W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 1 of 17

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 02.09.2026

Judgment delivered on:16.09.2026

Judgment uploaded on:16.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010271562002

+ W.P.(C) 8345/2002

MGT.OF KIRORI MAL COLLEGE .....Petitioner

versus

POONAM DEVI & ANR. .....Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Applicant : Dr. Monika Arora, Mr. Subhrodeep Saha,

Ms. Anamika Thakur, Mr. Abhinav Verma

and Mr. Bhaskar Sati, Advocates.

For the Respondent : Mr. Jawahar Raja and Ms. L. Gangmei,

Advocates.

CORAM

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

JUDGMENT

1.The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India assailing award dated 31.05.2002 passed by the

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 2 of 17

learned Labour Court whereby the termination of the Respondent No.1

was held to be illegal and she was awarded reinstatement with full

back wages and continuity of services.

2.Briefly stated, Respondent No.1 was appointed as a Junior

Assistant on ad-hoc basis by the petitioner on 19.09.1989 and worked

at the said post till 18.12.1989. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 was

assigned the job of Lower Division Clerk with effect from 26.12.1989

and worked at the said post till 15.03.1990. Thereafter, she was

assigned the job of Junior Lab Attendant on 26.03.1990 and worked at

the said post till 31.05.1992 when her services were terminated by the

petitioner. The services of Respondent No.1 were terminated pursuant

to appointment of a regular employee on the basis of selection.

Respondent No.1 had also taken part in the said selection process and

appeared in an interview, however, she was not selected.

3.Pursuant to her termination, Respondent No.1 raised an

industrial dispute and the appropriate government made the following

reference to the learned Labour Court:

“Whether Smt. Poonam Devi has left the job after full and final

settlement of his accounts or her services have been terminated

illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management and if so, to what

relief is she entitled and what directions are necessary in this

respect?”

4.The learned Labour Court observed that the petitioner

terminated the services of Respondent No.1 in violation of Section

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 3 of 17

25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘ID Act’). Accordingly, the

learned Labour Court held that the reference was answered in favour

of Respondent No.1 and directed the petitioner to reinstate the

workman with full back wages and continuity of services.

5.Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed.

6.This Court vide order dated 08.01.2003 stayed the operation of

the impugned award.

7.Vide order dated 20.01.2004, this Court allowed the application

of Respondent No.1 under Section 17B of the ID Act.

8.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned

Labour Court erred in directing reinstatement of Respondent No.1

with full back wages and continuity of service without appreciating

the nature of her appointment and the circumstances in which her

services came to an end. He submitted that Respondent No.1 was

never appointed on a regular basis and was initially appointed on

different occasions to different posts on a purely temporary and ad hoc

basis, before being appointed as Junior Laboratory Attendant on

22.10.1990, again on a purely temporary and ad hoc basis till further

orders. He submitted that the appointment letter dated 26.12.1989

specifically provided that her appointment was purely temporary and

ad hoc for a period of three months or till such time as the post was

filled on a regular basis through advertisement, whichever was earlier.

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 4 of 17

9.He submitted that the services of Respondent No.1 were

brought to an end only after the post was filled through the prescribed

regular selection process. He submitted that Respondent No.1 herself

participated in the said selection process but was unsuccessful,

whereafter a regular employee was appointed to the post and her

temporary services were consequently brought to an end with effect

from 01.06.1992. He submitted that the petitioner had also paid

compensation to Respondent No.1, which was accepted by her.

10.He submitted that in these circumstances the termination was

covered by Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act and did not constitute

retrenchment. He submitted that the learned Labour Court, however,

proceeded to examine the applicability of Section 25F of the ID Act

without first determining whether the termination constituted

retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act. He

submitted that there was also no finding by the learned Labour Court

that the termination was mala fide, punitive or a colourable exercise of

power.

