IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CR-2250-2020 (O&M)

Manpreet Kaur . . . . Pe$$oner

Vs.

Onkar Singh and Another . . . . Respondents

****

Reserved on: 16.05.2025

Pronounced on: 23.05.2025

****

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Argued by:- Mr. R.S. Bains, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. Inderpal Singh Deol, Advocate

for the pe##oner.

Mr. Amit Jain, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. Aryaman Thakur, Advocate

for the respondents.

****

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

It is a case of reversal, inasmuch as rent pe##on filed under Sec-

#on 13(3)(a) of the Landly’s aCle:CaslTtsdlTtnd:SFigsnloFdflhRrR filed by land-

lady Smt. Manpreet Kaur &MJDDYCJFH)JFJACa seeking ejectment of the tenants

Onkar Singh and another (respondents herein) from the demised premises i.e.

ground floor of Bay No.845 of SCO 845-46, Sector 22A, Chandigarh on various

grounds including bona fide necessity was accepted by learned Rent Controller

vide order dated 31.07.2015, but the appeal filed by the tenants Onkar Singh

and another (respondents herein) was accepted by learned Appellate Authority,

Chandigarh, vide order dated 23.01.2020, thus rejec#ng the ejectment pe##on.

2. In order to avoid confusion, par#es shall be referred as ‘landlady’

and ‘tenant’.

Landlady’s Case:

3. According to the case of the landlady, demised premises were

leased out to the tenant vide lease deed dated 12.07.2007 at monthly rent of

CR-2250-2020 (O&M)

₹15,525/- excluding electricity and water charges for the tenure of 20 years.

Other terms and condi#ons were also s#pulated in the said lease deed.

Reference of previous pending li#ga#on was made and then it was pleaded by

the landlady that she is a graduate and that her children have grown up. She

required the demised premises for se?ng up her own business i.e. a bou#que.

Request made to the tenant to vacate the demised premises went unheeded

and hence the pe##on.

Tenant’s Stand:

4. Opposing the pe##on, the tenants denied the rela# onship of

landlord and tenant between the par#es by submi?ng that lease deed dated

12.07.2007 was an invalid document conferring no right in favour of the

landlady. It was further contended that no conveyance deed was ever executed

in favour of the landlady and other allo@ees and thus, she was not the owner

thereof. The tenants further denied the personal necessity of the landlady, as

projected by her, submi?ng that ground floor of SCO 846 was on rent with M/s

Ajit Singh. With these averments and controver#ng other averments of the

pe##on, prayer was made for dismissal of the same.

5. Necessary issues were framed. Evidence produced by the par#es

was taken on record.

Finding of the Rent Controller:

6. Learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh held that the re was a

rela#onship of landlord & tenant between the par#es. It was further held that

the landlady had the bona fide personal necessity for the demised premises and

as such, he ordered the ejectment of the tenants therefrom.

&MCR()Na- COnOpRrDCD- O-2OettRHHNJROeKJ5-(DJEF

7.1 Before the Appellate Authority, in addi#on to challenging the

finding on the landlady’s bona fide requirement, the tenants also argued that

the evic#on pe##on was not maintainable. They contended that since the lease

term of 20 years had not yet expired, the landlady was barred from seeking

evic#on. However, the Learned Appellate Authority, relying on the judgment in

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Laxmidas Bapudas Darbar v. Smt. Rudravva, 2001 (2) RCR (Rent) 323 (SC), held

that the evic#on pe##on was maintainable even though the lease period was

s#ll ongoing. The Authority also affirmed the Rent Controller’s finding regarding

the existence of a landlord-tenant rela#onship between the par#es.

7.2 Nonetheless, the Appellate Authority disagreed with the Rent Con-

troller’s conclusion on the issue of the landlady’s bona fide need. It was noted

that aHer filing the evic#on pe##on, the landlady had relocated to Canada.

Based on the available evidence, it was observed that from 06.09.2012 un#l at

least 19.09.2014—when her General Power of A@orney holder appeared in the

witness box—she had been residing in Canada, with no indica#on of her having

visited India during this #me. Furthermore, the landlady did not tes#fy herself

to establish her claim of bona fide necessity, and instead, her husband ap-

peared as her a@orney to support the case. This weakened the credibility of her

claim.

