1

A.F.R.

Court No.39

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 10282 of 2017

Petitioner :- Manpal Singh

Respondent :- State Of U.P. & 2 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Anshul Kumar Singhal,Manish Goyal

Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Anjali Upadhya

Hon'ble Dilip Gupta, J.

Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.

A notification dated 24 July 2008 under Section 4(1) read with

Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

1

was issued for acquisition

of 105.5600 hectares of land situated in Village-Chipiyana Khurd alias

Tigri, Pargana & Tehsil Dadri for planned industrial development in

District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial

Development Authority

2

. This was followed by a declaration made on 29

January 2009 under Section 6 of the Act. The award was also made on 27

August 2011 by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition),

Greater Noida

3

. This petition has been filed for a direction upon the

respondents to declare that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by

virtue of operation of Section 11-A of the Act. Further reliefs that have

been sought are for quashing the award dated 27 August 2011 made by

the ADM and for not only restoring the name of the petitioner in the

revenue records but also restraining the State respondents from

dispossessing the petitioner from the land admeasuring 100 sq. yards

1the Act

2Greater Noida

3the ADM

Neutralr/itationrNo(rJrqwLDbx…/b9VDDwJ;%

2

situated in Khasra Plot No.57, Village-Chipiyana Khurd, Tehsil Dadri,

District Gautam Budh Nagar.

The petitioner claims to have purchased 100 sq. yards of land

situated in Khasra Plot No.57 from Leeladhar by a registered sale deed

dated 17 January 2006. It is stated that the name of the petitioner was

entered in the revenue records on 30 January 2014. It has further been

stated that the total area of Khasra Plot No.57 was 0.7305 hectares, out of

which 0.4770 hectares was acquired by the State in 2002-03 and the

remaining area of Khasra Plot No.57 was subsequently acquired by

issuance of the notification dated 24 July 2008 under Section 4(1) of the

Act. The petitioner claims that the aforesaid acquisition proceedings

initiated on 24 July 2008 were assailed by certain tenure-holders in Writ

Petition No.41017 of 2011 which was decided with a number of Writ

Petitions by a Full Bench of this Court in Gajraj & Ors. Vs. State of

U.P. & Ors.

4

. The said petition was marked in 'Group 27'. The

acquisition was upheld by the Full Bench and the petitions were disposed

of with certain directions contained in paragraph 482 of the judgment

which is reproduced :

“3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above

at (1) and (2) are disposed of with following

directions:

(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment

of additional compensation to the extent of

same ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for village

Patwari in addition to the compensation

received by them under 1997 Rules/award

which payment shall be ensured by the

Authority at an early date. It may be open for

Authority to take a decision as to what

42011 (11) ADJ 1

3

proportion of additional compensation be asked

to be paid by allottees. Those petitioners who

have not yet been paid compensation may be

paid the compensation as well as additional

compensation as ordered above. The payment

of additional compensation shall be without any

prejudice to rights of land owners under section

18 of the Act, if any.

(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for

allotment of developed Abadi plot to the extent

of 10% of their acquired land subject to

maximum of 2500 square meters. We however,

leave it open to the Authority in cases where

allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 6% or

8% have already been made either to make

allotment of the balance of the area or may

compensate the land owners by payment of the

amount equivalent to balance area as per

average rate of allotment made of developed

residential plots.

4.The Authority may also take a decision as to

whether benefit of additional compensation and

allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 10% be also

given to ;

(a) those land holders whose earlier writ petition

challenging the notifications have been

dismissed upholding the notifications; and

(b) those land holders who have not come to the

Court, relating to the notifications which are

subject matter of challenge in writ petitions

mentioned at direction No.3.”

