IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,

SHIMLA

Criminal Revision No.4047 of 2013

Date of Decision : 9

th

April, 2026

_______________________________________________________

Manohar Lal ….Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent.

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Virender Singh Rathour, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar,

Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi

Chauhan, Deputy Advocates General.

Sandeep Sharma, Judge (Oral)

Instant Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 397/

401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, lays challenge to judgment

dated 01.07.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III,

Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, in Cr. Appeal No.26-

D/X/10/06, affirming the judgment of conviction dated 29.08.2006 and

sentence dated 30.08.2006, passed by learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, in criminal

case No.26-II/04, whereby learned trial Court, while holding petitioner-

accused guilty of having committed the offence punishable under

Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2

Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC, convicted and sentenced him

as under:-

2. In nutshell, case of the prosecution is that on 02.12.2003,

person, namely Neeraj Kumar was going from Dharamshala to

Kangra, driving a scooter bearing registration No.HP-40-6949 and

alongwith him one Sh. Manoj Kumar was a pillion rider. When

aforesaid scooter reached near Shahid Samarak, Dharamshala, a

Tata Sumo jeep bearing registration No.PB-06A-1993 came from

opposite side, being driven rashly and negligently by accused

Manohar Lal, who, while, overtaking a standing jeep, hit the scooter of

Neeraj Kumar, as a result whereof, Neeraj Kumar and Manoj Kumar

fell down and became unconscious. Two other persons, namely Sh.

Rajeev Kumar Dhiman and Sh. Malkiat Singh, who at relevant time

were also coming behind the scooter being driven by aforesaid Neeraj

Kumar, took injured to the hospital, whereafter the matter was

reported to the police.

Sr. Offence Sentence Fine

amount( )

1.

279 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for

one month

500/-

2.

337 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for

one month

500/-

3.

304-A Rigorous imprisonment for

Six months

2000/-

3

3. Complainant Manoj Kumar got his statement recorded

under Section 154 Cr.P.C., alleging therein that the accident occurred

on account of rash and negligent driving of the accused. In the

aforesaid background, FIR, as detailed hereinabove, came to be

lodged against the accused, wherein similar allegations, as have been

noted hereinabove, have been recorded. After completion of the

investigation, police presented the challan in the competent court of

law.

4. Learned trial Court after satisfying itself that a prima-facie

case exists against the accused, framed notice of accusation under

Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC against him, to which he pleaded

not guilty and claimed trial.

5. Prosecution with a view to prove its case examined as

many as 13 witnesses. Accused in his statement recorded under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the case of the prosecution in toto and

claimed himself to be innocent. Though, opportunity was granted to

the accused to lead evidence in defence, but in vain.

6. Learned trial Court on the basis of the evidence made

available on record by the prosecution, found accused guilty of having

committed the offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A

of IPC and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the

description given hereinabove.

7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial Court,

present petitioner-accused filed an appeal under Section 374(3) of the

4

Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Additional Sessions

Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, which came to be registered as

Criminal Appeal No. 26-D/X/10/06, but same was also dismissed vide

judgment dated 01.07.2013. In the aforesaid background, present

petitioner approached this Court by way of instant criminal revision

petition, praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting-

aside the impugned judgments passed by the learned courts below.

8. Mr. Virender Singh Rathour, learned counsel for the

petitioner, vehemently argued that the Courts below, while

ascertaining the guilt of the accused for his having allegedly

committed offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A

IPC, failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a

result whereof findings to the detriment of the accused came to the

fore. While making this Court peruse the statements made by the

material prosecution witnesses, learned counsel for the petitioner

vehemently argued that none of the prosecution witnesses has stated

anything specific with regard to rash and negligent driving, if any, by

the accused and as such, there was no occasion, if any, for the

Courts below to hold accused guilty of having committed the offences

under the aforesaid provisions of law. He further argued that though

learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, while

passing the impugned judgment, categorically recorded that there is

no direct evidence suggestive of the fact that vehicle in question was

being driven in rash and negligent manner by the accused, but yet on

the basis of circumstantial evidence, he proceeded to uphold the

5

judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial

Court, which is not based upon proper appreciation of evidence led on

record by the respective parties.

9. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional

Advocate General, while supporting the impugned judgments passed

by learned Courts below, vehemently argued that the same are based

upon proper appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the

prosecution and there is no scope of interference in the same. He

further argued that otherwise also, this Court, while exercising

revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C., has very limited

jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence. He also referred to the

statements made by the prosecution witnesses to point out that they

have categorically stated that the accident occurred on account of

rash and negligent act of the accused. While making this Court peruse

the spot map Ex. PW13/D, learned Additional Advocate General

vehemently argued that bare perusal of the same suggests that the

scooter, which was allegedly hit by the vehicle being driven by the

accused, was on its side, but the accused, while overtaking another

standing vehicle, hit the scooter, as a result of which, persons

travelling on the same suffered multiple injuries and, unfortunately,

one person lost his life. He also invited the attention of this Court to

the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab

versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182; wherein Hon’ble Apex

Court has held that courts below while dealing with the accident cases

should exercise great constraint, while taking lenient view against

6

reckless drivers, who drive rashly and negligently. Learned Additional

Advocate General, has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by

Hon’ble Apex Court in case State of Kerala versus Puttumana Illath

Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 Supreme Court Cases 452,

wherein it has been held as under:-

“ In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and

examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying

itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,

sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of

supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting

miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be

equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated

even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would

not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence

and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has

already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions

Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice

of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross

miscarriage of justice.”

10. In the aforesaid background, he prayed that the present

petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of any merit.

11. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties

and gone through the record carefully.

12. True, it is that while exercising the power under Section

397 of Criminal Procedure Code, this Court has very limited power to

re-appreciate the evidence available on record. But in the present

case, where accused has been convicted and sentenced under

Sections 279,337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, this Court

solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by both the

7

Courts below are not perverse and same are based upon correct

appreciation of evidence available on record, undertook an exercise to

meticulously examine the evidence available on record to reach a fair

and just decision in the case.

13. As far as scope of power of this Court, while exercising

revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and

another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case

Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial

mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is

salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or

miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness

committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of

sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as

under:-

8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose

behind conferring the revisional power under

Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High

Court is to invest continuous supervisory

jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice

or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to

mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of

the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The

power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide.

However, the High Court must exercise such power

sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge

has simultaneously exercised revisional power

under Section 397(1). However, when the High

Court notices that there has been failure of justice

or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure,

sentence or order is not correct, it is but the

salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the

abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to

8

correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by

inferior criminal court in its judicial process or

illegality of sentence or order.”

14. In the instant case, this Court solely with a view to

ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the submissions having

been made by the learned counsel representing the petitioner as well

as to find out “whether there is any illegality or infirmity in the

impugned judgments passed by the Court below, undertook an

exercise to peruse the evidence led on record by the prosecution,

perusal whereof, certainly persuade this Court to agree with the

submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the

petitioner/ accused that learned courts below have not appreciated

the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which, erroneous

findings to the detriment of the petitioner-accused have come on

record.

15. In nutshell, case of the petitioner-accused, is that no

evidence, worth credence, ever came to be led on record to prove

rash and negligent driving, if any, at the behest of accused and if it is

so, learned court below could not have sentenced petitioner-accused

under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC. At this stage, it would be

profitable to reproduce Section 279 of IPC herein below:-

“ Rash driving or riding on a public way:- whoever drives any

vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or

negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or

injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to six months, or

with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees of with both.”

9

16. Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law reveals that

to invoke Section 279 IPC, prosecution is under obligation to prove

that offending vehicle was being driven by the accused in rash and

negligent manner and due to his negligent act, injury was caused to

the complainant. Since factum with regard to injuries suffered by the

pillion rider, Sh. Manoj Kumar as well as Sh. Neeraj Kumar, is not in

dispute, this Court need not to go into aforesaid aspect of the matter.

