[2026:RJ-JP:6935]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3740/2022

Metrocity Vikas Samiti, Through President, Gajanand Verma,

Resident Of E-38, Ram Nagar Extension, Hawa Sadak, Sodala,

Jaipur (Raj.)

----Petitioner

Versus

1. Mahesh Kumar Jain S/o Maliram Jain, Resident Of

13/1032, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.)

2. Jaipur Development Authority, Through Secretary,

Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur (Raj.)

3. Dhanna Lal Raiger S/o Ramdev, Aged About 85 Years,

Resident Of Raigaron Ka Mohalla, Mangyawas,

Mansarovar, Jaipur.

4. Ramratan S/o Late Shri Prabhu Lal, Aged About 40 Years,

Resident Of Raigaron Ka Mohalla, Mangyawas,

Mansarovar, Jaipur.

5. Ramavtar S/o Late Shri Prabhu Lal Raigar, Aged About 38

Years, Resident Of Raigaron Ka Mohalla, Mangyawas,

Mansarovar, Jaipur.

6. Pooran Mal S/o Shri Dhanna Lal, Aged About 58 Years,

Resident Of Raigaron Ka Mohalla, Mangyawas,

Mansarovar, Jaipur.

----Respondents

Connected With

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9002/2023

Hari Narain Sharma S/o Shri Ram Bux Sharma, Aged About 79

Years, Resident Of 91, Sooraj Nagar (East) Civil Lines, Jaipur.

----Petitioner

Versus

1. Jaipur Development Authority, Through Its Secretary, Jln

Marg, Jaipur.

2. Metro Vikas Samiti, Through Its President Gajanand

Verma, Resident Of E-38, Ram Nagar Vistar, Hawa Sadak,

Sodala, Jaipur.

3. Mahesh Kumar Jain S/o Shri Mali Ram Jain, Resident Of

13/1032, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur.

[2026:RJ-JP:6935] (2 of 24) [CW-3740/2022]

----Respondents

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3691/2022

Metrocity Vikas Samiti, Through President, Gajanand Verma,

Resident Of E-38, Ram Nagar Extension, Hawa Sadak, Sodala,

Jaipur (Raj.)

----Petitioner

Versus

1. Mahesh Kumar Jain S/o. Maliram Jain, Resident Of

13/1032, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.)

2. Jaipur Development Authority, Through Secretary,

Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur (Raj.)

----Respondents

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6754/2022

Jaipur Development Authority, Through Secretary, Jaipur

Development Authority, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Jaipur.

----Petitioner

Versus

Mahesh Kumar Jain S/o Shri Mali Ram Jain, R/o 13/1032 Malviya

Nagar, Jaipur.

----Respondent

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6768/2022

Jaipur Development Authority, Through Secretary, Jaipur

Development Authority, Jawaharlal Nehru Marg, Jaipur.

----Petitioner

Versus

1. Mahesh Kumar Jain S/o Shri Mali Ram Jain, R/o 13/1032

Malviya Nagar, Jaipur.

2. Metrocity Vikas Samiti, Through President Gajanand

Verma, R/o E-38, Ramnagar Vistar Hawasadak, Sodala,

Jaipur.

----Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Amit Kuri with

Mr. Ayush Sharma,

Mr. Dharma Ram and

Ms. Nandini Mirdha for JDA

Mr. R.K.Daga with

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Mr. Rahul Singh Chauhan in CWP

No.3740/2022

Mr. Ajeet Kumar Bhandari, Sr. Adv.

with

Mr. Namo Narayan Sharma and

Ms. Khushboo Rathore in CWP

No.9002/2023

Mr. A.K. Sharma, Sr. Adv. with

Mr. Ashish Sharma in CWP

No.3691/2022

For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.B. Mathur, Sr. Adv. with

Mr. Sandeep Pathak,

Mr. Manish Bhadiwal and

Mr. Pramod Singh for respondent No.1

in all the petitions

Mr. Anil Mehta, Sr. Adv. with

Mr. Yashodhar Pandey,

Mr. Banwari Lal Sharma and

Mr. Rahul Vishnoi in CWP

No.3740/2022 for respondent No.2 to

5

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA

Order

Arguments concluded on ::: February 11, 2026

Reserved on ::: February 11, 2026

Pronounced on ::: February 26, 2026

1. Since the issue involved in all these five writ

petitions is identical and the impugned order is same, hence

all these five writ petitions are being decided by a common

order.