The petitioner asserts that he had not filed any writ petition to

challenge the said acquisition proceedings and the petitioner acquired

knowledge of the award only on 24 November 2016 when some

documents were filed in Original Suit No.101 of 2014 that had been

instituted by Harpyari against the petitioner in the Court of Civil Judge

(Senior Division), Ghaziabad for grant of mandatory injunction. It is

4

stated that an affidavit was filed in said Original Suit on 10 January 2017

that the land had been acquired in the year 2009 and the name of the

petitioner had been expunged. Subsequently, the petitioner obtained

copies of the records on 20 January 2017 and found that the entries dated

30 January 2014 and 23 May 2014 made in favour of the petitioner in the

revenue records had been expunged on 30 May 2015 and 28 December

2016. It is, therefore, asserted that the petitioner came to know only on 24

November 2016 that the award had been made.

Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has

placed reliance upon Section 11-A of the Act and has submitted that since

the award was not made within a period of two years from the date of

publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the entire

acquisition proceedings lapse. In support of his contention, learned

counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in

Laxmi Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.

5

, Laxman Pandya & Ors. Vs.

State of U.P. & Ors.

6

and Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) through LRs Vs.

State of U.P. & Ors.

7

and also on Division Bench judgments of this

Court in Ram Jiyawan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

8

and Veer Singh &

Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.

9

Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents and

Sri R.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for Greater Noida have,

however, submitted that since the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (4)

5(2015) 10 SCC 241

6(2011) 14 SCC 94

7(2007) 5 SCC 85

8AIR 1994 Allahabad 38

9Writ-C No.64718 of 2008, decided on 4 March 2016

5

of Section 17 were made applicable, the acquisition proceedings would

not lapse under Section 11-A of the Act and in support of this contention,

learned counsel for Greater Noida has placed reliance upon the decisions

of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.

& Ors.

10

, Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.

11

and

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs. Harkishan (dead)

through LRs. & Ors.

12

.

We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel

for the parties.

In order to appreciate the contentions advanced by learned counsel

for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions

of Sections 4(1), 6, 11(1), 11-A and 17 of the Act. They are reproduced

below:

“4. Publication of preliminary notification and

powers of officers thereupon: (1) Whenever it

appears to the

appropriate Government that land in

any locality

is needed or is likely to be needed for any

public purpose

or for a company, a notification to that

effect shall be published in the Official Gazette

and in

two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of

which at least one shall be in the regional language

and the Collector shall cause public notice of the

substance of such notification to be given at

convenient places in the said locality the last of the

dates of such publication and the giving of such public

notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of

publication of the notification.

…..........................

6. Declaration that land is required for a public

purpose: (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of

this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied

after considering the report, if any, made under section

5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed

10(1993) 4 SCC 369

11(1995) 6 SCC 31

12Civil Appeal No.5170 of 2010, decided on 27 January 2017

6

for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration

shall be made to that effect under the signature of a

Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly

authorised to certify its orders and different

declarations may be made from time to time in respect

of different parcels of any land covered by the same

notification under section 4, sub-section (1),

irrespective of whether one report or different reports

has or have been made wherever required under

section 5A, sub-section (2)

….............

(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official

Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the

locality in which the land is situate of which at least

one shall be in the regional language, and the

Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of

such declaration to be given at convenient places in

the said locality the last of the date of such publication

and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter

referred to as the date of publication of the

declaration, and such declaration shall state the district

or other territorial division in which the land is situate,

the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate

area, and where a plan shall have been made of the

land, the place where such plan may be inspected.

(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence

that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a

Company, as the case may be; and, after making such

declaration the appropriate Government may acquire

the land in a manner hereinafter appearing.

…....................

11. Enquiry and award by Collector. (1) On the day

so fixed, or on any of other day to which the enquiry

has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to

enquire into the objections, if any, which any person

interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under

section 9 to the measurements made under section 8,

and into the value of the land at the date of the

publication of the notification under section 4, sub-

section (1), and into the respective interests of the

persons claiming the compensation and shall make an

award under his hand of

(i) the true are of the land;

(ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be

allowed for the land; and

(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation

among all the persons known or believed to be

interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he

7

has information, whether or not they have respectively

appeared before him:

Provided that no award shall be made by the

Collector under this section without the previous

approval of the appropriate Government or of such

officer as the appropriate Government may authorise

in this behalf:

Provided further that it shall be competent to the

appropriate Government to direct that the Collector

may make such award without such approval in such

class of cases as the appropriate Government may

specify in this behalf.

