As per case facts, the petitioners, legal heirs of an ex-serviceman, sought possession of land allotted to their deceased father by the Tahasildar in 1995, for which record-of-right entries were ...
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 1 of 30
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
RVWPET No.75 of 2024
CNR NO.ODHC010266232024
In the matter of an Application under Section 114
read with
Order XLVII of the CPC
and
Order XLVII of the CPC read with Chapter XII, Rule 34 of
High Court of Orissa Rules, 1948
***
1. Manoj Kumar Das
Aged about 59 years
Son of Late Prasanna Kumar Das
Resident of Village: Baselisahi
P.S.: Baselisahi, Town/District: Puri.
2. Arati Das
Aged about 57 years
Daughter of Late Prasanna Kumar Das.
3. Binapani Das
Aged about 55 years
Daughter of Late Prasanna Kumar Das.
4. Nrusingh Das
Aged about 52 years
Daughter of Late Prasanta Das.
All are Residents of Baselisahi
P.O.: Puri, P.S.: Baselisahi
District: Puri. … Petitioners
-VERSUS- RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 2 of 30
1. State of Odisha
Represented through
Secretary
Revenue Department
Secretariat Building
At: Bhubaneswar
District: Khordha.
2. The Revenue Divisional Commissioner
Central Division, Cuttack.
3. The Collector-cum-District Magistrate
Puri, At/P.O./P.S.: Puri.
4. The Tahasildar, Puri
At/P.O./P.S.: Puri. … Opposite parties.
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Petitioners : Mr. Surya Prasad Misra,
Senior Advocate assisted by
M/s. Soumya Mishra, Sakshi Rout,
Omkar Panda and G.N. Parida,
Advocates.
For the Opposite parties : Mr. Sanjib Kumar Swain,
Additional Government Advocate
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. HARISH TANDON
AND
HONOURABLE JUSTICE
MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of Hearing : 29.06.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 03.08.2026 RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 3 of 30
JUDGMENT
MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.—
The petitioners claiming to be the legal heirs of late
Prasanna Kumar Das, ex-serviceman of Indian Navy,
perceiving error apparent on the face of the record in the
judgment dated 7
th March, 2024 passed in W.P.(C)
No.23521 of 2013, have come up before this Court by
filing this review petition for grant of following relief(s):
“The review petitioners therefore, pray before this Hon‟ble
Court that in view of the grounds indicated above, the
same may be re-considered and this Hon‟ble Court may
graciously be pleased to:
(a) allow this review petition after hearing both the
parties and admit the same on the grounds as
indicated above;
(b) the judgment dated 07.03.2024 passed by this
Hon‟ble Court in W.P.(C) No.23521/2013 be
reviewed to the effect indicated above, the writ
petition vide W.P.(C) No.23521 of 2013 be restored to
its file and heard afresh by giving an opportunity of
hearing to the parties;
And may pass any other order(s), direction(s), as
this Hon‟ble Court may deem fit and proper;
And for this act of kindness the review petitioners
shall as in duty bound ever pray;
2. The case, adumbrated in nutshell by the petitioner in
the review petition, unfurls that the Government of RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 4 of 30
Odisha in Home Department declared late Sri Prasanna
Kumar Das, who served the Indian Navy and retired on
20.09.1967, eligible for “concession of 5 acres of land” in
pursuance of Home Department Letter No.28888/POLL,
dated 1
st December, 1966, but the same was not allotted
in his favour, which compelled him to file an application
before the Tahasildar, Puri on 07.12.1988.
2.1. In consideration thereof, the Tahasildar, Puri in
Army/Jawan Lease Case No.07 of 1988 vide order dated
5
th July, 1995 settled “the land of Ac.5.00 decimals out
of Ac.120.00 decimals in Mouza:Jagadal under Khata
No.537, Plot No.798, non-irrigated land on lease basis”
with certain conditions. Though entries in the Record-of-
Right in respect of aforesaid land were made in favour of
Late Sri Prasanna Kumar Das, no physical delivery of
possession was effected by the State/Tahasildar. Since
records were not traceable, the said late Sri Prasanna
Kumar Das applied before the Public Information Officer,
Brahmagiri, Tahasil for supply of certified copy of
Record-of-Right, whereby non-availability of the Record-
of-Right was informed on 23.06.2011.