2. The facts which emerges from the pleadings are

that the original appellant-Mahesh Kumar Jain filed four

different appeals before the Appellate Authority, Jaipur

Development Authority, Jaipur (for short, 'Appellate Tribunal,

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JDA') mentioning therein that Khasra Nos. 92, 94, 95, 100

and 104/572 situated at Village Mangyawas, Tehsil Sanganer,

belong to Shri. Prabhu and Shri Dhanna both sons of Shri

Ramdev. The suit property was Khatedari land of Prabhu and

Dhanna. On 28.06.1991, the Jaipur Development Authority

(for short, 'the JDA') acquired the said land and the award

with regard to the land situated in aforementioned Khasras

was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 28.06.1991.

On 13.12.1995 the aforesaid Khatedars and

Roopwas Model Grah Nirman Sehkari Samiti entered into an

agreement for sale with respect to the aforesaid property for

developing a housing society in the name and style of

Metrocity Vikas Samiti. In the said agreement it was agreed

that the aforesaid Khatedars will cooperate with the society

for ensuring that the aforesaid property will be transferred in

the name of the society as per law. At the time of signing of

the agreement the Vikas Samiti paid the consideration

amount and issued receipt to the Khatedars and physical

possession of the said property was also handed over to the

Vikas Samiti.

On 10.04.2002 the aforesaid Khatedars executed

an agreement in favour of one Mahesh Kumar Jain with

regard to the aforesaid property. As per the agreement, the

Khatedars have to execute a General Power of Attorney in

favour of Mahesh Kumar Jain to enable him to obtain

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necessary approval from the JDA on behalf of the Khatedars.

In furtherance of the aforesaid agreement, a General Power

of Attorney was also executed in favour of Mahesh Kumar

Jain by the recorded Khatedars.

On 11.04.2002 the aforesaid Khatedars executed a

compromise / agreement in favour of the JDA in order to

obtain 15% developed land in lieu of compensation for the

acquired land.

On 02.08.2002 the JDA issued a reservation letter

for 15 % developed land in lieu of compensation in favour of

aforesaid Khatedars.

On 19.08.2002 the recorded Khatedars through a

registered letter cancelled the Power of Attorney dated

12.08.2002. An information with regard to cancellation was

also published in the newspaper.

On 03.09.2002 Mahesh Kumar Jain obtained

unregistered lease for 15 % developed land allotted to the

recorded Khatedars against the acquisition of the aforesaid

property.

On 01.02.2003 Mahesh Kumar Jain sent a

registered notice to the recorded Khatedars for execution of

the lease deed in his favour stating that in case they fail to

execute the sale deed in his favour, he shall file a suit for

specific performance. The aforesaid Khatedars on 22.02.2003

sent reply to the legal notice dated 01.02.2003 denying

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therein that there is no requirement for execution of the lease

deed sought by Mahesh Kumar Jain as the agreement dated

10.04.2002 is not valid and is forged one.

On 21.10.2005 the Vikas Samiti entered into a

further agreement with the recorded Khatedars for purchase

of the aforesaid land. The agreement clearly states that the

same was executed in furtherance of the agreement dated

13.12.1995. The Vikas Samiti in furtherance of the

agreements developed the housing society and issued

allotment letters to several individuals.

On 23.09.2002 the acquisition for the purposes of

development of Prithvi Raj Nagar was cancelled. The said

cancellation was on account of order dated 20.09.2013.

To regularize the land allotted to its members, the

JDA issued public Notifications dated 04.06.2020, 15.06.2020

and 08.07.2020 which were challenged by Mahesh Kumar

Jain in the appeals filed by him before the JDA Appellate

Tribunal.

The JDA Appellate Tribunal vide its judgment dated

03.02.2022 allowed the appeals filed by Mahesh Kumar Jain

against JDA and Vikas Samiti and set aside the public notice

dated 27.04.2015 whereby the lease deeds were issued in

the name of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain, so also the public

notices dated 23.06.2015 and 11.03.2020 issued by the JDA

for holding camps for regularization and so also the public

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notices dated 27.04.2015 and 04.06.2020. The JDA Appellate

Tribunal also set aside the order dated 27/29.04.2015

whereby the lease-deeds of plots No.B-503 and B-168 to B-

175 were cancelled and directed the JDA to hand over the

possession of 1.24 hectare land of the same value in any

approved Scheme to the respondent/ appellant.