…..............

11A Period within which an award shall be made.

(1) The Collector shall make an award under section

11 within a period of two years from the date of the

publication of the declaration and if no award is made

within that period, the entire proceedings for the

acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said

declaration has been published before the

commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)

Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of

two years from such commencement.

Explanation. In computing the period of two years

referred to in this section, the period during which any

action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the

said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall

be excluded.

…..............

17.Special powers in cases of urgency.

(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the

appropriate

Government so directs, the Collector, though no such

award has been made, may, on the expiration of

fifteen days from the publication of the notice

mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1),

take

possession of any land needed for a public purpose.

Such land shall thereupon

vest absolutely in the

Government, free from all encumbrances.

….........

(4)In the case of any land to which, in the opinion

of the

appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-

section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the

appropriate Government may direct that the provisions

of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct,

a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect

of the land at any time

after the date of the publication

of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1).”

8

The award made under Section 11 of the Act gives reference of the

various dates relating to acquisition proceedings and they are as follows:

24 July 2008Date of Section 4(1)/17 notification

24 July 2008Date of publication in Official Gazette

8 August 2008Date of publication in two newspapers

28 July 2008Date of causing public notice of the substance of

the notification at convenient places in the locality

29 January 2009Date of publication of Section 6 declaration

29 January 2009Date of publication in Official Gazette

20 February 2009Date of publication in two newspapers

18 February 2009Date of causing public notice of the substance of

the notification at convenient places in the locality

7 March 2009Date of hearing under Section 9

9 March 2009Date of taking possession

27 August 2011Date of award under Section 11

Section 11-A of the Act provides that the Collector shall make the

award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of

publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period,

the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. The

dates referred to above would indicate that the date of publication of the

declaration under Section 6 of the Act is 20 February 2009 since it is the

last date of the publication and the giving of the public notice. The award

was made on 27 August 2011. It is beyond two year years from the date

of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

The issue that arises for consideration is whether the acquisition

proceedings would lapse when the provisions of Section 17 of the Act are

made applicable but before that it needs to be remembered that the

petitioner purchased land from Leeladhar on 17 January 2006 and the

9

name of the petitioner was mutated in the revenue records only on 30

January 2014. It was, however, subsequently expunged on 30 May 2015

and the name of Greater Noida was entered.

In the instant case, the fact reveals that the possession was taken by

the State on 9 March 2009. Possession can be taken under Section 16 of

the Act only when the Collector has made the award under Section 11 of

the Act. Section 17(1) of the Act provides that in cases of urgency,

whenever the

appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no

such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from

the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1),

take

possession of any land needed for a public purpose and such land shall

thereupon

vest absolutely in the

Government free from all encumbrances.

In the instant case, possession could be taken because the provisions of

sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 were made applicable. After the

notice under Section 9(1) of the Act was issued, objections were heard on

7 March 2009 and possession of 105.5600 hectares of land was taken on

9 March 2009. On such possession having been taken, the land vested in

the State free from all encumbrances.

It has, therefore, to be considered whether in such circumstances,

the acquisition proceedings would lapse if the award was made beyond

two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6

of the Act.

10

This issue was examined by the Supreme Court in Satendra

Prasad Jain. After referring to the provisions of Section 11-A and

Section 17 of the Act, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession

of the land proposed to be acquired only after an

award of compensation in respect thereof has been

made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession

the land vests in the Government that is to say, the

owner of the land loses to the Government the title to

it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of

Section 11-A are intended to benefit the land owner

and ensure that the award is made within a period of

two years from the date of Section 6 declaration. In

the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to

make an award within two years of the declaration

under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the

Government and its title remains with the owner, the

acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue

of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When

Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency,

Government takes possession of the land prior to the

making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon

the owner is divested of the title to the land which is

vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in

unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have

no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17

because the lands have already vested in the

Government and there is no provision in the said Act

by which land statutorily vested in the Government

can revert to the owner.

