against adherence

being made to the principles of natural justice. Predominantly also, when the

vires of the said statutory foreclosures remains unchallenged before this

Court.

25. Now irrespective of a notification in terms of Section 4

becoming not made wherebys the subject lands were thus declared to be

controlled area, wherebys, the other statutory provisions’ envisaging the

makings of adherence to the principles of natural justice by the respondents

concerned, through theirs’ prior to the finalization of the impugned plan,

rather inviting objections from the aggrieved concerned, thus may have

emerged to the forefront, rather the trite fact that, Section 24 of the Act of

1963, embodies a savings clause, provisions whereof become extracted

hereinafter, thereupon the said saving clause assumes grave/somber

relevance.

“24.Savings.

Nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the Government or any

other authority to acquire land or to impose restriction upon the use

and development of land comprised in the controlled area under any

other law for the time being in force, or to permit the settlement of a

claim arising out of the exercise of powers under this Act by mutual

agreement.”

26. A circumspect reading of the above savings clause, discloses

that thereins becomes ordained that all the provisions embodied in the Act of

1963, rather shall not restrict, nor affect the powers of the government or any

other authority to acquire land or to impose restriction upon the use and

development of land comprised in the controlled area under any other law

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -35-

for the time being in force, or to permit the settlement of a claim arising out

out of the exercise of powers under this Act by mutual agreement.

27. Therefore, the effective import of the said savings clause, as

carried in the Act of 1963, is that, the power of the respondent or of the

HSVP to make acquisitions of any land or to impose restrictions upon the

user of the subject sites, which also may become exerciseable over

controlled areas, but remaining saved or becoming preserved. Moreover

since in terms of sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the HSVP Act, provisions

whereof become extracted hereinafter, the HSVP becomes empowered to

dispose of the subject sites even by way of sale, exchange or lease. In

addition, when in terms of sub-Section (3) of Section 15 of the HSVP Act,

provisions whereof also become extracted hereinafter, thus an empowerment

is bestowed upon the HSVP to make sale, lease or make transfers of the

subject lands by auction, allotments or otherwise.

“15. Disposal of land.

(1)x x x x

(2)Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enabling the

[Pradhikaran] [Substituted 'Authority' by Haryana Act No. 28 of

2019, dated 2.8.2019.] to dispose of land by way of gift, but subject

to this condition, reference in this Act to the disposal of land shall

be construed as reference to the disposal thereof in any manner,

whether by way of sale, exchange or lease or by the creation of any

easement right or privilege or otherwise.

(3)Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, the

[Pradhikaran] [Substituted 'Authority' by Haryana Act No. 28 of

2019, dated 2.8.2019.] may sell, lease, or otherwise transfer

whether by auction, allotment or otherwise, any land or building

belonging to it on such terms and conditions as it may, by

regulations, provide.”

28. Consequently, since in terms of the supra endowed statutory

empowerments, the HSVP adopted the instant mode of disposal of the

subject lands, thus through offering them for sale through an e-auction being

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -36-

conducted. As such, when respondent No. 5 was the successful bidder in the

said conducted e-auction, which as stated (supra) was so conducted in terms

of the supra bestowed statutory provisions. Resultantly, unless there was

evident colorable exercise of powers at the instance of the officer

supervising the public auction, whereins, respondent No. 5 was declared to

be a highest bidder, therebys the conducting of the public auction, but could

not be challenged. Since there is no averment relating to the said conducted

e-auction, whereins, respondent No. 5 was declared as a successful bidder,

thus suffering from the taint of colorable exercise of powers at the instance

of the officer supervising the public auction, and nor when there is any

further averment, that the said conducted sale by public auction suffering

from any material illegality or irregularity, therebys the rights of the

successful bidder(s) in the public e-auction, thus cannot be snatched.

29. In case, any interference is yet made in the outcome of the

subject auction bid, despite the fact that the respondent No. 5 has tendered a

part of the sale consideration, and, with respondent No. 5 also averring that

it is ready and willing to pay the remaining part of the sale consideration.

Moreover when, therebys the remaining sale consideration rather has

remained untendered, only on account of this Court staying the results of the

e-auction. Resultantly when thereupon an enforceable agreement, thus has

come into existence between co-respondent No. 5 and the official respondent

concerned. Moreover when, the official respondents concerned, has also

evinced its readiness and willingness to comply with the obligation cast

upon it, in pursuance to the contract/agreement, as became entered into

between it and co-respondent No. 5. Therefore, when both the co-respondent

No. 5 and the official respondents are ready and willing to comply with the

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -37-

contractual covenants, as become encumbered upon them. Resultantly

when, therebys the official respondents do acquiesce to the enforceability of

the apposite contractual covenants. As such, when concomitantly they also

acquiesce qua therebys the benefits of the principles of promissory estoppel,

and, also the principles of legitimate expectation becoming endowable to co-

respondent No. 5. In sequel, the further consequent effect thereof, is that, all

the benefits of the supra acquiescences employable qua all concerned, thus

ad idem becoming accepted to be endowed vis-a-vis co-respondent No. 5.