11.He submitted that termination of an ad hoc employee upon the

regular filling up of the post, particularly where the employee had

herself participated in the regular selection process and was

unsuccessful, does not amount to retrenchment merely because the

employee had completed 240 days of service. Reliance in this regard

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 5 of 17

was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Ramjas College v.

Presiding Officer & Ors. : MANU/DE/7155/2007.

12.Per Contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1 submitted

that the impugned Award calls for no interference in exercise of the

writ jurisdiction of this Court.

13.He submitted that Respondent No.1 had remained continuously

employed with the petitioner from 19.09.1989 till 31.05.1992, initially

as Junior Assistant and thereafter as LDC and Junior Laboratory

Attendant, and had admittedly completed more than 240 days of

service. He submitted that the mere description of her appointment as

temporary or ad hoc did not deprive her of the statutory protection

available under Section 25F of the ID Act. He submitted that

Respondent No.1's services could not have been terminated without

complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the ID

Act merely on the ground that she had not been selected for regular

appointment.

14.He submitted that Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act would apply

only where the workman had been engaged for a specific period or for

a specific work and the period had expired or the work for which the

workman had been engaged had come to an end. He submitted that the

mere use of the expressions “temporary” or “ad hoc” in the

appointment letter was not sufficient to bring the termination within

the exclusion contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. He

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 6 of 17

submitted that the onus was upon the petitioner to establish that

Respondent No.1 had been engaged for a specific work or for a

specific period and that the period or work had in fact come to an end.

15.He submitted that the petitioner had failed to discharge the

aforesaid burden and that, in fact, the management witness had

admitted in cross-examination that persons continued to perform the

very work which had earlier been performed by Respondent No.1. He

submitted that the aforesaid admission demonstrated that the work for

which Respondent No.1 had been engaged had not come to an end

and, therefore, the termination could not be brought within the ambit

of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. He submitted that the last two

appointment letters issued to Respondent No.1 also did not stipulate

that her services would stand terminated upon appointment of a

regular employee.

16.I have heard the arguments and perused the record.

17.At the outset, it is necessary to note that the scope of

interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India

with an Award passed by the Labour Court is limited. This Court does

not sit as a Court of appeal over findings of fact rendered by the

Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where the findings are

perverse, based on no evidence, suffer from patent illegality, or

disclose a jurisdictional error. Reference in this regard may be made to

the judgment in International Airport Authority of India v.

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 7 of 17

International Air Cargo Workers Union : (2009) 13 SCC 374 where

the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:

“47. It is true that in exercising the writ jurisdiction,

the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings

and award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore,

cannot reappreciate evidence. The findings of fact

recorded by a fact-finding authority should ordinarily

be considered as final. The findings of the Tribunal

should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely

on the ground that the material on which the Tribunal

had acted was insufficient or not credible.

48. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are

based on some materials which are relevant, findings

may not be interfered with merely because another

view is also possible. But where the Tribunal records

findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is

certainly open to the High Court to interfere with the

award of the Industrial Tribunal.”

18.Adverting to the merits of the present case, the principal

challenge raised by the petitioner is that, the contours of Section 25F

of the ID Act would not be applicable in the present case, as the

termination of the services of Respondent No.1 would fall within the

exception of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.

19.It is relevant to take note of Under Section 2(oo) of the ID Act,

which reads as under:

““retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of

a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment

inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 8 of 17

(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if

the contract of employment between the employer and the workman

concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or

(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-

renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the

workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated

under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or

(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued

ill-health”

20.It is well settled that when a workman is engaged for a specific

work or for a specific period and that the employment came to an end

upon expiry of such period or upon completion of such work, in

accordance with the terms of the contract, the same does not amount

to retrenchment and would fall within the exception contained in

Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. Reliance in this regard is placed upon

the judgment inS.M Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager : (2003) 4

SCC 27 where the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:

“13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme

or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of

sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:

(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of

temporary duration;

(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager

simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall

come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project;

(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the

termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the

terms of the contract; and

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 9 of 17

(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of

the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of

employment.”