2.2. Being aggrieved thereby, the deceased father of the
petitioners filed writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No.3081 of
2004. It is asserted that during pendency of said writ
petition on the death of petitioner-Sri Prasanna Kumar
Das on 29
th May, 2012, the natural heirs, being RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 5 of 30
substituted in his place, sought permission to withdraw
the writ petition with liberty to file afresh, which was
allowed by this Court vide order dated 22
nd April, 2013
with the following observation:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner wants to withdraw the
present writ application with liberty to file a fresh
application.
Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed as
withdrawn with the liberty sought for.”
2.3. Pursuant thereto, the writ petition being W.P.(C)
No.23521 of 2013 was filed before this Court by the legal
heirs of late Sri Prasanna Kumar Das with a prayer for
issue of writ of mandamus to the opposite parties to
handover the possession of land allotted in their favour
as directed by the Tahasildar, Puri vide order dated 5
th
July, 1995 in Jawan Lease Case No.7 of 1988.
3. Sri Surya Prasad Mishra, learned Senior Advocate
representing the petitioners, submitted that after filing of
said writ petition, certain documents received under the
Right to Information Act, 2005, were filed on 24
th
February, 2024 by way of an additional affidavit. Upon
hearing the learned counsel for the parties on 29
th
February, 2024, the matter was kept reserved and a
judgment was delivered on 7
th March, 2024 on
consideration of averments, contentions and arguments
vis-à-vis documents enclosed with the writ petition. RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 6 of 30
3.1. He further submitted that had the petitioners been
aware of the Resolution bearing No.20827-POLL, dated
7
th July, 1969 issued by the Government of Odisha in
Home Department, the resultant of the case would have
been tilted in favour of the petitioners. He sought to rely
of said resolution along with Clarification thereto issued
by the Government of Odisha in Revenue and Excise
Department vide No. (GL)-S-123/86 48798, the 2
nd
August, 1986, which read as follows:
“In the context of the Emergency arising out of external
aggression the State Government had decided under the
above Resolution to extent certain facilities to the
personnel of the Indian Army, Navy, Air Force as also
other allied personnel as specified in the Resolutions and
orders issued thereunder, serving in the forward areas,
on a review of the progress of implementation of the above
Resolutions it had been found as necessary to lay down
specific principles for extending such facilities with a view
to avoid misconception in this regard and to ensure that
such facilities are provided to personnel for whom these
are intended. On a careful consideration of all the relative
aspect having a bearing on this matter, the State
Government have, therefore, been pleased to decide as
follows:
(A) The concessions by way of assignment of land,
medical facilities and educational facilities
contemplated under the above Resolutions will be
available only such personnel who have served in
the forward areas during the period from the 26
th
October, 1962 to the 31
st January, 1964. For this
purpose, the personnel seeking such concessions RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 7 of 30
will be required to produce a certificate from the Unit
Command that he actually served during the above
period in a forward area.
(B) Dependent families of the personnel killed in action
with the above period will also be eligible to similar
concessions.
(C) It is provided in the above resolutions that the
facilities will be made available only to those who
are unable to manage without some form of
assistance from the Government. This conditions will
no longer be in force.
(D) The facility of assignment of land will be available
only to such personnel who are „Landless‟. A person
shall be deemed to be landless if the total extent of
his land along with the land hold as a tenant or
raiyat by all members of his family living with him in
one mess is less than 5 acres.
The principles regulating the grant of facilities as also the
relative procedure laid down in the above Resolutions will
be modified in terms this Resolution.
Orders
Ordered that this Resolution be published in the Orissa
Gazettee for the information of the general public and
copies be forward to all Departments of Government/all
Heads of Departments/All Revenue Divisional
Commissioners/All District Magistrates/All District and
Sessions Judges/Secretary to Orissa Public Service
Commission/Secretary to Government.”
*** RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 8 of 30
“Government of Orissa
Revenue and Excise Department, Orissa, Bhubaneswar.
No. (GL)-S-123/86— 48798, the 2
nd August,
1986.
Bhubaneswar
From:
Shri R.K. Rout, O.A.S.,
Joint Secretary to Government.
To
The Secretary,
Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack.
Sub: Clarification on allotment of Land to Ex-serviceman.
Sir,
I am directed to say that as per Home Deptt.
Resolution No.11323 dated 14.05.1963 and PO
20827 dated 07.07.1969 Jawan‟s who have served
in the forward areas during the period from
26.10.62 to 31.01.1964 are eligible for settlement of
Govt. Waste land up to 5 acres free of premium.
According to the provisions in the OGLS Act and
Rules Jawan‟s as such do not qualify for settlement
of Govt. Land. Besides settlement of Govt. Waste
Land for agricultural purposes with any one cannot
exceed one standard acre. So according to the
Odisha Government Land Settlement Act and rules
made thereunder a Jawan as such is not eligible for
Settlement of Agricultural Land. Some collectors
have rightly expressed doubts regarding Settlement
of Land with Jawans. RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 9 of 30
Since it is not possible for settlement of Govt. Waste
Land upto 5 acres with the Jawans in terms of the
aforesaid resolution of the Home Deptt. Within the
existing provisions of OGLS Act and Rules
thereunder. Government after careful consideration
have been pleased to decide that such settlement
shall be made within the ambit of Govt. Grants Act,
1895 keeping in view the nature of concession as a
reward.
Under Government Grants Act, 1895 sanction of
Govt. Land is to be done by the Government There
would be considerable delay if all such cares are
referred to the Government for sanction. In
consideration of this difficulty it has further been
decided that Tahasildars will be competent to settle
land with aforesaid category of Jawans under
provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895
conferring the status of a raiyat as defined under
the OLR Act, 1960
1.”
3.2. It is submitted that till the date of hearing of the writ
petition, the petitioners had no knowledge about the said
Resolution and the Clarification. Laying stress upon
Clause (D) of Resolution dated 7
th July, 1969, it is
submitted that since the facility of assignment of the
land would be available only to the landless personnel,
the petitioners being natural heirs of late Sri Prasanna
Kumar Das, who served the Indian Navy, are entitled to
be settled with five acres of land.
1
The Odisha Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965. RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 10 of 30
4. Sri Sanjib Kumar Swain, learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for the opposite parties opposing the
submissions and contentions of the learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that
this Court having perused the record and after hearing
the learned counsel for both the parties, delivered
judgment taking note of the fact and the legal
perspective of the matter. He, therefore, contends that
the grounds for review as contemplated in the review
petition do not fall within the scope and ambit of review
jurisdiction of this Court.
5. Heard learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
petitioners and learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the State-opposite parties.
6. On perusal of record, considering the grounds taken in
the review petition, this Court is not persuaded that
though the documents sought to be relied on in course
of hearing in order to seek review of the judgment
rendered in the writ petition. Inasmuch as the said
resolution and the clarification thereto having not been
placed for consideration at the time of hearing of the writ
petition, it is inappropriate to consider the same in the
review petition by tinkering with the merit of the
judgment. RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 11 of 30
6.1. Even if the case law in the case of Lily Thomas Vrs. Union
of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224, referred to in course of
hearing by Sri Surya Prasad Misra, learned Senior
Advocate, is taken note of for the purpose of assessing
the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise power of review,
the same would not come to the rescue of the review
petitioners. In the said reported decision, the following is
the view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India:
“It follows, therefore, that the powers of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute
a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of
the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review
cannot be treated an appeal in disguise. The mere
possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for
review.”