30. Be that as it may, when the petitioners are not privy to the

acquiesced contract entered into amongst the official respondents, and,

respondent No. 5, therebys they cannot be permitted to intrude into the said

contract, merely on account of the purportedly vitiated instant conversion.

Moreover, since this Court has hereinabove concluded, that there was no

statutory necessity for adherence being made to the principles of natural

justice, therebys, the petitioners were required to place on record, thus such

material demonstrating, that in the making of the impugned conversion, their

incorporeal rights over the subject sites became severely impaired.

31. However, when for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, the

said permissible premise, thus for the petitioners successfully challenging

the impugned layout plan, rather is grossly amiss. Initially for the reason

that the houses of the petitioners are situated in proximity to the already

operational hospital nomenclatured as Alchemist Hospital. Since the said

hospital is opposite/adjoining to the respective homes of the present

petitioners. Though, it is averred that owing to heavy congestion of traffic in

the locale concerned, therebys the impugned conversion would overload the

existing infrastructure. However, the said grouse was required to be initially

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -38-

raised at the stage when the supra hospital was under construction. However,

since then the petitioners permitted the said hospital to become constructed

at the relevant site, therebys the petitioners acquiesce to the validity of the

construction of the hospital (supra), which exists opposite/adjoining to the

houses of the petitioners. Consequently, they are also estopped to contend,

that owing to the existence of the said hospital in the vicinity of their homes,

therebys there would be an overload of congestion, on the sectoral road

concerned, nor but obviously therebys any palpable prejudice is caused to

the petitioners, on account of the existence of the supra hospital in the

vicinity of their homes.

32. The consequent corollary thereof, is that, when initially the

subject sites became earmarked as Nursery and Primary School sites, and,

when therebys too, there would be also an increase of congestion of traffic in

the locale, which, however, may not occur as the subject sites have been

converted into nursing home sites. The reason for stating so becomes

garnered from the factum, that the over congestion, if any, on the sectoral

road concerned, but appears to become obviated through a proposal for a

multi-level parking being created on the subject sites.

33. In the wake of the above, if the impugned conversion is

quashed, therebys the proposed thereovers nursery and primary sites, but

contrarily would promote an over congestion over the sectoral road

concerned, whereupons some prejudice rather would accrue to the present

petitioners. The reason being that, in the earlier layout plan, there was no

multi-level parking for accommodating the vehicles, thus required to be

plied on the sectoral road concerned, rather for taking the students to the

schools, and, after the school hours, the vehicles being re-deployed for

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -39-

taking back the students to their respective homes. Resultantly therebys, the

extantly proposed multi-level parking, appears to be a well contemplated

functional plan for easing the increased flow of traffic on the sectoral road

concerned, wherebys also no prejudice accrues to the present petitioners,

thus on account of the present conversion.

34. Now the aspect that the hospital (supra) is in operational in

proximity to the subject sites, therefore when the subject sites would

augment the health services of the citizens/residents, who are already

receiving treatment at the Alchemist Hospital. Resultantly therebys, when

contra to the school sites being raised in terms of the initial layout plan in

the vicinity of the Alchemist Hospital, there may have been some deleterious

effect on the health of the students, who may have been undertaking

education at such established schools, inasmuch as, on account of some

deleterious emissions or on account of some contagion, if any, which may

stem from the hospital premise. As such, for avoiding any impairment to the

health of the students, who would undertake education in the schools, to be

constructed in the vicinity of Alchemist Hospital, thus therebys the making

of the impugned layout plan obviously appears to be made with an insightful

vision, but for promoting the health of the students. Therefore, the impugned

layout plan is in alignment of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, insofar

as the health concerns of the students, who would undertake education in the

schools to be raised on the earlier school sites, thus become well attended to.

Moreover when therebys, the acquisition of skills by the nurses, who would

undertake nursing education in the nursing home sites, to be constructed as

per the layout plan, has also been well attended to.