7.3 Addi#onally, the Appellate Authority noted that the landlady had

executed a General Power of A@orney dated 14.12.2015 in favour of one

Jitender Pal to manage her share in the demised property, sugges#ng she had

no personal requirement for the premises. Taking all these factors into account,

the Authority overturned the Rent Controller’s finding regarding the landlady’s

bona fide need. Consequently, the tenants’ appeal was allowed, and the evic-

#on pe##on was dismissed.

U- JR a- CO-2OIToOAR D-(OeT)-rNJRO2-(OJ5ROtRaa- R(O– landlady:

8.1 Assailing the aforesaid reversal, it is contended by learned senior

advocate for the pe##oner-landlady that in view of Sec#on 120 of the Indian

Evidence Act, a husband can appear as a witness on behalf of the wife and there

is no necessity even to produce any General Power of A@orney and therefore,

no adverse inference could be raised due to non-appearance of the landlady.

8.2 It is further the conten#on of learned counsel that the bona fide

necessity of the landlady, as was projected, was duly proved as she wanted to

open a bou#que in the demised shop. The husband/a@orney of the landlady

duly proved the said necessity and the tenants failed to prove that the said need

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was not genuine. By referring to consistent posi#on of law, it is contended that

once it has been deposed on behalf of the landlady that she required the

premises for her bona fide need, the said need is to be presumed and it is for

the tenants to rebut the presump#on, but they failed to do so. It has further

been contended that simply because the landlady had gone in the mean#me to

Canada to stay with her children, it cannot be a ground to doubt her bona fide

need. A@en#on is also drawn towards certain observa#ons made by the

Appellate Authority, in which it has been observed that the children of the

landlady had se@led in Canada and so, they were not likely to come back to

India to start their business. It is contended that the said observa#ons are

absolutely beyond pleadings and evidence, inasmuch as the landlady had clearly

stated that she required the premises for her own bona fide need, and had not

pleaded about the bona fide necessity of her children.

8.3 With all these submissions, learned senior advocate prayed for

se?ng aside the order as passed by the Appellate Authority and to restore the

order of the Rent Controller, whereby ejectment of the tenants was directed.

U- JR a- CO-2OIToOAR D-(OeT)-rNJRO2-(OJ5RO(RCt- TR ts – tenants:

9.1 Refu#ng the above arguments with strong convic#on, the learned

senior advocate represen#ng the tenant-respondents contended that the

Appellate Authority had erroneously held the evic#on pe##on to be

maintainable. It was argued that the case of Laxmidas Bapudas Darbar (supra),

relied upon by the Appellate Authority, was based on the provisions of the

Karnataka Rent Control Act, which are not applicable to the present ma@er. In

contrast, the proviso to Sec#on 13(3)(a) of the applicable statute in the present

case clearly s#pulates that an evic#on on the ground of bona fide requirement

cannot be sought during the subsistence of the lease term.

9.2 Although learned senior advocate for the respondent-tenants does

not dispute the pe##oner’s conten#on that under Sec#on 120 of the Evidence

Act, a husband is competent to appear as a witness for his wife, but it is argued

that the Appellate Authority rightly concluded—based on the evidence on

record—that the landlady failed to establish her bona fide requirement. This

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conclusion was drawn in light of the fact that she had been residing in Canada

and had shown no inten#on of returning to India, as she had not visited the

country even once since the filing of the evic#on pe##on.

9.3 With these submissions prayer is made for dismissal of the pe##on.

10. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides and has

appraised the record carefully.

Analysis and findings by this court:

N:OIRYNHOt-CDa- O6OM- NcTRO RRTF

11. In cases where evic#on is sought on the ground of bona fide re-

quirement, the Rent Controller is required to see that the landlord's need is

genuine and sincere, rather than a pretext to evict the tenant. As held by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adil Jamshed Frenchman (D) by legal heirs v. Sardar

Dastur Schools Trust and others, 2005 (1) RCR (Rent) 284, the requirement

must reflect a real, honest, and immediate necessity—one that is not whimsical

or fanciful. The test is whether, based on the material on record, a reasonable

person in the landlord’s posi#on would naturally and sincerely need the

premises. At the same #me, the Rent Controller is not to presume that the land-

lord's requirement is not bona fide. Once the landlord establishes a prima facie

case, a presump#on of bona fide requirement arises, which the tenant may re-

but. This principle was affirmed in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Com-

pany, 1998 (2) RCR (Rent) 533, where Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that

such a presump#on is mandatory, when the landlord asserts personal necessity.