6.2. While considering the merit of the matter, this Court
referred to Resolution dated 14
th May, 1963 and also
amendment thereof vide Resolution dated 11
th April,
1964, found that the property as directed in the order
dated 5
th July, 1995, the Tahasildar, Puri had never
given physical possession. Nonetheless, with reference to
ground Nos.C and D of paragraph 4 of the Review
Petition, it is sought to be suggested by the learned
Senior Advocate that at paragraph 7.5 and paragraph
7.6 read with paragraph 10 of the judgment there is
apparent error of record which necessitated filing of the RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 12 of 30
petition seeking review of the judgment rendered in the
writ application. Elaborating further he urged that
having regard to order dated 05.07.1995 by which the
application of late Prasanna Kumar Das for grant of
Government land as concession was allowed by the
Tahasildar, Puri, thereby allotting an area of 5 acres of
non-irrigated land out of total area of Ac.120.00
decimals situated in mouza: Jagadal under Khata No.
537, Plot No. 798 and further, having regard to the fact
that pursuant to order of the Tahasildar, Puri, late
Prasanna Kumar Das was granted with the Record-of-
Right in respect of the land appertaining to Sabik Khata
No. 537, Plot No. 798 corresponding to Hal Khata No.
516/284 and Hal Plot No. 798/2896 measuring an area
of Ac.5.00 decimals in Puri Tahasil [erstwhile Brahmagiri
Tahasil], there remains nothing to be adjudicated vis-a-
vis the rights of the Petitioners in respect of the land
allotted in their favour. Therefore, he would submit that
it is not disputed that the said order of the Tahasildar,
Puri in granting the lease in favour of late Prasanna
Kumar Das has not been challenged by the State before
the competent Court of law and as such the grant
continues to remain in vogue. Hence he vociferously
submitted that there emerge no disputed questions of
involving the lis between the parties vis-a-vis
establishment of right in favour of the petitioners, except
the fact that the land allotted/granted in favour of the RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 13 of 30
late Prasanna Kumar Das is to be delivered by the State
in favour of the present petitioners who are the legal
heirs and are entitled to the said grant made in favour of
their father.
6.3. This Court though made the observations, as contended
by the learned Senior Advocate, taking note of the prayer
made in the writ petition that the opposite parties, more
particularly the Tahasildar was required to be directed
“to handover possession of Ac.5.00 decimals of land in
favour of the petitioners in Puri, Tahasil which was
allotted in favour of their deceased father, Prasanna
Kumar Das, after identifying and demarcating the
same within a period fixed by this Hon‟ble Court and get
the same mutated and recorded in favour of the
petitioners” found the same to be adjudicated factually.
Hence this Court declined to exercise of discretionary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
6.4. Under such premise, having dismissed the writ petition,
in garb of review, it is not apt to sit in appeal to re-
appreciate the evidence and reconsider the material
available on record which had already been considered.
6.5. This Court also took note of Resolution dated 19
th
February, 2014 of the Government of Odisha in Home
Department published in Odisha Gazette Extraordinary
No.480, dated 10
th March, 2014 and decisions of this RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 14 of 30
Court rendered in Pratima Mohanty Vrs. State of Odisha,
W.P.(C) No.27100 of 2013, vide order dated 12.04.2021
[2021 (II) ILR-CUT 13], Santosh Kumar Nath Vrs. Collector,
Sambalpur, W.P.(C) No.8364 of 2007, vide order dated
15
th March, 2021, Anil Palai Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C)
No.80 of 2016, vide order dated 31
st May, 2021, rejected
the prayer of the petitioners, legal heirs of late Sri
Prasanna Kumar Das. Since the documents, which are
relied on at this stage cannot be said to have come to
their knowledge. Had the petitioners applied due
diligence, the same could have been placed before this
Court in course of hearing of writ petition.