35. Now adjudging from the perspective of the instantly proposed

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -40-

nursing home sites, thus visibly augmenting the health concerns of the

patients already undertaking treatment at Alchemist Hospital, therebys also

when the apposite additional infrastructure would be created adjunct to the

already operational hospital (supra). Moreover when therebys, the health

concerns of the elderly citizens, as also of the ailing children, thus would

become well augmented, besides when therebys there would be an intensive

training to the nurses also, who would receive education at the nursing home

sites, through theirs engaging with the doctors concerned, who administer

treatment to the patients inmated in the hospital (supra). Consequently when

therebys, there would be an additional augmentation to the health apparatus,

thus beneficial to all the residents of the society, therebys naturally the right

to life, as enunciated in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but also

would become well furthered. As such, the impugned conversion is in

alignment with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and, does not require

the same being quashed and set aside. Contrarily, the impugned legislation

is made within the domain of the jurisdiction vested in the competent

authority concerned, to alter the internal layout plans, alteration whereof, as

stated (supra), is beneficial to the health concerns of the society residents

inclusive of the present petitioners, who but would also be the beneficiaries

of the health services to be purveyed at the already existing hospital, and, to

which the proposed augmentation, thus would occur, through the making of

the impugned conversion. Resultantly therebys, rather than prejudice being

caused to the present petitioners, they would be the beneficiaries of the

impugned conversion.

36. Moreover, since the right to practice of business and occupation

is the fundamental right, to which respondent No. 5 is entitled, as respondent

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -41-

No. 5 is running a hospital nomenclatured as Alchemist Hospital, at the

relevant site, to which an augmented infrastructure would be added, therebys

the said right to practice business and profession, rather cannot be curtailed

through the instant writ petition, unless accruals of demonstrable palpable

prejudice to the incorporeal rights of the present petitioners rather became

cogently established. Since any purported accrual of prejudice to the

incorporeal rights of the petitioners arising from there being an increased

flow of traffic on the relevant sectoral roads concerned, when for the reasons

(supra), has been declared to be mitigated, through a proposal for creation of

a multi-level parking. Consequently, if yet the fundamental right to practice

business and profession as endowed, vis-a-vis respondent No. 5, thus is

fettered, therebys gross injustice would be wreaked upon co-respondent

No. 5.

37. Moreover, since the sale of the subject sites through an e-

auction was duly notified, thereupon when at the stage of publication of the

e-auction notice, the present petitioners had the right to restrain the

respondents concerned, from conducting the public e-auction, but theirs

having waived or abandoned the said challenge, therebys the petitioners

cannot, at this stage, ask for the quashing of the public e-auction, besides

they cannot ask for the concomitant relief, that there has been any arbitrary

alteration in the layout plan. If the said is done, thereupon the apposite

contract, as entered into, through the issuance of a letter of allotment to the

successful bidder(s) concerned, rather would become breached, besides

therebys, both the principles of promissory estoppel and the principles of

legitimate expectation, as become favourably attracted vis-a-vis respondent

No. 5, thus would also become violated, especially when the said principles

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -42-

have been accepted by the official respondents concerned, to be endowable

to co-respondent No. 5.

38. Now assuming that irrespective of no allegation being made by

the present petitioners regarding respondent No. 5, being the successful

bidder in the e-auction, on the ground, that the auction proceedings became

tainted with any material illegality and irregularity. Moreover, irrespective

of the fact, that despite the publication of the e-auction notice, the petitioners

rather not making a motion before this Court, thus for restraining the

respondents from conducting e-auction, wherebys the petitioners may

become estopped to make a challenge, thus both to the conversion, and, also

to the e-auction, yet paramountly the petitioners, were required to prove, that

the mandate embodied in Section 14 of the HSVP Act, and, that all the

mandates embodied in Sections 17 and 19 of the Panchkula Metropolitan

Development Authority Act, thus requiring theirs becoming effectively

applied vis-a-vis the subject sites, did warrant theirs being complied with,

especially before the conversion being made. In the wake of the said

successful challenges being made, therebys both the public e-auction of the

subject sites, besides the prior thereto conversion would become amenable to

become declared to be arbitrary and capricious.

39. In the said regard, it is necessary to bear in mind the provisions

of Section 79 of the Act of HSVP Act, provisions whereof become extracted

hereinafter.

“79. Amendment of Plan.- (1) The Local Development Authority

may make any amendment in the master plan or the sector

development plan as it thinks fit, which may in its opinion do not

effect important alterations in the character of the plan and which

do not relate to the extent of land uses or the standards of

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -43-

population density.

(2) The State Government may make amendments in the master plan

or the sector development plan whether such amendments are of the

nature specified in sub-section (1) or otherwise.