3. Mr. R.K. Daga counsel appearing for the petitioner

in SBCWP No. 3740/2022 submitted that the Appellate

Tribunal, JDA has over looked many material facts. He

submitted that the original khatedars said to have executed a

Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain for the

limited purpose. The Power of Attorney dated 10.04.2002 was

for seeking patta in the name of the khatedars for 15%

developed land in lieu of their land which has been acquired

but Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain has obtained the unregistered

lease deeds on 03.09.2002 in his own name, whereas even

the said Power of Attorney was also cancelled by the

Khatedars on 19.08.2002 and a registered letter was also

sent to Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain and there was a public notice

in the newspaper to that effect but even then he proceeded

to obtain the unregistered lease deeds without any authority.

Counsel further submitted that de-acquisition of the land

acquired was made on 23.09.2002 and Mr. Mahesh Kumar

Jain sent a legal notice to the Khatedars on 01.02.2003 for

executing the sale deeds and also stated that in case the

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Khatedars fail to executed the sale deeds, he shall file a suit

for specific performance. Meaning-thereby, till 01.02.2003 Mr.

Mahesh Kumar Jain was not having any right over the land in

question. Counsel further submitted that a criminal case was

also lodged against Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain and when he

preferred a criminal misc. petition under section 482 CrPC,

the khatedars submitted an affidavit that they have no

concern with Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain as regards the land in

question. He further submitted that the alleged unregistered

lease deeds dated 03.09.2002 were cancelled by the JDA as

they were not in accordance with law. Counsel further

submitted that the document on the basis of which Mr.

Mahesh Kumar Jain is claiming the rights over the land in

question, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for

report about the signatures of the Khatedars and a report

was received that the signatures of the khatedars on such

documents are forged. It has also been submitted by the

counsel that non-impleadment of khatedars in the appeal

filed by Mahesh Kumar Jain before the JDA speaks of his ill

intention. He also submitted that the khatedars at various

stages have mentioned the fact that they have sold the land

to Roopwas Model Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti for a

residential scheme.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in

SBCWP No. 9002/2003 in addition to the submissions made

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by the counsel for the petitioner in SBCWP No. 3740/2022,

has submitted that the khatedars sold their land to Roopwas

Model Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti and thereafter the

Society has developed the Metrocity Residential Scheme,

wherein the petitioner has also been allotted a plot and he is

entitled for regularization of the plot and possession. Counsel

also submitted that as per the provisions of Rule 26 of the

Rajasthan Improvement Trust (Disposal of Urban Land) Rules,

1974 (for short ‘the Rules of 1974’), the lease deeds should

have been stamped and registered. He further submitted that

the alleged lease deeds in favour of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain

are unregistered and he cannot claim any right on the basis

of such unregistered lease deeds.

5. Mr. A.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.

Ashish Sharma in SBCWP No.3691/2022 appearing for the

petitioner in addition to the arguments submitted by the

counsel appearing for the petitioners in earlier two petitions

submitted that the Appellate Tribunal, JDA, has taken a

contrary view as regards application of section 42B of the

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’) as

the original khatedars belong to the Scheduled Caste

Category. He submitted that the finding of the Tribunal is that

the Society is not Member of the Scheduled Caste Category

and the transfer of the land by the original khatedars in

favour of the Society is hit by section 42B of the Rajasthan

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Tenancy Act but on the other hand has failed to notice that

Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is also not a member of the Schedule

Caste Category in relation to whom the Tribunal has not

made any observation as regards the prohibition of section

42B of the Act of 1955. He further submitted that the view of

the Tribunal is contrary for two similarly situated parties. He

also submitted that an FIR was also registered against Mr.