7. This Court is not oblivious of the following dicta of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of
Meera Bhanja Vrs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1
SCC 170, wherein it was held that:
“8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not
by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined
to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In
connection with the limitation of the powers of the
Court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with
similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while
seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the
Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma Vrs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC
389 speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has
made the following pertinent observations: RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 15 of 30
„It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the
Constitution to preclude the High Court from
exercising the power of review which inheres in
every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and
palpable errors committed by it. But, there are
definitive limits to the exercise of the power of
review. The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence was not
within the knowledge of the person seeking the
review or could not be produced by him at the time
when the order was made; it may be exercised
where some mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record is found, it may also be exercised on any
analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised
on the ground that the decision was erroneous
on merits. That would be the province of a Court of
appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with
appellate power which may enable an appellate
court to correct all manner of errors committed by the
subordinate court.‟ ***”
7.1. Second innings sought to be played by way of review
petition by the writ petitioners on the facts which were
considered while disposing of the writ petition and
placing new materials like notification/resolution and
clarification it was contended that those vital materials
were not in possession of the petitioners. A caveat: with
due diligence such materials could have been in the
possession and knowledge of the petitioners. One of the
basic ingredients against review is a second chance on RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 16 of 30
the self-same material factual scenario which was before
the writ Court. In State of West Bengal Vrs. Jai Hind Pvt.
Ltd., (2026) 2 SCR 497 it has been succinctly laid down
as follows:
“75. A review can be sought under this ground by an
aggrieved litigant on the discovery of a certain new
and important matter or evidence, which, after
exercise of due diligence, was not within his
knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed. A review of a
judgment is a drastic step, and a reluctant resort to
it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent
mistake or a grave error has crept in earlier by
judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different
counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second
trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor
mistakes of inconsequential import, are obviously
insufficient, as was rightly held in Sow Chandra
Kante Vrs. Sk. Habib Sow, (1975) 3 SCR 933. The
provision is not meant to give a second chance to the
aggrieved party who has lost their case due to their
own negligence.
76. *** A party cannot justify a review by producing old
documents lying in its own custody, as this does not
constitute “discovery” nor satisfy the “due diligence”
requirement.”
7.2. What constitutes “an error apparent on the face of the
record” has been clarified by the Apex Court in the case
of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. Vrs. Lt. Governor of RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 17 of 30
Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 = (1980) 2 SCC 167, wherein in
paragraph 9 it has been held as follows:
“9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material
so assiduously collected and placed before us by the
learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now
been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was
never brought to our attention when the appeals
were heard, we may also examine whether the
judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face
of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more
views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold
that the controversy can be said to admit of only one
of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the
original judgment is a possible view having regard to
what the record states, it is difficult to hold that
there is an error apparent on the face of the record.”
7.3. Error apparent on the face of the record is a condition
precedent for exercise of review power. Following
observation made in the case of Rajender Kumar Vrs.
Rambhai, AIR 2003 SC 2095 may be relevant:
“*** The limitations on exercise of the power of review are
well settled. The first and foremost requirement of
entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of
which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the
face of the order and permitting the order to stand will
lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error,
finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be
disturbed.”
It is not inept to note that the Supreme Court has
cautioned in the very same judgment that, RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 18 of 30
“*** for there is a distinction which is real, though it might
not always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be
characterised as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is
by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent
error. ***”
7.4. Regard can be had to Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vrs.
Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1964) 5 SCR 174 = 1963
INSC 213 = AIR 1964 SC 1372
2, wherein it is stated thus:
“*** The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on
an identical state of facts that a substantial question of
law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier
order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the
statement was wrong, it would not follow that it
was an „error apparent on the face of the record ‟,
for there is a distinction which is real, though it
might not always be capable of exposition, between
a mere erroneous decision and a decision which
could be characterised as vitiated by „error
apparent‟. A review is by no means an appeal in
disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard
and corrected. but lies only for patent error. We do
not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for
dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great
detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where
without any elaborate argument one could point to
the error and say here is a substantial point of law
which stares one in the face, and there could
reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it,
2
Referred in State of West Bengal Vrs. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., (2026) 2 SCR 497. RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 19 of 30
a clear case of error apparent on the face of the
record would be made out. ***”
7.5. The factual errors, if any, as being canvassed arduously
by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners cannot
be the basis for exercise of review jurisdiction. The
position has been well established. Regard may be had
to the following observation made in the case of Asharfi
Devi Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2019) 5 SCC
86:
“It is settled law that every error whether factual or legal
cannot be made subject-matter of review under Order 47
Rule 1 of the Code though it can be made subject-matter
of appeal arising out of such order. In other words, in
order to attract the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the
Code, the error/mistake must be apparent on the face of
the record of the case.”