(3) Before making any amendments in the plan, the Local

Development Authority, or as the case maybe, the State Government

shall publish a notice in at least one newspaper having circulation

in the local development area inviting objections and suggestions

from any person with respect to the proposed amendment before

such date as may be specified in the notice and shall consider all

objections and suggestions that may be received by the Local

Development Authority or the State Government.

(4) Every amendment made under this section shall be published in

such manner as the Local Development Authority or the State

Government, as the case may be, may specify and the amendments

shall come into operation either on the date of the first publication

or on such other date as the Local Development Authority or the

State Government as the case may be, may fix.

(5) When the Local Development Authority makes any amendments

in the plan under sub-section (1) it shall report to the State

Government the full particulars of such amendments within thirty

days of the date on which such amendments come into operation.

(6) If any question arises whether the amendments proposed to be

made by the Local Development Authority are amendments which

affect important alterations in the character of the plan or whether

they relate to the extent of land uses or the standards of population

density, it shall be referred to the State Government whose decisions

thereon shall be final.

(7) Any reference to the master plan or the sector development plan

shall be construed as a reference to the master plan or the sector

development plan as amended under this section.”

40. Though, Section 79 of the Act of 1963 refers to the procedure

for making amendments to the initially drawn layout plan, by the local

authority, which includes issuing notices and inviting objections. However,

Section 61(b) of the Act of 1963, provisions whereof become extracted

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -44-

hereinafter, defines the Local Development Area, as the area declared as

such, under Section 62(1) of the Act of 1963, provisions whereof also

become extracted hereinafter.

“61. Definitions.- In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise

requires,-

(a)x x x x

(b) "local development area" means the area declared as such

under sub-section (1) of section 62.”

x x x x

62. Declaration of Local Development area.- (1) If in the opinion of

the State Government any area within the State requires integrated

planned development, it may, by notification, declare such area to

be local development area and such area shall include the area

within a town or local authority including a municipal committee or

Faridabad Complex Administration, the controlled area declared

under the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas

Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 (Act 41 of 1963)

and the Faridabad Complex Administration Act, 1971 (Act 42 of

1971), or any other area which in the opinion of the State

Government is likely to be developed.”

41. A reading of the above provisions reveals, that there is no

declaration as such, thus declaring Sector-21, Panchkula as the Local

Development Area, therefore, Section 79 of the Act of 1963, rather is not

applicable to the subject site, nor therebys any of the statutory provisions

relating to the objections being ensured to be received and decided, rather

warranted any reverence thereto becoming meted, nor the omission to make

any reverence thereto vitiates the impugned layout plan.

42. Furthermore, reiteratedly the petitioners have failed to prove on

record qua any prejudice being caused to them. Moreover, reiteratedly

insofar as the grievance raised by the petitioner with regard to the problem

of parking is concerned, it is well contended in the reply furnished by

respondent No. 5, that in order to curb the parking problem in the vicinity,

the respondent-HSVP has planned an area measuring 2468 mtrs., for

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -45-

multilevel parking, besides an additional space of 9 meter wide pavement,

thus for common parking, thus has also been planned. Consequently, since

the said grievance of the petitioners has already been adequately redressed

by the HSVP, therefore, the said purported prejudice has no bearing at all

upon the impugned layout plan.

43. Moreover reiteratedly, the nurses in the nursing homes to be

established at the nursing home sites would receive training at the adjoining

hospital, whereupon when their nursing skills would become enhanced.

Moreover also, since the nursing home site is a facility for the residential

care of elderly people, senior citizens, or disabled people, and, also when the

said nursing home sites are to be also used by those patients, who do not

require being admitted in a hospital, but require constant care and

supervision. Therefore, since the right to health and medical care is a

fundamental right, which includes the right to access the nursing homes,

therebys also the said right, as endowed under Article 21 of the Constitution

of India, vis-a-vis all supra, but naturally has been taken adequate care in the

drawings of the impugned conversion.

Final order

44. In aftermath, this Court finds no merit in the instant writ

petition, and, with the above observations, the same is hereby dismissed.

45. The letter of allotment, if not issued, be forthwith issued, and,

also the deed of conveyance, if not executed, be ensured to be forthwith

lawfully executed between all concerned. Moreover, all the requisite entries,

if required, be made in the relevant registers/records maintained by the

HSVP.

CWP No. 26692 of 2021 (O&M) -46-

46. The miscellaneous application(s), if any, is/are also disposed of.

(SURESHWAR THAKUR)

JUDGE

(VIKAS SURI)

JUDGE

March 12

th

, 2025

Gurpreet

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable : Yes/No