Mahesh Kumar Jain, wherein the police after investigation

submitted the charge-sheet and the cognizance has been

taken against him as regards the allegations of forgery. He

further submitted that the Power of Attorney on the basis of

which Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is claiming the rights over the

land, has already been cancelled by the khatedars in view of

the forgery committed by him. He has also referred the reply

submitted by the JDA wherein the JDA has admitted this fact

that the JDA has issued the public notice for regularization of

the land in question to the plot-holders treating it to be the

government land as no-one can made claim over the land in

question as any transfer of the land in the name of any

person who is not a member of the Scheduled Caste Category

is prohibited in view of section 42B of the Act of 1955.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the JDA in SBCWP

No. 6754/2022 additionally submitted that the order of the

Appellate Tribunal, JDA, is without jurisdiction as Mr. Mahesh

Kumar Jain is claiming rights for the acquired land of the

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khatedars. He further submitted that the Appellate Tribunal,

JDA, has no authority to adjudicate the validity of the

agreements. It is also submitted by the counsel that the

Appellate Tribunal, JDA has no jurisdiction to entertain the

appeal as regards the acquired land as the acquired land is

not covered under section 54 of the Jaipur Development

Authority Act, 1982 (for short ‘the Act of 1982’). It is also

submitted by the counsel appearing for the JDA that the JDA

has proceeded for regularization of the land in the name of

the plot holders in view of various circulars issued by the

State Government. He has also submitted that the JDA has

failed to consider the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10

CPC and the fact that the khatedars who are the necessary

parties, have not been impleaded as party respondents in the

appeal filed by Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain and therefore, the

appeal should have been dismissed for non-joinder of the

necessary party. It is further submitted by the counsel

appearing for the JDA that in lieu of the acquired land of the

khatedars, a reservation letter was issued in the name of the

khatedars only. He has also referred Rule 20 of the Rules of

1974 and further submitted that as per the provisions of Rule

26 of the Rules of 1974, the lease deed, which is not

registered, is not admissible in evidence. He has also referred

Rule 31 of the Rules of 1974 as regards the regularization

and further submitted that the khatedars have never objected

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the act of the JDA for proceedings of regularization of the

plots in favour of plot-holders.

7. Mr. Anil Mehta, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.

Yashodhar Pandey, Mr. Banwari Lal Sharma and Mr. Rahul

Vishnoi, in SBCWP No. 3740/2022 appearing for the

respondents No.3 to 6, who have been arrayed as

respondents vide order dated 03.04.2024 on an application

filed by them under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC submitted that the

alleged lease deeds were sought by Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain

on the basis of forged consent letter. He further submitted

that on the one hand Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain said to have

obtained the lease deeds on 03.09.2002 on the basis of the

consent letters of the khatedars but on the other hand he is

also serving a legal notice to the khatedars on 01.02.2003 for

a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated

10.04.2002, which clearly speaks in volume about the forgery

committed by him in getting unregistered lease deeds of the

land of the khatedars. He submitted that if Mr. Mahesh Kumar

Jain was legally issued the lease deeds on 03.09.2002 then

what was the occasion for him to serve a legal notice for suit

for specific agreement of the contract agreement dated

10.04.2002 which shows that the alleged lease deeds are

forged and invalid. He further submitted that in response to

the legal notice dated 01.02.2003, the khatedars replied and

denied the fact of the agreement. He also referred that in the

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appeal Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain has not challenged the order

of the cancellation of the lease deeds but only has challenged

the public notice issued by the JDA for regularization. It is

also submitted that the khatedars have also received the

consideration for the land in question.

8. Mr. R.B. Mathur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sandeep

Pathak, Mr. Manish Bhadiwal and Mr. Pramod Singh appearing

for Mahesh Kumar Jain submitted that the land was acquired

in the year 1991 and by an agreement dated 13.12.1995 the

khatedars alleged to have sold the land to the Roopwas Model

Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti but the said agreement is

notarized by one Mr. Anil Kumar Jain who on the said date

was not appointed as a Notary Public. He further submitted

that the another agreement is said to have been executed on

21.10.2005 in favour of the Samiti which is also notarized by

the same Notary Public Mr. Anil Kumar Jain. He submitted

that Mr. Anil Kumar Jain became Notary Public on

11.05.2004. He submitted that it seems that the first

agreement is an agreement prepared in a back date. It is also

submitted by the counsel appearing for Mr. Mahesh Kumar

Jain that the Metrocity Vikas Samiti has been constituted in

the year 2017 and therefore, the said Vikas Samiti has no

locus to file the petition. He further submitted that in a public

notice dated 27.04.2015 the name of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain

appears as lease deed holder. He has also submitted that the

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original khatedars executed a Power of Attorney and so also

the agreement. He further submitted that the original

khatedars have given a consent letter in favour of Mr. Mahesh

Kumar Jain for receiving the lease deeds for the land in

question. Counsel also submitted that this Court under Article

227 of the Constitution of India has limited scope.