21.Respondent No.1 was initially appointed on 19.09.1989 as a

Junior Assistant on a purely temporary ad hoc basis for a period of

three months and worked till 18.12.1989. She was thereafter appointed

as an LDC on 26.12.1989 on a temporary ad hoc basis for a period of

three months or till such time as the post was filled on a regular basis,

whichever was earlier, and worked till 15.03.1990. Thereafter, she was

appointed as a Junior Laboratory Attendant in the Department of

Mathematical Statistics on 20.03.1990 on a purely temporary ad hoc

basis for a period of six months. Upon expiry of the said period, she

was again appointed as a Junior Laboratory Attendant on 22.10.1990

on a purely temporary ad hoc basis till further orders. She continued to

work in the said capacity till her services were terminated with effect

from 01.06.1992 vide termination letter dated 29.05.1992.

22.A perusal of the aforesaid appointment letters, when read

cumulatively, leaves little doubt that Respondent No.1 was engaged

temporarily on ad hoc basis, and was extended from time to time,

while the recruitment of a regular employee was pending.

Significantly, the appointment letter dated 26.12.1989 expressly

stipulated that her engagement would continue only for three months

or till the post was filled up on a regular basis, whichever was earlier.

Thus, Respondent No.1 was conscious, from the very inception, that

her engagement was temporary in nature and that it did not confer

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 10 of 17

upon her any right to continue against the post once a regular

appointment was made. The subsequent appointment as Junior Lab

Attendant also continued to be on a purely temporary and ad hoc

basis. Materially, her services were ultimately brought to an end

pursuant to the appointment of a regular employee to the post.

23.Once a workman was appointed for a specific period on

temporary basis and was continued only till the regular selection

process was completed, termination upon appointment of a regularly

selected candidate would fall within the scope of Section 2(oo)(bb)

and would not amount to retrenchment.

24.The aforesaid position is also supported by the decision of a

Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ramjas College v. Presiding

Officer (Supra). In that case also, the workman had been appointed on

an ad hoc basis against a post and his appointment was extended from

time to time pending regular recruitment. The Court held that where

the appointment was made for a specific period and was continued

only till the regular selection process was completed, termination upon

appointment of a regularly selected candidate would fall within the

scope of Section 2(oo)(bb) and would not amount to retrenchment.

The Court further observed that merely because the workman had

completed 240 days of service, the provisions of Sections 2(oo), 25F

and 25H could not automatically be attracted without first examining

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 11 of 17

the nature and terms of his engagement. The relevant extract of the

same is reproduced hereinbelow:

“6 . The respondent was given appointment every time for specific

period. The appointment was being renewed after three months

because the process of selection of candidate on regular basis was

in progress and the ad-hoc appointment of the respondent was

made clearly with a notice to him that till the selection on regular

basis is done, the respondent may continue on ad-hoc basis. The

case is, Therefore, squarely covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) since,

the appointment was for a specific period and was co-terminus

with the selection of a permanent post. This fact is undisputed fact.

7. Where a person is hired on specific work because of exigencies

of work or pending the recruitment of regular employee, for a

specific period such a hiring is on contract basis. It was made

clear to the respondent by giving an appointment letter for a

period of three months that he was being hired only for a specific

period. The contract was renewed only till the regular

appointment was done and once the regular appointment was

done the respondent had no reason to make any grievance. His

termination was covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D.Act

and does not amount to retrenchment. The respondent himself

appeared in the interview for regular appointment and he could

not clear the selection criteria Therefore, was not selected. He

cannot make a grievance that an unfair labour practice was

adopted.