7.6. In Jain Studios Ltd. Vrs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.,
(2006) 5 SCC 501 it has been laid down as follows:
“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is
concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is
right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks
the same relief which had been sought at the time of
arguing the main matter and had been negatived.
Once such a prayer had been refused, no review
petition would lie which would convert
rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law
that the power of review cannot be confused with
appellate power which enables a superior court to
correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 20 of 30
is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of
old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications. The power of review can be
exercised with extreme care, caution and
circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the
applicant herein had been made at the time
when the arbitration petition was heard and
was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought
by an indirect method by filing a review
petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the
nature of „second innings‟ which is
impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be
granted.”
7.7. In the case of S. Murali Sundaram Vrs. Jothibai Kannan,
(2023) 13 SCC 515, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
observed as follows:
“16. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions
of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section
114 CPC are required to be referred to? In Perry
Kansagra Vrs. Smriti Madan Kansagra, (2019) 20
SCC 753 this Court has observed that while
exercising the review jurisdiction in an application
under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC,
the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its
own order. It is observed that a rehearing of
the matter is impermissible in law. It is further
observed that review is not appeal in disguise.
It is observed that power of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake but not to
substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised
within the limits of the statute dealing with the RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 21 of 30
exercise of power. It is further observed that it is
wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite
a Judgment by which the controversy has been
finally decided.
17. After considering a catena of decisions on exercise of
review powers and principles relating to exercise of
review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this
Court had summed up as under: (Perry Kansagra
case, (2019) 20 SCC 753:
„33. *** „***
(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal
and have to be strictly confined to the scope
and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some
mistake or error apparent on the fact of record
is found. But error on the face of record must
be such an error which must strike one on mere
looking at the record and would not require any
long-drawn process of reasoning on the points
where there may conceivably be two opinions.
(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on
merits.
(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any
sufficient reason which is wide enough to
include a misconception of fact or law by a
court or even an advocate.
(v) An application for review may be necessitated
by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae
neminem gravabit.‟ (As observed in: RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 22 of 30
Inderchand Jain Vrs. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC
663, p. 675, para 33).‟
It is further observed in the said decision that
an error which is required to be detected by a
process of reasoning can hardly be said to be
an error on the face of the record.
18. In Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. Vrs. Assam SEB,
(2020) 2 SCC 677, it is observed and held that scope
of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC read with
Section 114 CPC is limited and under the guise of
review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
reagitate and reargue questions which have already
been addressed and decided. It is further
observed that an error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error
apparent on the face of record justifying the
court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”
8. The facts narrated hereinabove and submissions
advanced by the learned Senior Advocate that the
discovery of new materials, viz., Resolution and
Clarification, which could have changed the ultimate
view are vague and do not stand to reason inasmuch as
it is observed that with due diligence such material
could have been produced before this Court in course of
hearing of writ petition. Furthermore, it is canvassed
before this Court for review indicating that though there
is no factual dispute, contrary has been held in the
impugned judgment. Such argument is only to be RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 23 of 30
repelled inasmuch as the learned Senior Counsel
required this Court to delve into the merit of the matter
by revisiting. Recourse to review is abhorrence to
exercise of jurisdiction.
8.1. In this regard, reference to State of West Bengal Vrs. Jai
Hind Pvt. Ltd., (2026) 2 SCR 497 would suffice, wherein it
has been held as follows:
“79. Insofar as this ground is concerned, recently, this
Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) Vrs. K.L.
Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315, held as follows:
„45. With regard to (iii) (supra), we can do no better
than refer to the traditional view in Chhajju
Ram
3, a decision of a Bench of seven Law
Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. It was held there that the words “any
other sufficient reason” means “a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to
those specified immediately previously”,
meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra)
4. Notably,
Chhajju Ram has been consistently followed by
this Court in number of decision starting with
Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vrs. Mar
Poulose Athanasius [(1955) 1 SCR 520 = AIR
1954 SC 526]. ...
3
Chhajju Ram Vrs. Neki, 49 I.A. 144.