16. Further, Section 17(3-A) postulates that the owner

will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of

the estimated compensation for the land before the

Government takes possession of it under Section

17(1). Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave

the Government holding title to the land without the

obligation to determine compensation, make an award

and pay to the owner the difference between the

amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of

the estimated compensation.”

11

This decision was relied upon by the Supreme Court in Awadh

Bihari Yadav and it was held :

10. …........... It was contended that in view of Section

11-A of the Act the entire land acquisition

proceedings lapsed as no award under Section 11 had

been made within 2 years from the date of

commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment

Act, 1984. We are of the view that the above plea has

no force. In this case, the Government had taken

possession of the land in question under Section 17(1)

of the Act. It is not open to the Government to

withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act).

In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted

and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even

if it is assumed that no award was made within the

period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act.

….............”

The same observations were made by the Supreme Court in Pratap

and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

13

and Allahabad Development

Authority Vs. Nasiruzzaman & Ors.

14

.

The Supreme Court again examined this issue in Banda

Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors.

15

. The

Allahabad High Court had allowed the writ petition that had been filed to

assail the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the award had not

been made within the time prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. It

needs to be noticed that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (4) of

Section 17 had been applied. The Supreme Court placing reliance upon

its earlier decisions held that since the provisions of Section 17 of the Act

had been applied and possession had been handed over to the

Development Authority on 30 June 2001, the view taken by the High

13(1996) 3 SCC 1

14(1996) 6 SCC 424

15(2011) 5 SCC 394

12

Court that acquisition provisions had lapsed due to non-compliance of

Section 11-A of the Act, could not be sustained.

The decisions in Satendra Prasad Jain and Awadh Bihari Yadav

have subsequently been followed by the Supreme Court in New Okhla

Industrial Development Authority and it has been held :

“12. There is yet another serious infirmity in the

impugned judgment. In the instant case, the land was

acquired by invoking urgency clause under Section 17

of the Act and dispensing with the requirement of

filing the objections under Section 5A of the Act. This

action on the part of the Government was upheld by

this Court in the first round of litigation. Once

possession is taken under Section 17(1) of the Act,

Section 11-A is not even attracted and, therefore,

acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to

make award within the period prescribed therein. This

is so held in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of

Uttar Pradesh & Ors., which view is affirmed in

Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.”

In view of the aforesaid decisions, it has to be held that once

possession of the land admeasuring 105.5600 hectares including that of

Khasra Plot No.57 was taken on 9 March 2009, it would vest in the State

free from all encumbrances and the acquisition proceedings would not

lapse even if the award was not made within two years from the date of

publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

It also needs to be noted that the acquisition proceedings that had

been initiated by issuance of the notification dated 24 July 2008 under

Section 4(1) of the Act were also considered by the Full Bench in Gajraj

in 'Group 27'. Issue no.10 in Gajraj was whether acquisition under

challenge had lapsed under Section 11-A of the Act since the award was

13

not made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration

under Section 6 of the Act. In paragraph 376, the Full Bench observed as

follows:

“376.We have considered the submission of the

learned counsel for the parties. In Satendra Prasad

Jain's case the issue was considered and it was held by

the Apex Court that when Section 17 sub Section (1)

is applied by reason of urgency, the Government takes

possession of the land prior to the making of the

award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is

divested of the title to the land which is vested in the

Government as laid down in paragraph 15. The said

view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Awadh

Bihari Yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar and others,

1995, 6 S.C.C. Page 31. The recent judgment of

Banda Development Authority (supra) has also

occasion to consider the said issue, relying on the

decision of Satendra Prasad Jain. The argument on the

basis of Section 11-A was repelled. In the present

bunch of cases the State Government has invoked

urgency clause under Section 17(1) and possession has

been taken in all the cases exercising urgency power.