8. In Batala Cooperative Sugar Mill v. Swaran Singh

MANU/SC/2496/2005 : 2006 SCC 11, Supreme Court observed

that where a person is appointed on daily wages for a specific work

and for a specific period, Section 22(oo)(bb) of I. D. Act was

attracted and if after the specific work, the services are terminated,

it is not a case of retrenchment. In Punjab State Electricity Board

v. Darshan Singh MANU/SC/1755/2005 : 2006 SCC 64, Board had

appointed respondent as daily wager peon for a period of about

two months with clear understanding that as and when regular

employee joins, his services would be terminated. His period of

appointment was extended from time to time and his services were

terminated on appointment of regular peon. Supreme Court

observed that it was a case covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 12 of 17

Industrial Disputes Act, despite the fact that his appointment was

extended from time to time. In Kishore Chand v. Orissa State

Development Corporation MANU/SC/2048/2005 : 2006 SCC 241,

the workman was appointed as junior typist with effect from

12.7.1982 and he continued in the said post for more than one year

and then another order was issued appointing him for 44 days with

effect from 1.10.1983. On its expiry on 15.11.1983, another

appointment was issued for a fixed period and in this way, he was

allowed to work up to 3.5.1989 and thereafter his contract was not

renewed. The Supreme Court upheld the order of High Court

holding that it was a case covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of

Industrial Disputes Act. In Municipal Council v. Raju 2006 SCC

473, respondent was appointed as a typist on contract basis at

Octroi Branch where permanent employees had gone on leave. The

respondent gave an affidavit that his services may be dispensed

with by the Municipal Council at any time. The respondent worked

from 24.6.1994 to 2.3.1996 and 7.3.1997 to 21.5.1997 with the

Corporation and thereafter his services were dispensed with. The

question arose whether Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes

Act was applicable or not. Supreme Court observed that Section

2(oo)(bb) of ID Act was applicable even in such cases where the

employment is taken by a person for a short limited period knowing

fully well that he is liable to be terminated at any time. In

MANU/SC/0261/2003 : (2003)IILL J359SC S.M. Nilajkar and Ors.

v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, Supreme Court observed

as under:

The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or

project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of

Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:

(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of

temporary duration;

(ii)he employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager

simpliciter, which provided inter alias that the employment shall

come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project;

(iii)the employment came to an end simultaneously with the

termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the

terms of the contract; and

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 13 of 17

the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the

above said terms by the employer at the commencement of

employment.

9 . In MANU/SC/8652/2006 : (2007)1SCC533 , Gangadhar Pillai

v. Siemens Ltd. the appellant was employed by respondent on

temporary basis since 1978 for duration of project work as and

when required. He continued in service till 2000 due to continuity

of project and in 2000 his services were terminated with the

termination of the project. He filed complaint before Industrial

Tribunal contending that the respondent resorted to unfair labour

practice and sought regularisation of service. He also contended

that junior persons to him were regularised. The Industrial

Tribunal gave an award against him holding that the complaint

was unsustainable. The appellant's writ petition was dismissed by

the High Court on the ground that no unfair labour practice was

adopted by non-grant of status and privileges of permanent

employee to the appellant. The Division Bench also dismissed

intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal

holding that the issue must be judged from the entirety of

circumstances only because the employee had been engaged on a

casual and temporary employee for a number of years, the same by

itself may not lead to the conclusion that such appointment had

been made with the object of depriving him of the status and

privileges of a permanent employee.

10. I consider that the Labour Court fell in error in holding that

wherever 240 days of service were completed Section 2(oo),

Section 25(F) & Section 25(H) come into picture. The Labour

Court did not pay attention to the fact that the services of the

respondent were being extended every time for a limited period

for a specific reason that the regular appointment was to be

made. The moment regular appointment was about to be made,

no extension was given to the respondent. The respondent himself

had appeared in the interview for regular appointment. The

respondent raised an industrial dispute only after he was not

selected in the interview. It was not a case of retrenchment. The

Labour Court fell in error in holding it as a case of retrenchment.