4
Paragraph 62 of State of West Bengal Vrs. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., (2026) 2 SCR 497
reads as follows:
“62. One can find the basic legal postulates of the scope of review in Section
114 read with Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the CPC, which are applied in all
proceedings in which the power of review is exercised. Thus, only on the
following grounds, a review would lie:
i. Discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or
ii. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
Any other sufficient reason.” RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 24 of 30
106. Moving on further, we find that the attempt of
the review petitioners has been to draw
inspiration from the ground “any other
sufficient reason” appearing in Rule 1. There
have been decisions of this Court which have
construed the words “any other sufficient
reason” expansively, like Netaji Cricket Club
and Jagmohan Singh, whereas there are
decisions, including Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos, Shatrunji, Kamlesh Verma and S.
Madhusudhan Reddy, that have followed
Chhajju Ram explaining that the ground “any
other sufficient reason” means “a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to
those specified immediately previously.
107. However, with utmost respect, we do not find
any of those decisions, which have taken an
expansive view, looking at such ground in the
manner we propose to look, for recording our
concurrence with the view in Chhajju Ram that
has unhesitatingly been followed over the
years. If indeed “any other sufficient
reason” were to take within its embrace
any situation not analogous to “discovery
of new matter or evidence” and “on
account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record”, we wonder why
the legislature chose to keep “any other
sufficient reason” immediately after the
aforesaid two grounds. If “any other
sufficient reason” were to be read independent
of the said two grounds, we believe the long
line in Rule 1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not
have been drafted in the manner it presently RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 25 of 30
reads. In lieu of referring to the said two
grounds as grounds on which a review could
be sought, the legislature could well have kept
it open-ended as in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 where it is provided, without any
strings attached, that any appeal or any
application may be admitted after the
prescribed period of limitation if the appellant
or applicant satisfies the court that he had
“sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal
or the application earlier. If the intention of the
legislature were to give an expanded meaning,
Order 47 Rule 1 would have read somewhat
like this: any person considering himself
aggrieved by a decree or order or decision of
the nature indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c)
for any sufficient reason desires to obtain a
review of the decree or order made against
him, may apply for a review. But that is not
what the provision says and means. Reading
Order 47 Rule 1 in juxtaposition to Section 5 of
the Limitation Act drives us to accept the view
in Chhajju Ram as having interpreted the law
correctly and acceptance of the same by this
Court and High Courts over the years, coupled
with the fact that Parliament did not consider it
necessary to amend Rule 1 when it inserted
the Explanation in 1976. Giving a wider
meaning to the ground “any other sufficient
reason” in Netaji Cricket Club and Jagmohan
Singh, therefore, must have been intended and
necessitated by this Court because the justice
of the cases so demanded but the same would
have no application in a case of this nature.” RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 26 of 30
80. Further, the Courts have time and again
decided what can fall under the term “any
other sufficient reason”. For instance, inter alia,
where the Court omits to notice or consider
relevant statutory provisions was held to be a
sufficient reason in Girdhari Lal Gupta Vrs.
D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189. Additionally, an
order arising out of a lack of jurisdiction was
held to be a sufficient reason in Budhia Swain
Vrs. Gopinath Deb, (1999) 4 SCC 396.
However, in the case at hand, there exists no
such “sufficient reason” within the meaning of
Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the CPC.”
9. The scope of review being very limited and founded on
three aspects
5 as postulated under Order XLVII, Rule 1
of the Code of Civil Procedure read with propositions as
expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India i n
very many decisions, the present case is not
comprehended within the parameters so set forth.
9.1. It may not be out of place to quote the following from S.
Tirupathi Rao Vrs. M. Lingamaiah, (2024) 7 SCR 1077:
“First, it is trite that the court cannot traverse beyond the
pleadings and make out a case which was never pleaded,
such principle having originated from the fundamental
legal maxim secundum allegata et probate, i.e., the court
5
They are as follows:
1. discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant’s knowledge or
could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was
passed, or order made; or
2. mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
3. for any other sufficient reason, which must be analogous to either of the
aforesaid grounds. RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 27 of 30
will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims and
proof led by the parties. *** Law is, again, well-settled
that when a point is not traceable in the pleas set out
either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered
on such point by the court would be unsustainable as that
would amount to an altogether new case being made out
for the party.”