The ratio laid down by Satendra Prasad Jain's case is

fully attracted and the submission made by the learned

counsel for the petitioners on the basis of Section 11-

A can not be accepted.”

Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, placed reliance on

the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Devi. The notification under

Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 24 July 2008 and the provisions of

Section 4/17 were also resorted to. The award under Section 11-A of the

Act was not made. The appellant before the Supreme Court had pleaded

that the land should revert to the appellant under Section 11-A of the Act

since the award under Section 11 had still not been made despite the

passage of almost three decades. It is in this context that the Supreme

Court observed :

14

“29. The scenario before us depicts the carelessness

and the callousness of the State, quite different from

the situation in Satendra Prasad Jain and Avinash

Sharma. The Appellants herein are being denied just

and fair compensation for their land in proceedings

which commenced in 1987, despite the directions of

the High Court passed as early as in 1988 to pass an

award within four months. The raison d’etre behind

the introduction of Section 11A was for the

landowners to have a remedy in the event of an award

not being passed expeditiously. If Satendra Prasad

Jain is interpreted to mean that Section 11A will not

apply to any acquisition under the urgency provisions,

landowners such as the Appellants before us will have

no protection, even if they are not paid full

compensation for their land for decades. This cannot

be in keeping with the legislative intent behind this

Section. Furthermore, keeping empirical evidence in

sight, we make bold to opine that circumstances

require this Court to reconsider its view that even if

the stated public interest or cause has ceased to exist,

any other cause can substitute it, especially where the

urgency provisions have been invoked.”

In the present case, as noted above, not only possession had been

taken on 9 March 2009 but the award was also made on 27 August 2011.

In Kunwar Pal Singh, the issue before the Court was regarding the

date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. This

judgment does not decide whether the acquisition proceedings would

lapse when the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the

Act are made applicable to the acquisition.

The judgment in Laxman Pandya, on which reliance has been

placed by learned counsel for the petitioner, would also not be of any

benefit to the petitioner. The Supreme Court distinguished the decisions

in Satendra Prasad Jain and Awadh Bihar Yadav for the reason that

the possession of the land had not been taken within two years from the

15

date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act as is

clear from paragraph 17 of the judgment which is reproduced below:-

“17.The High Court was also not justified in

applying the ratio of Satendra Prasad Jain Vs. State of

U.P. (supra) and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of

Bihar (supra) for negating the appellants' prayer

because in those cases possession of the acquired land

was taken within two years of the publication of the

declaration issued under Section 6(1) and, as a result

of that the acquired land vested in the State

Government. In these cases, possession of the

acquired land was not taken within two years of

dismissal of the writ petitions. Therefore, the land

cannot be said to have vested in the State

Government.”

In the instant case, possession of the land was taken on 9 March

2009 within two months from the date of publication of the declaration

under Section 6 of the Act.

The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Jiyawan

also does not help the petitioner because of what has been stated in

paragraph 41 of the judgment which is as follows:

“41.In the present petitions the only

substantive provision which is alleged to have been

violated is Section. 11A. If Section 11A is violated the

entire acquisition proceedings will indeed lapse but

the relevant facts attracting that provision have not

been placed on record by the petitioner. As already

noticed Section 11A requires the award to be made

within a period of two years from the date of the

publication of the declaration. If the award is not made

within this period the acquisition lapses. The period of

two years is to be calculated from the date of the

publication of declaration. In the present case, as

already noticed, initially the petitioner pressed this

point but subsequently gave up. Accordingly in the

present petitions it is not possible to quash the

acquisition itself. ….........”

16

The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Veer Singh

would also not help the petitioner because the issue as to whether the

acquisition proceedings would lapse if sub-section (1) and (4) of Section

17 are made applicable, was not considered.

Thus, for all the reasons stated above, it is not possible to accept

the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the acquisition

proceedings lapse because the award has not been made within two years

from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Date:07.03.2017

SK

(Dilip Gupta, J.)

(Siddhartha Varma, J.)