Section 25(H) was also not attracted in this case. It is now settled

law that the state and instrumentalities of state must adhere to the

recruitment rules and ad-hoc appointments must not be made

unless very necessary. Ad-hoc appointments and thereafter their

regularisation has been termed as back door entry into the service

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 14 of 17

by the Supreme Court and has also been considered as violation of

the fundamental right of the general public at large who is

deprived of competing for the post.”

(emphasis supplied)

25.The reasoning in Ramjas College squarely applies to the facts

of the present case. Respondent No.1 was appointed from time to time

on a purely temporary and ad hoc basis, and the extensions of her

engagement cannot be viewed in isolation from the circumstances in

which they were granted. The appointment letters clearly

demonstrated that she had not been appointed against the post on a

regular basis. The regular selection process was thereafter undertaken

by the petitioner and Respondent No.1 admittedly participated in the

said process. Having participated in the selection process, she was

aware that the post was ultimately to be occupied by a regularly

selected candidate. She was, however, unsuccessful in the said

selection process, following which a regular employee was appointed

and her services were brought to an end.

26.The learned Labour Court, however, proceeded substantially on

the basis that since Respondent No.1 had completed more than 240

days of service, the protection of Section 25F would automatically

become available to her. In doing so, the learned Labour Court did not

adequately examine the nature and terms of her successive ad hoc

appointments or the circumstances in which her services were

ultimately terminated. In particular, the learned Labour Court failed to

appreciate that her appointment had throughout been temporary, the

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 15 of 17

same contemplated cessation of the engagement upon the post being

filled on a regular basis, and that she herself had participated in the

regular selection process but was not selected.

27.The fact that the last appointment letter dated 22.10.1990

described the appointment as being on a purely temporary and ad hoc

basis “till further orders” does not, in the facts of the present case,

warrant a different conclusion. The said letter has to be considered in

the context of the entire course of engagement rather than in isolation.

Respondent No.1 had initially been appointed for defined periods, had

thereafter been continued through successive temporary appointments,

and the petitioner subsequently undertook the regular selection process

in which Respondent No.1 participated. Her services were ultimately

discontinued only upon the regular appointment being made. The

circumstances, therefore, demonstrate that the temporary engagement

came to an end with the completion of the process for filling the post

on a regular basis.

28.Though it has been contended by the counsel for Respondent

No.1 that juniors to Respondent No.1 have been retained in service

and thus, it cannot be said that the work for which she had been

appointed is over and the exception under Section 2(oo)(bb) is not

applicable, the said contention holds no water. Admittedly, the

petitioner in accordance with service rules issued an advertisement

and subsequently appointed regular employees for the work for which

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 16 of 17

Respondent No.1 was engaged. Respondent No.1 admittedly took part

in the recruitment process and was unsuccessful, merely because other

candidates were competent enough to be selected could not mean that

Section 2(oo)(bb) shall not be applicable.

29.Consequently, the termination of the services of Respondent

No.1, in the facts of the present case, falls within the exception

contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act and does not amount to

retrenchment. Once the termination is held not to constitute

retrenchment, the conditions prescribed under Section 25F of the ID

Act are not attracted. The question of compliance with Section 25F,

therefore, does not arise.

30.The finding of the learned Labour Court that the completion of

240 days of service, by itself, attracted Sections 25F of the ID Act is

consequently unsustainable. The learned Labour Court was required,

in the first instance, to determine whether the termination in question

constituted retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo), and

thereafter examine the applicability of Section 25F. Having regard to

the nature of Respondent No.1’s appointment, the terms of her

successive engagements, her participation in the regular selection

process and the fact that her services were discontinued upon

appointment of a regular employee, the termination was covered by

Section 2(oo)(bb).

W.P.(C) 8345/2002 Page 17 of 17

31.Accordingly, the impugned award cannot be sustained and is set

aside. The present petition is accordingly allowed.

32.Pending applications (if any) also stand disposed of.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J

SEPTEMBER 16, 2026

DU