Similarly, death of rider of the scooter, namely Sh. Neeraj Kumar, is

also not in dispute. Now, to ascertain whether the prosecution has

been able to prove that offending vehicle was being driven by the

accused in rash and negligent manner, this Court shall deal with the

evidence led on record in that regard by the prosecution.

17. Though, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses,

as stated hereinabove, but statements made by PW-1, Manoj Kumar

and PW-2, Rajeev Kumar, who are the spot witnesses, are relevant to

ascertain the correctness of submissions made at the behest of the

petitioner-accused. PW-1, Sh. Manoj Kumar, who was the pillion rider,

and suffered injuries in the accident, deposed that Neeraj Kumar was

driving the scooter at the relevant time and accused was driving the

Tata Sumo in rash and negligent manner. He further deposed that

Tata Sumo hit with the scooter, as a result of which, he and Neeraj fell

down from the scooter and sustained injuries. He also deposed that

he became unconscious at the spot. At this stage, learned Additional

Advocate General submitted that afore witness categorically stated

that vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently, but mere stating

10

of such fact that accused was driving the Tata Sumo in rash and

negligent manner may not be sufficient to conclude rashness and

negligence, especially in terms of Section 279 of IPC.

18. As per Section 279 of IPC, whoever drives any vehicle

on a public way in rash and negligent manner so as to endanger

human life, shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either

description for terms which may extend to six months, or with fine.

‘Negligence’ is the omission to do something which a reasonable

man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the

conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a

prudent and reasonable man would not do.

19. ‘Speed’ is not the criteria to ascertain the rash and

negligent driving, rather it is the manner, in which offending vehicle

was driven, which determines rashness and negligence. As per the

spot map Ex.PW-13/D, the offending vehicle was coming from Kangra

to Dharamshala on its side, but since at the place of the accident, one

jeep was parked in the middle of the road, accused, while overtaking

the standing vehicle, had to change the lane, and in the meantime,

scooter being driven by Neeraj Kumar came from Dharamshala side

and was allegedly hit by Tata Sumo being driven by the petitioner-

accused. As per the prosecution case, the road at the spot of the

accident was quite wide and three vehicles could easily pass. It is also

not in dispute that Tata Sumo driven by the accused was moving

uphill side and as such, it can be inferred that speed of the vehicle at

that time may not have been very high, especially when it had to

11

change its lane to overtake the standing vehicle. Moreover, perusal of

photographs Ex. PW-12/A to Ex. PW-12/E clearly reveals that scooter

being driven by the deceased Neeraj was hit by the bumper of Tata

Sumo from the driver’s side. Though, after being hit by the bumper of

the offending vehicle, the scooter fell down on the road, but

photographs of the scooter nowhere suggest that the same was hit

with high speed or force. At this stage, learned counsel for the

petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in case State of H.P and ors versus

Parmjit Singh, latest HLJ 2012(HP) 297 to substantiate his plea that

speed is not the only criteria to prove the rash and negligent driving.

The relevant para Nos.14 and 15 of the judgment is reproduced as

under:-

“14. It is a settled law that the speed is not a criterion to prove

the rash or negligent act of driving. The prosecution, as

already stated above is obliged to prove the necessary

ingredients of the offence by direct or circumstantial

evidence. To fasten the criminal liability for the offences

charged, there should be consistent, convincing and reliable

evidence. Even in the exceptional cases, where the rule of res

ipsa laquitar applies, it cannot be taken for guaranteed that

the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident is guilty of

offence. In the same situation, there could be civil liability as

well, in addition to the criminal liability, but so far as the

criminal liability, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt

and civil liability can be proved by preponderance of

probabilities.