9. Considered the submissions made by the counsels

appearing for the respective parties and also perused the

material available on record.

10. Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is said to have obtained the

alleged lease deeds dated 03.09.2002 which are unregistered

and on the basis of alleged Power of Attorney dated

02.08.2002 and the consent letter dated NIL. It has come on

regord that the alleged Power of Attorney dated 10.04.2002

(Annex.4 in CWP No.3740/2022) was cancelled on

19.08.2002 for which a registered letter was sent to him and

a notice was also published in the newspapers (Annex.9 in

CWP No.3740/2022). Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain also said to

have issued a legal notice to the khatedars for execution of

the lease deeds and for specific performance of the

agreement dated 10.04.2002 and the said notice was replied

by the khatedars denying the agreement. Once the Power of

Attorney, said to have been executed by the khatedars in

favour of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain, has been cancelled and

lateron he has also issued a legal notice on 01.02.2003 as

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regards the performance of the agreement dated 10.04.2002,

it could not be believed in a normal circumstances that some

lease deed was already issued in his favour on 03.09.2002

because if any lease deed has been issued in his favour then

there was no occasion for him to issue a legal notice for

specific performance of the agreement and creates doubt

about the authenticity of the lease deeds dated 03.09.2002

and thus, the JDA rightly cancelled the lease deeds.

11. Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is said to have obtained the

unregistered lease deeds on the basis of the consent letters

of the khatedars. It has come on record that the signatures

on the alleged consent letters have been found to be forged

when they were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for

verification. The lease deeds on the basis of which Mr. Mahesh

Kumar Jain is claiming the rights are dated 03.09.2002 and

they are unregistered. As per provisions of Rule 26 of the

Rules of 1974, the lease deeds must be registered.

12. Rules 20, 26 and 31 of the Rules of 1974 are

quoted as under:-

“20. Grant of sale deed. - Sale deed for the land

shall be executed by the Municipal

Board/Council/Corporation when the purchaser

allottee, deposit the full cost of land. The

possession of the land shall be handed over only

when sale deed has been issued to the

purchaser/allottee by the concerned Municipality.

26. Documentary evidence of transfer of land.

- For every transfer of land and conversion of

tenure and status of land from lease hold basis to

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free hold basis under these rules a document

evidencing the same shall be prepared in

appropriate form, as may be specified by the State

Government on the Stamps provided by the

allottee, purchaser or person who has applied for

conversion of status of land, which shall be signed

for and on behalf of the Governor of the State by

the Chairperson and Executive Officer of the Board.

The deed so executed shall be got registered, at the

expenses of the person in whose favour such deed

is executed, within four months of execution of such

deed.

31. Sale or disposal of Municipal land. - The

procedure for sale or disposal of municipal or other

lands vesting in or belonging to the Board not

covered by these rules shall be the same as

provided under these rules.”

In view of the aforesaid rules, the alleged lease

deeds on the basis of which Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is

claiming his rights, cannot be said to be the legally valid

evidence for the same.

13. The facts on record of the case speak that the land

was acquired and there was a Power of Attorney executed by

the khatedars in favour of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain. The scope

of the Power of Attorney was not to make transfer of land in

his name or to get the lease deeds of the land in favour of

him. After acquisition of the land of the khatedars, a

reservation letter for 15% developed land was issued in

favour of the khatedars and the lease deeds of the said land

could only be issued in favour of the khatedars but in the

present case Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is said to have obtained

the unregistered lease deeds in his name of the land for

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which the reservation letter was issued by the JDA in the

names of the khatedars on the basis of the alleged consent

letter of the khatedars. The signatures of the khatedars on

the alleged consent letter have been found to be forged.

14. No law permits transfer of land or the property

other than the mode specified in the Jaipur Development

Authority Act of 1982 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or

any other law. In the present case, Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain,

got the unregistered lease deeds in his favour of the land for

which a reservation letter was issued in the names of the

khatedars and this kind of transfer is not permissible.

15. The learned Appellate Tribunal, JDA, has not

accepted the claim of Metrocity Vikas Samiti on the count

that at the time of alleged agreement in favour of Roopwas

Model Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti, the land in question was

an agricultural land and in view of section 42B of the Act of

1955, the same cannot be transferred but has failed to

appreciate that Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain by filing the appeal

has challenged the public notice for regularization of the plots

in favour of the plot holders and at the relevant time the land

vested in the Government/ JDA and the JDA under the

scheme of regularization made by the government under

various circulars has proceeded for regularizing the plots.