9.2. It is not the case of the petitioners that this Court has
not taken into consideration the pleadings and
documents enclosed with the writ petition. This Court on
meticulous analysis of material made available for
consideration came to conclusion that factual dispute
does exist inasmuch as the prayer of the petitioner in
the writ petition was to direct the authority concerned to
demarcate the land allotted way back in the year 1995
by the Tahasildar, Puri in Army/Jawan Lease Case
No.07 of 1988 vide order dated 5
th July, 1995 and
handover possession. The argument advanced by Sri
Surya Prasad Misra, learned Senior Advocate, to press
the review petition is based solely on the ground that the
Resolution bearing No.20827-POLL, dated 7
th July, 1969
issued by the Government of Odisha in Home
Department and the Clarification thereto issued by the
Government of Odisha in Revenue and Excise
Department vide No. (GL)-S-123/86 48798, the 2
nd
August, 1986 were not within the knowledge of the
petitioners. It is fallacious. A public document like
Resolution of the Government cannot be said to have RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 28 of 30
come to the knowledge of the petitioners after judgment
in the writ petition is pronounced. Such submission in
the opinion of this Court cannot be comprehended
within the meaning of “an error apparent on the face of
the record”. Nevertheless, it could not be argued that
having due diligence such public document could be
possessed by Prasanna Kumar Das during his life-time
or after his death the petitioners, natural heirs. This
apart, mere issuance of allotment of land does not
amount to granting possession of site to the allottee,
much less ownership. Allotment of plot is one thing and
delivery of its possession pursuant to such allotment is
another. Possession precedes allotment. Unless it is
further shown that the possession of the subject plot/
land was given, one cannot equate the allotment of land
to delivery of possession.
9.3. The proposition of law as reaffirmed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of runs thus:
“16. Since the Division Bench (review) invoked the first
clause, we hasten to emphasize that an applicant
seeking review on the basis of discovery of new
evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has
been discovery of new evidence, of which he had no
prior knowledge or that it could not be produced at
the time the decree was passed or the order made
despite due diligence; and secondly, that the new
evidence is material to the order/decree being
reviewed in the sense that if the evidence were RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 29 of 30
produced in court when the decree was passed or
the order made, the decision of the court would have
been otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the court to
decide whether a review sought for by an applicant,
if granted, would prevent abuse of the process of
law and/or miscarriage of justice.
17. When the ground for review sought is that of
discovery of new evidence, this Court in State of
West Bengal Vrs. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 10 SCR 4
= (2008) 8 SCC 612 has clarified that the same must
be evidence which should be materially important to
the decision taken. The following passage is
instructive:
„21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that
where a review is sought on the ground of
discovery of new matter or evidence, such
matter or evidence must be relevant and must
be of such a character that if the same had
been produced, it might have altered the
judgment. In other words, mere discovery of
new or important matter or evidence is not
sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae.
Not only this, the party seeking review has also
to show that such additional matter or
evidence was not within its knowledge and
even after the exercise of due diligence, the
same could not be produced before the court
earlier.”
9.4. Under the above premise, it is difficult to comprehend
that the grounds on which the review of judgment dated
7
th March, 2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.23521 of 2013 is RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
RVWPET No.75 of 2024 Page 30 of 30
sought for can be said to fall within the parameters
discussed above.
10. Having thus the perspicuity of ratio emanating from the
judgments referred to supra, this Court does not find
good ground to perceive that the judgment dated
07.03.2024 rendered in W.P.(C) No.23521 of 2013
suffers from error apparent on the face of the record.
11. In the wake of the above, the review petition stands
dismissed along with the pending interlocutory
application(s), if any. However, in the circumstances,
there shall be no order as to costs.
I agree.
(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 03
rd August, 2026//Aswini/Laxmikant RVWPET/75/2024
ODHC010266232024
2026:OHC:5-DB
Login with google
Legal Notes
Add a Note....