15. On the strength of the aforesaid evidence, it is very

difficult to conclude that the accused was driving the vehicle

rashly or negligently, more specifically when it has also come

in the evidence that the deceased came in contact with the

12

offending vehicle while crossing the road. Therefore, in my

considered opinion, the offences punishable under Sections

279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code against the accused

are not made out.”

20. Leaving everything aside, neither PW-1 nor PW-2 has

stated anything specific with regard to rash and negligent driving, but

they have deposed that offending vehicle was being driven

negligently, which is not sufficient to invoke Section 279 of IPC, as

has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena

of cases. Moreover, this Court, having taken note of the fact that

Manoj Kumar was the pillion rider, is persuaded to agree with learned

counsel for the petitioner that, being a pillion rider, he would not have

been in a position to clearly observe or assess the speed or manner in

which the offending vehicle was being driven. Interestingly, pillion

rider, who was the owner of the scooter, was wearing a helmet,

whereas Neeraj Kumar, who at the relevant time was driving the

scooter, was neither wearing helmet nor holding a valid driving

licence.

21. PW-2, Rajeev Kumar, who was coming on a scooter

behind the scooter of deceased Neeraj Kumar, deposed that Tata

Sumo coming towards Dharamshala side, while overtaking the

standing jeep, hit the scooter of the complainant. He deposed that

driver of the Tata Sumo had fled away from the spot. He nowhere

stated that Tata Sumo was being driven rashly and negligently by the

accused. He also deposed that offending vehicle was being driven by

13

the accused in negligent manner, which is not sufficient to invoke

section 279 of IPC.

22. PW-3, Sh. Hans Raj Agnihotri, PW-4, Roshan Lal, PW-5,

HC Sushil Kumar, PW-7, Prem Chand, PW-8, Devender Pathania

and PW-9, Sanjeev Kumar are the formal witnesses and their

statements are not very relevant for determining the rash and

negligent driving, if any, by the accused.

23. PW-10, Dr. Adarsh Kumar, conducted the postmortem

examination on the body of Neeraj Kumar and issued report

Ex.PW10/A. PW-11, Dr. K.S.Dadhwal, medically examined Manoj

Kumar and Neeraj Kumar and issued MLCs Ex.PW11/A and

Ex.PW11/B, respectively. He deposed that the injuries suffered by

the injured could be caused in a vehicular road accident. No doubt,

MLCs adduced on record reveal that injuries suffered by deceased

Neeraj Kumar and Manoj Kumar were due to vehicular accident, but

once prosecution has been not able to prove that offending vehicle

was being driven rashly and negligently by accused, mere factum of

suffering injuries by Manoj Kumar and Neeraj Kumar may not be

sufficient to prove guilt, if any, of accused under Section 279 and 337

of IPC. Interestingly, learned Addititiional Session Judge, after having

gone through the evidence led on record by the prosecution though

arrived at a conclusion that there is no direct evidence that accused

was driving the vehicle in question in rash and negligent manner, but

yet taking note of circumstances, which otherwise have not been

14

disclosed in the judgment, proceeded to record that accused was

negligent in driving the vehicle.

24. Mere bald statement that the petitioner-accused was

negligent, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed to be

sufficient to hold the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed the

offence punishable under Section 279, 337 and 304 A IPC, hence,

this Court after having carefully perused the material on record has no

hesitation to conclude that the prosecution has miserably failed to

prove on record reckless or careless driving by the petitioner-accused

beyond reasonable doubt.

25. It is well settled that a person cannot be held criminally

accountable for his rashness and negligence merely because evil

consequences flow from his act, rather rashness must be such as to

endanger human life or personal safety of others. Similarly, for

criminal liability, the rashness or negligence must show a disregard for

human life or personal safety of others. Question whether an act is

criminally rash or negligent is a question of fact depending upon the

circumstances of particular case and as such, needs to be elucidated

minutely and with certain degree of precision. But in the instant case,

prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt

negligence, if any, on the part of the petitioner-accused. In this

regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Braham Dass versus State of H.P. (2009) 7 Supreme

Court Cases 353. The relevant para No. 6 and 8 are reproduced

herein below:-

15

“6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that there was no evidence on record to

show any negligence. It has not been brought on record as to

how the appellant-accused was negligent in any way. On the

contrary what has been stated is that one person had gone to

the rooftop and the driver started the vehicle while he was

there. There was no evidence to show that the driver had

knowledge that any passenger was on the rooftop of the bus.

Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand

submitted that PW-1 had stated that the conductor had told

the driver that one passenger was still on the roof of the bus

and the driver started the bus.

8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a pubic

way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must

be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a

public way in manner which endangered human life or was

likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously

the foundation in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not

(sic) negligence. Similarly, in Section 304-A the stress is on

causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for brining

on application of either Section 270 or 304-A it must be

established that there was an element of rashness or

negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto,

there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was

involved.”

26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled “ State of

Karnataka v. Satish,”1998 (8) SCC 493. The relevant paras of which

are being reproduced herein below:-

“1. Truck No. MYE-3236 being driven by the respondent turned

turtle while crossing a "nalla" on 25-11-1982 at about 8.30 a.m.

The accident resulted in the death of 15 persons and receipt of

injuries by about 18 persons, who were travelling in the fully

loaded truck. The respondent was charge-sheeted and tried. The

learned trial court held that the respondent drove the vehicle at

a high speed and it was on that account that the accident took

place. The respondent was convicted for offences under

Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A IPC and sentenced to various

terms of imprisonment. The respondent challenged his

conviction and sentence before the Second Additional Sessions

Judge, Belgaum. While the conviction and sentence imposed

upon the respondent for the offence under Section 279 IPC was

set aside, the appellate court confirmed the conviction and

sentenced the respondent for offences under Sections 304A,

337 and 338 IPC. On a criminal revision petition being filed by

16

the respondent before the High Court of Karnataka, the

conviction and sentence of the respondent for all the offences

were set aside and the respondent was acquitted. This appeal

by special leave is directed against the said judgment of

acquittal passed by the High Court of Karnataka.

2. We have examined the record and heard learned counsel for the

parties.

3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent

guilty for offences under Sections 337, 338 and 304A IPC after

recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at

a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by

the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the

respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly.

After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a

"high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of

res ipsa loquitur to hold the respondent guilty.

4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed"

does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself.

None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give

any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by

"high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the

prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it

meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the

case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything

essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused

always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of

innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved.

Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some

statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception

pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on

the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could

be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is

evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned

turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the

jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The

Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had

submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the

record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best

known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna

in the prosecution case.

27. At this stage, this Court also cannot lose sight of the stern

observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab

versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182, wherein it has been

observed as follows:-

25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe

that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a

17

nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the

“Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to

careless driving where the other people become their prey. The

poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of

uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still

apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who

project themselves as “larger than life”. In such obtaining

circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers

should scrutinize, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in

Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.”

28. There cannot be any quarrel, whatsoever, with regard to

the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the

careless/reckless driving of the drivers and the fact that drivers driving

under the influence of alcohol deserve to be punished but in the

present case careful perusal of evidence adduced on record by the

prosecution, nowhere suggest that the prosecution was able to prove

beyond reasonable doubt that vehicle was being driven by the

petitioner-accused in rash and negligent manner and he was under

the influence of liquor.

29. After having carefully perused the record and the

statements of the witnesses and applying ratio of law laid down by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment, noted hereinabove, this court is

of the view that the judgments passed by the courts below are not

based upon correct appreciation of the evidence adduced on record

and as such, same deserve to be quashed and set-aside.

30. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made

herein above, the present petition is allowed and the judgments

passed by the courts below are quashed and set-aside. Accordingly,

18

petitioner-accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him.

His bail bonds/personal bonds are ordered to be discharged and

interim order, if any, is vacated. All applications, if any, also stand

disposed of.

(Sandeep Sharma)

9

th

April 2026 Judge

(shankar)