12. In this case, ejectment has been sought by the pe##oner-landlady

for her own bona fide need i.e. to set up her own business of a bou#que. It is

not her case that she wanted the demised premises for her children. Even in the

evidence produced on behalf of the pe##oner, there is nothing to show that she

ever pleaded or proved that she required the premises for her children. As such,

the observa#ons made by the learned Appellate authority in para No.24 of its

order to the effect that the mala fide inten#on of the pe##oner could be gath-

ered from the cross-examina#on, as her adult children are studying and residing

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in Canada and that they will not return to India to start a business, are abso-

lutely without pleading and evidence and without even carefully going through

the conten#on of the pe##oner-landlady.

13. It was specifically deposed by PW1 Dilawar Singh, the husband and

General Power of A@orney holder of the pe##oner-landlady, that the pe##oner

is a graduate, her children are grown up, and being unemployed, she intends to

start her own business in the demised premises. He further stated that she

neither occupies any other similar premises in the urban area of Chandigarh nor

has she vacated such premises without sufficient cause since the commence-

ment of the Rent Act. He also affirmed that she possesses adequate funds to

commence the proposed business.

b) Evidence of husband for wife-landlady:

14. Further, while it is true that the landlady, Manpreet Kaur, did not

personally step into the witness box but she examined her a@orney-husband,

Dilawar Singh, who tes#fied to all the necessary elements of her bonafide claim

for the demised premises. The Appellate Authority, however, rejected this tes#-

mony solely on the ground that the landlady herself did not appear to tes#fy or

submit to cross-examina#on. In doing so, reliance was placed on Vidhyadhar v.

Manikrao and another, 1999 (3) SCC 573; Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd

Bank Ltd., 2005 (2) SCC 217; and M/s Shankar Finance and Investments v.

State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 422.

15. However, this Court is of the view that learned Appellate Authority

clearly fell in error as it ignored the provisions of Sec#on 120 of the Indian Evi-

dence Act, as per which ‘SslaAAlFSpSAlb:gFtt&Ssunldvtlba:itnldgldvtln’Sdflasd the

husband or wife of any party to the suit, shall be competent witnesses.’

Even

learned senior advocate for the respondents-tenants does not dispute the said

legal proposi#on. This issue was also considered at great length by this Court in

RSA-3800-1998 #tled Kishan Chand Vs. Balbir, decided on 01.04.2025 wherein

a similar conten#on had been raised and this Court held as under: -

“38. S#ll further, even Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh’s case aHer

referring to various precedents though emphasized that the plain#ff must

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personally tes#fy under oath and the plain#ff’s Power of A@orney holder

cannot speak on ma@ers beyond his personal knowledge, but as explained by

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Man Kaur’s Case (supra), an excep#on exists when

an a@orney-holder, such as a close family member, exclusively manages the

party’s affairs. In such cases, their tes#mony may be accepted even on ma@ers

of bona fides or readiness and willingness—for example, a spouse solely

handling the affairs of the other.

39. Thus, though there cannot be any dispute as to the principles of

law enunciated in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani’s case; Man Kaur’s case and Rajesh

Kumar’s case but when husband or wife depose on behalf of the plain#ff-

spouse, then the said principle of law will not be applicable. A non-li#gant

spouse is a competent witness for the other spouse to li#ga#on. Sec#on 120 of

the Indian Evidence Act permits the husband to give evidence in place and

instead of his wife and vice versa even in the absence of a wri@en Authority or

Power of A@orney. Such a witness is en#tled to depose not only the facts within

his/her knowledge but also within the knowledge of his/her spouse

.”

16. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid legal posi#on that a husband can

appear as a witness for his wife and therefore, bona fide necessity of the

pe##oner in the present case could not be disbelieved simply because that she

had not appeared in the witness box and rather, had examined her husband.

c) bonafide need - evidence:

17. Moving forward, the Appellate Authority observed that the

pe##oner had been residing in Canada at least since 06.09.2012—the date on

which she executed the General Power of A@orney (Ex. PW1/2) in favour of her

husband—un#l 19.09.2014, when her husband, Dilawar Singh, appeared for

cross-examina#on. It reasoned that had her need been genuinely bona fide, she

would have returned to India. The fact that her children were also se@led and

studying in Canada, with no inten#on of star#ng a business in India, was cited to

support the conclusion of mala fide intent.