Since at the time of the issuance of the public notice for

regularizing the land vested in the State Government, the

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provisions of section 42B of the Act of 1955 could not be

attracted. The learned Appellate Tribunal, JDA has failed to

appreciate the fact that Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain is not having

any vested right over the land in question on the basis of the

unregistered lease deeds which have also been cancelled by

the JDA and no prayer has been made in the appeal for

setting aside the cancellation of the lease deeds. Mr. Mahesh

Kumar Jain has only challenged the public notice for

regularization and that too on the basis of any legal valid

document.

16. This Court also finds some substance in the

submissions of the counsel appearing for the JDA that the

Appellate Tribunal, JDA has no competence to adjudicate the

validity of the agreements in between the parties. It is only

the Civil Court which can adjudicate the issue of validity of

the agreements. In view of this Court, the learned Appellate

Tribunal, JDA, has made observations as regards the validity

of the agreements beyond its jurisdiction.

17. By filing the appeals Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain has

challenged the notice dated 27.04.2015 and so also the

public notice issued by the JDA for holding the camp for

regularization of the possession of the plot holders. Mr.

Mahesh Kumar Jain has made a challenge to the notice dated

27.05.2015 whereby the alleged lease deeds said to have

been issued by the JDA in his favour has been cancelled as

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same were not in consonance with the Rules of 1974 and the

same has been obtained by submitting the forged letters of

the khatedars. A consent letter does not create any right in

favour of any person. Any transfer of the property has to be

in accordance with the procedure and by legally valid

documents under the provisions of law like lease deed, lease,

allotment etc. The Appellate Tribunal, JDA has failed to

appreciate this material fact that the alleged lease deeds in

favour of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain are not in accordance with

law and therefore, same are void ab initio and does not

create any right in his favour.

18. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/

appellant has raised an issue that in exercise of powers under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot

interfere in the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, JDA

as the grounds raised in the writ petitions are not covered

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Article 227 of

the Constitution of India provides for supervision of the High

Court over the Subordinate Courts. The writ petitions have

been filed against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal,

JDA, and therefore, the High Court is competent to make

scrutiny of the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal, JDA

19. On perusal of the findings and the observations of

the Appellate Tribunal, JDA, the Court finds that various

observations are contrary to each other. The Appellate

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Tribunal, JDA has passed the order in favour of Mr. Mahesh

Kumar Jain by holding his claim over certain plots which were

said to have been given to him in lieu of 15% developed land

for which the reservation letters were issued in favour of the

original khatedars i.e. Prabhu and Dhanna. Until and unless

the lease deeds are issued in favour of the khatedars in

furtherance of the reservation letters, there cannot be any

transfer of any rights of the khatedars. Mr. Mahesh Kumar

Jain is claiming that the JDA has issued the lease deeds for

15% developed land to be given to the khatedars for their

acquired land and for which reservation letters were also

issued. The JDA said to have issued the alleged unregistered

lease deeds on the basis of consent letter submitted by Mr.

Mahesh Kumar Jain. The signatures of the khatedars on the

said consent letters were found to be forged and therefore,

Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain cannot claim any right over the land

to be given to the khatedars on the basis of such forged

consent letter. The findings of the Appellate Tribunal, JDA that

on the basis of the agreements and consent letters of the

Khatedars namely; Prabhu and Dhanna, the lease deeds of

nine plots were issued in favour of Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain

and therefore Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jain has full rights over the

said land. The learned Appellate Tribunal, JDA has failed to

appreciate the conferment of the rights of Mr. Mahesh Kumar

Jain over the land in question. Thus, in the light of the

[2026:RJ-JP:6935] (21 of 24) [CW-3740/2022]

observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Suresh Chand & Anr.,

reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1879 the findings of the

Appellate Tribunal, JDA are perverse and contrary to law.

20. In case of Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs. (supra),

the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :-

“General Power of Attorney

18. A power of attorney is a creation of an agency

whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do

the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor,

which when executed will be binding on the grantor

as if done by him. It is revocable or terminable at

any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner

known to law. A General Power of Attorney does not

ipso facto constitute an instrument of transfer of an

immovable property even where some clauses are

introduced in it, holding it to be irrevocable or

authorizing the attorney holder to effect sale of the

immovable property on behalf of the grantor. It

would not ipso facto change the character of the

document transforming it into a conveyance deed.