18. However, this reasoning is flawed. As already noted, the pe##oner

never claimed the premises for the bona fide need of her children, but for her

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own personal use. Her con#nued stay in Canada during the pendency of the pe-

##on cannot be a valid basis to doubt her bona fide requirement. A landlord is

not expected to remain physically present in India throughout the li#ga#on

period simply to demonstrate the sincerity of their need or to await possession

of the premises.

19. The Appellate Authority also relied on addi#onal documents sub-

mi@ed by the tenants during the appeal—namely, a General Power of A@orney

dated 14.12.2015 executed by the pe##oner in favour of Jitenderpal Singh con-

cerning her share in SCO No. 845-846, Sector 22A, Chandigarh, along with a

compromise/se@lement deed dated 12.07.2007. These documents were ad-

mi@ed into the record. Based on the GPA, it was concluded that the pe##oner,

intending to permanently se@le in Canada, and was unable to manage her prop-

erty in India, thus nega#ng her claim of bona fide need.

20. This Court, however, disagrees with that conclusion. The comprom-

ise deed dated 12.07.2007 indicated that although there had ini#ally been an

agreement to sell the property, it was cancelled the same day and replaced with

a lease agreement. The mere existence of a previous agreement to sell does not

conclusively prove an intent to dispose of the property permanently. There is

no evidence to show why the sale was cancelled or that the pe##oner took any

subsequent steps to sell the property aHer that date.

21. As for the General Power of A@orney in favour of Jitenderpal Singh,

it merely empowered him to manage the pe##oner’s share in the SCO—not to

sell it. There is no indica#on that she authorized him to transfer ownership.

Therefore, gran#ng someone the authority to manage a property cannot be

equated with relinquishing ownership or interest in it. This, by itself, is insuffi-

cient to conclude that the pe##oner lacked a bona fide need for the premises

or intended to part with it permanently.

22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that

learned Appellate Court has wrongly upset the finding of the learned Rent

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Controller, whereby ejectment of the tenant was ordered on the ground of

bona fide necessity of the landlord.

tSj8BUmejA,jeU4fnjA,j UanUjtUUtjpUe9UUsje1Ujva4)Unr

23. However, there is another reason for dismissal of the present

appeal and eventual dismissal of the ejectment pe##on. This is the terms and

condi#ons of the lease dated 12.07.2007 Ex-PW-1/3 (Annexure P-1), as per

which pe##oner-landlady has rented out the demised premises to the

tenants-respondents for a period of 20 years commencing w.e.f. 12.07.2007 to

11.07.2027.

24. The specific conten#on of learned senior advocate for the

respondents-tenants is that in view of this term in the lease deed, the ejectment

pe##on is pre-mature and so, not maintainable; whereas learned Senior

Advocate for the pe##oner-landlady argues that provisions of the Rent Act

overrides the provisions of general law and, therefore, in case pe##oner-

landlord is able to make out the case on any of the grounds specified in the Rent

Act, then any such condi#on i.e. the lease period will not come in her way to

seek the ejectment of the tenant.

25. This Court does not agree with the conten#on raised by learned

senior advocate for the pe##oner in this regard. Sec#on 13(3) of the East

@K ,NMO7(MN O0R JO0RCJ(Dra- COerJVOv9S9 reads as under:

“(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order direc#ng the tenant

to put the landlord in possession -

(i) in the case of a residen#al building if -

(a) he requires it for his own occupa#on;

(b) he is not occupying another residen#al building, in the urban area

concerned; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause aHer the

commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;

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(d) it was let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the

service or employment of the landlord, and the tenant has ceased, whether

before or aHer the commencement of this Act, to be in such service or

employment:

Provided that where the tenant is workman who has been discharged or

dismissed by the landlord from his service or employment in contraven#on of

the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he shall not be liable to be

evicted un#l the competent authority under that Act confirms the order of

discharge or dismissal made against him by the landlord.

(i-a) In the case of a residen#al building, if the landlord is a member of the armed

forces of the Union of India and requires it for the occupa#on of his family and if he

produces a cer#ficate of the prescribed authority, referred to in Sec#on 7 of the Indian

Soldiers (Li#ga#on) Act, 1925, that he is serving under special condi#ons within the

meaning of Sec#on 3 of the Act.

Explana#on. - For the purposes of this sub-paragraph -

(1) the cer#ficate of the prescribed authority shall be conclusive evidence that

the landlord is serving under special condi#ons; and

(2) "family" means such rela#ons of the landlord as ordinarily live with him and

are dependent upon him;]

(ii) in the case of rented land, if –

(a) he requires it for his own use;

(b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his

business any other such rented land; and

(c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause aHer the

commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned;

(iii) in the case of any building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out any building

work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust

under some improvement or development scheme or if it has become unsafe or unfit

for human habita#on;

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(iv) in the case of any residen#al building, if he requires it for use as an office, or

consul#ng room by his son who intends to start prac#ce as a lawyer or as a

"registered prac##oner" within the meaning of that expression as used in the

Punjab Medical Registra#on Act, 1916, or for the residence of his son who is

married, if –

(a) his son as aforesaid is not occupying in the urban area concerned any

other building for use as office, consul#ng room or residence, as the case

may be; and

(b) his son as aforesaid has not vacated such a building without sufficient

cause aHer the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned:

Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon

between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not, except under sub-

paragraph (i-a), be en#tled to apply under this sub-sec#on before the expiry of

such period:

Provided further that where the landlord has obtained possession of a

residen#al building or rented under the provisions of sub- paragraph (i) or sub-

paragraph (ii) he shall not be en#tled to apply again under the said sub-

paragraphs for the possession of any other building of the same class or rented

land:

Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of any

building under the provisions of sub-paragraph (iv) he shall not be en#tled to

apply again under the said sub-paragraph for the possession of any other

building for the use of, or as the case may be, for the residence of the same

son.”

26. The first proviso to the above-said provision mandates that where

the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and ten-

ant, the landlord shall not, except under sub paragraph (i-a), be en#tled to apply

under this sub Sec#on before the expiry of the such period.

27. The use of the word ‘shall’ in this said proviso makes it mandatory

that a landlord cannot seek the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of

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bonafide need, when the tenancy is for a specified period. The excep#on carved

out in this regard is when the ejectment is sought under sub Paragraph (i-a).

Said paragraph i.e. excep#on is applicable, if the landlord is a member of the

Armed Forces of the Union of India and requires it for the occupa#on of his own

family and produces necessary cer#ficate in this regard.

28. In the present case, it is not the case of the pe##oner-landlady

that she is a member of Armed Forces of Union of India and as such, the said ex-

cep#on sub paragraph (i-a) is not applicable to this case.

29. In order to hold the pe##on as maintainable despite the s#pulated

period in the lease deed, the Appellate Authority has referred to “Laxmidas

Bapudas Darbar v. Smt. Rudravva” (Supra). In that case Hon’ble Supreme Court

was dealing with a case under Karnataka Rent Control Act, Sec#on 21 of which

provides as under:-

1y:gdtFigslgmldtsasdnlauaSsndltpSFigsl0lNotwithstanding anything contained in

any other law or contract, no order or decree for recovery of possession of any

premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the

landlord and against the tenant.

Provided that the Court may on an applica#on in wri#ng make an order for

recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following

grounds, namely, _____.”

30. While interpre#ng the abovesaid provision i.e. Sec#on 21 of the

Karnataka Rent Control Act, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:-

“17. It may have to be scru#nized as to what extent the provisions

of

Sec#on 21 of the Karnataka Rent Act shall have an overriding effect over any

other law or a contract. The Rent Acts have primarily been made, if not wholly,

to protect the interest of tenants, to restrict charging of excessive rent and their

rampant evic#on at will. In that view of the ma@er Sec#on 21 of the Karnataka

Rent Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in

any contract, no order for evic#on of a tenant shall be made by Court or any

other authority. Undoubtedly, it is a provision providing statutory protec#on to

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the tenants as it is also evident from the heading of Sec#on 21 of the Act. This

prohibi#on is however relaxed under the proviso saying that an order for

recovery of possession of the premises can be made on an applica#on made on

that behalf only on the grounds as enumerated in clauses (a) to (p) to the

Proviso. The non-obstante clause contained under Sec#on 21 of the Act, will

override any condi#on in any contract which may provide a ground for evic#on

other than those enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p) of Sub-sec#on (1) of Sec#on