19. A power of attorney is not a sale. A sale

involves transfer of all the rights in the property in

favour of the transferee but a power of attorney

simply authorises the grantee to do certain acts

with respect to the property including if the grantor

permits to do certain acts with respect to the

property including an authority to sell the property.

20. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Basant

Nahata, it was held that:

“13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially

governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By

reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent

is formally appointed to act for the principal in

one transaction or a series of transactions or to

manage the affairs of the principal generally

conferring necessary authority upon another

person. A deed of power of attorney is executed

[2026:RJ-JP:6935] (22 of 24) [CW-3740/2022]

by the principal in favour of the agent. The

agent derives a right to use his name and all

acts, deeds and things done by him and subject

to the limitations contained in the said deed, the

same shall be read as if done by the donor. A

power of attorney is, as is well known, a

document of convenience.

xxxx

52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of

the provisions of the Contract Act as also the

Powers of Attorney Act is valid. A power of

attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is

executed by the donor so as to enable the

donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases

where power of attorney is coupled with

interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise of

his power under such power of attorney only

acts in place of the donor subject of course to

the powers granted to him by reason thereof.

He cannot use the power of attorney for his own

benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act

of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter

between the donor and the donee.”

21. Further, the position of a power of attorney

with respect to conferment of title was explained by

this Court in the case of Suraj Lamp (supra), thus:

“20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of

transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in

an immovable property. The power of attorney is

creation of an agency whereby the grantor

authorises the grantee to do the acts specified

therein, on behalf of grantor, which when

executed will be binding on the grantor as if

done by him (see Section 1-A and Section 2 of

the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is

revocable or terminable at any time unless it is

made irrevocable in a manner known to law.

Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the

effect of transferring title to the grantee.”

22. Having discussed the position of law, it is

essential to peruse the recitals of the General Power

of Attorney, which is on record and pressed into

[2026:RJ-JP:6935] (23 of 24) [CW-3740/2022]

service by plaintiff. The said GPA merely authorises

the grantee to manage the affairs of the suit

property, which includes the power to let out the

property on rent, and create a mortgage of the

same, etc. However, it is silent on the aspect of

conveyance. Be that as it may. The recitals of the

power of attorney would indicate the intent of the

grantor is to limit the powers of the grantee to only

manage the suit property, and not to create any

interest in his favour, which is in consonance with

the settled position of law as discussed above that a

power of attorney is an agency by which the agent

derives the authority or the right to enter into

transactions on behalf of the principal. Even if we

accept the validity of the Power of Attorney in

favour of the plaintiff, still it does not confer a valid

title on him with respect to the suit property.”

21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in para Nos.16 & 17 of the

said judgment further observed as under :-

“16. xxxx

19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which

is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of

sale) would fall short of the requirements of

Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer

any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable

property (except to the limited right granted under

Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP

Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession

or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section

54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable

property can be made only by a registered

instrument and an agreement of sale does not

create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.”

17. In the instant matter, undisputedly plaintiff

claims that there is only an agreement to sell, and

there is no sale deed executed in his favour by the

father. As per the settled position of law, this

document does not confer a valid title on the

plaintiff as it is not a deed of conveyance as per

Section 54 of the TP Act. At best, it only enables

the plaintiff to seek for specific performance for the

[2026:RJ-JP:6935] (24 of 24) [CW-3740/2022]

execution of a sale deed and does not create an

interest or charge on the suit property.”

In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble

Apex Court, the petitioner cannot claim any right over the

land-in-question and certainly it is for the Jaipur Development

Authority to dispose of the land-in-question as per the

Government notifications and circulars.

22. In view of the discussion made above, the order of

the Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur,

dated 03.02.2002 is not sustainable and deserves to be set

aside.

23. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are allowed and

the order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Appellate Tribunal,

Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, is set aside.

24. The appeal Nos. 551/2015, 260/2015, 174/2020

and 180/2020, filed by the respondent-appellant before the

Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur are

hereby dismissed.

25. In view of the order passed in the main petitions,

the stay application and pending application/s, if any, also

stand disposed of.

26. The Registry is directed to place a copy of this

order in connected petitions.

(GANESH RAM MEENA),J

Sharma NK/Dy. Registrar