21. Such an addi#onal ground in a contract shall be rendered ineffec#ve. The

use of the word `only’ in the Proviso is significant to emphasize that it relates to

grounds alone which cannot be added over and above as provided. The whole

contract or other condi#ons not related to evic#on or grounds of evic#on shall

not be affected. So far a fixed term lease is concerned, it shall be affected only

to the extent that even aHer expiry of period of the lease the possession cannot

be obtained by the lessor unless one or more of the grounds contained

in Sec#on 21 of the Act are available for evic#on of the tenant. There is nothing

to indicate nor it has been held in any case that in view of Sec#on 21 of the

Karnataka Rent Act a contract of fixed term tenancy stands obliterated in

totality. As indicated in the earlier part of this judgment in the case of

Dhanapal CheEar, it has been observed in Paragraph 5 that none of the State

Rent Acts have abrogated or affected the provisions of Sec#on 107 of the

Transfer of Property Act, which provides for lease of immovable property from

year to year or for a term more than a year or reserving a yearly rent. As

indicated earlier, the Proviso to sub-sec#on (1) of Sec#on 21 of the Karnataka

Rent Act limits the grounds on which landlord can seek evic#on of a tenant.

Nothing has been indicated by reasons of which it can be concluded that a

contract of tenancy loses significance on coming into force of the Karnataka

Rent Act. The effect of non obstante clause, in our view has been rightly

explained in the Full Bench decision in the case of Sri Ramakrishna Theatres

Ltd. versus General Investments and Commercial Corp-(Na- OIJToOnO&(Co AIR

1993 Karnataka 90. In one of the decision of this Court reported in 1989 (2)

S.C.C. 686, Modern Hotel versus V.K. Radhakrishnaiah, it has been held that

period of a subsis#ng lease for fixed term could not be curtailed in absence of a

forfeiture clause in the lease. The effect of the non-obstante clause contained

under Sec#on 21 of the Karnataka Rent Act on the fixed term contractual lease

may be explained as follows:-

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(i) On expiry of period of the fixed term lease, the tenant would be liable

for evic#on only on the grounds as enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p) of

Sub-sec#on (1) of Sec#on 21 of the Act.

(ii) Any ground contained in the agreement of lease other than or in

addi#on to the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p) of Sub-sec#on

(1) of Sec#on 21 of the Act shall remain inopera#ve.

(iii) Proceedings for evic#on of a tenant under a fixed term contractual

lease can be ini#ated during subsistence or currency of the lease only on

a ground as may be enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p) of Sub-sec#on (1)

of Sec#on 21 of the Act and it is also provided as one of the grounds for

forfeiture of the lease rights in the lease deed, not otherwise.

(iv) The period of fixed term lease is ensured and remains protected

except in the case indicated in preceding paragraph.”

[underlined por#on emphasized by this court]

31. It is clear that it is because of non-obstante clause contained in

Sec#on 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act that it was held that it will override

any other condi#on in any contract, which provides a ground for evic#on other

than those enumerated in some specific clauses of Sec#on 21.

32. In the present case, the proviso to Sec#on 13(3)(i) contained in the

East Punjab Urban Rent Restric#on Act, 1949, as has been reproduced above

does not provide any such non-obstante clause. As such, the authority rendered

by Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Laxmidas Bapurdas Darbar v. Smt. Rudravva”

(Supra) is not applicable to this case.

33. In order to contend that despite s#pula#on of specified lease

period, the ejectment pe##on is s#ll maintainable before expiry of the lease

period under the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restric#on Act, 1949,

learned Senior Advocate for the pe##oner-landlady has also referred to

“Rakesh Rishi Vs. Bakshish Kaur”, 2013(4) PLR 401. However, the perusal of the

said authority would reveal that, that case pertained to Sec#on 13-B of the East

Punjab Urban Rent Restric#on Act, 1949. Sec#on 13-B provides a right to the

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landlord to recover immediate possession of the residen#al building or

scheduled building and/or non-residen#al building to accrue to non-resident

Indian. Meaning thereby, this Sec#on 13-B is applicable when the landlord is a

non-resident Indian. The perusal of Sec#on 13-B would further reveal that there

is no such condi#on like proviso to Sec#on 13(3)(a), pu?ng an embargo on the

right of the landlord to seek the ejectment of the tenant, when there is a

specified lease period provided in the agreement between the par#es. As such,

“Rakesh Rishi Vs. Bakshish Kaur” is also of no help to advance the case of the

pe##oner.

34. Learned Senior Advocate for the pe##oner also refers to “Paramjit

Kaur Vs. Satya Gupta”, 1996(2) Rent LR 319, wherein the lease of land was for a

period of 06 years. The tenant was not paying rent. Pe##on under the

provisions of Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Evic#on Act, 1973 was filed. It

was held by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court that landlord was en#tled to eject

the tenant under the Rent Act and that the conten#on that before expiry of the

lease period, landlord was not en#tled for ejectment of tenant but could only

recover arrears of rent, was not tenable. While holding so, this Court has

referred to “Lakshmi Venkateshwara versus Syeda Vajhiunnissa” 1994(1) RCR

635 (SC), wherein it had been held that where the landlord had granted the

lease of the land to the tenant for 32 years and the tenant stopped paying the

rent, the par#es would be governed by the Rent Act and ejectment can be

sought under the Rent Act on the ground of non-payment of rent.

35. I am afraid the said conten#on is without any merit. In “Laxmidas

Bapurdas Darbar v. Smt. Rudravva” case, the abovesaid judgment i.e.

“Lakshmi Venkateshwara versus Syeda Vajhiunnissa” has also been referred.

Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

“11. Sri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (supra) while holding that

provisions of the

Rent Control Act would be applicable to a fixed term

contractual lease relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1979 S.C. 1745

Dhanapal CheEar versus Yesodai Ammal & Anr. It is further observed in M/s.

Bombay Tyres that interpreta#on of Dhanapal CheEars case given by the

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Supreme Court in Sri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (supra) is binding on

it. It will be beneficial to peruse Paragraph 15 of the judgment in M/s. Bombay

Tyres which is quoted below:

It was contended by the learned counsel for the tenants that the

decision of the Supreme Court in Dhanpal Che?ars case AIR 1979 S.C.

1745 is confined only to a case of determina#on of a lease

under S.106 of the T.P. Act and that the principles cannot be extended to

cases where a term is provided for in the lease. Learned counsel also

relied on various observa#ons of the Supreme Court in the above

decision in support of his case. But we are afraid that we cannot accept

the conten#on of the learned counsel for the tenants. In Sri Lakshmi

Venkateshwara Enterprises case (ILR (1994) Karnataka 1659), the

Supreme Court has considered the very same decision and has stated

that the above decision clearly holds that the provisions of the Rent

Control Act would apply notwithstanding the contract. The effect of the

decision in Dhanpal Che?ars case is stated by their Lordships of the

Supreme Court and we are bound by the same. This Court cannot take a

different view as to what was laid down in Dhanpal Che?ars case. What

is decided in Dhanpal Che?ars case is stated by their Lordships in

paragraph 11 of the Judgment of Sri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises

case. It is to the effect that the provisions of the Rent Control Act would

apply de hors the contract. When the Supreme Court has laid down the

law to that effect, this Court has necessarily to follow the same and we

do so.”

36. It is clear from the aforesaid observa#ons of Hon’ble Supreme

Court that Sri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises case was also pertaining to

the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and not the provisions of East

Punjab Urban Rent Restric#on Act and so, it is not applicable to present case.

37. It may also be clarified here that the embargo to seek ejectment of

the tenant, when there is a specified lease period before the expiry of lease

term, is only when the ejectment is sought on the ground of bonafide need

under Sec#on 13(3)(a) of East Punjab Urban Restric#on Act. There is no such

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embargo, when the ejectment is sought on any other grounds available under

the Act, because the proviso as discussed above is applicable only to Sec#on 13

(3) (a) i.e. when ejectment is sought on the ground of bonafide need.

38. Since in the present case, the ejectment was sought by the

landlady-pe##oner on the ground of bonafide need and there is a specified

lease period as per the lease deed (Ex.PW1/3), which is to expire in July, 2027,

therefore, this Court has no hesita#on to conclude that the ejectment pe##on

as filed by the pe##oner-landlady was not maintainable prior to expiry of lease

period and as such, the ejectment pe##on is hereby dismissed and consequent

thereto, the present appeal is hereby dismissed.

Pending applica#on(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(DEEPAK GUPTA)

JUDGE

23.05.2025

,JJD6NH7GTJON

Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes

Whether reportable? Yes

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